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Overview
My first working day at Norges Bank took place only two weeks after Lehman Brothers failed in
October 2008. The severity and the global nature of the financial crisis that followed the Lehman
default meant a steep learning curve, but also valuable experience. Furthermore, the crisis triggered
my interest in financial economics. I am grateful to Norges Bank for the opportunity to fully pursue
this interest and thankful to many of my colleagues for their encouragement to begin this project.
My thesis consists of six independent articles organized as chapters. Although independent in
nature, all the chapters are related to the impact of monetary policy, financial frictions and banking
regulation on financial markets.
The banking sector has been subject to substantial regulatory changes over the past decade. A
number of new regulatory requirements, ranging from increased capital buffers to higher liquidity
standards and new reporting requirements, have gradually been phased in over the past ten years.
These regulations have certainly influenced how banks are operating. At the same time, interest
rates have plunged to unprecedented low levels yet the pressure on monetary policy to stimulate
economic growth is larger than ever. As a result, some central banks have decreased the key policy
rate below zero, engaged in various forms of guiding to the market on future policy and extensively
expanded the central bank balance sheet to revive the economy. One lesson from the past decade
with various unconventional central bank measures is that central banks indeed have powerful tools
at hand with the potential to influence financial markets far beyond the short term interest rate.
In the midst of a new regulatory environment, the Libor benchmark rate, is at play. The Libor
benchmark rate has been a cornerstone in the pricing of fixed income products for decades and
serves as the underlying benchmark in financial contracts worth trillions of USD. After discovering
that the Libor fixing had been manipulated over a long period, the Wheatley report, and later the
Financial Stability Board (FSB), recommended to develop more stringent rules for the contributing
bank. This recommendation was accompanied by a recognition of a need to develop alternatives
to Libor. Recently, many jurisdictions have taken this a step further by recommending that Libor
should not only be complemented, but indeed replaced by the alternative benchmark rates. Along
with the measures taken by central banks, the transition to alternative benchmark rates have huge
implications for market functioning and pricing and indeed interact with many of the new banking
regulations in complex ways. In this thesis I explore some of the ways central bank measures,
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regulation and benchmark rates affect financial markets.
The first four chapters center around the foreign exchange (FX) swap market. The FX swap
market enables market participants to hedge the foreign exchange rate risk arising from currency
mismatch between assets and liabilities. FX swaps are characterized by deep market liquidity and
high turnover. Due to the liquid nature and the fact that an FX swap implies changing one currency
for another, this market responds fast to central bank measures across currencies and supply and
demand changes caused by regulatory constraints.
The FX swap price is theoretically pinned down by the no-arbitrage condition referred to as Cov-
ered Interest Parity (CIP). CIP has been known as one of the most reliable no-arbitrage conditions
in international finance. However, after the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, large and persistent
deviations from commonly used measures of CIP has puzzled academics, market participants and
policy makers alike.
Chapter 1, a result of joint work with Dagfinn Rime (BI) and Andreas Schrimpf (BIS), investi-
gates the existence of potential CIP arbitrage by borrowing and investing in short-term instruments.
Chapter 1 highlights that it is not arbitrary which money market instruments one choose when mea-
suring CIP arbitrage and the choice of interest rates should be considered carefully. An important
insight from this chapter is that measures by the central bank can have huge impact on banks’
marginal borrowing and investment rates. Indeed, when the marginal costs of conducting the ar-
bitrage is fully accounted for, only high quality banks face arbitrage opportunities. However, the
persistence of arbitrage opportunities for high quality banks is still puzzling. We highlight that not
only regulatory constraints, but also other institutional constraints make it possible for the arbitrage
opportunities for the high quality banks to persist over time.
In chapter 2, joint with Ganesh Wiswanath-Natraj (WBS), we exploit FX swap order-flow and
high frequency tick data to shed light on the price setting in the FX swap market. Guided by a small
model we empirically test the price impact of order flow and how order flow responds to different types
of information. The results suggest that the price impact of order flow has increased substantially
after the global financial crisis. Investigating the post crisis period more closely, we find that the
increase in price impact can mostly be attributed to periods of high funding heterogeneity in US
dollar and over reporting dates when regulatory constraints are tighter. We also find that FX swap
prices responds immediately to publicly available information like monetary policy announcements
without a systematic impact on order flow, while private information affect order flow that eventually
lead to price changes.
The third chapter look at potential real implications of deviations from CIP. Chapter 3 is based
on work joint with Ragnar Juelsrud (Norges Bank), Artashes Karapetyan (ESSEC), Filippo Ippolito
(UPF) and Jose Luis Peydro (Imperial). We exploit that Norwegian banks with access to US money
markets faced lower implicit funding costs in Norwegian kroner by borrowing in USD and exchange
for NOK with the FX risk fully hedged, compared to banks that borrowed domestically, during end
of 2011 and beginning of 2012. This is a violation of the law of one price saying that similar assets
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should yield the same return across currencies. Within a difference-in-difference framework using
granular loan and firm level data, we show that banks with access to foreign funding in this period
supplied more credit and charged lower interest rates.Using firm-level data we trace out the impact
of the expansion of credit on economic performance. We find that firms that borrowed from treated
banks increased their fixed tangible assets, and in particular capital and fixed financial assets. The
increase in borrowing from banks is driven by both an increase in short-term and long-term debt.
In chapter 4, I look at CIP in long-dated securities. This chapter builds on the insights from
chapter 1. Central Bank measures have resulted in massive liquidity injection in some currency areas
giving rise to large differences in liquidity premia across currencies. It is therefore necessary to use
interest rates that capture these differences accurately when measuring deviations from CIP. While
the results in chapter 1 suggested that some arbitrage opportunities remain in short-term securities
even after accounting for interest rates that capture marginal costs, this is not the case in long-term
securities. In short, my results indicate that the pricing of long term securities has been broadly in
line with CIP also after the global financial crisis.
In Chapter 5, I turn the attention to the benchmark reform and the implications of replacing
Libor. This chapter is based on joint work with Sven Klingler (BI). We are explaining the new
benchmark rates across currencies and comparing them to Libor. In contrast to Libor, which is
based on panel banks own assessment of uncollateralized funding costs across several maturities,
the new benchmark rates are based on overnight transactions. Moreover, the new benchmark rates
may either be collateralized or uncollateralized. We show that, depending of the nature of the new
benchmark rates, regulatory requirements and the supply of high quality collateral affect the rates.
We also pinpoint the issues connected to losing a term benchmark rate that includes liquidity and
credit premiums.
Finally, in chapter 6, joint work with Dagfinn Rime (BI) and Gisle James Natvik (BI), we
investigate the effects of conditional forward guidance on market participants forecast errors. Royal
Bank of New Zealand, Norges Bank and Riksbanken were all early adopters of forward guidance, i.e.
explicit communication of the future plans for the key policy rate. By communicating a conditional
path of the interest rate going forward, these central banks explicitly inform market participants on
actual policy going forward conditional on the assumptions of economic development. One important
reason for doing this is to give market participants more information about the central bank reaction
function. The question is if this information actually reduces market participants forecast errors, i.e.
the difference between the projected market rate and the actual realization. We find that interest
rates respond a great deal to central bank communication. However, the introduction of central bank
interest rate projections has done little to improve these responses in the sense of bringing them
closer to realized interest rates. Overall, central bank communication about future policy through
interest rate projections has played only a limited role in guiding markets in the case of Sweden and
Norway.
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1.1 Introduction
The persistent deviation from Covered Interest Parity (CIP) in major currencies, as some common
measures indicate, has been one of the most puzzling phenomena in international financial markets
in recent years.1 The concept of CIP builds on the principle of ‘no-arbitrage’—the most fundamental
mechanism in financial markets. It postulates that it is impossible to earn a profit by borrowing in
one currency and lending in another, while fully covering the foreign exchange (FX) risk. The pricing
in money markets and in FX swaps should adjust so that it is not possible to reap risk-free profits
(net of costs) on a self-financed strategy. Studying why a fundamental no-arbitrage relation such as
CIP breaks down offers insights into the functioning of some of the world’s largest and systemically
important financial markets and the constraints faced by the key players operating in them.2
When it comes to arbitrage the devil is in the details. Testing the validity of a no-arbitrage
condition such as CIP requires carefully accounting for the key costs and inherent risks in the
arbitrage trade. Obviously, accounting for transaction costs is important. However, as we stress in
this paper, it is even more important to account for the marginal funding cost the arbitrageur faces,
and to make sure the trade is indeed risk-free from the arbitrageur’s perspective. To understand the
phenomenon, we zoom in on the key players, globally active banks, and describe how their incentives
crucially depend on their funding costs.
Taking these considerations seriously in our empirical tests, we find that the no-arbitrage con-
dition implied by CIP does in fact hold quite well for the majority of market participants—even
though commonly used aggregate measures may indicate material arbitrage profits in recent years.
As we show in this paper, the set of potential CIP arbitrageurs is fairly narrow, but with some
high-rated globally active banks in a position to reap economically attractive arbitrage profits.
A situation with persistent arbitrage opportunities emerges as an equilibrium outcome in inter-
national money markets, when banks are heterogeneous in their U.S. dollar (USD) funding costs and
funding liquidity premia diverge across major currency areas. An implication of different funding
liquidity premia is that CIP cannot hold for different types of interest rates, e.g., both risk-free rates
like repo-rates or rates with credit-risk like LIBOR-rates. We provide evidence based on FX swap
order flow data consistent with such a market environment, and rely on issuance data on short-term
USD funding instruments to show that CIP arbitrage opportunities are difficult to scale.
Before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), Akram et al. (2008) found—based on carefully con-
structed high-frequency data from the interbank deposit market and taking account of transaction
costs—that any CIP deviations were too small and short-lived to give rise to economically signifi-
1See, inter alia, BIS (2015), Barclays (2015), Pinnington and Shamloo (2016), Du et al. (2019), Shin (2016), BIS
(2016), Borio et al. (2016a), Avdjiev et al. (2019), Arai et al. (2016), Duffie (2017a) and Debelle (2017).
2The key subject of study of this paper is the market for FX swaps—a derivative contract consisting of a si-
multaneous combination of a spot transaction and an opposite forward. FX swaps are traded OTC and are widely
used by market participants to facilitate cross-border borrowing and investment and to manage exposure to FX risk.
Banks use FX swaps for liquidity management in different currencies and the management of currency risk. By any
standards, the FX swap market is huge with a daily trading volume exceeding U.S. dollar 3.2 trillion (BIS, 2019).
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cant arbitrage profits. Since the onset of the GFC, however, sizable CIP deviations have emerged,
even involving some of the world’s most liquid currencies (such as the euro (EUR), the Japanese
yen (JPY) and the Swiss franc (CHF)). The breakdown of no-arbitrage during the height of the
GFC and of the European sovereign debt crisis—periods which saw price dislocations across many
asset classes—may not be surprising.3 However, e.g. Du et al. (2019) suggest that the anomaly has
been particularly severe during the much calmer period since 2013. This stands in contrast to the
above-mentioned pre-crisis evidence and (more generally) the basic principles of financial economics,
and has puzzled academics, central bankers and market participants alike.
To make progress in the understanding of the CIP puzzle, we address how the main arbitrageurs
would approach the question of whether it is attractive to enter into the trade. We focus on short-
term (1-week to 3-month) arbitrage opportunities for global active banks, which we consider to be
the arbitrageurs that matter at the margin. These banks operate in funding markets in multiple
currencies, have broad access to short-term risk-free assets (including central bank facilities around
the world), face constant funding/liquidity needs and can flexibly choose the cost-optimal funding
option.4
In focusing on implementable arbitrage from the perspective of global banks, our approach
deviates from the extant CIP literature in several important ways. First, we argue that it is critical
to rely on money market rates that adequately capture fluctuations in banks’ marginal funding
costs. Against the backdrop of significant structural changes in money markets over the past decade,
selecting the appropriate interest rates is not straightforward. There is a wide dispersion in short-
term borrowing rates faced by participants in various segments in U.S. money markets (as shown,
e.g., by Duffie and Krishnamurthy, 2016). Heterogeneity in funding costs (both across banks in
USD money markets due to credit premia, and across major currency areas due to differences in
funding liquidity premia) makes it impossible for a single FX swap rate to ensure that the ‘law of one
price’ holds for the full spectrum of short-term interest rates. Such heterogeneity was not present
pre-GFC as different rates lay virtually on top of each other, but has become a salient feature of
today’s money markets. Arbitrage incentives will hence differ substantially across banks and vary
by their marginal funding costs. The law of one price will hold for one set of market participants,
but not for others.
Second, we argue that it is important to treat the funding and investment leg of cross-currency
arbitrage trades differently. For the funding leg, it is no longer appropriate to look at interbank rates
3For this reason we exclude crisis episodes, like the GFC (2008-9), the euro-crisis (2011-12), or the recent Covid-19
crisis.
4To be clear, while we consider non-banks to also respond to CIP deviations, they are not the major players
that matter at the margin. Hedge funds, for instance, are dependent on bank funding (or prime brokered funding)
to arbitrage price dislocations. Banks generally avoid charging their own customers below their own funding cost
and hence would be reluctant to provide hedge funds with the leverage to profitably exploit any CIP deviations.
Real-money asset managers (e.g. pension funds, central bank reserve managers or sovereign wealth funds) can be
considered to be long-only investors and hence typically would not enter into leveraged arbitrage trades. Their search
for cross-border value in investment options will also respond to pricing in the FX swap market, yet such opportunistic
behavior cannot be regarded as arbitrage in the strict sense as it does not involve a full (self-financing) roundtrip.
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such as LIBOR. Activity in interbank deposit markets has dwindled due to regulatory changes and
excess liquidity created by central banks’ asset purchase programs (e.g., Schrimpf and Sushko, 2019).
Instead, it is necessary to turn to interest rates at which banks can raise wholesale money market
funding from non-bank investors. We focus on Commercial Paper (CP) and Certificates of Deposit
(CD), i.e. short-term unsecured funding instruments issued by banks that are typically held by
U.S. prime money market funds (MMFs) or other institutional investors. In today’s money markets,
these rates are better at capturing the marginal funding costs of banks. We show that for CP rates
(unlike for other interest rates), law of one price deviations are in fact fairly small—in stark contrast
to, e.g., interbank offered (IBOR) or also risk-free rates (such as Overnight-Index-Swap (OIS) or
repo rates).
Moreover, it is important to allow for the rate in the investment leg of the arbitrage strategy
to differ from that in the funding leg so as to ensure that the trade is truly risk-free. As riskless
investment vehicles we therefore consider both deposit facilities of foreign central banks and short-
term government securities (T-bills). All market participants have access to the latter, but only a
subset of globally active banks are central bank eligible counterparties and can deposit funds at the
central bank deposit facility rate. T-bill rates will typically decrease in response to demand pressure
generated by arbitrage, whereas the interest on reserves deposited at central banks is insensitive to
volume.
Based on this empirical setup, we find that risk-free CIP arbitrage opportunities do indeed exist
over our post-crisis sample period—but are confined to a small set of market participants. The
vast majority of banks around the globe faces prohibitively high marginal funding costs in USD.
Economically viable arbitrage opportunities are available only to those high-rated banks that have
access to direct USD funding at attractive terms and can invest at the deposit facilities of foreign
central banks. Such arbitrage opportunities are less attractive if short-term government securities
are the only risk-free investment asset available (given that their interest rates tend to lie below the
rate of remuneration on central bank deposit facilities).
Third, we study the main challenges for dealers of quoting FX swap rates against the backdrop
of imbalances in the demand and supply of USD in the FX swap market.5 Understanding the
incentives faced by these key market intermediaries is crucial to explaining how the pricing anomaly
arises and is not arbitraged away. We start by conceptually characterising the challenges faced by
FX swap dealers in a situation when funding liquidity premia in different currency areas diverge. A
situation like this has been an important feature of money markets in recent years due to the excess
liquidity created by the balance sheet policies of major central banks outside of the U.S. (notably
the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank and the Swiss National Bank). While unsecured
wholesale USD funding markets have remained costly and fragmented, with a large dispersion in
5FX swap dealers, the ones that actually set FX swap quotes, extract intermediation markups from the bid-ask
spread, but have strong incentives to balance customer order flow. See e.g. Evans and Lyons (2002) on how FX
dealers control inventory in the FX spot market. The basic principles also apply for simple derivatives such as FX
swaps or forwards.
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funding costs across banks, we show that funding liquidity premia have significantly compressed in
other key currency areas (in particular, JPY, EUR and CHF). The main reason for this divergence
has been the relative abundance of central bank reserve balances in the affected currency areas,
compared to the U.S. where the Fed balance sheet was no longer growing and even shrinking.
We then study the impact of imbalances in the demand and supply for USD in the FX swap
market—as captured via FX order flow—to gain a better understanding of FX swap market equilib-
rium and breakdown of CIP in this market environment. Relatively easier funding conditions outside
of the U.S. create strong incentives for market participants to obtain USD funding via the FX swap
market as opposed to raising such funding directly in U.S. money markets. To control inventory
risk and to keep a matched book, a swap dealer that aims to balance order flow from customers
needs to quote FX swap prices so as to incentivize flows in both directions. Consistent with this
mechanism, we find that the price impact of swap order flow is particularly elevated in situations
when the deviations from CIP are severe. By increasing the FX swap rate in response to net buying
pressure to obtain USD through the swap, the FX swap dealer can control inventory by making it
attractive even for banks of lower creditworthiness that have access to core USD funding markets to
supply those USDs in the swap market. This essentially involves the granting of arbitrage profits for
these counterparties. Importantly, the price impact of swap order flow is asymmetric. The impact
of net flow pressure to obtain USD is large and statistically significant; net flow out of the USD and
into currencies such as the JPY or the EUR, by contrast, only induces insignificant price changes in
the FX swap market.
These results indicate that situations with large CIP deviations tend to coincide with broader
funding constraints in U.S. money markets. Faced with the resulting demand and supply imbalances,
swap dealers revise their quotes to attract providers of USD to take the other side. As a consequence,
a confined set of market participants—notably, high-rated banks with access to core USD funding
markets—will enjoy arbitrage opportunities. To our knowledge, this is the first paper investigating
the role of order flow as a determinant of pricing in the FX swap market.
Finally, we complement the results from the order flow analysis by studying why such pricing
distortions and arbitrage opportunities can persist for some time. Our goal here is to better under-
stand some of the limits faced by potential arbitrageurs to scale up their positions. To this end,
we rely on transaction-level data for short-term Certificates of Deposit issuances in USD funding
markets. The pricing and availability of funding in these markets will determine how attractive and
easy it is for the arbitrageur to benefit from the CIP deviations. Our regression results indicate that
with reasonably large increases in issuance volumes, much of the CIP arbitrage profit quickly evap-
orates by the increase in USD funding costs. These results further support that funding constraints
in USD are important to explain the existence of CIP arbitrage profit for a confined set of market
participants and why these can persist.
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Related literature. The GFC has revitalized research interest in the validity of CIP. A first
wave of papers, e.g. Baba et al. (2008) and Baba and Packer (2009a), focused on the USD funding
shortages of global banks as a key driver of the relationship’s breakdown.6 Based on this research,
and more recently Bahaj et al. (2018a), a consensus emerged that the provision of USD liquidity via
major central banks’ swap lines with the Federal Reserve was instrumental in alleviating the USD
shortage and helped to significantly ease the CIP dislocation.
Our paper mostly relates to a second wave of research that seeks to explain why deviations have
been so persistent post-GFC—even in the absence of any obvious market stress. Du et al. (2019)
carefully document the price dislocations, stressing in particular the importance of bank regulations,
and suggest a causal link from regulation to CIP deviations. Sushko et al. (2016) highlight the role
of FX hedging demand. Cenedese et al. (2017) use trade repository volume data to study limits to
arbitrage and to study imbalances in the dealer-to-customer segment of the FX swap market. Iida
et al. (2016), Wong and Zhang (2018) and Wong et al. (2016) stress the importance of counterparty
risk.
Furthermore, our paper relates more broadly to work emphasizing the role of intermediation
frictions and the role of limits to arbitrage. Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) provide an equilibrium model
where intermediation frictions and segmentation effects can lead to the failure of both uncovered and
covered interest parity. The results in our paper are also linked to theoretical work emphasizing the
constraints faced by arbitrageurs in segmented markets (e.g. Gromb and Vayanos, 2002), frictions
in funding markets (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011) and slow-
moving capital (e.g. Mitchell et al., 2007; Duffie, 2010).
Finally, although our approach differs from other current papers, our focus on funding liquidity
differences across currency areas and heterogeneity across banks in terms of funding costs has an-
tecedents in some of the earliest work on CIP. Tsiang (1959), for instance, emphasizes that being
liquid in crucial currencies like the USD is valued differently than being liquid in another. Both
Tsiang (1959) and Branson (1969) stress the importance of heterogeneity across the banks that are
the key arbitrageurs in the forward exchange market. Following this tradition, we point to banks’
marginal unsecured funding costs as the main source of heterogeneity and ability to arbitrage the
CIP condition.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 lays out the main concepts and provides
some basic stylized facts going back to before the GFC, while the implied data requirements are
spelled out in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 investigates law of one price violations and CIP arbitrage in
international money markets based on a realistic assessment of marginal funding costs. It focuses
on the heterogeneity of banks’ borrowing costs in the commercial paper market and quantifies the
magnitude of riskless cross-currency arbitrage profits. Section 1.5 explores equilibrium dynamics
in the FX swap market from a dealer’s perspective in a world with segmented money markets and
6Other important contributions include Coffey et al. (2009), Gârleanu and Pedersen (2011), Goldberg et al. (2011),
Griffoli and Ranaldo (2010), McGuire and von Peter (2012), Bottazzi et al. (2012), and Syrstad (2014).
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divergence in liquidity premiums across currency areas. It presents results on the price impact of
order flow and explores the forces that impede arbitrage. Section 1.6 concludes. A separate Online
Appendix contains supplementary material.
1.2 CIP arbitrage: concepts and stylized facts
This section defines some key terms and provides an overview of relevant stylized facts. It also shows
that the choice of interest rates is a non-trivial, yet crucial, input for the study of CIP violations.
1.2.1 CIP vs. LOOP
We distinguish between two key concepts—the no-arbitrage condition known as Covered Interest
Parity (CIP) and the Law of One Price (LOOP). Our focus is on CIP, but to understand dynamics
in the FX swap market, it will be necessary to refer to LOOP as well.
Covered interest parity. CIP is based on the basic proposition that a self-financed, risk-free
arbitrage trade—borrowing in e.g. USD, investing in a risk-free asset in e.g. EUR, and using an FX
swap in order to ensure riskless conversion of the proceeds—should not yield any profits.
To exploit CIP deviations, the arbitrageur has to perform a full round-trip of trades:
1. Borrow USD for, say, 30 days, at rate rt;$ directly in U.S. money markets
2. Sell USD against EUR spot to obtain 1/St EUR; simultaneously enter a forward Ft, reversing
the currency exchange at a predetermined price in 30 days (effectively entering a FX swap
contract),
3. Invest the EUR at the currently available 30-day EUR rate rt;? in EUR money markets.





The (zero-profit) no-arbitrage condition defines the relation known as CIP. A requirement is
that all transactions (borrowing, spot, forward and lending) are made simultaneously and hence
the profits are known ex-ante (we therefore drop time subscript henceforth). The forward contract
removes the FX risk, and, if the interest rates in the investment leg are risk-free, this will amount
to a risk-free (self-financed) arbitrage trade. Arbitrageurs typically implement the spot-forward
combination via an FX swap since the swap market is more liquid than the outright forward market
(e.g. BIS, 2019).




(1 + r?)− (1 + r$) , (1.1)
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that is, the discrepancy between the synthetic interest rate implied by the FX swap FS (1 + r?) and
the direct interest rate (1 + r$). A higher basis, as defined here, corresponds to a situation where
the USD trades at a premium in the swap market compared to raising funds directly in U.S. money
markets.7
In reality, the arbitrageur will encounter transaction costs in form of bid-ask spreads. In the
example above, she will borrow at ask rates, lend at bid rates, buy spot at ask (EUR is the base
currency in EURUSD exchange rate), and sell forward at the bid. No-arbitrage then holds if the
borrowing rate (in USD in the example above) is equal or higher than the implied lending rate in










where the superscripts a and b symbolize ask and bid rates, respectively, and ra > rb.8
Law of one price violations. The basic law of one price condition in international money markets
implies that borrowing costs in similar funding vehicles should be equal across currencies. To assess
deviations from LOOP, we compare the direct borrowing costs in currency A money markets with
the implied borrowing costs (based on the FX swap market). The latter are given by the costs of
raising funds in e.g. U.S. money markets, converting the funds into e.g. EUR while at the same
time hedging the currency risk. While, in this paper we mainly focus on a funding perspective of
LOOP, one can also take an investment perspective by comparing the investment return in currency
A with that on a synthetic asset (i.e. the implied investment return based on currency B hedged
back into currency A).
There are some important differences between testing for LOOP vs CIP violations. LOOP
deviations represent an opportunity for borrowers to fund a given position in an asset more cheaply
by raising funds in another currency and hedging the FX risk via the FX swap market. In other
words, responding to LOOP deviations does not require an expansion of balance sheet, but is just
akin to a recomposition of the funding (or investment) mix. While some authors refer to this
as borrower’s arbitrage, we deem it more appropriate to characterize such behavior as exploiting
“relative value” opportunities. By contrast, exploiting CIP deviations leads to an expansion of the
arbitrageur’s balance sheet as the strategy needs to be leveraged, thereby requiring funding.
1.2.2 Stylized facts about international money markets
Akram et al. (2009) showed that CIP held closely in a pre-GFC sample when calculated using high-
frequency interbank deposit rates. These rates are of similar type as LIBOR-rates which were the
7We prefer to define the basis this way, given the more straightforward link to arbitrage strategies borrowing
directly in U.S. money markets. Note that other papers sometimes define the basis the other way around (e.g. Du
et al., 2019).
8For further details on measurement respecting all market conventions, see Appendix B and Online Appendix
1.A.
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common choice in prior tests of the validity of CIP. Figure 1.1 plots the basis using one-week LIBOR-
rates for GBP and JPY against USD from 2004. The figure confirms that the LIBOR basis was close
to zero pre-GFC, but that large deviations emerged after the GFC (as also documented elsewhere).
Prior to the GFC, the average 1-week LIBOR-basis was 2bp (Sterling) and 1.4bp (Yen) and hence
quite negligible. Post-crisis (after 2013), however, the same basis had risen to 12bp (Sterling) and
23bp (Yen) on average—a notable shift compared to pre-crisis.9
[Insert Figure 1.1 about here]
Prices of FX swaps (as implied by the so-called swap points) are determined by the dealers of
the large investment banks, aiming to earn the bid-ask spread from their intermediation services
while maintaining a balanced book (i.e. a zero overnight inventory). If the dealer does not succeed
in keeping inventory close to zero, funding has to be raised from the bank’s Treasury unit to cover
the imbalance. Such funds are not costless, but internally priced reflecting the banks’ funding cost.
What this boils down to is that the dealer generally cannot quote FX swap prices to counterparties
that would imply a price below the bank’s own internal funding costs.
The fact that the LIBOR cross-currency basis was close to zero before the GFC suggests that
banks’ funding costs over this period were closely approximated by LIBOR. However, after the GFC,
the interbank deposit market (i.e. the market underpinning LIBOR) is no longer a primary source
of term funding for banks. Figure 1.2, Panel (a), shows that the activity in U.S. interbank markets
has decreased substantially post-GFC.10 At the same time, dispersion in banks’ funding cost, e.g.
as proxied by dispersion in submissions to the LIBOR-panel, has increased notably suggesting that
LIBOR is no longer a representative rate that would uniformly capture major banks’ funding costs.
U.S. prime money market funds have strengthened their function as important marginal funding
source for banks, and Panel (b) shows that the U.S. Money Market Fund reform of 2016 was a
major impediment to this source of funding (more on this below). Hence, post-GFC it is critical
which money market rates are used to capture banks’ marginal funding costs and that dealers draw
on when pricing of the FX swap.
[Insert Figure 1.2 about here]
It is also interesting to take a longer-term perspective on the cross-currency basis for risk-free
rates, which are not exposed to the credit premia as embedded in unsecured rates such as LIBOR.
One type of risk-free money market rates are generalized collateral (GC) repo rates (where the
basket of possible collateral consists of U.S. Treasury securities), while another such rate are T-Bill
rates.11 Figure 1.3 plots the cross-currency basis calculated from repo and T-bills over the same
sample period and currencies as shown before for the LIBOR-basis.
9Small deviations in the LIBOR-basis can be attributed to the LIBOR being fixed at 11 am GMT while the FX
swap price is the closing price at 7 pm CET.
10Similar trends can be observed in other currency areas, (see,e.g. ECB, 2015; Schrimpf and Sushko, 2019).
11To be sure, T-bill rates are not capturing funding costs for arbitrageurs, but T-Bills are suitable instruments for
market participants exploiting LOOP deviations (from an investment perspective).
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[Insert Figure 1.3 about here]
What is notable is that the cross-currency basis using risk-free interest rates also shows con-
siderable deviations in the pre-GFC period—in strong contrast to the LIBOR-basis. Pre-GFC, the
1-week repo-basis reached 10bp (Sterling) and 12bp (Yen) on average, and it only picked up slightly
post-crisis to reach 14bp (Sterling) and 15bp (Yen) after 2013. In a similar vein, pre-GFC we ob-
serve LOOP deviations for T-Bills of magnitudes not too different from those in the post-crisis: 23bp
(pre-GFC) vs 15bp (post-2013) for Sterling, and 33bp (pre-GFC) vs and 39bp (post-GFC) for Yen.
Figure 1.3 demonstrates that deviations from the law of one price for risk-free rates are not an
entirely new phenomenon. The underlying drivers hence cannot solely be attributed to factors that
changed post-crisis (such as a tightening of banking regulation). One such factor that had also
been present then is the special investor preference for U.S. Treasury securities, due to their safety
and liquidity features. It is commonly accepted that this preference gives rise to a “convenience
yield” and a depressed U.S. T-bill rate (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012). And indeed,
already Tsiang (1959) in some of the earliest work on CIP, pointed out that if potential arbitrageurs
value assets with similar characteristics denominated in different currencies differently, e.g. due
to convenience yields, deviations from LOOP in international money markets can arise. A similar
argument can be applied to the repo-basis. Raising funds through a repo encumbers high-quality
collateral such as U.S. Treasury securities. Just like the T-bill basis may be non-zero because of
differences in convenience yield, the repo-basis may be non-zero due to cross-currency differences in
how investors perceive the collateral value of the Treasury securities.12 This means that there will
be a link between the T-bill basis and the repo-basis.13
The discussion above shows how important it is to use interest rates that capture arbitrageurs’
marginal funding costs when analysing CIP. LIBOR-rates used to fit this bill pre-GFC, but do not
do so anymore. Neither T-bill and repo rates capture banks’ marginal funding costs, and a law of
one price deviation observed for such rates does not necessarily signal the existence of a “free lunch.”
1.3 Data
Unless otherwise stated, we focus on the post-crisis period from the beginning of 2013 (after both
GFC and the euro crisis), a period of calm financial markets, where explaining CIP deviaions has
proven particularly challenging. The dataset ends in June 2017. Our study comprises the set of
most liquid currencies worldwide, that is, the Australian dollar (AUD), the Canadian dollar (CAD),
12We provide a more detailed analysis of trading strategies involving repos and another risk-free interest rate,
Overnight Index Swaps, in Online Appendix 1.D and 1.C.
13? illustrate this point by using repo (and reverse repo) rates for different currencies from a Eurex trading
platform where the collateral is of the same currency, i.e the funding leg involves a special repo where the collateral
is denominated in foreign currency. This approach in turn eliminates the difference in the financing costs across
currencies. They find that measures of law of one price deviations for repo rates based on the same collateral are close
to zero.
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the euro (EUR), the British pound sterling (GBP), the Japanese yen (JPY), and the Swiss franc
(CHF), all quoted against the U.S. dollar (USD). We consider three tenors: 1-week, 1-month and
3-month (with special emphasis on the 3-month tenor unless there are important lessons to be made
from the short tenors). These tenors are the most liquid and natural choices to implement CIP
arbitrage.
1.3.1 The funding leg of CIP arbitrage
Unlike in the textbook description of CIP, there is a plethora of money market rates faced by
different types of market participants and with very different characteristics.14 As shown by Duffie
and Krishnamurthy (2016), the dispersion across different types of rates has increased substantially
post-crisis. Against the backdrop of structural changes in funding markets and a large degree of
fragmentation, care needs to be exercised to select rates that most adequately capture the marginal
funding costs of the critical arbitrageurs in international money markets (i.e. global banks).
Neither LIBOR, repo or T-bill rates qualify as adequately capturing banks’ marginal funding
costs in the post-GFC world, as discussed in the previous section. Instead, money market instruments
such as Commercial Paper (CP) or Certificates of Deposit (CD) have emerged as the key marginal
sources of obtaining term funding for banks. CPs are issued with maturities up to 9 months, while
CD maturities can also be longer. These instruments are typically held by non-banks, such as
money market funds or other institutional investors, and provide a flexible way for banks to attract
short-term unsecured funding. There is substantial heterogeneity across banks’ funding costs in CP
and CD markets. High-rated banks (A-1/P-1 rating) pay significantly less for USD funding than
mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2 rating) or lower-rated banks.15
Our analysis of CDs also draws on primary market issuance data. We collect all USD CD
issuances with maturity close to 1-month, 3-month and 6-month maturity, giving us a large cross-
sectional variation in funding rates. However, this comes at the cost of slightly fewer time series
points as we only have data from issuances available. For our analysis of arbitrage profits, we hence
primarily use CP rates for which we have a more complete time series. The virtue of the granularity
of the CD data is that it allows us to study the dispersion in funding costs across institutions and
the relationship between issuance volume and funding cost. The dataset (obtained from Bloomberg)
includes issuances by most of the major global banks, with precise information on the date of
issuance, volume and yield.16 After filtering out non-rated small banks (mostly local U.S. banks),
and aligning our sample with the rest of our analysis (January 2013 to June 2017), we are left with
around 17,000 observations.
14Table 1.8 in Appendix A gives an overview of our data.
15Results for the best rating group, A-1+/P-1, are qualitatively similar to the results of A-1/P-1 and available on
request. We leave out this group for reasons of space and because it is a narrower set of banks with fewer observations.
Figure 1.7 in the Online Appendix compares results for A-1/P-1 banks to A-1+/P-1 banks. We refer to A-2/P-2 banks
as mid-rated as there are many banks with international operations with a lower rating (or no rating at all).
16CD issuance requires that the issuing bank be located in the U.S., either by subsidiary, branch or head office.
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Descriptive statistics for money market rates at the funding leg. Table 1.1 reports de-
scriptive statistics for 3-month CP spreads (for two rating categories) over OIS rates (Table 1.H.1
in the Online Appendix shows the same descriptive statistics for 1-week and 1-month maturity).
OIS rates are commonly regarded as a proxy for risk-free rates; they are insensitive to fluctuations
in term funding liquidity premia and thus cannot represent the marginal funding costs of the typ-
ical arbitrageurs when funding conditions change.17 For the sake of comparison, we also include
interbank deposits and IBOR rates over OIS rates in Panels B and C.
Table 1.1 Panel A shows that there are notable difference in funding costs across banks for
different rating categories, and across currency areas for the same rating category. For 3-month
USD funding, mid-rated banks on average pay about 14bps more than high-rated banks. Moreover,
the table shows that over the sample period USD funding was on average significantly more expensive
than funding in other major currencies (for the same rating bucket). The difference is especially
stark in case of the JPY: a high-rated bank can fund itself about 43bps more cheaply in JPY as in
USD markets—illustrating the difference in funding liquidity premia across the two currency areas.
Even though IBOR and inter-bank deposit rates are less suitable to capture banks’ marginal funding
costs post-GFC, the descriptive statistics shown in Panels B and C corroborate the picture of notable
differences in funding costs across currency areas.
[Insert Table 1.1 about here]
Time-variation in funding costs. Figure 1.4 shows the evolution of 3-month USD CP and CD
spreads over time. All spreads are positive, with the volume-weighted CD rates being more volatile.
The vertical line marks the implementation of U.S. Money Market Fund (MMF) reform on October
14, 2016.18 The reform can be considered as a severe disruption to USD funding—the drop in prime
funds’ assets under management in the run-up to reform implementation (see Figure 1.2b) effectively
led these funds to scale back on their provision of USD funding through purchases of banks’ short-
term debt. As can be gleaned from Figure 1.4, for both high- and mid-rated banks, the CP spread
increased notably in this episode. Given their reliance on CP/CD funding from MMFs, especially
non-U.S. banks saw a worsening of their USD funding situation. It is also important to note that
the funding strains in 2016 were exclusive to USD markets, but were not present in other major
17Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) contracts are derivatives that involve exchanging a fixed interest rate against a
pre-defined floating overnight rate. The instruments are used for hedging purposes, but not for raising funds. Since
the overnight rate usually contains a negligible credit risk premium (due to the very short term) and a majority of
central banks target the overnight rate, this rate is usually close to the key policy rate. An OIS contract does not
involve any exchange of the principal (as it is a derivative), only the net difference between the realized overnight rate
during the term of the contract and the agreed fixed rate. Figure 1.H.1 depicts the OIS-basis for the currency pairs
in our sample.
18MMF reform induced two main changes which made prime funds much less attractive for investors: i) a require-
ment to publish mark-to-market values of assets in contrast to the constant asset valuation previously used, and ii) a
possibility for the fund to impose a redemption fee of 2 per cent if the assets that can be liquidated within one week




[Insert Figure 1.4 about here]
1.3.2 The investment leg of CIP arbitrage
The main economic prediction of CIP is that risk-less arbitrage profits from borrowing and investing
in international money markets and FX swap markets should be zero (once the relevant costs are
factored in). In the analysis of cross-currency arbitrage in international money markets, it is therefore
important to choose interest rates in the investment leg that are risk-free. Obviously, lending rates
to other banks do not fulfill this criterion. Academic work on CIP deviations prior to the GFC
often considered unsecured rates such as IBOR for the investment leg of CIP arbitrage trades—a
perspective which is not warranted due to credit risk. We hence deviate from prior work on CIP by
considering an interest rate for the investment leg of the arbitrage trade that differs from that for
the funding leg.20
As risk-free investments, we hence turn to government T-bills (bid quotes) and central banks’
(CB) deposit facilities. The main difference between the two instruments is that the former is widely
accessible to all market participants (including non-banks), whereas the latter is only available to
the eligible counterparties of the central bank (i.e. banks). Moreover, the CB deposit rate is in
most cases unresponsive to the amount of reserves placed in the facility.21 By contrast, T-bill rates
fluctuate with changes in demand and supply conditions. Table 1.2 shows that the rate on T-bills
often lies below the OIS-rate and that the CB deposit rate is therefore relatively more attractive.22
[Insert Table 1.2 about here]
1.3.3 Swap order flow
Banks may turn to the FX swap market in order to try to benefit from low funding costs in foreign
currency, or try to exploit CIP arbitrage violations. From our high-frequency data from the Reuters
D3000 platform (similar to the electronic limit order book for FX spot), we match transaction prices
with bid and ask prices to infer if the initiator of the transaction was buying or selling USD at the
spot leg. From this we create a daily measure of swap market order flow as the net of USD buyer-and
19Figure 1.7 below presents CP-OIS spreads for other currencies and longer samples. These figures show a significant
compression in wholesale funding costs especially in EUR, CHF, and JPY when the central banks of the respective
currency areas significantly expanded the supply of reserve balances as a by-product of their balance sheet policies.
20In the funding leg, it still remains important to consider interest rates that are not risk free. Otherwise, the
relevant costs for the arbitrageur of engaging in the arbitrage are not adequately captured (see discussion in Section
1.2).
21In cases where the central bank has adopted tiered deposit remuneration (Bech and Malkhozov, 2016), we use the
lowest rate as an expression of the marginal remuneration rate. The more favorable rates only apply to a restricted
amount.
22For further discussion of cross-currency arbitrage based on OIS, see Online Appendix 1.C.
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seller-initiated volume at the spot leg of the swap (For further details see Online Appendix B).23 We
are, to the best of our knowledge, the first paper to study the impact of order flow on intermediaries’
FX swap market quotes.
1.4 Law of one price violations and CIP arbitrage
We now turn to our empirical study of LOOP violations and CIP arbitrage profits in international
money markets. In line with the main focus of our work, our analysis relies on money market rates
that are consistent with the marginal funding costs of the main arbitrageurs, i.e. globally active
banks.
1.4.1 LOOP violations in international money markets
As discussed above, LOOP deviations give rise to opportunistic behavior, e.g. to either directly
borrow in the target currency, or to fund in USD and swap into the target currency, depending on
what is more attractive in terms of cost. Previous research shows that in the post-GFC world, the
relevant arbitrage case has been to raise USD directly and swap into foreign currency (except for
AUD. See Table 1.H.2 in the Online Appendix for all currencies). Thereby the arbitrageur is reaping
the USD premium in the swap—arising from the USD being more expensive to borrow via the swap
than directly in U.S. money markets. Hence, we will focus on this particular case in the following.
Figure 1.5 illustrates that the choice of interest rates is crucial when analyzing LOOP violations.24
It shows box plots for the LOOP violations, over the post-crisis period (after 2013), averaged across
the three currency pairs for which we have CP rates (EUR, JPY and GBP, against USD). We distin-
guish between four different money market rates: IBOR, interbank deposits, OIS and CP rates. For
CP rates we look at the average across rating categories. For IBOR and OIS rates, i.e. interest rates
that do not adequately capture marginal funding costs, we observe economically significant LOOP
violations (vertical line inside bar) of around 15 basis points or higher on average over the post-crisis
period. However, the main takeaway here is not that there are some LOOP deviations for certain
interest rates (as also previous research has shown), but that LOOP violations are significantly lower
for interbank deposits and basically non-existent for CP rates.25 Most strikingly, in the case of CP
rates, we observe median deviations of only around two basis points on average in the post-GFC
period.
[Insert Figure 1.5 about here]
23Akram et al. (2008) analyzed high-frequency on pre-GFC data. In the post-GFC regime a daily frequency is
sufficient. Analysis of high-frequency swap rates gives similar results and is available upon request.
24See Tables 1.H.4 – 1.H.5 and Figure 1.H.2 in the Online Appendix for other maturities and for separate currencies.
25A main reason why violations based on interbank deposits are so small, compared to IBOR rates, is that quotes
of interbank deposits capture how banks are pricing funds internally, a common practice called Funds Transfer Pricing
(FTP). This important institutional feature is discussed in Online Appendix 1.E.
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The main reason is that CP rates—unlike some of the other money market rates—are better at
capturing banks’ marginal funding cost. An initial interpretation (further developed in Section 1.5
below) is that the price signals from CP markets serve as an important ingredient when swap dealers
set FX swap quotes. In contrast to OIS rates which are commonly regarded as proxies for risk-free
rates, CP rates additionally embed credit and liquidity premium components. Liquidity premia can
differ notably across currency areas. An important factor is the liquidity regime in which the two
central banks operate in, which in turn is determined by the relative supply of reserve balances
to the system. That the CP-based LOOP violation is much smaller than the OIS-based deviation
indicates that FX swap dealers draw on the former rates, embedding the currency-specific liquidity
premia, when setting their quotes in the FX swap market (i.e. the so-called swap points).26
1.4.2 CIP arbitrage in international money markets
We now turn to our main analysis of CIP arbitrage in international money markets. For simplicity,
our analysis in the following considers only arbitrage trades with direct borrowing in USD markets
and swapping into foreign currency, as opposed to the other direction (given that the latter is
not a profitable strategy. See e.g. Table 1.H.2 reported in the Online Appendix). Given the
discussion above, we split the post-crisis sample into the period before and after the U.S. MMF
reform. Although the MMF reform came into effect October 14, 2016, the major adjustments in
funding markets occurred already several months as prime funds’ assets under management dropped
substantially (see Figures 1.3(b) and 1.4). Thus, we determine the start of the MMF reform period
to be April 2016. This phase is a particularly interesting sub-sample and nicely illustrates changes
in USD funding costs as the marginal buyers of bank-issued CP/CD scaled back their presence in
unsecured funding markets.
Standard textbook treatments of CIP-arbitrage, e.g. Hull (2017), typically consider risk-free
rates in both legs of the transaction. The reasoning is that the theoretically correct discount rate
for a risk-free asset should be the risk-free rate. However, this argument rests on the ability to
encumber the asset of interest to raise funding at the risk-free rate in the funding currency, e.g.
as collateral in a repo. As discussed in Section 1.2.2, in a CIP-arbitrage trade the asset obtained
in the investment leg is denominated in a currency other than that of the funding currency. This
means that the trader cannot simply resort to the standard GC repo market in the funding currency,
but has to conduct a special repo using the foreign currency denominated asset (say a Japanese or
German T-Bill) as collateral to obtain the necessary USD funding. Doing so is significantly more
expensive than GC repos, though, where the collateral is denominated in the same currency as the
cash raised. Cross-currency collateral is more risky as it has different liquidity characteristics and is
26By contrast, LOOP violations based on (risk-free) OIS rates, that are insensitive to such premia, largely reflect
fluctuations in the relative difference in funding liquidity premia across two currencies. Based on this interpretation, a
widening of the OIS cross-currency basis is hence not necessarily an indication of arbitrage profits, but rather suggests
that the costs of USD term funding (relative to other currencies) have gone up. See Online Appendix 1.F for a simple
framework for identifying liquidity premium differentials, and how this measure varies with e.g. the OIS-basis.
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difficult/costly to re-use if the cash lender faces sudden liquidity needs in the currency provided in
the repo—again, a point that is most relevant for the USD given its special status in the financial
system. To compensate, a dealer will therefore charge higher haircuts and/or higher interest rates
for cross-currency collateral. Consequently, due to lack of available data on special repos, one way
two overcome this issue is to employ the unsecured marginal cost in the funding leg.27
For the funding leg of the arbitrage, we therefore use CP rates as these provide us with realistic
marginal funding costs for banks in the post-crisis market environment. As vehicles for the risk-
free investment leg we consider (i) short-term government paper (T-bills), and (ii) central bank
deposit facilities. Not only do these choices make sure that our analysis is in line with the basic
requirements for arbitrage—namely that the arbitrageur is not exposed to risk while reflecting the
relevant costs—but, the arbitrage strategies set up this way also bind little to no capital for banks.28
[Insert Table 1.3 about here]
Table 1.3 present results for 3-month CIP-arbitrage. Part I covers the first sub-sample, while
results for the MMF reform sample are presented in Part II (also see Table 1.H.6 in the Online
Appendix for other maturities). The left-hand panel shows CIP arbitrage profits with central bank
deposit facilities as investment vehicle, while the right-hand panel of the Table reports profits when
the funds are invested in T-bills. First, we consider USD funding costs by mid-rated (A-2/P-2)
banks in the CP market, swapped into foreign currency and invested into the T-bill in the respective
currency.29 Panel A of Table 1.3 shows that during the first sub-sample hardly any arbitrage profits
can be reaped for A-2/P-2 banks. For better-rated banks (Panel B), there are some arbitrage profits
for investments in CHF- and JPY-denominated T-bills.
Table 1.3 (left-hand panel) reports CIP arbitrage profits when global banks borrow in USD CP
markets and place the swapped funds in foreign central banks’ deposit facilities. Panel A of the Table
shows that in the CHF and the JPY some arbitrage profits have been available even for A-2/P-2
banks. These are fairly small in economic terms, though, around 1 and 4 basis points on average
over the post-crisis sample period up to the U.S. MMF reform. For the set of high-rated global
banks with good access to funding in USD markets (Panel B), the profits have generally been larger,
with economically viable arbitrage opportunities as large as 14 basis points in JPY and CHF.
27This is especially relevant when using the central bank deposits as the investment vehicle as they do not give the
trader any asset that could be pledged as collateral in the funding currency.
28The statement that a risk-free trade does not consume any capital may not be entirely correct in presence of
Funding Value Adjustment (FVA), Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) and Leverage Ratio (Andersen et al., 2017; Duffie,
2018a). However, in this paper we are considering short-term trades (up to 3 months), which are much less affected
by FVA and CVA. The FVA increases with the probability of default and loss given default. The shorter the maturity
of the funding, the lower is the probability of default. Two-way Credit Support Annex (CSA) agreements, which are
common among major market participants, significantly reduce both CVA and FVA in the FX swap. Only U.S. and
U.K. banks have been subject to Leverage Ratio requirements during our sample period.
29Note that A-2/P-2 rated banks (while being rated some notches below high-rated banks in their CP issuance)
can still be considered as fairly creditworthy institutions, relative to many other financial institutions that do not
have access to the CP market in the first place.
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It is noteworthy that arbitrage profits involving CB deposit facilities are much larger than when
investing in T-bills. The difference in median profit between the two investment vehicles is between
5 and 20 basis points depending on currency and which rating category one is looking at. It is
important to keep in mind that the rate of remuneration offered on central bank deposits is insensitive
to the volumes placed in the facility. Moreover, there is segmentation in the sense that only a selected
group of financial institutions has access to the deposit facility. On the other hand, the pricing of
T-bills adjusts to demand and supply imbalances. If a cross-border arbitrage opportunity combining
an FX swap and T-bills emerges, one would expect both the FX swap price and the T-bill rate to
respond to the corresponding arbitrage induced flow.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the time series behavior of CIP profits involving either Treasury bills (Panel
a) or central bank deposit facilities (Panel b) as investment vehicles. We average over EUR, CHF,
and JPY in order to highlight the cases with positive CIP profits, as evident from Table 1.3 above,
and use a two-week moving average to enhance the visibility of the key trends.30 CIP profits funded
by issuing CP are in all cases much smaller than what the cross-currency basis for OIS rates would
suggest. For high-rated and mid-rated banks that invest in Treasury bills, there are only few periods
with positive and economically attractive CIP arbitrage opportunities.
[Insert Figure 1.6 about here]
When central bank deposits are used as the investment leg, we see some prolonged periods
with profitable CIP arbitrage opportunities in EUR, CHF, and JPY (Panel (b) in Figure 1.6).
In particular, arbitrage profits pick up strongly in the run-up of the 2016 MMF reform—a major
disruption to USD funding markets, as discussed above, when prime MMFs receded as main marginal
lender in USD CP/CD markets due to shrinking assets under management. In this episode of
widespread funding strains in USD markets, the median CIP arbitrage profits available to high-rated
banks were as high as 30-40 basis points, as shown in Table 1.3 Part II. While this is economically
attractive, it is however much lower than the 80-100 basis points suggested by the OIS-Basis. During
this episode of strained USD funding conditions, even lower-tier banks have faced economically
attractive arbitrage opportunities, with riskless profits as high as 26 basis points on average (in
case of deposits with the Bank of Japan). Needless to say, however, that a pre-requisite for reaping
such profits has been to be maintain access to wholesale non-bank USD funding markets in this
challenging period, and for the bank to be eligible to the respective central bank deposit facility.
A natural reaction when presented with evidence of arbitrage is that some prices are measured
incorrectly and some additional costs or risks are not taken care of. Given our careful choice of inter-
est rates, one might ask if dealers for instance may embed a risk premium in their FX swap quotes
to guard against counterparty risk. The source of FX swap prices, however, is the interdealer market
where the use of two-way Credit Support Annex (CSA) agreements is common practice to govern
30Figure 1.H.3 in the Online Appendix shows that when averaging over AUD, CAD, and GBP, CIP seems to hold
as profits are primarily negative.
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the collateralization of the derivatives transaction. This means that both counterparties are obliged
to pay variation margin according to price movements. This effectively eliminates counterparty risks
and is the reason for negligible price differentiation in the interdealer market.31 As a consequence,
the FX swap prices used in this paper are the most appropriate to use for an arbitrageur.32
Interim summary. The empirical analysis above reveals the following preliminary lessons: (i)
deviations from the law of one price are either non-existent, or an order of magnitude smaller when
using marginal funding rates such as CP rates; (ii) for a large set of banks, either facing a lower rating
or without access to the relevant central bank deposit facilities, economically attractive profits from
CIP arbitrage are hard to reap due to elevated funding costs in USD markets. Even for high-rated
banks, risk-less arbitrage profits tend to be lower than what common measures of the cross-currency
basis suggest; (iii) during periods of funding strains in core USD funding markets CIP arbitrage
opportunities have been sizeable for those institutions that retained market access. We now turn to
a framework that can help us understand these empirical observations.
1.5 FX swap market equilibrium
The previous analysis begs a key question: How is it possible that risk-free arbitrage profits, even
for a narrow set of banks, can persist over such an extended period of time? To tackle this question,
it is important to study the problem faced by the key intermediaries, i.e. FX swap dealers.
Compared to the situation of no-arbitrage prior to the GFC, three major forces have altered
the FX swap market equilibrium post-GFC: (i) greater heterogeneity in USD funding costs across
banks; (ii) divergence in banks’ funding liquidity premia in the USD vs. major currency areas (such
as JPY and EUR), driven in large part by divergence in central bank balance sheet policies over the
period (notably QE); (iii) limited scope for individual banks to scale the arbitrage, in particular due
to quantity constraints affecting the price elasticity of the supply of USD.
These forces have created challenges for dealers that use their quote-setting behavior to extract
intermediation spreads while obtaining a balanced book. We argue that the “new normal” in FX
swap markets is characterized by an equilibrium where dealers face an incentive of quoting prices
that imply arbitrage opportunities and that in turn are traded upon. However, such an equilibrium
can only be sustained if arbitrage positions are not infinitely scalable. Hence, after discussing the
equilibrium in the FX swap market under the post-crisis new normal, we turn to empirical evidence
to shed light on the key mechanisms at play.
31While inter-dealer pricing is homogeneous, one can observe price differentiation in the dealer-to-customer segment,
in particular depending on the way the trades are collateralized.
32Hau et al. (2017) show that the pricing of FX derivatives transactions is highly homogeneous for active, sophis-
ticated, counterparties.
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1.5.1 Divergence in funding liquidity premia
A notable development in money markets post-GFC is that funding liquidity premia have evolved
differently across currency areas on the back of a divergence in central bank balance sheet policies
and the associated supply of reserve balances. USD funding conditions tightened as the Fed balance
sheet was no longer expanding from end 2014:Q2 onwards, whereas the size of balance sheets of
central banks in the euro area, Japan, U.K. and Switzerland expanded strongly, going hand in hand
with a commensurate increase in reserve balances. As Figure 1.7 shows, this has led to a situation
where for a bank of a certain credit rating, it became much cheaper to raise funds in major currency
areas outside of the U.S. (See also Figure 1.4 above and Figure 1.F.1 in the Online Appendix).
[Insert Figure 1.7 about here]
Such divergence in funding costs in turn has made it significantly more difficult for dealers to
quote a price of the swap (the swap points implied by the F/S ratio) so that the law of one price




1 + rf$ + c̃r$ + l̃p$
1 + rf? + c̃r? + l̃p?
, (1.3)
where rf$ + c̃r$ + l̃p$ refer to the level of some USD interest rate (r
f represent the risk-free rate, c̃r the
credit risk premium, and l̃p the funding liquidity premium). Prior to the GFC and central banks’
reliance on unconventional policies, liquidity premia l̃p (for different currencies) were relatively small
and roughly equal across currencies. If credit premia c̃r (for equally risky banks) were similar across
currencies, the same F/S could ensure LOOP for different interest rates (or credit premia).
Figure 1.8 illustrates the importance of diverging liquidity premia for the FX swap market. Panel
(a) illustrates how, in a normal market environment, a single swap rate can maintain the law of one
price (LOOP) for different funding rates. The two vertical lines indicate interest rate levels in the
two countries (“U.S.” on the left-hand side and “Foreign” on the right-hand side). For simplicity,
we look at three levels of funding rates faced by different banks in the credit spectrum (top, mid,
low) as indicated on the vertical axis. The slope of the curve connecting interest rates in the two
currency areas is the FX swap implied interest rate differential (as given by the F/S-ratio). If the
vertical distance between the different interest rates is the same, e.g. when risk premia are aligned
for equally risky banks, LOOP will hold for all levels of funding rates with just one F/S-ratio. The
absence of any LOOP deviations is indicated by marking the curve with zeros.
[Insert Figure 1.8 about here]
Now consider the case of a divergence in liquidity premia across currency areas. A main reason
behind such a divergence can be a large rise in the supply of reserve balances as a side-product
of large-scale asset purchases or FX interventions, in turn leading to a compression in marginal
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funding costs of banks domiciled in the corresponding QE economies (see, e.g. Jondeau et al., 2020).
In Figure 1.8 we assume that this leads to a drop as low as to the rate of remuneration of the central
bank deposit facility. Banks at the bottom of the credit spectrum benefit disproportionately from the
fall in short-term funding costs. An improvement in the ease of funding is akin to a fall in liquidity
premia, l̃p? in Equation (1.3). As discussed above, a key feature of the post-crisis new normal in
money markets has been that the relative funding liquidity premia have evolved differently across
major currency areas: USD liquidity premia, l̃p$, have typically been elevated, thanks in large part
to structural demand for USD funding by non-U.S. domiciled global banks. By contrast, the costs
of term funding dropped heavily in other currency areas where the respective central banks supplied
ample liquidity to the banking system as a result of their balance sheet policies.
Panel (b) of Figure 1.8 illustrates the impact of a compression in banks’ marginal funding costs
in one currency area, while those in USD remain elevated. The previous bank-specific marginal
funding costs in foreign currency, now in italics, are no longer binding in this situation. Instead,
the rate of remuneration of the CB deposit facility has become the effective marginal funding rate
for all banks (irrespective of credit-rating). The main reason is that banks awash with holdings
of reserve balances, rather than obtaining market funding, can simply run down their holdings of
excess reserves.33 Hence, the rate of remuneration of reserves held at the foreign central bank’s
deposit facility determines funding costs at the margin. The Figure shows that in this situation it
is impossible for an intermediary to quote a single FX swap rate to be consistent with LOOP (or
CIP) for the key money market rates faced by all banks in the credit spectrum.
The difference in funding liquidity premia across currencies is partly due to the special role of USD
in the global financial system as the world’s primary invoicing, funding, investment and settlement
currency (see e.g., Gopinath and Stein, 2018; Eren and Malamud, 2018). The USD money market
is by far the largest and most vibrant in the world and globally oriented non-U.S. banks tap this
market as the access to retail deposit funding in USD might be limited. However, these global banks
have ample access to deposit funding (and potentially central bank funding) in their home currency
(like EUR or JPY). Their enduring USD demand to finance USD assets can either be funded by
directly raising USD in core U.S. money markets or by local currency funding swapped into USD.
When the former type of funding becomes more difficult to obtain, it falls on the FX swap market
to fill the gap.
33In the real world, there are limits to this behavior, however, for several reasons. Central bank reserve balances
have become an important “asset” for banks to hold in the post-GFC money market landscape—in particular driven
by liquidity regulation, stress testing and more prudent liquidity management practices. Given their superior liquidity
characteristics, banks have revealed a preference of holding reserve balances over other liquid assets such as short-
term Treasury securities. This also explain why—despite a significant amount of reserve balances held at the Federal
Reserve—USD funding conditions tightened as the Federal Reserve started to gradually shrink its balance sheets
since Q2:2014. As banks’ demand for reserves has been more difficult to ascertain, determining the amount of reserve
balances that can been deemed truly to be in “excess” has become very challenging.
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1.5.2 Implications for dealers and order flow in the FX swap market
What does this imply for the main intermediaries in the FX swap markets, i.e. dealers? When a
swap dealer enters into a transaction with a counterparty, she/he has three alternatives: (i) attract
an opposite interest (matched book); (ii) fund the delivery of the currency as short as possible and
invest the currency received until opposite interest is found, which involves taking on some (short-
term) liquidity risk; (iii) fund the open position at the same maturity as the FX swap and invest at
the same maturity. A dealer typically has a strong preference for the first option. This is further
reinforced by internal overnight risk limits that effectively force the market-making desks to end the
day “flat”.
In the environment described above, any quote of FX swap points set by the dealer will imply a
profitable opportunity for at least one set of swap end-users. Imagine a situation where the dealer
quotes prices (i.e. swap points) such that the implied rate differential equals that between the USD
rate faced by high-rated banks and the foreign central bank’s deposit facility rate.34 It is clear that
such a quote cannot be an equilibrium rate because all banks with more costly direct funding in
USD could obtain USD more cheaply via the swap-market. The dealer would face highly one-sided
demand pressure for USD (indicated by arrows that point towards USD for the spot leg of the swap)
and would accumulate a large inventory.
To be consistent with equilibrium, the quotes of the dealer thus need to induce flows in both
directions. This is accomplished by setting the swap quote so as to imply an interest rate differential
such that LOOP holds for the majority of banks that account for the bulk of USD demand.35
Similarly as above (Panel (b)), banks with higher USD funding costs have an incentive to obtain
USD via the swap market (i.e. a response to a LOOP deviation).
In this “new normal”-equilibrium the necessary flows in the opposite direction are induced by
granting an arbitrage opportunity to those few banks with advantages in terms of USD funding
costs. Their low USD funding rates render it attractive to borrow in unsecured USD markets, swap
the dollars into foreign currencies and place the funds with foreign central banks (or other risk-free
instruments, e.g. T-bills). The implied flows supporting this as an equilibrium are shown in Panel
(d) of Figure 1.8 as arrows in both directions. The larger the divergence in liquidity premia, the
steeper is the slope of the curves in Panel (d) of Figure 1.8, and the larger is the CIP-gain if one
can invest in CB-deposits.
We argue that the main mechanism described above is also consistent with FX swap market
developments around regulatory reporting dates. As Du et al. (2019) forcefully show, there are
especially large basis-widenings around key regulatory reporting dates at quarter-ends and year-
34In Panel (b) of Figure 1.8, this case is indicated by the red dashed line connecting the foreign CB rate and the
low U.S. rate, marked with zeros to indicate no deviation from LOOP for the high rated banks (and hence no CIP
arbitrage).
35This is indicated by the solid red line marked by zeros in Panel (c) of Figure 1.8, connecting USD rates for
mid-tier banks with the rate on the foreign central bank’s deposit facility. Note that this quote implies a slightly
steeper FX swap-implied rate differential than the non-optimal alternative (‘dashed‘ line).
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ends. A key reason is that banks practice so-called window-dressing behavior close to reporting
dates aimed at fulfilling regulations tied to the size of the balance sheet. As we analyse empirically
in the next section, FX swap market imbalances are especially acute in such periods. To keep a
balanced book, dealers set FX swap quotes so as to incentivize arbitrage flow to offset strong demand
for USD liquidity.36
1.5.3 Empirical evidence
We now investigate the predictions of the above framework empirically. First, we show that the
pricing in FX swap markets responds significantly to swap order flow, suggesting that dealers revise
their quotes to avert inventory imbalances. Second, we present evidence that highly rated banks,
but not lower-rated ones, do in fact take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities. For this situation
to be consistent with an equilibrium, such arbitrage opportunities must be bounded, though. As a
third step, we present evidence of upward-sloping USD supply curves based on issuance data in the
USD CD market, suggesting that potential arbitrageurs face limits to scaling up their positions.
FX swap market imbalances: the role of swap order flow. As outlined above, dealers have
a primary incentive to quote FX swap points so that (in expectation) they face a balanced order flow
from their counterparties. Imbalances can arise in a situation of severe constraints in USD funding
markets, in particular when lower-tier banks face constraints to raise USD directly and need to turn
to the swap market to fill the gap instead. Such imbalances will be associated with movements in
swap order flow, i.e. flow into USD at the spot leg. Faced with such a situation, the swap dealer
will have to quote a higher swap rate (F − S), thereby implying a steeper curve in Figure 1.8, in
order to attract a matching flow of opposite sign. As outlined above, the opposing flow will come
from less constrained banks in the USD market (typically highly rated banks), who are in a position
to supply USD to the swap market. Consequently, our framework predicts that a CIP arbitrage
opportunity (a positive CIP deviation) will arise for highly rated banks in response to a positive
order flow imbalance.
To test this, we rely on panel regressions of the form
∆CIP devi,t = αi + γ · CIP devi,t−1 +Di,t · βswapOFOF
swap
i,t +Di,t · βxXi,t + εi,t, (1.4)
where we regress the change in CIP deviations for currency i on a measure of FX swaps order flow,
OF swapi,t , and a set of control variables, Xi,t. Order flow is standardized and measured so that a
positive number represents flow into USD at the spot leg and into foreign currency at the forward
leg. The regression also includes the lagged level of CIP deviation to capture the forces pulling
any deviations back to zero (akin to an error-correction mechanism). All variables capturing the
dynamics are interacted with dummiesDi,t indicating whether there is a deviation or not. This allows
36We discuss the role of regulations further in Online Appendix 1.G.
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us to capture that the variables may have a different impact during periods of arbitrage opportunities
than in more normal periods. As an extra control variable we use a broad spot FX USD index, as
suggested by Avdjiev et al. (2019), where positive changes indicate a USD appreciation.37
[Insert Table 1.4 about here]
Table 1.4 presents regression results for 3-month arbitrage profits involving CB deposits as in-
vestment vehicles (given less scope for arbitrage using Treasury bills).38 For each case, CIP arbitrage
profits are computed based on CP funding costs by mid-tier (A-2/P-2) and highly rated banks (A-
1/P-1). We find that the coefficient on swap order flow is positive and significant in all regressions,
confirming the intuition of our framework. A positive coefficient on the order flow variable suggests
that the demand pressure to obtain USD via swaps requires an increase in the CIP deviation.
The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients suggest that the price impact of order flow varies
depending on how severe CIP deviations are. Interacting order flow with a CIP dummy shows that
in orderly markets, with no deviation, only a small quote update of 0.17bp, for a one standard
deviation change in flow, is needed to curb an order imbalance. During periods when deviations are
observed for A-1/P-1 banks, a positive order flow imbalance signals to the swap dealer a worsening
of funding conditions in U.S. money markets. In this case, the dealer may expect further demand
pressure from lower-tier financial institutions to raise USD via the swap market. To cope with this,
a large adjustment in the quoted FX swap points is necessary to attract offsetting arbitrage flow
from highly rated banks. The price impact of 0.73 bp in Table 1.4, column (4) and (5), confirms this
intuition. By the same token, a positive flow (into USD at spot leg) observed in a situation when
also deviations for banks with lower ratings occur (A-2/P-2 in Table 1.4) serves as a signal of even
worse funding conditions. This requires an even greater adjustment in swap quotes by the dealer to
restore equilibrium, as indicated by the 1.1 bp price impact coefficient in column (1) and (2).
We also find notable differences in the price impact of swap order flow depending on whether
it is the USD or the foreign currency that is sought after. Column (3) and (6) of Table 1.4 show
the difference in price impact between flow into versus out of USD. Purely from a balance sheet
perspective, it does not matter for the dealer which way the order flow is. If the dealer cannot
match the order against opposite flow, she will have to finance the inventory position in the respective
currency. Potential regulatory constraints should therefore transmit into the same price impact of
order flow independently of the direction of the flow. In contrast, if funding constraints in USD
markets are more severe than in other currencies—or in other words, when funding liquidity premia
across currencies diverge—one would expect to see a larger coefficient for flows directed into USD
(demand pressure to obtain USD), but less so for flows directed out of USD (demand pressure to
obtain foreign currency). Our results clearly suggest that the latter mechanism is in play. The
37Alternative specifications, such as adding bilateral spot exchange rates, spot FX order flow, and our measure of
liquidity premium differentials as control variables, are summarized in Figure 1.H.4.
38Table 1.H.7 in the Online Appendix shows results from fixed-effect panel regressions for all maturities and the
Money Market Fund reform sample.
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coefficients indicate a strong price impact of 1.2 bp and 0.7 bp when the order flow indicates a
pressure to obtain USD. When the order flow indicates pressure to obtain foreign currency, we do
not observe a significant impact and the coefficient estimate is much lower.
Our regressions indicate that order flow emerges as a more powerful variable to explain CIP
arbitrage profits than the alternative variables we consider as controls. Estimated coefficients on the
USD index are positive, but small and only barely statistically significant. Figure 1.9 summarizes
the impact of swap market order flow, for different tenors, in periods of arbitrage. In all three cases
(1-week, 1-month and 3-month), the price impact of order flow is positive and significant. The
impact of order flow is higher for CIP profits by mid-tier banks, and it is also higher for shorter
maturities.
[Insert Figure 1.9 about here]
The impact of flow imbalances is especially powerful around regulatory reporting dates. As men-
tioned in the previous section (and further elaborated in Online Appendix 1.G), the costs involved
with carrying balance sheet over the end-of-quarter indeed generate fairly extreme outcomes in the
FX swap market (see also Du et al., 2019). In Table 1.5 we study 1-month and 1-week maturities, the
maturities most affected, and interact the price impact of swap order flow with an End-of-Quarter
dummy. Impact is about twice as large during the End-of-Quarter period (1 week (month) before for
1-week (-month) maturity) compared to other periods. These large price impact estimates reflect the
strong incentives for banks to swap liquidity-abundant currencies into USD around these periods,
while at the same time the supply of USD will be fairly inelastic. Faced by this demand/supply con-
stellation, swap dealers need to adjust their quotes of FX swap points even more to elicit opposing
arbitrage flow by top-rated banks.
[Insert Table 1.5 about here]
CIP arbitrage and central bank deposits. We now provide some evidence on the footprint of
global banks’ CIP arbitrage involving central bank deposit facilities. Our previous results showed
that the Japanese yen stands out as the currency with the most attractive CIP arbitrage opportuni-
ties, in particular when considering the central bank deposit facility in the investment leg (Table 1.3).
One would therefore expect the pricing in FX swaps and the CIP arbitrage profits available by in-
vesting at the Bank of Japan’s deposit facility to have indeed attracted arbitrage capital.
Figure 1.10 shows JPY cash holdings by foreign banks operating in Japan (green bars), as well
as the amounts placed in the deposit facility of the central bank (red bars). Panel (a) shows JPY
holdings by highly rated banks, while those of all other global banks active in Japan are depicted in
Panel (b). Blue bars represent the amount of net headquarter funding from abroad.
[Insert Figure 1.10 about here]
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As can be gleaned from the graph, highly rated banks have indeed bolstered their JPY cash
holdings with the Bank of Japan substantially in recent years, primarily by channeling funds from
their head office and effectively exploiting CIP arbitrage opportunities. Responding to the incen-
tives given the pricing in international money markets, yen holdings by high-rated foreign banks
have picked up especially since the introduction of the QQE (Quantitative and Qualitative Easing)
program by the Bank of Japan in April 2013. In Panel (a) we superimpose the annual average CIP
deviation that supports this interpretation. Figure 1.10, Panel (b), also suggests that globally active
banks that do not enjoy a top rating have increased their holdings at the Bank of Japan much less, in
contrast to their better-rated peers. This evidence is consistent with the prediction of the framework
above that banks with access to cheap funding in USD exploit the cross-currency arbitrage trade.
Limits to arbitrage scalability. Our previous results suggest that to arbitrage CIP deviations,
the burden falls on a confined set of highly rated banks to supply a significant amount of USD
in the FX swap market. What is preventing these banks from deploying even more capital to the
arbitrage? To study this question we turn to an analysis of certificate of deposit (CD) issuance in
USD markets. Descriptive statistics on issuance volumes are presented in Table 1.6.39
[Insert Table 1.6 about here]
Drawing on the CD transactions of individual banks’ with access to this funding market, Figure
1.11 depicts the corresponding profits from CIP arbitrage trades. A first takeaway is the large
heterogeneity in funding costs across banks: Even within the set of highly rated banks that do have
access to USD CD markets, there are quite a few that do not enjoy economically attractive arbitrage
opportunities given their elevated funding costs.40
[Insert Figure 1.11 about here]
To shed light on the scalability of CIP arbitrage, we study the relationship between USD funding
spreads (CD minus the OIS rate) and volume using individual CD transactions. Our goal is to test
whether the price of USD funding picks up as banks seek to place higher issuance volumes. To test
this, we rely on panel regressions of the form
rCDi,t,m − rOISt,m = β1 · CDvolumei,t,m + λi,t + αt,m + εi,t,m (1.5)
where rCDi,t,m−rOISt,m is the CD-OIS spread for bank i at time t with maturity m, CDvolumei,t,m is the
issued volume, λi,t is bank-time fixed effects and αt,m is maturity-time fixed effects. The standard
errors are clustered at the bank level.
39In our regression analysis below, we exclude issuances below USD 1 million to make sure that very small issuances,
in particular those issued by small U.S. banks, do not contaminate our results.
40Also note that CIP arbitrage profits appear slightly lower when we consider volume-weighted averages of CD
rates compared with baseline results using CP rates that do not take volume information into account (see Figure
1.H.5 in Online Appendix).
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[Insert Table 1.7 about here]
By including bank-day fixed effects and maturity-day fixed effects, we can control for economi-
cally important unobservable effects. Important unobserved time-varying bank characteristics that
may affect the banks’ funding costs can, for instance, be the perceived risk on different banks’
balance sheets. It also deals with the issue that longer-maturity funding spreads tend to increase
more when funding liquidity conditions tighten (i.e. the term structure of funding spread steepens).
Finally, we report the result for each of the maturities separately to ensure that maturity effects are
not driving our results.
Table 1.7 reports the results. We find that a USD 100 million increase in CD issuance volume
corresponds to a 1 basis point increase in funding costs.41 This means that for a given bank, at a
given date and for a given maturity, controlling for time-varying bank and maturity characteristics,
funding costs increase significantly by volume issued. This in turn suggests limited scalability of the
arbitrage trades. Turning to the maturity-specific estimates, our results indicate that the volume
effect is largest at the 3-month maturity. A USD 100 million increase in CD issuance volume
corresponds to a 2.68 basis point increase in funding costs. Results are quantitatively similar when
the sample is restricted to high-rated banks only.
One important reason why the USD supply curve is likely to be upward-sloping is that the
marginal investors in unsecured short-term bank liabilities, i.e. U.S. money market funds, care about
concentration risk and do not consider banks with different risk profiles to be perfect substitutes
for each other. For instance, if a high-rated bank increases issuance of short-term debt, typical
investors may not be able to meet this demand due to limits on the concentration risk posed by
large investments in specific issuers, even when the bank issuing the debt is of high quality.
1.6 Conclusion
The absence of arbitrage is the most fundamental mechanism in financial markets. Common mea-
sures suggest that CIP, a no-arbitrage condition once considered to be a cornerstone of international
financial markets, is broken. We argue that to understand the CIP conundrum, a new perspective is
warranted. In the post-crisis environment, characterised by fragmented USD funding markets and
a substantial heterogeneity in funding costs (both across banks and across currency areas), it is no
longer possible for the law of one price to hold for the full spectrum of interest rates simultaneously.
Careful attention needs to be paid to select the interest rates capturing the marginal funding costs
at which banks can borrow to set up the arbitrage position.
The main message from our paper is that the law of one price in fact holds remarkably well
for the majority of market participants when considering money market rates that reflect banks’
marginal funding costs. That said, we find that economically attractive CIP arbitrage opportunities
41Table 1.6 shows that USD 100 million is below the average amount of a CD primary market issuance. This Table
also shows that the largest issuances have exceeded USD 4 billion.
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do exist—but, they are confined to a few high-rated global banks. The key reason why CIP arbitrage
for these banks is profitable is favourable access to USD Commercial Paper (CP) and Certificates
of Deposit (CD) markets where banks can raise funding from non-bank institutional investors at
the lowest cost. Moreover, the fact that these banks operate globally gives them access to safe
investment vehicles in foreign currency, particularly central bank deposit facilities.
This raises the fundamental question of how a situation with riskless arbitrage profits, even if
only for a confined set of banks, can persist over a prolonged period of time. We show how such
arbitrage opportunities emerge as an equilibrium outcome as FX swap dealers set prices to avoid
inventory imbalances. Mid-rated banks find it attractive to turn to the FX swap market to cover
their USD funding, while swap dealers elicit opposite (arbitrage) flows by high-rated banks. The
price impact of FX swap order flow is particularly strong—and arbitrage profits greatest for high-
rated banks—when lower-tier banks have an incentive to turn to the FX swap market to obtain USD
funding.
Such arbitrage opportunities for a few high-rated banks can persist as the arbitrage positions are
difficult to scale. Drawing on issuance data for USD CDs, we show that funding rates adjust as soon
as arbitrageurs increase their positions, in turn significantly reducing profits. All in all, the evidence
presented in this paper suggests that the main paradigm of CIP—i.e. the non-existence of riskless
arbitrage profits after accounting for the risk and relevant costs incurred by the arbitrageur—still
remains largely valid in post-crisis financial markets, at least for the majority of market participants.
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Tables and Figures
Figure 1.1
IBOR-basis for GBP and JPY (1-week)








































Notes: The Figure shows the 1-week IBOR basis for Sterling (GBP) and the Japanese yen (JPY) vis-a-vis
the U.S. dollar (USD). Individual observations of the IBOR-basis are shown in red dots, while the blue solid
lines depict a smoothed series for ease of visibility (based on a 3-month moving average). The units are in
basis points. Positive values indicate a higher synthetic dollar rate (implied via the FX swap market) when
compared to the direct USD rate, or in other words, that foreign currency LIBOR swapped to USD is higher
than USD LIBOR. Black dotted lines represent the average basis in the periods up to and after the Global
Financial Crisis. The gray dotted lines on the vertical axis indicated points where the axis is broken in order
to ease presentation of extreme values. Sample is January 2004 — August 2017. Source: Bloomberg.
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Figure 1.2
Activity in U.S. money markets












(a) Activity in U.S. interbank markets














Assets under Management (lhs)














(b) U.S. prime money market funds
Notes: The Figure shows activity and major developments in U.S. money markets. Panel (a) shows the
evolution of weekly aggregate volumes in U.S. interbank markets. The sample period is from January 1975
until June 2017 and represents interbank loans issued by all commercial banks. The original source is the H.8
Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the United States released by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. The left-hand axis of Panel (b) shows the evolution of the assets under management
of prime U.S. money market funds in USD trillion. The right-hand axis shows the volumes issued by foreign
financial institutions in the U.S. commercial paper market (in USD billion). The vertical line marks the
introduction of the U.S. Money Market Reform on October 14, 2016, and the sample is January 2013 — June
2017. Source: St. Louis FRED database.
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Figure 1.3
Basis based on T-bills (3-month) and repos (1-week) for GBP and JPY


















(a) 3m Tbill-basis, GBPUSD



















(b) 3m Tbill-basis, USDJPY















(c) 1w repo-basis, GBPUSD















(d) 1w repo-basis, USDJPY
Notes: The Figure shows the evolution of the 3-month T-Bill basis and the 1-week repo basis for Sterling
(GBP) and the Japanese yen (JPY) vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar (USD). Individual observations of the respective
bases are shown in red dots, while the blue solid lines depict a smoothed series for ease of visibility (based
on a 3-month moving average). The units are in basis points. Positive values indicate a higher synthetic
dollar rate (implied via the FX swap market) when compared to the direct USD rate. Black dotted lines
represent the average basis in the periods up to and after the Global Financial Crisis. The gray dotted lines
on the vertical axis indicated points where the axis is broken in order to ease presentation of extreme values.
Sample is January 2004 — August 2017. Source: Bloomberg and Global Financial Data.
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Figure 1.4
U.S. dollar unsecured funding spreads (3-month)




















(a) CP-OIS and CD-OIS spreads



















(b) USD CP-OIS minus average foreign CP-OIS spread
Notes: The Figure depicts the evolution of 3-month unsecured funding spreads in USD in the post-GFC
period, as well as a comparison to the same spreads in major foreign currencies. Panel (a) shows spreads of
USD Commercial Paper (CP) over OIS rates for high-rated (A-1/P-1 rating) and mid-rated (A-2/P-2) banks,
together with moving average (10 days) of volume-weighted Certificate of Deposit (CD) rates, over OIS, from
issuances by high-rated banks. The units are in basis points. Panel (b) compares the funding spreads in USD
markets for a given rating category, to the same spreads in other major currencies; it shows the difference
between USD CP-OIS spreads and that of EUR, GBP and JPY (averaged across the three currencies) for
high-rated (A-1/P-1) and mid-rated (A-2/P-2) banks. The vertical line indicates October 14, 2016, the date
of the implementation of the U.S. Money Market Fund reform. Sample: January 2013 — June 2017.
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Figure 1.5
LOOP deviations for different money market rates (3-month maturity)






Notes: The Figure shows box plots displaying law of one price (LOOP) deviations, measured in basis points,
for different 3-month money market rates. Positive values indicate a higher synthetic dollar rate (implied via
the FX swap market) when compared to the direct USD rate. For ease of exposition, the average across the
currencies for which we have CP-rates (EUR, JPY and GBP) is shown and LOOP deviations for CP rates are
averaged across rating categories. Elements of the box plot are as follows: the box itself represents the first
and third quartile; inside the box, the mean is represented by a dot, while the median by a line; the shaded
area around the median represents the 95% confidence interval; the staples (end of straight line) represent












































(b) Invest in CB deposits
Notes: The Figure shows risk-free CIP arbitrage profits—averaged over EUR, CHF and JPY—for global
banks when funded via the issuance of USD commercial paper, swapping into foreign currency and placing
the funds in foreign Treasury bills (panel a) or the foreign central banks’ deposit facility (panel b). Funding
rates differ for mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2) and high-rated banks (A-1/P-1). In both panels we also show the
3-month OIS basis for comparative purposes. All series are smoothed with a 2-week moving average. The
vertical lines indicate October 14, 2016, the date of the implementation of the U.S. Money Market Fund
reform. Sample: January 2013 – June 2017.
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Figure 1.7












































































Notes: The Figure depicts the evolution of the spread between the 3-month Commercial Paper (CP) rate over
the 3-month OIS rate for two rating groups and four currencies. Rating A-1/P-1, which is used throughout
the paper, is compared to the even better rating A-1+/P-1. The sample runs from 2010 to June 2017. The
vertical line at January 2013 indicate the end of the period with the GFC and euro-crisis, and the beginning
of the sample for our main analysis.
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Figure 1.8






















































































(d) Divergence in funding liquidity:
Equilibrium swap flows
Notes: The Figure characterizes FX swap market equilibrium, by illustrating the link between various types
of interest rate differentials, swap rates and the direction of swap flows. The two vertical lines indicate the
interest rate levels in the two countries, exemplified by the “U.S.” (left) and “Foreign” (right). The curve
connecting the two interest rates is the FX swap-implied interest rate differential (in short, the “swap rate”).
Since all market participants face the same swap rate, these swap rate curves are shifted vertically. A red
line marked with zeros means that there are no LOOP deviations (Panel a). The solid lines represent market
rates, whereas the dashed line represents a hypothetical rate. The black line suggest a profitable opportunity,
and the arrows show the direction of swap flows in the “spot leg” of the swap (Panels b-c). Arrows from U.S.
rates mean a profitable opportunity by directly raising dollars in U.S. funding markets. In Panel (d), the
arrows from U.S. indicate a CIP deviation because the risk-free investment rate is higher than the implied
borrowing rate. The arrow to the U.S., however, indicates a LOOP deviation as there are no risk-free U.S.
investment opportunities available at higher rates than the swap-implied rate.
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Figure 1.9






















Notes: The Figure shows the impact coefficient, in basis points, of (standardized) swap order flow on CIP
arbitrage profits (funding in U.S. CP-rates and investing in CB deposits), conditioned on being in a positive
arbitrage state. Results are shown for three different maturities. Vertical lines indicate ± 2 × coefficient
standard errors, which are symmetric but truncated at the top if they reach outside the graph area. Regression
results are based on regressions similar to column (1) and (3) in Table 1.4. Coefficients measure the impact
of a one standard deviation change in swap order flow. See Figure 1.H.4 in the Online Appendix for other
regression specifications. Sample for estimation: January 2013 – June 2017.
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Figure 1.10
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(b) Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
Notes: The Figure shows the assets, measured in trillions of JPY, of global banks’ subsidiaries in Japan, for
different rating categories. Green bars show total assets, red bars are holdings of cash (held at the Bank of
Japan deposit facility), and blue bars show net funding by headquarters. High-rated banks (Panel a) are
rated A-1/P-1 (and include some with A-1+/P-1 rating), while Panel (b) is for all other banks. In Panel (a)
we superimpose the average CIP arbitrage profit recorded in June each year in basis points (on right axis)
from funding in CP rates and deposting the funds in the Bank of Japan’s deposit facility. Source: KPMG
Japan.
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Figure 1.11
Dispersion in CIP arbitrage opportunities (funded via CD issuance) across
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Notes: The Figure shows the dispersion in CIP arbitrage opportunities, when invested in central bank
deposits, across high-rated (A-1/P-1) banks given their heterogeneity in funding costs in USD CD markets.
Positive numbers indicate positive arbitrage profits. The dispersion is captured by quarterly box plots. The
box shows the first and third quartile of the data, together with the mean (dot) and median (line). The
vertical lines measure the distance to points within a range (1.5) outside the inter quartile range, while the
dots outside are defined as outliers. Panels (a-c) show CIP arbitrage opportunities when swapping to EUR,
JPY and CHF, respectively.
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Table 1.1
Comparison of money market spreads for different currencies (3-month
maturity)
Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs.
A: Commercial paper
Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
EUR 10.71 13.10 7.63 1,105
GBP 18.76 18.80 5.03 1,099
JPY -8.50 -7.12 15.32 1,054
USD 31.41 27.80 12.13 1,099
High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
EUR -0.22 0.10 5.68 1,104
GBP 8.51 8.01 3.84 1,101
JPY -25.73 -26.96 21.83 1,098
USD 17.00 12.37 9.39 1,099
B: IBOR interbank rates
AUD 20.97 20.90 8.21 1,171
CAD 31.94 28.08 6.46 1,130
CHF -11.36 -12.62 10.74 1,137
EUR 9.31 10.00 4.19 1,150
GBP 11.16 10.24 3.80 1,136
JPY 4.97 5.40 2.71 1,137
USD 18.45 14.56 8.22 1,137
C: Interbank deposit rates
AUD 49.26 50.00 18.27 1,173
CAD 30.44 25.40 14.33 1,174
CHF -1.78 2.85 16.19 1,174
EUR 12.73 12.90 5.43 1,172
GBP 28.05 28.00 11.47 1,173
JPY 3.34 6.20 10.98 1,174
USD 31.48 29.50 14.06 1,173
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for spreads between different 3-month money market rates
and OIS rates across currencies. Panel A presents results for Commercial Paper (CP) for high-rated (A-1/P-
1) and mid-rated (A-2/P-2) banks, Panel B presents for IBOR rates, while Panel C for interbank deposits.
All rates are measured as ask rates, and mean, median and standard deviation of spreads are expressed in
basis points. Sample: January 2013 – June, 2017. See the Online Appendix Table 1.H.1 for 1-week and
1-month tenors.
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Table 1.2
Descriptive statistics: Risk-free investment vehicles in CIP arbitrage
(2013-June 2017)
A. T-bills
Mean Median Stdev Obs
AUD 25.97 14.55 92.13 339
CAD -4.94 -5.20 4.87 1,146
CHF -2.35 2.45 16.11 1,125
EUR -10.81 -6.55 11.51 1,165
GBP 1.47 1.12 5.86 1,016
JPY -7.58 -5.29 9.13 755
USD -10.81 -10.31 4.72 1,173
B. Central bank deposits
Median Ave.change #change June 2017
AUD 2.25 -0.25 6 1.50
CAD 0.75 -0.25 2 0.50
CHF 0.75 — 0 0.50
EUR -0.20 -0.10 4 -0.40
GBP 0.50 -0.25 1 0.25
JPY 0.10 -0.20 1 -0.10
USD 0.25 0.25 4 1.25
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for risk-free investment vehicles in risk-free CIP arbitrage.
Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the difference between 3-month T-bill rates and OIS rates, ie.
iTB − iOIS . Panel B provides summary statistics on the remuneration on central bank deposit facilities. All
T-bill rates are measured as ask (offer) rates. The German T-bill rate is used for EUR. The SNB (CHF) and
BoJ (JPY) have a tiering structure for their deposit rates, meaning that not all reserves are remunerated at
the same rate. Sample: January 2013 - June 2017.
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Table 1.3
Risk-free CIP arbitrage funded via the CP market (3-month maturity)
Investment rate: Investment rate:
Central bank deposit facilities Treasury bills
Deviation Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs. Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs.
I: Post-crisis to beginning MMF reform period (Jan 2013 – Mar 2016)
A. Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
AUD -54.8 11.5 0 0 701 -47.7 81.8 0 0 222
CAD -20.2 7.0 0 0 783 -29.5 7.0 0 0 758
CHF 1.4 16.4 56 33 783 -12.8 11.2 14 4 762
EUR -22.0 11.9 7 1 780 -15.7 6.6 5 0 723
GBP -14.1 5.4 1 0 782 -32.0 7.7 0 0 745
JPY 4.6 14.8 68 55 781 -4.9 11.4 32 13 537
B. High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
AUD -43.8 11.4 0 0 701 -34.5 80.8 0 0 222
CAD -7.7 5.4 14 2 783 -16.1 5.3 1 0 758
CHF 14.2 17.4 100 97 783 0.6 11.4 53 15 762
EUR -6.8 13.5 34 26 780 -1.4 7.5 42 19 723
GBP -0.3 3.6 47 25 782 -18.7 7.4 2 0 745
JPY 14.2 14.7 100 100 781 6.0 11.7 90 77 537
Notes: The Table shows CIP deviations, measured in basis points, for an implementable strategy involving
unsecured borrowing in the U.S. money market. The sample covers the post-crisis period and prior to the
adjustment phase of the U.S. money market fund (MMF) reform (January 2013–March 2016). Positive
numbers represent arbitrage profits. The Commercial Paper (CP) funding rate differs according to two
rating categories, either high-rated banks (A-1/P-1) or mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). Two risk-free choices for
the investment leg are considered: central bank deposit facilities (left-hand panel) and T-bills (right-hand
panel). Columns give the median CIP arbitrage profit, the standard deviation of CIP arbitrage profits and
the proportion of days (%D) and months (%M), as 20 consecutive days, during the sample when a positive
arbitrage profit is observed.
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Table 1.3
(Continued) Risk-free CIP arbitrage funded via the CP market (3-month
maturity)
Investment rate: Investment rate:
Central bank deposit facilities T-bills
Deviation Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs. Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs.
II. MMF reform sample (Apr 2016 – June 2017)
A. Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
AUD -67.6 8.9 0 0 294 -50.1 9.2 0 0 111
CAD -29.5 6.2 0 0 316 -30.5 7.9 0 0 316
CHF 19.6 10.5 99 84 316 7.9 8.6 85 44 310
EUR 10.2 9.4 83 75 316 -11.9 8.1 3 0 316
GBP -7.1 7.2 13 0 315 -24.5 8.5 0 0 211
JPY 26.4 14.1 100 100 307 8.4 11.5 78 37 182
B. High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
AUD -52.3 5.9 0 0 294 -33.6 8.0 0 0 111
CAD -13.3 6.5 4 0 316 -13.8 7.5 3 0 316
CHF 34.8 13.2 100 100 316 23.4 11.0 100 98 310
EUR 25.5 11.4 100 100 316 4.4 8.2 71 27 316
GBP 8.8 8.9 85 52 315 -7.4 8.0 17 0 211
JPY 42.9 16.3 100 100 307 26.4 14.4 97 88 182
Notes: The Table shows CIP arbitrage profits, measured in basis points, for an implementable strategy
involving borrowing in the U.S. market. The sample covers the transition phase of the U.S. money market
fund reform from April 2016 – Dec 2016. Positive numbers represent arbitrage profits. The Commercial
Paper (CP) funding rate differs according to two rating categories, either high-rated banks (A-1/P-1) or
mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). Two risk-free choices for the investment leg are considered: central bank deposit
facilities (left-hand panel) and T-bills (right-hand panel). Columns give the average CIP arbitrage profit,
the standard deviation of CIP arbitrage profits and the proportion of days (%D) and months (%M), as 20
consecutive days, during the sample when a positive arbitrage profit is observed.
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Table 1.4
CIP arbitrage and FX swap market order flow imbalances
Mid-rated (A-2/P-2) High-rated (A-1/P-1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Error correction -0.035 -0.035 -0.036 -0.020 -0.020 -0.020
(-3.23) (-2.99) (-4.70) (-2.12) (-1.97) (-2.52)
Swap OF, in arb. 1.116 1.138 0.733 0.743
(2.64) (2.61) (2.77) (2.75)
Pos. Swap OF, in arb. 1.215 0.714
(3.59) (3.55)
Neg. Swap OF, in arb. 1.019 0.782
(0.94) (1.25)
Swap OF, no arb. 0.172 0.182 0.181 0.192 0.215 0.215
(3.95) (4.10) (4.09) (5.03) (5.45) (5.44)
Dollar index, in arb. 0.008 0.008 0.014 0.014
(1.43) (1.42) (3.10) (3.07)
Dollar index, no arb. 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
(1.50) (1.50) (1.95) (1.94)
Lagged ∆CIP -0.186 -0.203 -0.204 -0.107 -0.127 -0.127
(-3.51) (-4.16) (-4.25) (-1.50) (-2.01) (-2.11)
Obs. 5,969 5,569 5,569 5,969 5,569 5,569
adj.R2 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.08
Notes: The Table shows results from panel regressions of changes in 3-month CIP deviations on FX swap
order flow, across six different currencies. CIP deviations are based on an arbitrage strategy funded in the
U.S. Commercial Paper market for either mid-rated (A-2/P-2) or high-rated (A-1/P-1) banks and measured
in basis points. The constant (not reported) and error-correction term (lagged level of CIP deviation) have
constant coefficients across deviation regimes, while the other explanatory variables are allowed to have
different effects, depending on dummy variable capturing whether a profitable CIP arbitrage (arb) exists
or not. Swap order flow is standardized by its standard deviation, while the broad dollar index return is
measured in basis points. Columns (3) and (6) add a dummy variable to the specification depending on
whether order flow is positive (into USD at spot leg) or not. Robust t-statistics (cross-sectional clustering)
are reported in parenthesis below coefficient estimates. Sample: January 2013 – June 2017.
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Table 1.5
CIP arbitrage, FX swap order flow market imbalances, and End-of-Quarter
effects
1-month 1-week
A-2/P-2 A-1/P-1 A-2/P-2 A-1/P-1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error correction -0.046 -0.028 -0.198 -0.146
(-2.58) (-2.28) (-3.73) (-2.26)
Swap OF
In arb EoQ 1.771 1.998 7.839 9.831
(4.15) (4.65) (3.53) (4.07)
In arb Not EoQ 1.010 0.907 3.771 2.897
(4.26) (6.40) (3.96) (3.53)
No arb EoQ 1.318 1.100 8.200 2.111
(1.28) (2.46) (11.25) (5.35)
No arb Not EoQ 0.284 0.169 0.724 0.847
(1.28) (2.62) (2.34) (2.07)
Dollar index
In arb EoQ 0.078 0.071 0.389 0.461
(2.92) (3.13) (6.89) (2.78)
In arb Not EoQ -0.018 0.002 -0.002 0.011
(-1.33) (0.26) (-0.07) (0.38)
No arb EoQ 0.010 0.004 -0.022 0.015
(0.64) (0.37) (-0.35) (0.15)
No arb Not EoQ -0.024 -0.006 0.003 0.009
(-2.01) (-0.68) (0.25) (0.62)
Lagged ∆CIP -0.207 -0.061 0.018 0.044
(-4.46) (-1.36) (0.25) (0.56)
Obs. 1,648 1,648 1,631 1,408
Adj.R2 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.11
Notes: The Table shows results from panel regressions of changes in CIP deviations (1-month and 1-week
maturity) on FX swap order flow, across six different currencies, for the MMF reform period. CIP deviations
are based on an arbitrage strategy funded in the U.S. Commercial Paper market for banks with either A-2/P-
2 rating or high-rated banks with A-1/P-1-rating and measured in basis points. The constant (not reported)
and error-correction terms (lagged level of CIP deviation) have constant coefficients across deviation regimes,
while the other explanatory variables are allowed to have different effects, depending on dummy variables
capturing whether a profitable CIP arbitrage exists or not (arb), or if it is in an End-of-Quarter (EoQ)
period. End-of-quarter effects start 1-week (1-month) before for a 1-week (1-month) tenor. Swap order flow
is standardized by its standard deviation, while the broad dollar index return is measured in basis points.
Positive order flow implies a buying pressure of USD at the spot leg of the swap. Robust t-statistics (cross-




Descriptive statistics on issuance volume of USD Certificates of Deposit (mio
USD)
Total Mean Std.Dev. Max Obs
Aggregate (average) 84,179 134 172 1,268 1,215
Small countries (average) 6,704 77 85 354 209
Canada 388,332 268 306 1,930 1,449
Japan 343,026 153 188 2,730 2,242
USA 291,785 20 67 1,400 14,887
China 250,944 40 59 600 6,353
Hong Kong 211,500 100 168 1,700 2,115
Switzerland 187,590 390 522 4,550 481
Sweden 155,805 255 277 1,600 611
France 91,875 175 199 3,200 525
Netherlands 77,724 306 355 1,960 254
United Kingdom 72,800 182 232 1,610 400
Germany 68,392 332 565 4,640 206
Australia 32,500 250 426 3,000 130
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for issuance volume of Certificates of Deposit (CD) in USD.
The first row presents aggregate numbers across all countries, while the 10 countries with the largest total
issuances are presented in the following rows. Sample: January 2013 – June 2017.
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Table 1.7
Impact of CD issuances on USD funding costs
All banks High-rated banks
Maturity
All All 3-month 6-month All All 3-month 6-month
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Amount Issued 1.05 0.85 2.68 0.75 0.91 0.86 3.40 0.69
(2.98) (2.11) (1.96) (2.42) (2.89) (2.42) (2.15) (2.01)
Fixed effects:
Bank × day X X X X X X
Maturity × day X X X X
Bank × month X X
Obs 8,283 15,449 2,623 3,203 3,581 8,015 1,190 1,340
Notes: The Table presents panel regressions for the impact of CD issuance volume on the CD-OIS spread.
Maturities included are 1-month, 3-month and 6-month. All issuances considered are larger than USD 1mio.
Coefficients measure impact in basis points for a 100 mio USD issue. t-values, based on standard errors
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1.A Equations for LOOP and CIP calculations
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) is typically, in a simplified way, expressed as
1 + rd =
1
S
(1 + rf )F, (1.6)
where rd and rf are domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively, and S and F are spot and
forward rates, expressed in units of domestic currency for a foreign currency, and the forward contract
has the same maturity as the interest rates. This equation is obviously a simplification since it
disregards that prices come with a bid-ask spread, ie. differ if one borrows (ask-rates) or lends
(bid-rates), or buys (ask) or sells (bid) currency.
CIP is typically thought of as an arbitrage, i.e a self-financing round-trip. We can also use
it to compare two borrowing (or lending) rates, in which case we are studying the Law of One
Price (LOOP) as discussed in Section 1.4. Furthermore, one has to consider whether one takes the
perspective of domestic borrowing, in which case one buys spot and sells forward, or vice versa in
the case of foreign borrowing. LOOP is a weaker condition than CIP (Akram et al., 2009).
1.A.1 CIP: Round-trip arbitrage
Taking bid-ask prices into account, represented by b and a superscripts, respectively, CIP is not
violated if the following conditions hold:
(1 + rad) >
F b
Sa
(1 + rbf ), (1.7)
(1 + raf ) >
Sb
F a
(1 + rbd). (1.8)
Using swap rates instead of forward rates, represented by F b − Sa and F a − Sb for bid and ask
swap rates, respectively, then a positive arbitrage Dev is given by,








where the arbitrage superscript comes from the superscript on the forward leg of the swap (i.e, Deva
in the case of USDJPY means buying USD at the forward leg).42
We can rewrite this as a condition between actual and swap-based interest rates, the so-called






Sa > F b, and subtract Sa from both sides to
get the condition above.
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cross-currency basis. On the bid-side:
F b − Sa
1 + rbf
Sa
> rad − rbf
F b − Sa
1 + rbf
Sa
+ 1 + rbf − 1 > rad











− 1 > rad[





− 1 > rad (1.11)
Proceeding similarly for the ask-side gives the following two conditions for measuring profitable
CIP deviation using cross-currency basis representation:
Deva > 0⇒
[





− 1 < rbd, (1.12)
Devb > 0⇒
[





− 1 > rad (1.13)
1.A.2 LOOP: One-way arbitrage
The law of one price can be violated either for borrowing rates (ask) or lending rates (bid). Strictu
senso, this is not an arbitrage as it is only relevant for those that have a borrowing or lending need at
the outset. As discussed in Section 1.4, responding to LOOP can be compared to exploiting relative
value opportunities, but does not require expanding the balance sheet.
If we take the perspective of borrowing rates, these are not in violation if the following holds:







Bid : 1 + raf ≤ Sa (1 + rad)
1
F b
The first condition says that it is cheaper to finance in the domestic market than to shop around
to borrow abroad and swap into domestic currency. The second equation states the same, but from
the perspective of the foreign market.




Sb ≤ F a − Sb




These equations can be rearranged to express the condition as difference between actual and
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swap-implied interest rates, i.e. the basis. At the ask-side,
rad − raf
1 + raf




F a − Sb + raf
rad ≤
[










Sb + F a − Sb
− 1. (1.15)
For the bid side:
rad <
[(








1.A.3 Adding market conventions
There are several issues that have to be taken into account when such conditions as stated above
are used in calculations based on actual market data. We list them here:
1. Swaps are not priced as forward price minus spot price, but rather in the units of the smallest
decimal of the spot price (so-called pips). For example, if F = 1.1001 and S = 1.000, then the
quoted swap is 1 (and not 0.0001). So quoted swap prices must be divided by 10 to the power
of the number of decimal points. For most currencies this is 4, while for JPY it is 2.
2. Interest rates are quoted in percentage points and not as a share of 100 as above. All the 1s
in the above equations must therefore be replaced by 100.
3. Interest rates are quoted as annual rates, and not for the maturity time-horizon. Hence, the
interest rates must be corrected for this by multiplying by number of days to maturity divided
by number of days in a year, D/Y EAR. Most countries calculate with 365 days in a year,
except the UK which uses 360. Days to maturity must respect that both markets are open,
and the interested reader is referred to Akram et al. (2008) for details. Bloomberg and other
financial services can provide the exact days for any date and currency pair.
When applied to the CIP basis at the bid, the condition then becomes:
BasisbCIP = −rad +
[(
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1.B Construction of high-frequency data
We primarily use high-frequency data for the creation of daily time series for FX swap order flow and
spot order flow. Results based on high-frequency intraday analysis of CIP deviations when funded
in interbank deposits (focus of previous drafts) are available upon request, but are omitted here as
interbank deposits are no longer a vibrant source of funding.
We follow Akram et al. (2008) closely and collect high-frequency data for interbank deposits
rates, OIS rates, FX spot and FX swaps, as shown in the overview in Table 1.8. All high-frequency
data are timed to the thousandth of a second (millisecond) and are from 2005 until June 2017. We
merge all data to the exact time and fill in with previous prices if an instrument does not have an
updated quote in a particular millisecond.
Spot exchange rates are taken from the Reuters D2000-2 Electronic Limit Order Book, one of the
primary wholesale trading platforms for trading FX Spot. The D2000-2 is an inter-dealer platform,
which is mostly used by market makers to offload inventory positions from trades with end-users.
This market thus performs an important risk-sharing function.
We use FX swaps instead of forwards because this is how sophisticated participants in interbank
markets implement forward transactions. For FX swaps, we rely on two different sources, indicative
quotes and data from the FX swap part of the electronic limit order book Reuters D2000-2 (this
part is often labelled D3000-3).
We create measures of order flow for spot and FX swaps based on transactions on the electronic
limit order books. By matching transaction prices with the prevailing best bid and ask quotes, we
can determine the sign of the trade, positive (1) for buyer-initiated trades (at ask) and negative (-1)
for seller-initiated trades. For FX swaps we construct the order flow to measure the net number
of buyer/seller-initiated trades in USD in the spot leg of the swaps. Hence it serves as a proxy of
demand and supply imbalances in the swap market, available at high frequency. Daily aggregates
are created based on weekdays between GMT 01:00-18:00 and only for active trading days.
In some part of our analysis we rely on interbank deposit rates. The deposit quote on the ask
side is an indication of the rate at which the quoting bank is willing to lend funds to another bank
(i.e. placing deposits). The bid-quote is an indicative price for borrowing funds (i.e. accepting
deposits) from another bank. Both bid and ask rates are quoted continuously throughout the day.
OIS is a derivative, but the quote on the ask-side can be interpreted as the borrowing rate.
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1.C CIP arbitrage with OIS contracts
This section provides some details on CIP arbitrage involving Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS) con-
tracts. As discussed in the main text, OIS contracts are derivatives and no vehicles that could easily
be used for funding purposes. Thus, OIS rates do not capture marginal funding costs of the key ar-
bitrageuers. Yet, they are still very useful to provide a reference, in particular as the cross-currency
basis based on OIS rates can be regarded as a reflection of the relative term liquidity premium in
USD vs other currencies.
In this section, we note that relying on OIS contracts in CIP arbitrage exposes the arbitrageur
to rollover risks. This can be a further impediment to arbitrage activity.
Implementing a CIP arbitrage trade based on OIS contracts is fairly complicated (illustrated by
Figure 1.C.1). We repeat the sequence of trades here for convenience:
1. Borrow funds overnight (O/N) in the borrowing currency,
2. Roll over the O/N loan daily over the preferred maturity and hedge the interest rate risk by
paying the (fixed) OIS rate of the same maturity,
3. Buy the lending currency spot, hedging the exchange rate risk by selling the lending currency
forward at the date when the OIS matures,
4. Invest the lending currency O/N,
5. Roll over the O/N investment and hedge the interest rate risk by receiving the OIS rate in the
lending currency.
The issue of rollover risk is best illustrated by looking at the difference between quoted O/N
interbank deposit rates and the underlying O/N rate in the OIS contract for EUR and USD.43 If an
arbitrageur seeks to exploit a widening of the OIS-basis, she has to constantly borrow USD in the
U.S. O/N market and place EUR-denominated funds in the EUR area O/N market. This may have
to be done at different rates than the weighted average of the money market transactions that are
used for the fixing of the underlying O/N rate in the OIS contract.44
It is well-known, for instance, that the effective Federal funds rate that constitutes the un-
derlying overnight interest rate in USD OIS contracts, is heavily affected by transactions involving
Government-sponsored Entities (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and 11 Federal Home Loan Banks). These
institutions can transact in the Fed funds market, but do not have access to the Fed’s deposit facil-
ity (Bech and Klee, 2011). The Fed funds market may deviate from the O/N eurodollar market, a
43The underlying O/N rates in the EUR and USD OIS contracts are EONIA and the effective Fed funds rate,
respectively.
44Griffoli and Ranaldo (2010) also point this out, but assume in the remainder of their analysis that this spread is
negligible.
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Figure 1.C.1








Overnight funding market, USD









































Notes: The graph shows the mechanics involved in using OIS contracts for CIP arbitrage. Solid lines represent
transactions while dashed lines are interest rate payments. In the OIS, the fixed rate is not paid or received
every day. It is a fixed rate where the net difference between the average of the floating rate and the fixed
rate is settled on the termination date of the contract.
development that has encouraged the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to develop an alternative
benchmark rate (Overnight Bank Financing Rate). This rate relies on eurodollar transaction data
(see, e.g., Duffie and Krishnamurthy, 2016).
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Figure 1.C.2


































Notes: The Figure show difference between overnight rates and the underlying overnight rate in the OIS
contract measured in basis points. For USD, the underlying rate is the effective Fed funds rate, while for
EUR it is the EONIA rate. The graphs show borrowing in USD (overnight ask rate minus effective Fed
funds) in Panel (a) and lending in EUR (EONIA minus overnight bid rate) in Panel (b).
Figure 1.C.2 illustrates the rollover risk in OIS-based CIP arbitrage arising from the mismatch
in the evolution of actual O/N borrowing rate faced by the arbitrageur and the movement of the
underlying floating O/N rate in the OIS contract. As can be gleaned from the graph, this spread
can widen significantly at times and can be quite volatile, suggesting that rollover risk can be quite
material in discouraging OIS-based CIP arbitrage.45
45The GFC is a primary example of evaporating funding liquidity characterised by a shortening of the maturity
of funding, where it became highly expensive, and even virtually impossible, to roll over O/N funding. Instead of
providing reserves in the O/N market, banks were hoarding reserves and arbitrageurs (hedge funds and proprietary
trading desks in banks) found it difficult to even obtain O/N funding.
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1.D CIP arbitrage with repo contracts
As discussed in the main text in Section 1.2.2, the cross-currency basis for risk-free interest rates has
been different from zero also pre-crisis, in particular for repo rates. Tightening of banking regulation
thus cannot be the sole explanation for the existence of the basis for repo rates (as well as for other
risk-free rates such as T-Bills). As discussed in the main text, a non-zero repo-basis arises from how
investors value the collateral in different currencies, also referred to as convenience yield. For these
reasons, it is hard to argue that the existence of a repo basis truly represents arbitrage opportunities
and the existence of a free lunch. In the following, we provide some further institutional background
and arguments to make this case.
To give some background, Figure 1.D.1 illustrates the mechanism of using the repo market in
CIP arbitrage.
Figure 1.D.1










































Notes: The Figure shows the mechanics involved in using repo contracts for CIP arbitrage. Solid lines
represent transactions, while dashed lines depict interest rate payments/security transfers.
The following example may help shed further light on our argumentation in the main text why
the use of repo rates in assessing arbitrage opportunities due to CIP deviations is not innocent.
Imagine a bank with an initial portfolio endowment of both U.S. and German Treasury securities.
These assets are unencumbered and obviously ultimately funded by unsecured financing. The bank
can in principle repo out the U.S. Treasuries and obtain cash. When encumbered through a repo, the
U.S. Treasuries serve as a vehicle to be exposed to potential interest rate risk, but cannot generate
any more cash during the term of the repo. This means that it makes little difference to the bank
whether it conducts a repo or sells U.S. Treasuries in order to obtain the necessary USD for the
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trade. When the Treasuries are sold, it is clear that the bank is left with cash financed by unsecured
borrowing. The shadow cost of encumbering the collateral is the difference between the unsecured
borrowing and the repo rate, plus the cost of a potential haircut.
Now imagine that the bank wants to benefit from a CIP deviation as indicated by the repo-basis.
After having monetized the U.S. treasuries to repo dollar financing, the bank may then conduct an
FX swap, swapping the dollars for EUR and engage in a reverse repo, receiving German Bunds as
collateral. The bank can now raise cash in EUR by re-using its euro-denominated assets received
in the repo, but the bank cannot raise U.S. dollars via the euro-denominated asset without going
through the FX swap market again. What this sequence of trades shows is that the new EUR-
denominated assets held by the bank are effectively financed by unsecured USD funding. This
simple example shows that the secured funding cost via repo does not reflect the marginal funding
cost in the CIP arbitrage. CIP deviations based on GC repo rates will therefore reflect cross-currency
differences in the total costs of funding the collateral, rather than be an indication of a ‘free lunch’.
Special repo. For the reasons above, when testing for the existence of arbitrage opportunities
based on repo rates, it is therefore important to move beyond GC repo rates. A special repo needs
to be considered where the arbitrageur delivers and receives collateral denominated in the same
currency in both the borrowing and the investment currency. This does not alter the currency
composition of the liquidity portfolio of the arbitrageur, and hence allows a comparison of “apples
with apples”. The interest rate quoted in a special repo, however, can be very different from that
in a GC repo. The issue is exacerbated when the relative term funding premiums between the two
currencies are different.46
Rehypothecation. There may be situations, however, where market participants are able to use
collateral where their own unsecured funding cost is not the correct measure of the full marginal
cost. This applies for example to custodians and a practice called rehypothecation. Rehypothecation
means that the custodian has an agreement with the legal owner of the asset to use the collateral
against a fee. This was common practice among U.S. custodians before 2008, but legal issues
connected to rehypothecation and regulatory initiatives have reduced both the demand for and
supply of this business in recent years. In any case, the fee the custodian has to pay must be
incorporated in the cost of setting up a CIP arbitrage trade.
46Data on special repos are rare and difficult to obtain. We asked for a cross-currency OTC repo quote from a
high-rated dealer via Norges Bank’s money market desk. The dealer responded by saying that such a deal would
have been priced based on FX swaps. This means that the dealer would need to add the cost of delivering a security
denominated in the currency with a high funding liquidity premium equal to the cost of swapping cash into the same
currency. This would obviously effectively eliminate any profit from the CIP trade.
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1.E How do banks price funds internally?
We provide here some more details on the institutional background on how banks price and allocate
funds internally, mentioned in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. An important concept of how banks determine
the “internal price” when allocating funds across different divisions is funds transfer pricing (FTP).
The treasury division is responsible for the bank’s funding, its liquidity management and the internal
pricing of funds to its different operations. One can think of the treasury division as a “bank within
the bank”: it buys funds from the divisions managing the liability side of the bank and sells funds
to the divisions that invest in assets. The most commonly used method currently considered by
practitioners is called matched-maturity funds transfer pricing.
The basic goal of FTP is to transfer interest rate risk and liquidity risk to a central location
(the treasury unit) and make the booked income of the remaining units of the bank immune against
these risk factors. Matched-maturity funds transfer pricing implies that the prices at which the
treasury buys funds from its deposit-taking units and the prices it charges for funds transferred to
units investing in banking assets are related to the cost of obtaining the funds. This means that the
internal price also reflects the associated balance sheet costs for a given maturity.
To accomplish this task, the treasury unit constructs an interest rate curve, determining the
funds transfer price for the full maturity spectrum. This curve incorporates the marginal cost of
using funds across maturities. The use of a marginal cost interest rate curve enables the treasury
unit to maintain all liquidity risk within the treasury department and price this risk accordingly
(arising from maturity transformation).47 Hence, the corresponding interest rate curve determines
the appropriate price at which the treasury unit buys and sells funds such that the business units are
left with the net interest margin arising from (i) the funding spread between deposit rates faced by
the bank’s customers (liability side) and the internal price, and (ii) the spread between the internal
price and the return on the banking assets (asset side).
The crucial part of FTP is to construct the interest rate curve based on the marginal funding
costs faced by the bank in a way that also reflects the balance sheet cost. A crude way of doing this
is to use interbank deposit rates for tenors below one year and the Interest Rate Swap (IRS) curve
beyond that.48 The difference between the market swap curve based on interbank deposit rates and
the final FTP curve determines the term structure of the funding liquidity premium. The reason for
using deposit rates in FTP is that they are regarded as a reasonable proxy for the marginal cost of
using funds for banks.
Globally active banks need to create a FTP curve in each of the currencies they are operating in.
For example, a bank may establish a full interest rate curve in its main funding currency and then
rely on the pricing in the FX swap market to create implied interest rate curves in the rest of the
47Liquidity transfer pricing is an integral part of funds transfer pricing (see Grant (2011)).
48It is more precise to construct the FTP curve by relying on the bank’s own fixed-rate funding cost, stripped down
to variable-rate marginal funding cost by an internal interest rate swap.
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operating currencies. Alternatively, the bank could calculate a fully independent curve in each of
the currencies. Regardless of the approach taken, the internal price of funds in different currencies
has to be consistent with the implied interest rate one can achieve through the FX swap market. In
case of a discrepancy, internal business units may otherwise exploit the inconsistency.49
Funds transfer pricing and the law of one price. The discussion above has major implications
for investigating the law of one price in international money markets. As laid out above, the internal
pricing of funds by banks needs to be closely aligned with the law of one price.50 Interbank deposit
rates reflect the general interest rate level in a currency, the term funding liquidity premium, the
credit risk premium of the quoting bank, and the balance sheet cost of using additional funds.
Interbank deposit rates thus exactly capture what banks’ funds transfer price ought to represent
as well. One may therefore expect that there is a tight empirical relationship between interbank
deposit rates and the funds transfer price.
49For example, if the treasury pays business units more for currency A than it implicitly charges for the funds in
currency B swapped into currency A by conducting an FX swap, business units may have an incentive to borrow
currency B, conduct an FX swap in the market and sell currency A back to the treasury unit.
50Of course, the bank’s treasury unit may be in a position to look for the relative value of funding in different
currencies. One should also point out that the exact implementation of FTP may vary across banks. That said, the
main principles remain largely intact.
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1.F Liquidity premia in international money markets
This section provides some further background and illustration regarding the evolution of funding
liquidity premia across currencies. It is useful conceive of the unsecured marginal funding cost of
bank j in USD, rj;$ (suppressing the t subscript) as
rj;$ = r
f
$ + crj + l̃p$, (1.18)
where rf$ is the USD risk-free rate, crj denotes a compensation for credit risk (assumed constant
across currencies for global banks) and l̃p$ stands for the liquidity premium in USD.
It is worth illustrating the importance of funding liquidity premia based on a simple proxy. First,
we insert the OIS rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate in Equation (1.18), and, second, assume that
the credit component faced by a particular bank j is the same across currency areas. Taking the
difference in the marginal funding spread (rj − rOIS) across the two currencies will then filter out
the credit component and give us a measure of the relative liquidity premium differential,











between USD and the foreign currency. This simple measure can be averaged over bank-specific
data, or, as we do, over CP-spreads for different rating categories, to minimize noise.













Figure 1.F.1 illustrates that funding premium differentials (between the USD and other curren-
cies) and the OIS-Basis are highly correlated. In Panel (a) the blue line shows the time series of
the OIS-Basis (positive number suggests deviation) together with the liquidity premium differential
vis-à-vis the USD in red (both averaged across currencies). The latter is constructed based on CP
rates following Equation (1.19) outlined above. Panel (b) depicts the cross-plot of the cross-currency
basis with OIS rates and the average liquidity premium differential across currencies vis-à-vis the
USD.
The fact that proxies for the relative funding liquidity premium exhibit fluctuations that closely
resemble those in the OIS-Basis indicates that funding strains in USD markets are a primary driver
of both the premium to obtain USD in the FX swap market and funding spreads in U.S. money
markets. The vertical line marks the implementation date of the U.S. money market fund reform—a
major disruption to USD funding markets. Both time-series—our measure of the relative funding
liquidity premium in the USD compared to other major currencies and the cross-currency basis for
OIS rates—have their peak around this event and fluctuate quite closely together (liquidity premium
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Figure 1.F.1
Funding liquidity premia and the cross-currency basis
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(b) Cross-currency OIS basis vs. funding liquidity premia
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Notes: The Figure illustrates the relationship between funding liquidity premia and the cross-currency basis
(3-month maturity). The cross-currency basis is calculated from OIS rates. Panel (a) compares the time
series of the 3-month OIS-basis (left-hand axis) with the average funding liquidity differential based on CP-
rates (right-hand axis, inverted scale). The vertical line in Panel (a) indicates October 14, 2016, the date of
the implementation of the U.S. Money Market Fund reform. Panel (b) shows a scatter-plot for the average
3-month cross-currency basis based on OIS rates (horizontal axis) together with average funding liquidity
premium differentials vis-à-vis USD (vertical axis) based on CP rates. Averages are across EUR, CHF and
JPY. Sample: January 2013 – June 2017.
differential on inverse axis on the right).
What this evidence suggests is that OIS-based LOOP violations largely reflect fluctuations in the
relative difference in term funding liquidity premia across currencies. Based on this interpretation,
a widening of the OIS cross-currency basis is not necessarily an indication of arbitrage profits, but
rather suggests that the costs of USD term funding (relative to other currencies) have firmed.
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1.G Regulations and the FX swap market
This section gives some further background on the impact of banking regulations on developments in
FX swap markets, especially around regulatory reporting dates (notably, quarter-end and year-end).
An important question is whether short-term (in particular, 1-week and 1-month) LOOP violations
around quarter- and year-end reporting days can be attributed to the tightening of banking regula-
tions following the GFC, hampering banks ability to sufficiently exploit the arbitrage. Such spikes,
documented in the recent work of Du et al. (2019), provide compelling evidence of banks’ window
dressing behavior (also see Krohn and Sushko (2017) and Abbassi and Bräuning (2018)). The uneven
application of the leverage ratio across jurisdictions—with some jurisdictions requiring reporting on
a period-average basis and others as a period-end snapshot—undoubtedly creates extreme outcomes
in FX swap markets around reporting dates.
Several pieces of evidence suggest, however, that a mono-causal explanation based on regulation
as the single driver is insufficient but that quarter- and year-end spikes arise due to a confluence
of factors. A first piece of evidence relates to the timing of law of one price deviations. The fact
that there have been sizeable deviations from the law of one price for repo rates and T-bills already
prior to the GFC, as shown in Figure 1.3 above and discussed in Section 1.2, suggests that law of
one price deviations in international money markets are not limited to the period of tighter banking
regulation post-crisis.
A crucial factor that has played a role, in conjunction with regulation, has been the strong in-
crease in excess liquidity as central banks’ heavily expanded their balances sheets via asset purchases.
An important reason for the relation between end-of-quarter spikes and abundance of liquidity is
that for regulatory reporting purposes, an FX swap is treated as an off-balance sheet item (as op-
posed to repos, for instance, which increase the size of the balance sheet, see Borio et al. (2017)).
This means that a globally active bank holding (excess) EUR liquidity on its balance sheet, can lend
it out via an FX swap in exchange for USD. The result is that the cash held in EUR is replaced
with USD cash on the balance sheet. If the bank simultaneously lets its USD borrowing mature and
uses the USD cash obtained via the swap to pay down the debt, the consolidated balance sheet of
the bank will be reduced. Figure 1.G.1 illustrates the balance sheet effects. Due to such incentives,
excess liquidity in EUR, JPY, and CHF is just waiting to be deployed in the FX swap market around
major reporting dates, with the aim of reducing banksâ balance sheets.
Corroborating the important role played by the evolution of excess liquidity in different currency
areas, Figure 1.G.2 shows that fluctuations in 1-week LOOP violations and quarter-end and year-
end spikes started to emerge when excess liquidity increased on the back of central bank balance
sheet expansion. In fact, in several cases the spikes in CIP deviations could already be observed
prior to the implementation of tighter banking regulations. The vertical lines indicate key dates
associated with a significant rise in central banks’ balance sheets (the ECB’s public sector asset
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purchase program, the Bank of Japan’s quantitative and qualitative easing, and in the case of
the Swiss National Bank, the introduction of the EUR/CHF floor regime). The spikes, almost all
aligned with quarter-end periods, typically started to emerge in the period after the substantial rise
in central bank reserve balances. In the case of the CHF, a few spikes occur prior to implementation
of the exchange rate peg with the EUR. A likely reason is the Swiss National Bank’s efforts to fight
the appreciation of the currency via (unsterilized) FX interventions and provision of central bank
reserves through collateralized loans, which significantly expanded the CHF reserve balances held by
commercial banks. In the case of EUR, a few spikes occur in relation to ECB’s liquidity-measures
during the EUR-crisis in 2011 and 2012 which resulted in a large expansion of reserve balances.
Table 1.G.1 presents a regression analysis showing that end-of-quarter effects were not present prior
to the introduction of QE by major foreign central banks.
Table 1.G.1
Quantitative Easing (QE) and End-of-Quarter effects
CHF EUR JPY Panel
EoQ during QE 0.343 0.862 0.635 0.526
( 3.27) ( 3.90) ( 3.85) ( 5.62)
EoQ pre-QE -0.022 0.006 0.014 0.003
( -0.54) ( 0.19) ( 0.55) ( 0.24)
Obs. 2,192 2,186 2,192 6,570
adj.R2 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.09
Notes: Regression of 1-week IBOR LOOP violations on dummy for End-of-Quarter-period, interacted with
dummy for before and after implementation of Quantitative Easing (QE). Constants and fixed effects su-
pressed. Sample: January 2009 – June 2017.
Another piece of evidence relates to the extent that regulations have hampered banks ability
exploit arbitrage in international money markets. Evidence from banks’ own balance sheets suggests
that constraints have been rarely binding outside of reporting dates. As trading the cross-currency
repo basis is close to risk-free, the most relevant regulatory constraint for banks engaging in such a
trade is the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio discourages low margin and leveraged trades. Repo
intermediation—or “matched book repos”—also falls into this category as the business is based on
a dealer passing on cash and high quality collateral denominated in the same currency between its
counterparties against a small margin (typically 5-10 basis points). When it comes to regulatory
implications, such repo intermediation is very similar to the type of arbitrage involved in exploiting
the cross-currency basis in repo rates.
Both types of trades increase leverage at low risk (and low return). But, the main difference
is that when arbitraging the cross-currency repo basis, unlike the case of matched book repo inter-
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Figure 1.G.2
















































Notes: The Figure shows fluctuations in 1-week LOOP deviations (based on LIBOR rates). Positive values
indicate that the synthetic LIBOR rate (FX swapped from EUR, JPY and CHF) is higher than the direct
LIBOR rate in the U.S. The vertical lines indicate key dates associated with large-scale central bank balance
sheet expansion that led to a substantial rise in reserve balances in the three currency areas (introduction of
QQE in Japan, PSPP in the euro area and the introduction of the CHF/EUR floor system). Sample: Jan
2009 — July 2017.
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mediation, the funding currency is different from the investment currency. That is, the collateral
received in the investment leg (typically JPY or EUR) is denominated in a different currency than
the funding (mainly the U.S. dollar). Since matched book repo activity consumes balance sheet one
would expect this activity to fall should the leverage ratio act as a binding constraint. However, fig-
ure 1.G.3 indicates that foreign bank holding companies in U.S. instead have significantly increased
their matched book repo intermediation activity steadily since 2010 (during a period of tightening
of regulation).51 This suggests that globally active banks must also have balance sheet capacity to
perform cross-currency repo basis arbitrage as well. There are other factors, however, that prevent
the arbitrage from being fully exploited—especially the fact that the foreign collateral constitutes
an additional cost on top of the GC repo rate when financing the cross-currency repo basis.
Figure 1.G.3





















Notes: The Figure depicts a proxy for matched book repo activity in USD among foreign bank offices and is
calculated as the sum of the repo-holdings of foreign bank offices balance sheets in the U.S. that are matched
on both sides on the balance sheet. A bank with 10 billion USD on repo liabilities and 20 billion repo assets
will be assigned 10 billion USD in matched book repo-holdings. The numbers are in USD billions. Source:
U.S. call reports (FFIEC 002).
Finally, for some of those banks that do have balance-sheet capacity to engage into arbitrage,
it will in fact not be profitable given the investment opportunities that they have access to. As
we showed in the main text, some of arbitrage flow (supplying USD at a premium in the FX swap
markets against EUR, CHF or JPY) will be profitably invested at the deposit rate offered by the
51It is indeed true that foreign bank holding companies reduce the repo activity significantly over reporting dates,
but the quarterly average activity, as shown in Figure 1.G.3, has increased notably in spite of regulatory tightening.
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foreign central bank (see the evidence presented in Section 1.4 and Figure 1.6). But, for banks or
other opportunistic players that do not have access to the central bank deposit facility, the only
risk-free investment alternatives available will be short-term reverse repos and T-bills that mature
right after year-end/quarter-end. Importantly, however, the pricing of these investment vehicles
(unlike the rate of remuneration on central bank deposits) responds to volume, thereby reducing
possible arbitrage profits. Given that collecting data on all bonds that mature right after reporting
days is difficult, Figure 1.G.4 shows an example of a typical price response of a German Treasury
bill that, given its maturity profile, would be suitable as a risk-free investment vehicle around such
an episode. The Figure shows that the T-bill yield drops significantly, in turn making the arbitrage
less attractive. In Panel (b) we show that EUR GC repo rates also have significant drops around
quarter-end and year-end.
Figure 1.G.4































Notes: Panel (a) shows the interest rate on a German Treasury bill (BUBILL 0 01/10/18) maturing on
January 10, 2018. Panel (b) shows the euro General Collateral (GC) repo rate for collateral issued only by
the German government. The index is calculated from trades executed on either the BrokerTec or the MTS
electronic platform and all transactions are centrally cleared. The data is published by NEX Data.
1.H Supplementary Tables and Figures
86 CHAPTER 1. COVERED INTEREST PARITY ARBITRAGE
Figure 1.H.1






































(b) EUR, CHF, JPY
Notes: The Figure shows the evolution of profits from roundtrip cross-currency basis trades (measured in
basis points) involving USD borrowing (USD interest rate at the ask rate), using 3-month OIS rates. All legs
of the roundtrip cross-currency trade (rates and FX swaps) are adjusted for bid-ask spreads (as described in
the text). Panel (a) shows trading profits for AUD, CAD and GBP, while Panel (b) depicts the corresponding
profits for EUR, CHF and JPY. Axis capped at 300bp for readability. The maximum was just above 400bp
for JPY during October 2008. The vertical line indicate October 14, 2016, the date of the implementation
of the U.S. Money Market Fund reform.
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Figure 1.H.3



































Notes: The Figure shows risk-free CIP arbitrage profits for global banks when funded via the issuance of
USD commercial paper, swapping into foreign currency, and investing the funds in the foreign Treasury bills
(Panel (a)) or central bank deposits (Panel (b)). Funding rates differ for mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2) and
high-rated banks (A-1/P-1). The vertical lines indicates October 14, 2016, the date of the implementation
of the U.S. Money Market Fund reform. Sample: January 2013 – June 2017.
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Figure 1.H.4













































(b) Treasury bill investment
Notes: The Figure shows the impact of (standardized) swap order flow on CIP arbitrage profits (3-month
maturity), conditioned on being in a positive arbitrage state, for different model specifications. Vertical lines
indicate ± 2 × coefficient standard errors, which are symmetric but truncated at top and bottom if they
reach outside graph area. Panel (a) shows alternatives with CIP deviations using central bank deposits as
investment (as in c), or OIS basis. Panel (b) shows results for T-bills as the investment-leg in the CIP-
arbitrage. The seven alternative models are as follows (from left): (i) Using a broad FX index (for panel
(a) same as 1.4); (ii) replacing the FX index with bilateral spot exchange rates; specifications (iii)-(vii) adds
different variables to the benchmark model in (i), like VIX, FX volatility represented by the VXY index, bond
market volatility represented by MOVE index, and our measure of liquidity premium differentials. Sample
for estimation: January 2013 – June 2017.
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Figure 1.H.5






















































Notes: The Figure compares 3-month CIP arbitrage profits (in basis points) when investing in central banks
deposits, for high-rated banks (A-1/P-1) using different sources of funding. The comparison is between
funding either using CP rates or (5-day moving average of) the volume-weigthed CD rates faced on the issue
date. Sample: Jan 2010 – July 2017.
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Table 1.H.1
Comparison of CP spreads across currencies. 1-week and 1-month maturity




EUR -3.84 -1.60 7.75 1,102
GBP 4.50 4.60 4.13 1,103
JPY -22.65 -18.18 20.94 1,045
USD 13.37 12.20 6.67 1,099
(ii) 1-week
EUR -5.80 -6.10 5.24 1,070
GBP -0.54 -0.20 4.25 1,093
JPY -9.34 -6.48 12.55 368
USD 8.98 6.90 10.60 1,092
High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
(i) 1-month
EUR -10.41 -9.50 6.58 1,106
GBP -4.04 -2.70 5.56 1,103
JPY -38.50 -29.26 36.31 1,099
USD 4.27 3.90 3.33 1,099
(ii) 1-week
EUR -17.47 -14.60 20.85 998
GBP -10.15 -6.60 21.33 957
JPY -37.35 -25.90 74.68 924
USD -0.96 -0.60 2.88 1,052
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for money market spreads across currencies (for 1-week and
1-month maturities). Panel A provides summary statistics for the difference between commercial paper (CP)
rates and OIS rates across two different rating categories, high-rated (A-1/P-1) and mid-rated (A-2/P-2),
ie. ij − iOIS , j ∈ {A-1/P-1, A-2/P-2}. All rates are measured as ask (offer) rates and mean, median and
standard deviation of spreads are expressed in basis points. Sample: January 2013 – June, 2017.
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Table 1.H.1
(Continued) Comparison of money market spreads across currencies. 1-week
and 1-month maturity
Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs.
B: IBOR interbank rates
(i) 1-month
AUD 9.71 10.50 7.55 1,173
CAD 28.49 25.40 7.39 1,130
CHF -17.51 -23.20 13.36 1,137
EUR 1.52 2.40 3.37 1,150
GBP 5.07 4.92 2.00 1,137
JPY 0.62 1.30 2.96 1,137
USD 6.66 6.30 2.37 1,136
(ii) 1-week
CAD -0.66 -0.50 0.25 1,174
EUR -1.87 -2.00 2.55 1,150
GBP 2.89 2.67 1.61 1,137
JPY -0.95 -0.49 3.00 1,137
USD 2.22 2.09 1.82 1,137
C: Interbank deposit rates
(i) 1-month
AUD 35.03 34.40 17.89 1,173
CAD 18.84 15.00 12.66 1,174
CHF -11.53 -10.00 19.56 1,174
EUR 4.33 3.50 4.94 1,174
GBP 16.30 16.53 8.44 1,174
JPY -0.05 3.60 11.28 1,174
USD 18.68 15.20 11.80 1,173
(ii) 1-week
AUD 23.45 22.50 16.56 1,173
CAD 14.31 12.00 13.06 1,174
EUR 2.16 1.20 5.22 1,174
GBP 9.72 7.70 5.36 1,174
JPY -0.14 1.90 18.74 1,174
USD 12.59 12.70 7.04 1,174
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for money market spreads across currencies. Panel B-C
presents descriptive statistics on the difference between various interbank funding rates and OIS rates. All
rates are measured as ask (offer) rates and mean, median and standard deviation of spreads are expressed in
basis points. Sample: January 2013 – June, 2017.
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Table 1.H.2
Roundtrip cross-currency basis arbitrage with OIS rates. 3-month maturity
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Direction Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
AUD FCU ⇒ USD 7.9 9.5 68 57 847 2.1 9.2 65 39 326
USD ⇒ FCU -12.3 9.3 13 7 847 -6.2 7.7 24 15 325
CAD FCU ⇒ USD -8.1 4.5 0 0 848 -17.2 9.7 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 3.0 4.4 79 51 848 12.4 9.6 99 88 325
CHF FCU ⇒ USD -34.0 26.9 0 0 848 -89.4 19.6 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 25.1 24.8 100 100 848 80.3 18.6 100 100 325
EUR FCU ⇒ USD -19.2 10.6 0 0 846 -60.1 17.8 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 15.4 10.4 97 90 846 57.6 17.3 100 100 325
GBP FCU ⇒ USD -8.3 4.8 0 0 847 -33.7 12.9 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 3.9 4.6 99 85 848 26.0 12.4 100 100 324
JPY FCU ⇒ USD -25.3 16.9 0 0 848 -80.1 24.3 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 22.2 16.4 100 100 848 74.5 24.2 100 100 325
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for the 3-month cross-currency basis with OIS rates (measured
in basis points) for currencies against USD. The cross-currency basis is adjusted for transaction costs as
outlined in the text and is sampled daily. The “Direction” column indicates if the roundtrip goes from USD,
swapped into Foreign Currency (“USD ⇒ FCU ”), or to USD, swapped into USD (“FCU ⇒ USD”), at the
spot leg of the swap. As FX quotes differ by the base currency, for AUD, EUR and GBP “USD ⇒ FCU ”
involves the bid side of the swap, while for others it involves the ask side. Positive numbers in the “Median”
column implies that a roundtrip trade would have been profitable if OIS rates adequately captured the
arbitrageurs’ funding costs and the rate at which the swapped funds can be placed. “Std.dev” is standard
deviation. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a roundtrip deviation exists, while
(%M) measures the fraction of times a roundtrip deviation can be observed over 22 consecutive trading days.
We report results for two sample periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013 – Apr 2016, and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 –
June 2017.
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Table 1.H.2
(Continued) Roundtrip cross-currency basis arbitrage with OIS rates. 1-week
and 1-month maturity
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Direction Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
A. 1-month
AUD FCU ⇒ USD 4.1 12.5 65 49 847 -1.8 10.4 42 15 326
USD ⇒ FCU -8.9 11.5 20 6 846 -4.6 9.0 31 16 326
CAD FCU ⇒ USD -
10.1
5.8 1 0 848 -
20.7
11.5 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 3.7 5.8 81 45 847 13.7 11.2 98 73 326
CHF FCU ⇒ USD -
30.1
33.6 0 0 848 -
83.1
34.0 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 21.1 30.1 100 100 847 73.5 32.0 100 100 326
EUR FCU ⇒ USD -
18.7
11.8 0 0 848 -
58.4
27.5 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 14.6 11.3 95 87 847 53.7 26.7 100 100 326
GBP FCU ⇒ USD -9.4 6.7 0 0 848 -
37.4
21.0 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 4.0 6.5 95 74 847 29.9 19.9 100 100 326
JPY FCU ⇒ USD -
24.7
22.1 0 0 848 -
72.2
43.2 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 19.1 21.0 100 100 847 60.0 42.5 100 94 326
B. 1-week
AUD FCU ⇒ USD -4.2 13.4 34 4 847 -9.1 13.8 18 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
10.8
14.2 17 3 847 -
10.1
11.9 13 0 326
CAD FCU ⇒ USD -
12.3
8.4 4 0 848 -
23.7
23.1 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 2.5 7.3 65 15 848 7.6 22.0 77 31 326
EUR FCU ⇒ USD -
20.2
14.7 2 0 848 -
44.9
64.2 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 11.1 11.8 94 72 848 32.2 55.7 100 100 326
GBP FCU ⇒ USD -
10.6
13.5 0 0 848 -
29.1
49.1 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 1.9 12.6 69 27 848 14.2 42.9 93 74 326
JPY FCU ⇒ USD -
24.3
46.3 0 0 848 -
54.9
78.6 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU 12.0 32.4 98 81 848 23.5 63.7 92 46 325
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for the 1-month and 1-week cross-currency basis with OIS rates
(measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. The cross-currency basis is adjusted for transaction
costs as outlined in the text and is sampled daily. The “Direction” column indicates if the roundtrip goes from
USD, swapped into Foreign Currency (“USD ⇒ FCU ”), or to USD, swapped into USD (“FCU ⇒ USD”), in
the spot leg of the swap. As FX quotes differ by the base currency, for AUD, EUR and GBP “USD ⇒ FCU ”
involves the bid side of the swap, while for others it involves the ask side. Positive numbers in the “Median”
column implies that the median roundtrip trade would have been profitable if OIS rates adequately captured
the arbitrageurs’ funding costs and the rate at which the swapped funds can be placed. “Std.dev” is standard
deviation. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a roundtrip deviation exists, while
(%M) measures the fraction of times a roundtrip deviation can be observed over 22 consecutive trading days.
We report results for two sample periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013 – Apr 2016, and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 –
June 2017.
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Table 1.H.3
Roundtrip cross-currency basis arbitrage with interbank deposit rates. 1-week
and 3-month maturity
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Deviation Deviation
Direction Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
A. 3-month
AUD FCU ⇒ USD -
15.5
9.2 1 0 848 -
41.3
19.7 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
11.5
8.9 9 0 848 11.0 19.1 67 17 326
CAD FCU ⇒ USD -
13.4
8.3 2 0 848 -
41.8
21.6 2 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
13.0
8.6 6 0 848 6.7 20.8 61 12 326
CHF FCU ⇒ USD -
24.2
13.7 1 0 848 -
60.6
18.7 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
12.3
10.1 11 0 848 16.2 19.8 72 19 326
EUR FCU ⇒ USD -
14.7
8.9 1 0 848 -
43.6
18.4 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -9.8 9.1 11 0 848 18.5 19.3 73 30 326
GBP FCU ⇒ USD -
17.1
11.3 3 0 848 -
43.9
17.6 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
11.6
10.4 7 0 848 9.5 19.0 65 16 325
JPY FCU ⇒ USD -
20.8
12.0 1 0 848 -
48.4
19.7 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -9.6 9.7 17 0 848 8.6 20.6 65 8 326
B. 1-week
AUD FCU ⇒ USD -
18.0
15.6 1 0 848 -
30.8
20.5 2 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
15.9
13.9 3 0 848 -
18.9
19.5 13 0 326
CAD FCU ⇒ USD -
17.1
11.0 1 0 848 -
42.0
27.5 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
15.6
8.3 4 0 848 -5.3 26.4 35 0 326
CHF FCU ⇒ USD -
24.2
35.8 0 0 848 -
47.6
63.6 2 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
14.8
26.8 5 0 848 -6.5 53.9 40 0 326
EUR FCU ⇒ USD -
16.2
15.9 3 0 848 -
43.5
63.8 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -9.3 12.7 17 0 848 10.5 55.1 69 7 326
GBP FCU ⇒ USD -
13.9
15.7 1 0 848 -
38.7
51.6 0 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -
12.5
14.4 7 0 848 -1.0 43.3 49 4 326
JPY FCU ⇒ USD -
21.7
39.6 1 0 848 -
52.1
69.1 1 0 326
USD ⇒ FCU -9.0 26.8 17 0 848 0.4 59.1 50 0 325
Notes: The Table presents summary statistics for the 3-month and 1-week cross-currency basis with Interbank
deposit rates (measured in basis points) for currencies against USD (1-month available on request). The cross-
currency basis is adjusted for transaction costs as outlined in the text and is sampled daily. The “Direction”
column indicates if the roundtrip goes from USD, swapped into Foreign Currency (“USD ⇒ FCU ”), or to
USD, swapped into USD (“FCU ⇒ USD”), in the spot leg of the swap. As FX quotes differ by the base
currency, for AUD, EUR and GBP “USD ⇒ FCU ” involves the bid side of the swap, while for others it
involves the ask side. Positive numbers in the “Median” column implies that the median roundtrip trade
would have been profitable if OIS rates adequately captured the arbitrageurs’ funding costs and the rate
at which the swapped funds can be placed. “Std.dev” is standard deviation. Deviation (%D) indicates the
fraction of days in the sample a roundtrip deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a
roundtrip deviation can be observed over 22 consecutive trading days. We report results for two sample
periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013 – Apr 2016, and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 – June 2017.
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Table 1.H.4
LOOP violations for IBOR rates. 3-month maturity
(i) y$︸︷︷︸
Direct $ rate
− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
AUD (i) 3.1 4.9 77 38 821 1.0 4.8 59 24 316
(ii) -4.9 4.9 12 0 821 -3.4 4.4 20 0 316
CAD (i) -19.9 6.2 0 0 800 -30.0 5.2 0 0 308
(ii) 17.8 6.5 100 100 800 27.8 5.3 100 100 308
CHF (i) -16.4 17.6 0 0 821 -37.9 13.7 0 0 316
(ii) 13.6 15.3 100 100 821 35.7 12.7 100 100 316
EUR (i) -15.2 9.3 1 0 818 -33.9 10.8 0 0 316
(ii) 14.2 9.1 99 94 818 33.0 10.5 100 100 316
GBP (i) -2.3 4.2 10 2 821 -19.6 9.7 0 0 316
(ii) 1.5 4.1 81 63 821 16.5 9.1 100 100 315
JPY (i) -17.0 14.0 0 0 821 -55.8 15.7 0 0 316
(ii) 15.4 13.6 100 100 821 51.1 15.4 100 100 316
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 3-month LOOP deviations for IBOR rates (measured in
basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured at the ask (borrowing
rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the ask (bid) if the
comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a
LOOP deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a LOOP deviation can be observed over
22 consecutive trading days. We report results for two sample periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013 – Apr 2016,
and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 – June 2017.
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Table 1.H.4
(Continued) LOOP violations with IBOR rates. 1-week and 1-month maturity
(i) y$︸︷︷︸
Direct $ rate
− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
A. 1-month
AUD (i) 0.87 7.69 53 28 821 -5.4 9.2 30 0 316
(ii) -3.4 7.8 37 13 821 0.9 8.1 54 23 316
CAD (i) -25.8 9.9 0 0 800 -50.9 10.1 0 0 308
(ii) 22.2 10.2 100 100 800 46.1 9.8 100 100 308
CHF (i) -16.6 25.7 0 0 821 -48.7 32.8 0 0 316
(ii) 12.7 22.4 100 98 821 43.0 30.5 100 100 316
EUR (i) -14.7 12.3 3 0 818 -47.3 25.7 0 0 316
(ii) 12.8 11.9 95 87 818 45.5 25.0 100 100 316
GBP (i) -6.9 6.5 0 0 821 -33.2 20.7 0 0 316
(ii) 5.3 6.5 96 87 821 28.6 19.4 100 100 316
JPY (i) -19.2 20.9 0 0 821 -61.2 36.6 0 0 316
(ii) 16.4 20.0 100 100 821 52.1 34.5 100 100 316
B. 1-week
CAD (i) -6.8 8.4 15 0 821 -16.9 16.4 5 0 316
(ii) 0.6 7.6 53 12 821 4.8 14.2 71 24 316
CHF (i) -16.4 35.6 0 0 821 -38.8 62.9 0 0 316
(ii) 9.1 23.3 85 58 821 20.9 51.9 99 95 316
EUR (i) -15.2 11.8 4 0 818 -33.6 55.8 0 0 316
(ii) 10.3 10.3 92 60 818 27.5 47.9 100 100 316
GBP (i) -9.2 10.1 0 0 821 -24.3 42.5 0 0 316
(ii) 5.2 9.5 87 73 821 15.2 37.6 92 64 316
JPY (i) -18.3 39.8 0 0 821 -49.3 72.2 1 0 316
(ii) 10.6 27.9 98 82 821 23.3 57.7 93 50 315
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 1-week and 1-month LOOP deviations for IBOR rates
(measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured at the ask
(borrowing rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the ask (bid)
if the comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a
LOOP deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a LOOP deviation can be observed over
22 consecutive trading days. We report results for two sample periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013 – Apr 2016,
and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 – June 2017.
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Table 1.H.4




− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Deviation Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
A. 3-month
AUD (i) -5.0 9.2 18 0 848 -28.5 20.7 13 0 326
(ii) 3.2 9.2 70 12 848 26.2 20.2 83 48 326
CAD (i) -3.0 8.4 29 0 848 -28.8 22.3 18 0 326
(ii) 0.6 8.7 54 2 848 26.4 22.3 81 49 326
CHF (i) -13.0 13.8 8 0 848 -46.7 19.5 0 0 326
(ii) 9.8 13.0 88 37 848 44.3 20.0 99 87 326
EUR (i) -3.6 9.0 22 0 848 -30.8 19.2 6 0 326
(ii) 2.6 8.9 71 7 848 29.7 19.2 94 74 326
GBP (i) -4.9 11.6 34 0 848 -31.0 18.9 7 0 326
(ii) 3.9 11.4 62 7 848 28.4 19.2 90 59 325
JPY (i) -9.0 11.6 12 0 848 -36.7 20.6 5 0 326
(ii) 7.7 11.6 81 26 848 34.4 21.8 84 57 326
B. 1-week
AUD (i) -7.7 15.3 10 0 848 -18.8 19.8 7 0 326
(ii) -0.1 13.7 50 1 848 3.6 16.2 60 0 326
CAD (i) -6.7 10.7 11 0 848 -31.1 27.3 3 0 326
(ii) 0.2 9.7 52 2 848 20.3 28.4 86 21 326
CHF (i) -13.7 35.8 2 0 848 -35.8 63.7 6 0 326
(ii) 5.0 27.1 72 12 848 17.6 55.1 82 38 326
EUR (i) -5.8 15.5 14 0 848 -32.0 63.9 0 0 326
(ii) 1.2 13.3 61 6 848 22.3 55.6 97 63 326
GBP (i) -3.6 15.4 23 0 848 -26.7 51.6 2 0 326
(ii) -0.4 14.6 48 0 848 15.4 45.4 88 20 326
JPY (i) -11.7 39.2 5 0 848 -41.0 69.1 1 0 326
(ii) 3.4 26.2 68 1 848 20.3 57.9 82 22 325
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 1-week and 3-month LOOP deviations for interbank
deposit rates (measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured
at the ask (borrowing rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the
ask (bid) if the comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in
the sample a LOOP deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a LOOP deviation can be
observed over 22 consecutive trading days. We report results for two sample periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013
– Apr 2016, and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 – June 2017.
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Table 1.H.4
(Continued) LOOP violations for OIS rates. 1-week and 3-month maturity
(i) y$︸︷︷︸
Direct $ rate
− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Post-crisis (2013 – Mar 2016) MMF reform (Apr 2016 – Jun 2017)
Deviation Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
A. 3-month
AUD (i) 9.1 9.4 71 61 847 2.6 9.2 67 53 325
(ii) -11.0 9.7 23 10 847 -4.9 7.8 28 18 325
CAD (i) -6.9 4.5 1 0 848 -17.0 9.6 0 0 325
(ii) 4.4 4.7 91 63 848 14.1 9.6 100 100 325
CHF (i) -33.0 26.9 0 0 848 -88.8 19.6 0 0 325
(ii) 30.3 24.8 100 100 848 85.3 19.2 100 100 325
EUR (i) -18.2 10.6 0 0 846 -59.3 17.6 0 0 325
(ii) 17.3 10.4 99 95 846 58.1 17.4 100 100 325
GBP (i) -7.1 4.7 0 0 847 -33.3 12.7 0 0 325
(ii) 6.2 4.6 100 98 847 28.7 12.4 100 100 324
JPY (i) -24.2 16.9 0 0 848 -79.9 24.2 0 0 325
(ii) 22.8 16.3 100 100 848 75.8 24.2 100 100 325
B. 1-week
AUD (i) -1.5 13.3 45 5 847 -5.9 13.2 25 0 326
(ii) -6.5 13.7 27 6 847 -8.1 12.6 21 0 326
CAD (i) -9.7 8.3 7 0 848 -19.9 23.0 1 0 326
(ii) 3.7 7.4 71 27 848 8.6 22.0 82 37 326
EUR (i) -17.7 14.5 2 0 848 -40.9 64.2 0 0 326
(ii) 13.2 12.1 95 75 848 34.6 55.9 100 100 326
GBP (i) -8.1 13.3 0 0 848 -25.6 49.1 0 0 326
(ii) 4.2 12.7 83 61 848 16.2 43.0 95 75 326
JPY (i) -21.5 46.2 0 0 848 -51.8 78.5 0 0 326
(ii) 13.9 32.4 99 87 848 25.1 63.7 92 57 325
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 1-week and 3-month LOOP deviations for OIS rates
(measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured at the ask
(borrowing rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the ask (bid)
if the comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a
LOOP deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a LOOP deviation can be observed over
22 consecutive trading days. We report results for two sample periods, “Post crisis” Jan 2013 – Apr 2016,
and “MMF reform” Apr 2016 – June 2017.
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Table 1.H.5
LOOP violations for CP rates. 3-month maturity
(i) y$︸︷︷︸
Direct $ rate
− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
A. 3-month
(a) High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
EUR (i) -11.6 11.9 6 0 1,098
(ii) 10.6 11.6 92 79 1,098
GBP (i) -4.1 9.1 9 0 1,099
(ii) 3.2 8.3 81 51 1,098
JPY (i) -3.1 3.9 20 0 1,096
(ii) 1.1 4.2 59 32 1,096
(b) Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
EUR (i) -7.2 10.1 6 0 1,099
(ii) 6.1 9.8 90 63 1,099
GBP (i) -0.5 7.3 45 9 1,097
(ii) -0.4 6.6 47 19 1,096
JPY (i) -2.9 7.5 21 0 1,051
(ii) 1.0 7.2 62 8 1,051
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 3-month LOOP deviations for commercial paper rates
(measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured at the ask
(borrowing rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the ask (bid)
if the comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a
roundtrip deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a roundtrip deviation can be observed
over 22 consecutive trading days. Panel (a) shows calculations using commercial paper rates of the set of
high-rated banks (A-1/P-1), while Panel (b) reports LOOP violations for mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). The
sample covers the post-crisis period (Jan 2013 – Jun 2017).
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Table 1.H.5
(Continued) LOOP violations in CP rates. 1-month maturity
(i) y$︸︷︷︸
Direct $ rate
− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
B. 1-month
(a) High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
EUR (i) -10.0 19.5 11 1 1,100
(ii) 7.7 18.9 84 70 1,100
GBP (i) -3.4 14.2 8 0 1,100
(ii) 1.6 13.3 69 37 1,100
JPY (i) -2.8 5.9 32 0 1,097
(ii) -1.6 7.9 42 21 1,097
(b) Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
EUR (i) -7.3 17.7 8 0 1,096
(ii) 5.4 17.1 85 52 1,096
GBP (i) -2.0 17.1 28 0 1,100
(ii) -0.1 16.0 50 25 1,100
JPY (i) -3.5 16.9 27 3 1,042
(ii) 0.5 15.2 53 6 1,042
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 1-month LOOP deviations for commercial paper rates
(measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured at the ask
(borrowing rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the ask (bid)
if the comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a
roundtrip deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a roundtrip deviation can be observed
over 22 consecutive trading days. Panel (a) shows calculations using commercial paper rates of the set of
high-rated banks (A-1/P-1), while Panel (b) reports LOOP violations for mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). The
sample covers the post-crisis period (Jan 2013 – Jun 2017).
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Table 1.H.5
(Continued) LOOP violations for CP rates. 1-week maturity
(i) y$︸︷︷︸
Direct $ rate
− yFCU→$︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied $ rate
(ii) yFCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct FCU rate
− y$→FCU︸ ︷︷ ︸
Swap-implied FCU rate
Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs
C. 1-week
(a) High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
EUR (i) -6.9 20.0 17 3 949
(ii) 1.8 16.2 60 27 949
GBP (i) -2.8 11.7 19 1 912
(ii) -1.4 10.3 31 2 912
JPY (i) -1.8 51.1 33 0 895
(ii) -8.1 54.5 16 4 895
(b) Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
EUR (i) -9.5 30.5 10 0 1,061
(ii) 3.7 25.4 68 30 1,061
GBP (i) -4.1 21.3 23 0 1,087
(ii) -1.5 18.3 38 11 1,087
JPY (i) -4.8 8.4 25 0 365
(ii) -1.7 8.7 40 12 365
Notes: The Table presents descriptive statistics for 1-week LOOP deviations for commercial paper rates
(measured in basis points) for currencies against USD. Both U.S. and foreign rates are measured at the ask
(borrowing rates), consistent with a perspective of “borrower’s arbitrage”, while the swap is at the ask (bid)
if the comparison is with direct $ (FCU) rate. Deviation (%D) indicates the fraction of days in the sample a
roundtrip deviation exists, while (%M) measures the fraction of times a roundtrip deviation can be observed
over 22 consecutive trading days. Panel (a) shows calculations using commercial paper rates of the set of
high-rated banks (A-1/P-1), while Panel (b) reports LOOP violations for mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). The
sample covers the post-crisis period (Jan 2013 – Jun 2017).
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Table 1.H.6
Risk-free CIP arbitrage funded via the CP market and invested in CB deposits.
1-week and 1-month maturity
1-month 1-week
Deviation Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs. Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs.
I: Post-crisis to beginning MMF reform period (Jan 2013 – Mar 2016)
A. Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
AUD -42.3 10.1 0 0 702 -38.8 11.7 0 0 698
CAD -7.2 7.3 16 3 784 -3.4 7.4 31 1 778
CHF 8.9 24.3 98 82 784 7.2 21.9 82 50 778
EUR -9.1 14.6 19 16 781 -5.1 11.9 26 5 775
GBP 0.2 7.5 51 22 783 3.4 9.3 72 40 777
JPY 13.0 20.8 95 82 782 9.2 27.5 94 62 776
B. High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
AUD -34.6 8.7 0 0 702 -31.7 10.0 0 0 694
CAD 1.3 6.9 59 26 784 3.2 8.1 68 26 776
CHF 16.6 24.8 100 97 784 13.2 23.6 94 75 776
EUR 1.3 15.3 52 46 781 0.8 13.5 53 37 773
GBP 8.7 6.0 100 100 783 10.9 10.5 92 83 775
JPY 20.2 21.3 100 100 782 16.3 29.6 100 95 774
Notes: The Table shows CIP deviations, measured in basis points, for an implementable strategy involving
borrowing in the U.S. market. The sample covers the post-crisis period prior to the adjustment phase of the
U.S. money market fund (MMF) reform (January 2013–March 2016). Positive numbers represent arbitrage
profits. The Commercial Paper (CP) funding rate differs according to two rating categories, either high-rated
banks (A-1/P-1) or mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). The crucial aspect for a proper arbitrage, seen from the
arbitrageur’s perspective, is that the investment is risk-free, here represented by investing in central bank
deposits. Columns give the median CIP arbitrage profit, the standard deviation of CIP arbitrage profits, and
proportion of days (%D) and months (%M) during the sample when a positive arbitrage profit is observed.
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Table 1.H.6
(Continued) Risk-free CIP arbitrage funded via the CP market and invested in
CB deposits. The MMF reform sample. 1-week and 1-month maturity
1-month 1-week
Deviation Deviation
Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs. Median Std. (%D) (%M) Obs.
II: MMF reform sample (Apr 2016 – June 2017)
A. Mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2)
AUD -45.3 10.4 0 0 294 -45.2 17.7 0 0 293
CAD -3.4 10.8 38 0 316 -4.6 18.9 36 0 314
CHF 36.0 29.0 100 100 316 16.7 46.6 97 71 314
EUR 30.3 23.0 100 94 316 14.9 42.0 99 80 314
GBP 16.5 17.9 96 69 316 7.1 31.4 83 34 314
JPY 34.1 34.1 100 93 307 7.5 50.5 70 12 305
B. High-rated banks (A-1/P-1)
AUD -32.4 7.6 0 0 294 -31.0 11.3 1 0 254
CAD 6.7 9.7 88 50 316 9.6 15.2 81 38 276
CHF 48.5 31.7 100 100 316 30.2 55.5 100 100 276
EUR 43.3 25.2 100 100 316 28.8 50.3 100 100 276
GBP 28.8 19.5 100 100 316 19.4 39.7 98 80 276
JPY 47.0 36.5 100 100 307 23.0 60.8 88 37 267
Notes: The Table shows CIP deviations, measured in basis points, for an implementable strategy involving
borrowing in the U.S. market. The sample covers the post-crisis period prior to the adjustment phase of the
U.S. money market fund (MMF) reform (January 2013–March 2016). Positive numbers represent arbitrage
profits. The Commercial Paper (CP) funding rate differs according to two rating categories, either high-rated
banks (A-1/P-1) or mid-rated banks (A-2/P-2). The crucial aspect for a proper arbitrage, seen from the
arbitrageur’s perspective, is that the investment is risk-free, here represented by investing in central bank
deposits. Columns give the median CIP arbitrage profit, the standard deviation of CIP arbitrage profits, and
proportion of days (%D) and months (%M) during the sample when a positive arbitrage profit is observed.
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Table 1.H.7
CIP arbitrage and FX swap market order flow imbalances across maturities
3-month 1-month 1-week
A-2/P-2 A-1/P-1 A-2/P-2 A-1/P-1 A-2/P-2 A-1/P-1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant -0.936 0.159 0.475 0.371 1.228 1.953
(-2.02) (0.77) (0.90) (0.74) (1.13) (1.38)
Error correction -0.100 -0.020 -0.033 -0.015 -0.095 -0.037
(-2.80) (-1.41) (-1.27) (-1.20) (-2.06) (-0.52)
Swap OF, in arb. 0.374 0.531 1.239 1.280 3.479 3.129
(1.65) (4.81) (4.49) (5.40) (3.22) (2.62)
Swap OF, no arb. 0.330 0.319 0.180 0.438 0.441 1.153
(2.35) (2.38) (0.65) (1.64) (0.99) (1.53)
Dollar index, in arb. 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.017 0.057 0.059
(0.06) (0.87) (0.16) (1.54) (1.62) (1.73)
Dollar index, no arb. -0.002 0.005 -0.024 0.008 0.007 0.003
(-0.20) (0.85) (-1.46) (0.86) (0.48) (0.16)
Lagged ∆CIP -0.163 -0.048 -0.196 -0.009 0.025 0.045
(-1.49) (-1.34) (-3.39) (-0.17) (0.42) (0.68)
Obs. 924 924 924 924 907 702
adj.R2 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01
Notes: The Table shows results from panel-regressions for changes in CIP deviations, measured in basis points,
across six different currencies. CIP deviations are based on funding in the U.S. CP market for banks with
either A-2/P-2 rating or high-rated banks with A-1/P-1-rating, and invested in central bank deposits. The
constant (not reported) and error-correction term (lagged level of CIP deviation) have constant coefficients
across deviation regimes, while the other explanatory variables are allowed to have different effects, depending
on whether a deviation exists. The return on FX spot is measured in basis points, while swap order flows
are standardized by own standard deviation. Robust t-statistics (cross-sectional clustering) are reported in
parenthesis below coefficient estimates. Sample: April 2016 – June 2017.
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Chapter 2
Price-setting in the FX swap market
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2.1 Introduction
Foreign Exchange (FX) swaps allow market participants to hedge exchange rate risk arising from
currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. After growing steadily over the past decade, FX
swaps are now the most traded foreign exchange instrument worldwide, with a daily turnover of
approximately $3.2 Trillion USD (2019 BIS triennial survey). In theory, the pricing of FX swaps is
pinned down by Covered Interest Parity (CIP) - a renowned no-arbitrage relationship in international
finance. CIP states that the rate of return on equivalent domestic and foreign assets should equalize
after covering exchange rate fluctuations in the FX swap market. However, the FX swap market has
been subject to considerable scrutiny since the global financial crisis, as the pricing no longer obeys
the iron law of CIP. Since 2008, CIP deviations have been large and persistent, and have implied
a systematic premium to swap EUR, CHF and JPY into USD via FX swaps (Figure 2.1). In this
paper we focus on the mechanisms that govern price-setting in the FX swap market.
While much of the recent literature focuses on why CIP deviations exist, and range from expla-
nations that center on limits to the supply of dollars in the FX swap market due to bank regulations
(Du et al., 2019; Cenedese et al., 2019; Bräuning and Puria, 2017a) and funding constraints (Rime
et al., 2019a; Liao, 2020), as well as factors that lead to an excess demand for dollars in the FX swap
market (Borio et al., 2016b; Sushko et al., 2016), less is understood about the role of price-setting
in the FX swap market. This paper aims to fill this gap. To this end, we examine order flow - the
net of buyer and seller initiated transactions - as a fundamental signal used by dealers to update the
forward rate of the FX swap contract. In particular, we investigate the price impact of order flow
before and after the financial crisis and how dealers respond to different types of information.
When a no-arbitrage relationship like CIP holds tightly, the role of order flow is confined to
correcting short-lived periods of mispricing. In the pre-crisis period, money markets were charac-
terized by low heterogeneity in funding costs where Libor (London interbank offered rate) acted as
an accurate representation of banks’ marginal cost across currencies. This made price-setting in
the FX swap market a straightforward process, where the dealer takes interest rates in respective
currencies as given. The dealer then sets the forward rate according to CIP so that the returns are
equalized after covering the exchange rate risk. Hence, we hypothesize that the price impact of order
flow is small prior to 2008. In contrast, the post-crisis period is characterized by a large dispersion
in funding costs, differences in funding availability across currency areas and tighter constraints on
banks’ balance sheets. This makes it difficult for dealers to determine the equilibrium price. We
hypothesize that dealers use order flow in the post-crisis period as a signal to set the forward rate.
By exploiting time variation in the dispersion of funding costs and balance sheet constraints we
examine how these factors can account for an increase in the price impact of order flow.
Our order flow measure is based on transaction level data from the Thomson Reuters D2000-2
platform. This platform registers inter-dealer transactions in the FX swap market where each trade
is signed as either a buyer or a seller initiated transaction. The daily net of buyer and seller initiated
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transactions constitutes our order flow measure. In our sign convention, we interpret a positive order
flow as net buying pressure to obtain USD through FX swaps. Due to superior market depth, we
use 1-week maturity as our preferred tenor and base our empirical analysis on the 1-week FX swap
order flow and 1-week deviation from CIP.1
We start by developing a microstructural model of the FX swap market. The model has three
key agents; customers, arbitrageurs and dealers. Customers are managing the currency exposure on
their balance sheets, for example by swapping foreign currency into USD. Arbitrageurs provide funds
through the FX swap market when arbitrage opportunities appear. Dealers act as intermediaries
and match the flows of customers and arbitrageurs and typically try to keep their positions flat to
avoid financing inventories (Lyons, 1995a; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005). Dealer aversion to inventory
accumulation yields a price-setting condition in which the forward rate is set to correct order im-
balances. The model’s primary contribution is to map a linear relationship between order flow and
the price-setting of FX swaps. We can use this framework to study how the price impact of order
flow is governed by shocks to arbitrageurs. For example, the model predicts that a tightening of
funding and balance sheet constraints leads to an inelastic supply of arbitrage capital, with dealers
adjusting the price substantially to avoid order flow and balance inventories.
Guided by our model, we first estimate the price impact of order flow, and find it has increased
substantially after the global financial crisis in 2008. Since the crisis, a positive 1 standard deviation
shock to order flow, i.e. demand to borrow USD through the FX swap market, causes a widening
of CIP deviations by up to 4 basis points. That is, when the demand for USD in the FX swap
market increases, the cost of obtaining dollars through FX swaps increases as well. We then test
why the price impact of order flow is a post-crisis phenomenon by examining potential differences
in the price impact of order flow in periods when the heterogeneity in US funding costs is large
and when balance sheet expansion is particularly costly for banks.2 Our estimates reveal that up to
three quarters of the increased price impact can be attributed to periods when funding heterogeneity
in USD is high and when the FX swap contract crosses regulatory reporting dates at quarter-ends.
Higher funding heterogeneity reduces the number of potential arbitrageurs as an increasing share of
market participants face funding costs exceeding the threshold necessary to reap arbitrage profit.
Similarly, regulatory reporting at quarter-ends give arbitrageurs incentives to reduce their provision
of arbitrage capital. Consequently, a larger price adjustment is necessary for dealers to balance
inventories.
In addition to the time varying price impact of order flow, we also test whether news is impounded
in the price contemporaneously, or through trading (see Evans and Lyons (2005) for analysis on the
FX spot market). Our model predicts that private information is revealed through order flow
1Note that our aim is not to precisely measure CIP arbitrage opportunities, but rather price-setting in the FX
swap market. We are therefore using 1-week Libor rates as the benchmark rate in our CIP calculation. Importantly,
by examining CIP deviations instead of the forward rate directly, we control for movements in the forward rate that
relates to changes in the interest rate differential.
2We define periods of funding heterogeneity by the daily cross sectional dispersion in 3-month US Libor panel
quotes.
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meaning that prices adjust as a result of trading activity. For example, suppose in response to a
shock to its access to dollar funding, a Euro area bank now obtains dollars via the FX swap market.
If the bank’s information is private and not known to the dealers before the order appears, these
excess demands translate to order flow in the inter-dealer market, which can then be used by dealers
to update the forward rate. Alternatively, we hypothesize public information is impounded in the
price contemporaneously. For example, consider a scheduled monetary announcement of a central
bank, where the outcomes of the meeting are conveyed to all market participants simultaneously.
If the announcement implies a change in the interest rate differential between two currencies, the
dealer can reset the forward rate to match the change in the interest differential. In this setting,
the monetary news is impounded in the price, suggestive of efficient price-setting in the FX swap
market.
We test whether the public or private information view is relevant in price-setting by studying
three different types of events. First, we examine the effect of Federal Reserve Swap lines during
the period 2007-2010. The swap lines allowed foreign central banks to provide US dollar funding
directly to their own eligible counterparties. By doing so, a larger set of counterparties were able
to access USD directly from the central bank rather than via the FX swap market.3 Although it is
publicly announced when these auctions take place, the dealers do not have detailed information on
whether individual counterparties would draw on the swap line.4 Therefore, we expect swap lines
will reduce the demand for USD through FX swaps and lower the order flow into USD. Second, we
look at dates when the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. A large number of banks report
quarter-end balance sheet snapshots to regulators. This implies incentives to reduce the size of the
balance sheet leading to a more inelastic supply of arbitrage capital and significant price effects
over reporting dates, as documented in Du et al. (2019). Given quarter-ends are public information
and known to dealers in advance, we hypothesize contemporaneous price adjustment. Third, we
identify monetary policy surprises to test whether the adjustment in the forward rate following
monetary policy announcements happens through order flow. Following our example of a monetary
announcement constituting public information, our theory points towards monetary news being
impounded in the forward rate contemporaneously.
Turning to the empirical evidence, we find evidence that the swap lines reduced the order flow
into USD which in turn affected the forward rate, supporting the private information hypothesis. In
response to quarter-ends, we utilize high frequency data of forward rates to show a large contempo-
raneous price adjustment exactly at the hour the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends, with the
3Alternatively, the swap line also relaxes arbitrageur balance sheet constraints and increases arbitrageurs’ ability
to supply dollars in the FX swap market. The effects on both customers and dealers will have an equivalent effect of
reducing the relative demand for dollar funding in the FX swap market.
4We stress that the private information is not the announcement of the swap line itself, which is known to dealers,
but the details of counterparties that use the swap line. For example, only a subset of banks that draw on the swap
line may have previously been relying on dollar funding via FX swaps. Similarly, banks may now start using these
dollar funds to supply dollars in the FX swap market. Both of these outcomes are unanticipated by dealers until they
are revealed as positive order flow.
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full price adjustment priced within two hours. Finally, in line with the hypothesis of public infor-
mation we find no effect on order flow of monetary policy announcements. These results highlight
that dealers efficiently adjust the price according to publicly available information.
Roadmap. The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of related lit-
erature. In section 2.3, we outline definitions of covered interest rate parity, FX swaps and order
flow and describe the data. In section 2.4, we develop a model of the microstructure of the FX
swap market and derive a price-setting rule that relates the forward rate of the swap to order flow
observed in the inter-dealer market. In section 2.5, we first provide baseline estimates of the price
impact of order flow. In section 2.6, we empirically test the microstructure hypotheses of how prices
are determined in response to public and private sources of information, using the response of the
FX swap market in response to quarter-end bank regulations and central bank swap lines. In section
2.7 we conclude.
2.2 Related literature
The literature on post 2008 CIP violations naturally centre on theories of what are the supply
and demand fundamentals in the FX swap market that explain persistent violation of deviations.
Theories on limits to the supply of dollars in the FX swap market include rising balance sheet costs
and regulatory requirements (Du et al., 2019; Liao, 2020; Bräuning and Puria, 2017a), the role of
the dollar in constraining leverage (Avdjiev et al., 2019), and rising bid/ask spreads due to limited
dealer capacity (Pinnington and Shamloo, 2016), costs to leverage such as shareholder risk (Andersen
et al., 2019) and rising counterparty or liquidity risk (Baba and Packer, 2009a; Griffoli and Ranaldo,
2010). Other factors affecting agents demands for dollars in the FX swap market include declines
in bank quality, declines in short-term funding, unconventional monetary policies, and central bank
swap lines (Sushko et al., 2016; Bahaj et al., 2018b; Ivashina et al., 2015; Iida et al., 2016). This
paper contributes to understanding CIP violations by understanding how constraints on the supply
of dollars in the FX swap market can lead to price discovery through order flow. This is a critical
component of the FX swap market microstructure and we show empirically that dealers use order
flow as a fundamental signal to update the forward rate of the FX swap.
The seminal work on market microstructure in FX has typically examined the price impact of
order flow on spot foreign exchange markets (Evans and Lyons, 2002, 2005, 2006; Berger et al., 2008;
Rime et al., 2010; Ranaldo and Somogyi, 2019). Microstructure models in Evans and Lyons (2002)
have typically used simultaneous trade models in which dealers set prices, and use inter-dealer order
flow following a trading round as information to reset prices. In developing our model framework of
the FX swap market, we share many of the elements in trading, however we note two clear differences
in FX swaps. The first is that customers in the FX swap market are trading for hedging purposes.
In contrast, investors in the FX spot market are composed of informed and uninformed traders, with
informed traders having an information advantage in the price of the spot exchange rate, which is
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treated as a speculative asset. Second, we add arbitrageurs to the framework as they attempt to
make systematic profits from the mispricing of the forward rate. Using our framework, we derive a
price-setting relation in which price adjustment of the FX swap, which we denote by the change in
the CIP deviation, is linearly related to order flow.
Finally, we relate to a recent interest in understanding the microstructure and impact of order
flow in the FX swap market. Krohn and Sushko (2017) examine how the market structure of the FX
swap market has led to a reduction in market liquidity and rising bid/ask spreads during quarter-
end periods. Cenedese et al. (2019) and Rime et al. (2019a) find evidence that order flow has
price impact in the post-crisis period. We extend their work in several ways. First, our measure
of order flow is based on each trade being marked as buyer or seller initiated within the data from
the trading platform, not the Ready-Lee algorithm. This eliminates potential errors and enable
us to sign each trade. Second, through a model framework, we derive the price impact of order
flow on the FX swap market through an inter-dealer market that sets the forward rate to minimize
inventory accumulation. Third, in contrast to the existing literature we provide an explanation on
how price impact of order flow has changed after the financial crisis. Our model framework enables
us to link two factors, increased dispersion in dollar funding costs, and the tightening of leverage
constraints, that explain up to three quarters of increased price impact we observe empirically in
the post-crisis period. Fourth, we find that the source of information matters: in response to public
announcements, dealers set the forward rate contemporaneously. In contrast, order flow plays a
significant role in price-setting of the forward rate in response to private information, and this is
substantiated through the allotment of central bank swap lines by the Federal Reserve in the period
2008-2010.
2.3 Definitions and data
Definitions
Foreign exchange swaps
Foreign exchange swaps, also known as spot-forward contracts, are used by banks and corporates to
hedge balance sheet risk. A bank may hedge the FX exposure due to a mismatch of their currency
assets or liabilities, with evidence in Borio et al. (2016a) that Japanese banks have significantly
higher dollar assets than liabilities, causing them to turn to the FX swap market for dollar funding.
5 We illustrate the legs of a EUR/USD FX swap in Figure 2.2. In the first leg of the contract, the
customer exchanges a principal of X EUR at the current spot rate S USD per EUR. The customer
receives SX USD. Both parties then agree to re-exchange the principals at maturity at a specified
5Similarly, a corporate may hedge the currency mismatch of their cash flows, for example if a European corporate
has profits in USD from their offshore activities, they will hedge the foreign exchange risk by swapping their USD
receivables with EUR.
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forward rate, this is known as the forward leg of the contract. The customer receives their X EUR,
and the dealer then receives FX USD, where F is the forward rate of the contract.
In the empirical analysis the focus is on short-term FX swaps with maturity of 1-week. We focus
on this maturity because the majority of platform trading in FX swaps happens at short maturities.
At longer maturities, the use of brokers and telephone-based trading are more common.
Covered Interest Rate Parity
Covered interest rate parity (CIP) states that two assets with identical characteristics in terms of
credit risk and maturity, but denominated in different currencies, have the same rate of return after
accounting for exchange rate risk using a forward contract. To illustrate, let us consider an investor
that can borrow at the risk-free rate in USD or EUR. The total cost of borrowing 1 USD directly
is 1 + rf$ . Alternatively, the investor can borrow USD via the FX swap market. To do so, they
borrow 1S EUR, where S is the quotation in USD per EUR. The total cost in EUR is then
1+rfd
S .
They exchange the EUR into USD and hedge the exchange rate risk with a forward contract, which
gives a synthetic dollar cost of FS (1 + r
f
d ). The CIP deviation is defined as the difference between
the direct and synthetic dollar borrowing cost, which we formally state in equation 2.1.




(1 + rfd )︸ ︷︷ ︸
synthetic
(2.1)
Since 2008, the cost of borrowing USD through the FX swap market - the synthetic interest rate
in USD - based on EUR, CHF and JPY has been higher than the corresponding direct funding cost
in USD. The CIP deviations can therefore be interpreted as a synthetic dollar borrowing premium.
We document this in Figure 2.1, which plots 1 year CIP deviations for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD
and JPY/USD pairs.
In this paper, when we refer to price-setting of the FX swap, we specifically refer to a dealer
setting the forward rate, taking interest rates and the spot rate as inputs. We make this distinction
in equation 2.2, where in the pre-crisis period, deviations were rather small, ∆pre−crisis ≈ 0, and so
the forward rate is set by dealers consistent with CIP arbitrage (Akram et al., 2008).




In the post-crisis period, significant deviations from parity suggest dealers set the forward rate in
response to underlying demand and supply fundamentals in the FX swap market. Price determina-
tion is complicated by heterogeneity in funding spreads, leverage constraints and customer quality
during this period. As we will outline in our microstructural model of the FX swap market, these
factors can cause an inelastic supply of arbitrage capital, increasing the price impact of order flow.
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Data
CIP deviations
To compute CIP deviations at the 1 week maturity, we use Thomson Reuters tick history which con-
tains historical data on spot and 1 week forward rates of the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD
pairs measure at 6 PM Central European Time. Swap points, also referred to as pips, are used to get
the forward exchange rate, F = S + sp
104
, where we express S and F as dollars per unit of domestic
currency, and so the dollar is classified as the quoting currency. The CIP deviation we calculate in
equation 2.3 is expressed as the difference between the local dollar borrowing rate less the synthetic
dollar borrowing rate, where iq is the US interest rate, ib is the base interest rate (denominated
in EUR, CHF or JPY), S is the spot rate and F is the forward rate, calculated as the mid-point
using bid and ask quotes.6 A negative ∆ indicates that synthetic dollar borrowing costs exceed local
borrowing costs, and this is indeed the case for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs.
For a measure of risk-free rates, we use the 1 week Libor in the quoting and base currencies. In
constructing the CIP deviation, we convert our forward premium FS to annualised percentage points
in order to construct a measure of 1 week CIP deviations in annualised terms.7
∆t = 1 + iq,t −
Ft
St
(1 + ib,t) (2.3)
Summary statistics for the three currency pairs are provided in Table 2.1, for the EUR/USD,
CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs respectively. CIP deviations are much wider in the post 2008 period,
with an average of 30 basis points for all pairs. Average deviations are negative, suggesting that
the US Libor rate is less than a synthetic Libor rate based on borrowing in EUR, CHF or JPY and
swapping into USD using a forward contract. The range of CIP deviations also increases significantly
with measured spikes of up to -300 basis points. These spikes correspond to quarter-end periods,
which we investigate empirically in following sections.
Order Flow
Order flow is defined as the net of buyer initiated transactions. We define a transaction as buyer
initiated if it is initiated by a counterparty swapping EUR, CHF or JPY into USD. Conversely, a
transaction is seller initiated if the transaction is swapping USD into foreign currency. To measure
order flow at short-term maturities, we use the Reuters D2000-2 trading platform, which contains
inter-dealer trades from January 1st 2005 to September 1st 2017 in FX swaps for the EUR/USD,
CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs. We use the 1 Week maturity as it is the most liquid and traded
pair at maturities above 1-day. The dataset has quotes in the inter-dealer market, with columns
indicating bid price, ask price, a timestamp of the quote to the nearest second, and a column for the
6To calculate the mid spot rate, we average the spot rates at ask and bid, S = Sa+Sb
2
. Similarly, the forward rate
is calculated as the mid point of bid and ask quotes, F = Fa+Fb
2
7We account for the exact number of trading days by properly adjusting for bank holidays in the respective
currency pairs
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market price when a trade has occurred. Additionally, our data set has a column indicating if the
trade was buyer or seller initiated. Using this data, we can construct a measure of order flow. The
measure of order flow is then given as the net of buyer initiated transactions, where buyer initiated
transactions are signed +1 and seller initiated transactions are signed -1. The order flow for 1 week




1[Tk = B]− 1[Tk = S]
Summary statistics of order flow using the inter-dealer trades are provided in Table 2.2. The
mean of net buyer initiated trades is close to zero, and the standard deviation of trades ranges from
2-5 net buyer transactions per day. The EUR/USD pair has the highest range of order flow, with a
range of [-30,+30]. We provide plots of daily order flow in Figure 2.3.
Funding dispersion
We calculate the daily dispersion in the 3-month Libor contributions as a proxy for funding hetero-
geneity. The measure is computed as the difference between the highest and lowest daily submission
by the contributing panel banks. A higher value indicates larger dispersion in funding costs among
the panel banks. Data until February 1st 2014 for individual Libor submissions can be obtained from
Bloomberg. After this date Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) took over as Libor administrator from
British Bankers Association (BBA) and the data can be obtained from ICE. Figure 2.4 shows the
dispersion in 3-month Libor during our sample period ranging from January 1st 2005 to September
1st 2017.
Bid/ask spreads and price volatility
In the empirical part of the paper we also exploit the high frequency data from the Thomson Reuters
tick history to create bid/ask spreads and a measure of intra-day price volatility. The measure of
bid/ask spreads is the daily average of the last observation each hour. Figure 2.5 shows the evolution
of the bid/ask spreads during the sample period. As a measure of daily price volatility, we compute
the daily standard deviation based on hourly observations. The intra-day price volatility is depicted
in Figure 2.6.
2.4 Model
Before turning to the empirical results, we first develop a model to structure our testable hypotheses.
As a starting point, we introduce three types of agents in the model, customers, arbitrageurs, and
dealers. Customers include banks, other financial institutions and non-financial institutions that
8Note that the common way of measuring order flow is to follow the algorithm provided in Lee and Ready (1991),
which sign transactions as buyer or seller initiated based on bid and ask quotes. In our data we know the direction
of the trade (seller or buyer initiated) is already indicated. This means that we are able to sign all trades correctly.
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manage currency mismatch between assets and liabilities by hedging their positions via FX swaps.
In addition to customers, there are a distinct group of arbitrageurs. The arbitrageurs can step in and
supply funds in the FX swap market to earn arbitrage profits from mispricing of the forward rate in
response to underlying demand from customer flows. The third group of agents are dealers, who set
the forward rate of the FX swap. The objective of dealers is to match flows as much as possible, both
from customers and arbitrageurs. Any unmatched flows are submitted to the inter-dealer market
and are observed as order flow. The key assumption in price-setting is that the inter-dealer market
sets the forward rate to avoid order imbalances.
The primary contribution of the model is in deriving a relationship between order flow and
price-setting of the forward rate. Additional testable implications include an analysis of the factors
that affect price impact. We identify two factors, shocks to arbitrageur capital in the form of
heterogeneous funding costs and leverage constraints, increase the price impact of order flow.
Arbitrageurs
Following Sushko et al. (2016), we model an arbitrageur that has expected exponential utility over




, where ρ is a measure of risk
aversion. The arbitrageur decides to lend x$,j,t dollars in the FX swap market. To do so, they first
borrow at the dollar risk-free rate rf$ . The dealer exchanges principals at a specified spot exchange
rate st dollars per unit of domestic currency, with an agreement to re-exchange principals at maturity
at the forward rate ft. During the contract, they invest the domestic currency, at a risk-free rate
rfd . The CIP deviation, ∆t, is the excess of the forward premium over the interest rate differential,
∆t = ft− st− (rf$ − r
f
d ).
9 In our model, the arbitrageur faces three limits to arbitrage: counterparty
risk, funding costs, and leverage constraints. We detail each of these channels below.
Counterparty risk
The arbitrageur bears counterparty risk. In the event of a default with a given probability θ, the
arbitrageur does not earn the forward premium ft − st on the trade, but instead earns a stochastic
return based on the realized spot rate exchange rate st+1.10
Funding costs
Funding spread heterogeneity is a post-crisis feature and is typically represented as higher credit
spreads in dollars, as well as more dispersion in Libor rates for banks (Rime et al., 2019a). The
9Note that the definition of the CIP deviation in the model is the negative of the CIP deviation expressed in the
empirical evidence. We change the notation for the model as we are taking the perspective of an arbitrageur supplying
dollars in the FX swap market.
10Our model excludes the market practice of paying margin in FX swaps. This would imply that moves in the
underlying spot exchange rate are effectively collateralized by the counterparty. An implication of the margining
practice is that the arbitrageur faces liquidity risk instead. However, in short-term FX swaps, the liquidity risk
connected to margining is limited. Similarly, an arbitrageur may minimise counterparty risk by conducting the trade
with its own dealer, if it is an arm of an investment bank. Therefore, we do not consider counterparty risk as a
relevant factor in our empirical analysis.
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dollar funding spread reflects individual arbitrageur funding margins over the risk-free rate.11 We
model this formally, with each arbitrageur j facing a marginal funding cost c$,j,t over the risk-free
rate rf$ .
Leverage constraints
As the ratio of debt to total assets increases with more arbitrage capital, so does the marginal cost of
obtaining dollars. For example, in Bräuning and Puria (2017b) they find evidence that the size of the
swap position leads to higher forward premiums charged by dealers, all else equal. This is especially
heightened in quarter-end periods when leverage constraints prevent agents from borrowing dollars






, with φt (.) > 0. This is a stylized way of capturing regulatory factors such as requirements
on a minimum level of risk-weighted capital to assets, and other costs of scaling the balance sheet
to conduct CIP arbitrage.
We can write the evolution of wealth in the next period as the sum of returns on initial wealth,
CIP arbitrage profits and the difference between the actual spot rate at t+1 and the forward rate.
Wt+1 = Wt(1 + r
f
$ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
return on wealth
+ x$,j,t∆t︸ ︷︷ ︸
cip arbitrage
+ θx$,j,t(st+1 − ft)︸ ︷︷ ︸
counterparty risk










Assuming st+1 ∼ N(ft, σ2), and drawing on the properties of the exponential distribution,


















The equation for the supply of dollars by the arbitrageur takes the following piece-wise functional
form, provided in equation 2.6. An arbitrageur will only supply dollars if their funding cost is below
a threshold c∗$. We define the funding cost threshold as the point at which the net arbitrage profits















, c$,j,t < c
∗
$
0 , c$,j,t ≥ c∗$
(2.6)
To summarize, arbitrageur supply of dollars is positively related to the forward premium (and CIP
deviation ∆), and negatively related to dollar funding spreads and leverage constraints. Increased
heterogeneity in dealer funding spreads, for example, will cause more arbitrageurs to have too high
11Note that we are using the Libor fixing as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the empirical part of the paper. This
is strictly speaking not accurate, but our mission in this paper is to investigate the price-setting in FX swaps, not to
precisely measure arbitrage opportunities.
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funding spreads c$,j,t ≥ c∗$, and to not supply dollars in the FX swap market. We will discuss the
implications of funding spread heterogeneity for price-setting in the inter-dealer market in a following
section.
Customers
Customers, typically banks, use the FX swap market to hedge their currency balance sheet mismatch.
We capture customer demands by the following stylized function, where banks are in a continuum
[0,1] indexed by bank quality θb and the CIP deviation ∆. Importantly, xD$,t is a measure of the net





The first determinant of net demand for USD in the FX swap market is θb, which measures
counterparty quality. All else equal, counterparties with higher quality are more likely to obtain
dollars directly via commercial paper markets or bank deposits. Therefore, demands for dollar
funding via FX swaps is inversely related to counterparty quality. The increase in counterparty risk
is a key determinant of the increased demand for dollar constrained banks in the FX swap market
in 2008 (Baba and Packer, 2009a). The second determinant of net demand is the CIP deviation ∆.
All else equal, a higher CIP deviation implies an increase in the net cost of swapping euros, swiss
francs and yen into dollars. Evidence in Eguren Martin et al. (2018) suggests that in response to
shocks to the CIP deviation, banks’ net demand for dollars in the FX swap market declines.
Inter-Dealer Market
We have defined customers and arbitrageurs. Each of these agents are price-takers, and go to a
market-maker to find a counter-party to take the other side of the trade. The market-maker is
the dealer in our model. The dealer’s objective is to match flows of swapping domestic currency
into dollars with opposing flows. This is consistent with theories of market microstructure where
dealers are sufficiently risk averse to holding inventory (see Lyons (1995b) and Bjønnes and Rime
(2005) for empirical evidence on dealers minimizing inventory). Moreover, all dealers in FX swaps
are associated with a bank. Therefore, the dealer faces the same funding costs and constraints as
the mother bank that indeed can be part of the group of arbitrageurs. We denote the net dollar
demands by customers to dealer j by xD$,j . Denote the net supply of dollars by arbitrageurs to dealer
j by x∗$,t,j . Unmatched flows in dollars are submitted to the inter-dealer market. We illustrate the
unmatched flows of a dealer in Figure 2.7. The dealer submits the excess demand for dollar funding
to the inter-dealer market, and this is observed as OFt,j in the Figure.
Aggregating across all dealers, we obtain an expression for inter-dealer order flowOFt, in equation
2.8. Inter-dealer order flow is equal to the net buying pressure of swapping EUR, CHF or JPY
(domestic currency) into USD. Net customer demands for USD at the spot leg of the FX swap is
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$,t, where we denote N as the number of arbitrageurs that have sufficiently low funding







To illustrate the timing of customer-dealer trades and price-setting, Figure 2.8 depicts a two
period model, in which customers and dealers trade at the beginning of each period. Immediately
after each period of trading, the inter-dealer market observes order flow. Dealers then set the forward
rate of the FX swap, and hence the CIP deviation ∆, to set expected order imbalances to zero for
the next period of trading.
Definition [Price setting]: The inter-dealer market sets a forward rate to set inter-dealer order
flow to be zero, based on an information set that includes information on current and past prices,
and customer and arbitrageur fundamentals.
Et [OFt(∆t)|It] = 0 (2.9)
The price-setting condition is implicitly assuming an inter-dealer market that sets a common price
for all dealers. This is a reasonable assumption, as if dealers set different prices, this would not be a
sustainable equilibrium as other dealers will only execute swap trades with the dealer that sets the
most favorable rate.12 Combining equations 2.8 and 2.9, we can rewrite the order flow in period t

















In the model, order flow responds to changes to demand fundamentals that are not forecast
by dealers. This provides a simple decomposition of order imbalances into unexpected idiosyncratic
shocks to customers and dealers, shown in equation 2.11. The first term reflects unanticipated shocks
to customer type and funding spreads. For example, the inter-dealer market may not directly observe
customer types, such as credit ratings and their ability to borrow dollars in alternative markets. The
second term reflects unanticipated changes in funding spreads. The third term reflects rises in the
cost of leverage.
12Moreover, inter-dealer trades are secured by daily margining practically eliminating potential differences in
counterparty risk across dealers.




























Finally, we can solve for the equilibrium CIP deviation ∆, can be derived from setting expected
order flow to zero, in equation 2.12. Intuitively, an increase in customer demand, an increase in
dollar funding spreads, or a tightening of leverage constraints on arbitrageurs, leads to a widening


















E [f(θb, .)|It] (2.12)
We can use the framework to study the price impact of order flow, as well as the propagation of
shocks to demand and supply on price-setting in the FX swap market.
Proposition 1: price impact of order flow
A positive shock to order flow in period t implies a widening of CIP deviations, with the price
sensitivity β = ρθ
2σ2
N .
∆t −∆t−1 = βOFt (2.13)
The price impact of order flow is seen in equation 2.13 is governed by β, which is related posi-
tively to variance of the exchange rate, counterparty risk, and negatively related to the number of
arbitrageurs N . 13
We can further decompose price impact of order flow into unanticipated shocks to customer
demand and arbitrageur supply in equation 2.14. An unanticipated change in customer demands for
dollars in the FX swap market, due to a change in quality, or an unanticipated change in arbitrageur
funding spreads and leverage constraints, has price impact through order flow.
13This contrasts to the β in microstructure models of the spot FX market, which typically measures the relative
share of informed traders (Evans and Lyons, 2002). We differentiate our price impact equation in that FX swaps do
not feature uninformed traders, and rely on customers that use FX swaps for largely hedging purposes.
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∆t −∆t−1 = β
1∫
0
























In an efficient market with no limits to arbitrage, N →∞ and there is a zero price impact of order
flow. In this case, there is an elastic supply of arbitrage capital to take the other side of customer
trades, and dealers are able to minimise inventory and match flows. This leads us to proposition 2,
which states that the price impact of order flow is more sensitive in periods of increased dispersion
in funding spreads of arbitrageurs.
Proposition 2: (i) Heterogeneity in funding spreads and (ii) the tightening of leverage
constraints, increases the price impact of order flow
Assume the distribution of arbitrageur funding costs is given by c$,j,t ∼ N(c̄$, σ2c ). An increased
dispersion in funding costs (σc ↑) and an increase in the marginal cost of leverage (φ′j( xW ) ↑) leads
to a decline in the number of arbitrageurs supplying dollars in the FX swap market (N ↓) and an
increased price impact of order flow, β ↑).
Proof: The number of arbitrageurs supplying dollars in the FX swap market is proportional to
the probability that the investor will conduct arbitrage, which is when the funding cost c$,j,t is less
than the threshold value c∗$. Utilizing the fact that the threshold value c
∗
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) . An increase
in σc and an increase in the marginal cost of leverage φ′j(
x
W ) lowers the probability of conducting
arbitrage, and increases the expected price impact of order flow.
Heterogeneity of funding spreads is consistent with the empirical findings of Rime et al. (2019a).
When heterogeneity in funding costs increases, the remaining arbitrageurs that still face arbitrage
opportunities have to supply more USD. 14 Limits to arbitrage capital are particularly pronounced
14Arbitrageurs face higher funding costs when they need to raise large amounts of debt to fund the arbitrage trade.
For instance Money Market Funds that lend dollars are limited by regulation not to invest more than 5 per cent of
their assets in a single issuer.
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during quarter-end regulations, and there is micro level evidence suggesting dealers that are more
leveraged are more sensitive to order imbalances and demand a higher forward premium on the
contract (Du et al., 2019; Cenedese et al., 2019). Finally, we can use the framework to decompose
shocks to private and public information, that gives rise to our two views of price-setting in the FX
swap market in proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Public versus Private information view
Consider a shock to customer quality, arbitrageur funding spreads or leverage constraints. Denote
these shocks εt = [εQ,t, εC,t, εL,t]. Define the dealer information set It, and private information I−t
is the complementary set. The price-setting equation can then be expressed in equation 2.16, where
OFt = εQ,t + εC,t + εL,t|I−t
∆t −∆t−1 = βOFt + βE[εQ,t + εC,t + εL,t|It] (2.16)
Proof: For illustration, let us partition shocks to customer quality into public and private infor-
mation shocks. εQ,t = εQ,t|I−t + εQ,t|It. Order flow is then defined as shocks to customer quality
unanticipated by dealers: OF = εQ,t − εQ,t|It. Using the price-setting equation, and re-arranging
terms, gives us equation 2.16.
∆t −∆t−1 = βεQ,t
= β(εQ,t|I−t + εQ,t|It)
= β(εQ,t − εQ,t|It) + β(εQ,t|It)
= β OFt︸︷︷︸
private
+ β(εQ,t|It)︸ ︷︷ ︸
public
Proposition 3 states that the source of information matters for price-setting. Public informa-
tion shocks are impounded in the price contemporaneously. In contrast, order flow reflects private
information. We provide examples of public and private information shocks in the context of the
model.
Public information shocks: Examples include monetary announcements and quarter-end
reporting requirements. A testable implication of our framework is that we expect to observe con-
temporaneous adjustment of the forward rate in response to public announcements.
Private information shocks: An example of a shock to bank quality that we test empirically
is the introduction of central bank swap lines. Central bank swap lines by the Federal Reserve
provide incremental dollar liquidity to sufficiently dollar constrained banks. As banks of low quality
are more likely to use central bank swap lines as a way to meet dollar funding, we can interpret this
as reducing customer demand for dollars via FX swaps. Crucially, if the swap line auctions to dollar
constrained banks are private information, this results in a decline in order flow, causing a decline
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in the forward premium of the swap trade.
To conclude, the model has provided a framework to show how unanticipated shocks to customer
demand, funding spreads and leverage constraints can translate to an increase in inter-dealer order
flow. This causes dealers to reset the forward premium of the FX swap to offset order flow, resulting
in a widening of the CIP deviation. This is consistent with microstructure theories on inventory
control; dealers are sufficiently averse to holding inventory and update the forward rate as a response
to avoid inventory accumulation. We test three predictions in our empirical evidence. First, based on
proposition 1, we measure the price impact of order imbalances. We then test proposition 2; which
states that heterogeneous dollar funding costs and leverage constraints during quarter-ends lead to
increased price impact of order flow. In proposition 3, we test the public and private information
views with an analysis of central bank swap lines, quarter-ends and monetary announcements.
2.5 Price Impact of Order Flow
Baseline specification
In this section, we examine the price impact of order flow. In proposition 1 of the model, we
concluded that an increase in order flow in the inter-dealer market is consistent with excess demands
for swapping other currencies into USD, i.e. borrowing USD through FX swaps. As dealers are averse
to holding inventory, the inter-dealer market resets the forward rate to offset order flow. This leads
to an increase in the forward premium and a widening of CIP deviations. Our baseline specification
for testing the price impact of order flow is outlined in equation 2.17.
∆CIPt = α+ β1OFt + βjXj,t + εt (2.17)
The outcome variable is the daily change in 1-week CIP deviations, where negative values indicate
that it is more costly to obtain USD through FX swaps relative to the direct borrowing rate in USD.
Our variable of interest, β1, measures the price impact of order flow (OF). X is a vector of control
variables including the change in the U.S. Libor-OIS spreads for 1-week and 3-month maturities, the
VIX index, and the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. We run the specification for all currency
pairs as a panel and for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs separately, and divide our
sample into two periods, a pre 2008 period (January 2005 to December 2007), and a post 2008 period
(January 2008 to September 2017).
By dividing our sample into before and after 2008 we are able to uncover potential changes in
the price impact of order flow after the global financial crisis. Our justification is that during the
pre 2008 period, CIP held tightly, indicating an elastic supply of arbitrage capital. Order flow is not
expected to have any significant price impact, as there are relatively short-lived periods of mispricing
in the FX swap market (Akram et al., 2008). However, in the post-crisis period, arbitrage capital
becomes scarce. We hypothesize that dealers adjust prices more aggressively during this period to
attract the necessary arbitrage capital and balance dealer inventories.
Our results are presented in Table 2.3. In columns (1) through to (4), we test for price impact
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in the pre-crisis period, and in columns (5) through to (8), we test for price impact in the post-crisis
period. We find that order flow has significant price impact in the post 2008 period for all 3 pairs,
with a one standard deviation change in order flow widening CIP violations by up to 4 basis points
based on the panel specification in column (5). In contrast, there is no significance in the pre 2008
period.
Dynamic effects
In addition to the contemporaneous price impact of order flow, we test for dynamic effects using
a structural vector autoregression (VAR) framework. Following the work of Hasbrouck (1991) and
Ranaldo and Somogyi (2019), we estimate the following bivariate VAR, illustrated in equations 2.18
and 2.19. In equation 2.18, a contemporaneous shock to daily order flow is impounded in the price
the same day, which is consistent with the price-setting equation derived in our model framework.
Conversely, we only allow for shocks to prices to affect order flow with a lag. The identification
assumption is consistent with causality running from order flow to price-setting of the FX swap.






β1,kOFt−k + ε1,t (2.18)






β2,kOFt−k + ε2,t (2.19)
Based on our specification with 7 lags, we test the effects of a 1 standard deviation shock to
order flow on the CIP deviations in Figure 2.9. On the left panel, we test for effects during the
pre 2008 period, and observe no systematic effect of order flow on the CIP deviation for all pairs
of the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD. In the post 2008 period, we find the CIP deviation
widens by approximately 4 basis points contemporaneously, with the price impact decaying to zero
approximately 3-5 days following the shock. This response is intuitive; order flow has maximum
impact contemporaneously, and decays over time as dealers update their information sets. We now
turn to two factors that can restrict arbitrage capital, an increase in funding cost heterogeneity and
regulatory reporting during quarter-ends, that account for the increase in price impact observed in
the post 2008 period.
Dispersion in funding costs and quarter-ends
Proposition 2 of the model in section 2.4 predicts that the price impact of order flow increases when
heterogeneity in U.S. funding costs is large and when banks’ balance sheet constraints are more
binding. When funding cost dispersion increases in USD less market participants are in the position
to conduct the arbitrage trade. The remaining arbitrageurs with favourable funding costs may face
limits to the scalability of the arbitrage trade. Important reporting dates, such as quarter-ends,
represent an opportunity to test how the price impact of order flow responds to tighter regulatory
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constraints. An increasing marginal cost of leverage suggests the supply of arbitrage capital becomes
less elastic and the price impact of order flow increases.
To jointly test these hypotheses we run the following regression specification in equation 2.20.
The variables FundingHet and Qend represent dummy variables for funding cost heterogeneity and
quarter-ends, respectively. We are interested in the interaction between order flow and these variables
to examine if the price impact of order flow changes when dispersion in funding costs increases and
the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. The dummy FundingHet captures days with high cross
sectional dispersion among U.S. Libor panel banks in their individual submissions and when the
1-week FX swap contract matures after quarter-ends.15 The dummy Qend captures an increase in
balance sheet constraints as regulatory authorities in most jurisdictions rely on quarter-end snapshot
of banks’ balance sheets. In addition to the control variables mentioned in the baseline specification,
we also include the two dummies FundingHet and Qend.
∆CIPt = α+ β1OFt + β2OFt × FundingHett + β3OFt ×Qendt + βjXj,t + εt (2.20)
Table 2.4 presents the results. Columns (1) to (4) measure the price impact of order flow
during the pre-crisis period, and columns (5) to (8) measure price impact during the post period.
Consistent with our theory, we find that the price impact of order flow is significantly higher during
periods of high dispersion in Libor quotes in the post crisis period. The results suggest that larger
heterogeneity in funding spreads implies that the forward rate has to adjust more aggressively to
attract the necessary arbitrage capital to balance the market. Moreover, there is a substantial
increase in price impact during quarter-end periods. This is also consistent with our theory of more
inelastic supply of arbitrage capital when balance sheet constraints are more binding. Based on the
panel regression estimates in column (5), days with high funding cost heterogeneity and quarter-end
periods account for approximately three quarters of the increase in price impact after 2008.16
Direction of order flow
Following Rime et al. (2019a), we now test for asymmetric price impact of order flow. We expect
that the price impact of order flow when it is positive, i.e. there is net pressure for swapping domestic
currency into USD in the inter-dealer market. This is because high funding cost heterogeneity in
USD leads to a shortage of arbitrage capital in USD. However, for negative shocks to order flow, the
availability of arbitrage capital in other currencies is what matters for price impact.
We present our results in Table 2.5. Columns (1) through to (4) depict the results from regressing
positive and negative order flow on changes in CIP deviations and these two variables interacted with
15The dispersion dummy takes value 1 when the cross sectional dispersion (difference between the maximum and
the minimum submitted quote) is within the highest quartile of the distribution on the respective day and zero
otherwise
16To arrive at this calculation, we note that the aggregate price impact of a one standard deviation order flow
shock is approximately 4 basis points. After controlling for funding heterogeneity and quarter-ends, the coefficient
β1 ≈ 1, implying that three quarters of the price impact is explained by these two factors.
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a dummy that takes the value of 1 after 2008, and zero otherwise. As expected, neither positive nor
negative order flow have any price impact prior to 2008. After 2008, both negative and positive order
flow is highly significant across all currencies. This result serves as an indication that insufficient
arbitrage capital in USD as an important constraint after 2008.
In addition, we run a similar regression as specified in equation 2.20 on the panel of currencies,
but now with the order flow split between positive and negative order flow. Columns (5) and
(6) depict the pre and post 2008 results respectively. In the post 2008 sample, shown in column
(6), the price impact of positive order flow is significantly larger than for negative order flow, and
during periods when funding heterogeneity is high. This is consistent with our hypothesis that high
funding cost heterogeneity in USD leads to a shortage of arbitrage capital in USD, making dealers
more sensitive to positive order flow (net demand for swapping domestic currencies into USD) in
the FX swap market. During quarter-ends, we find both positive and negative order flow have large
price impact. Dealers are aggressively adjusting the price to balance order flow independent of the
direction. They are using the order flow as a signal to update the forward rate of the swap in periods
when balance sheets are particularly constrained.
Bid/ask spreads and price volatility
To further substantiate the results on the price impact of order flow we examine bid/ask spreads
and price volatility, calculated from high frequency quotes in the FX swap market. Bid/ask spreads
are a proxy for market liquidity, and constructed as the daily intraday average of 1-week bid and
ask for each currency pair. High bid/ask spreads can either indicate inventory risk for the dealer, or
asymmetric information in the FX swap market. We calculate the daily standard deviation of price
changes from high frequency intraday FX swap quotes as a proxy for price volatility.
We hypothesize that bid-ask spreads and intraday volatility increase during periods of funding
heterogeneity and when the FX swap contract trades over quarter-ends. Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present
results from regressing the bid/ask spread and price volatility on the quarter-end and funding het-
erogeneity variables used in specification 2.20. Columns (1) through to (3) test for effects in the
pre-crisis period. Columns (4) to (9) test for effects in the post-crisis period, with additional dum-
mies capturing the post 2015 period. First, the constant in the regression indicates that the bid/ask
spreads are lowest for EUR/USD and highest for CHF/USD. This is in line with the interpreta-
tion that the EUR/USD is the most liquid currency pair while the CHF/USD is the least liquid.
Similarly, price volatility increases during periods of large funding cost heterogeneity and during
quarter-end periods. This is in line with order flow having stronger price impact and wider bid/ask
spreads during these periods.
Most of the increase during quarter-ends have taken place after banks started to report leverage
ratio to the public in 2015. In addition to lower market liquidity over quarter-ends, this may be
related to leverage ratio increasing the costs of inventory for dealers. Wider bid/ask spreads act as a
compensation for higher costs of being a dealer, and is consistent with empirical evidence in Krohn
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and Sushko (2017) which find bid/ask spreads rise during quarter-end periods.17
2.6 Public vs Private Information Shocks
In this section we empirically test the microstructural hypotheses of public and private information,
outlined in proposition 3 of the model in section 2.4. We examine how price-setting in the FX swap
market is determined in response to three different types of announcements, central bank swap lines,
quarter-end reporting requirements and monetary policy surprises.
Central Bank Swap Lines
Central bank swap lines provide incremental dollar liquidity to sufficiently dollar constrained banks.
Price effects have been well documented, with the rate at which the Federal Reserve lends to coun-
terparty central banks enforcing a ceiling on CIP deviations (Bahaj et al., 2018b). We use the central
bank swap lines to test the following microstructure hypotheses of how price-setting is determined in
the FX swap market. If swap lines are public information, swap line auctions should be impounded
in the price contemporaneously. In contrast, if the details of swap line auctions are private to dealers,
price effects are due to the arrival of order flow.
We hypothesise that the swap lines constitute private information. While the date of swap line
auctions are publicly known, the details of which banks have access to the swap line are unknown
to dealers. Banks that have access to dollars via a central bank swap line will reduce their demand
for dollar funding in the FX swap market. Therefore, dealers can update forward rates once they
observe a decline in buyer initiated transactions. 18
To test our hypothesis, we use data on Federal Reserve swap line allotments to counterparty
banks during the period of 2008-2010. The data contains a record of every transaction made, with
both amounts and maturity listed. The maturity of a swap line can range from one week to 1
month. At a daily frequency, we compute the total stock of allotments as the total amount of all
loans made by the Federal Reserve to counterparty central banks, less any loans that have matured.
The daily change in stocks provides us a flow measure of allotments. This is the most direct measure
of incremental liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to foreign (non U.S.) banks. We construct
a measure of total allotments for the central bank swap line. At the height of the crisis, in October
of 2008, allotments peaked at approximately $250B to the ECB, and approximately $100B to the
BOJ. The sharp rise in allotments was due to a move by the Federal Reserve to raise the ceiling on
allotment amounts. To construct a global measure of total loans to banks in the Eurozone, Japan
and Switzerland, we add the total amounts outstanding for lines extended to the ECB, BOJ and
SNB.
17They make an additional point that market structure matters for dealer pricing. In particular, the role of smaller
dealers providing arbitrage capital during quarter-ends leads to an increase in the observed bid/ask spreads
18Alternatively, if the central bank swap lines are instead allocated to arbitrageurs supplying dollars in the swap
market, we expect an increase in seller initiated transactions for dollars in the EUR/USD FX swap market. In either
case, we predict an increase in allotments to reduce order flow.
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We test for the impact of the constructed measure of swap line allotment flows on the CIP
deviations and order flow using the multivariate VAR framework is summarized in equations 2.21,
2.22 and 2.23. We use data on 1 week FX swaps as the majority of swap allotments are of a 1
week maturity. As well as the measure of CIP deviations CIPt and order flow OFt, we augment the
bivariate VAR in section 2.5 with a measure of swap allotment flows At. The identifying assumption
is that shocks to swap line allotments can have contemporaneous effects on the covered interest
rate parity deviation and order flow. In contrast, swap line allotments are only affected by lagged
order flow and CIP deviations. We hypothesize that a positive shock to swap line allotments causes
a decline in order flow, as banks substitute toward the swap line for additional dollar funding.
Similarly, banks that now receive dollar funding can use their arbitrage capital by supplying dollars
in the FX swap market. The decline in order flow then narrows deviations of covered interest rate
parity.









δ1,kAt−k + ε1,t (2.21)









δ2,kAt−k + ε2,t (2.22)









δ3,kAt−k + ε3,t (2.23)
In our baseline specification, we use L = 7 lags. We document the impulse response to a 1
standard deviation shock in swap line allotment flows in Figure 2.10. Consistent with our hypothesis,
there is a contemporaneous decline in order flow for the EUR/USD and JPY/USD pairs. The effect
on order flow is strongest for the EUR/USD. This is intuitive, given the majority of swap line
allotments were extended to the ECB, which then auctioned funds to European banks that relied
on dollar funding in the EUR/USD FX swap market.
Examining price effects, we see that there is a peak narrowing of CIP deviations by 5 basis points
for each pair, with the peak effect occurring 2-3 days following the swap line shock. The delayed
price adjustment is attributed to the timing of swap line allotments; allotments occur in periods
of extreme dislocation in FX swap markets, and are responding to periods of low liquidity, high
counterparty risk, and significant dollar shortages.19 While the effect of swap lines on reducing CIP
deviations has been the focus of Bahaj et al. (2018b), we contribute to this literature by showing
that the price impact of central bank swap lines occurs through the channel of order flow.
Direct effects on order flow
Adding to the dynamic effects of the swap lines on order flow and CIP, we run a simple regression
where we regress order flow on a dummy for the days when the results of the swap line auctions are
19In appendix 2.3 table 2.13 we find no effect of the swap lines on the price impact of order flow.
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announced. As in our previous regressions we include the dummies for funding heterogeneity and
quarter-ends. The control variables includes changes in Libor-OIS spreads (1w and 3m), VIX and
broad USD index. The sample runs from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2009, the period when
the banks actively draw on the swap lines.
Table 2.8 depicts the results from the regression. In line with the VAR results, the order flow
is substantially lower (less pressure to borrow USD in the FX swap market) on the days when the
central banks announces the outcome of the USD auctions.
Quarter-end effects
At quarter-ends, there is an incentive for financial institutions to window-dress balance sheets in
order to meet leverage requirements imposed by Basel 3. Quarter-ends can impact both customers
and arbitrageurs in the FX swap market. First, quarter-ends limit capital to conduct CIP arbitrage
trades, reducing the supply of dollars in the FX swap market. Second, there is evidence that a large
increase in excess reserves of Euro area, Japan and Swiss banks during the post 2008 period increases
the incentive to use FX swaps as an alternative source of dollar funding during quarter-ends. 20
Quarter-end reporting obligations are known publicly to dealers, and in accordance with our
microstructure hypothesis, we find evidence of contemporaneous price-setting. Figure 2.11 shows
the reaction of the 1 week CIP deviation for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs in
September 2016. Once the quarter-end period ends, the forward rate contemporaneously adjusts
back to its pre quarter-end level.
To shed more light on the speed of adjustment of the forward rate over quarter-ends we exploit
high frequency tick data from Thomson Reuters Tick History. In Table 2.9 we consolidate the data
to the last quote each hour and identify exactly the timing when the 1 week FX forward contract
trades over quarter-end. For each currency pair we look at the 1 hour change in the FX swapped
USD rate (the synthetic USD rate swapped from the respective currency 1-week Libor rate) from
5 hours before to 5 hours after the contract crosses quarter-ends. Finally, the data are averaged
across all quarter-ends. The data show that the contemporaneous adjustment is strong across all
currency pairs, in particular after 2015 when the Leverage ratio was introduced. A large part of the
adjustment happens at exactly the hour when the contract first trades over quarter-end. However,
for CHF and JPY there is further adjustment in the same direction up to 2 hours following the
quarter-end. Moreover, for JPY, the currency where the central bank engaged in various forms of
quantitative easing (and hence provided excess reserves to banking system), there is evidence of a
large contemporaneous price adjustment over quarter-ends (14 basis points) even prior to the global
financial crisis.
In addition to contemporaneous adjustment of the forward rate, we also test for effects on order
flow. Given market participants face heterogeneous balance sheet constraints, the contemporaneous
adjustment could be too large or too small. In theory, this means that a potential effect on order
20This is due to FX swaps being off balance sheet, in contrast to short-term direct USD funding that increases
leverage of the bank, see Rime et al. (2019a) for more details
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flow could be in both directions.21 We test for systematic effects on order flow by simply regressing
order flow on our dummy for dates when the 1-week FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends. Table
2.10 depicts the results.
We find that order flow increases (i.e. more flow into USD) during quarter-end periods for all
currency pairs in the post 2008 sample, however for JPY the effect is not statistically significant.
Furthermore, we do not find that the effect on order flow changes after the Leverage ratio was
introduced in 2015. These results indicate that there is a tendency that the contemporaneous
adjustment around quarter-end is not large enough to curb order imbalances. Interestingly, for
JPY, where the contemporaneous price adjustment is largest, the effect on order flow is smallest.
Monetary Announcements
We argue in this section that as central bank announcements are public information, dealers respond
by adjusting the forward rate contemporaneously. CIP deviations are decomposed into a forward
premium and the interest rate differential. In response to a change in the risk-free rate, we hypoth-
esize that the forward premium reacts in a systematic way to offset the change in the interest rate
differential. We illustrate this hypothesis in equation 2.24, where a decline in the risk-free rate rfd
is met by an offsetting increase in the forward premium, preserving the cost of swapping euros into
dollars.




(1 + rfd ↓)︸ ︷︷ ︸
synthetic
(2.24)
Figure 2.12 plots the forward premium of the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD in response
to scheduled monetary announcements of the ECB, SNB and BOJ respectively. The ECB announce-
ment we consider is the September 14th, 2014 announcement where the ECB lowered the deposit
facility rate by 10 basis points.22 The SNB policy announcement is on January 15th, 2015, where
the interest rate target is lowered by 50 basis points to -0.75%, and the SNB lifts the floor on the
CHF/EUR exchange rate.23 Finally, the BOJ announcement we document is the 29th January,
2016 announcement when the central bank introduces a negative interest rate of 10 basis points on
current account that financial institutions hold at the central bank.24 For each announcement, we
observe a widening of the forward premium of approximately a similar magnitude to the surprise
change in the interest rate, with most of the adjustment occurring within an intra-day window of the
announcement. The increase in the forward premium in response to a decline in the risk-free rate
21For example, if dealers overshoot in their expectations of the tightness of leverage constraints, then this will
result in a negative order flow. Conversely, if dealers underestimate the tightening of leverage constraints, this will
result in positive order flow.
22See ECB monetary policy decision here: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2014/html/pr140904.
en.html
23see SNB press release here: https://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20150115/source/pre_20150115.en.
pdf
24For BOJ press release here: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2016/k160129a.pdf
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is intuitive: dealers offset the change in the risk-free rate with a change in the forward premium,
keeping the CIP deviation constant.
We test our hypothesis in equation 2.24 more concretely through an event study analysis of
scheduled monetary announcements. For our measure of monetary surprises, we calculate the high
frequency (30 minute window) change in the 1 month overnight index swap (OIS) rate. The surprise
rate is a proxy for the surprise component of the interest rate change around monetary announce-
ments based on a measure of the risk-free rate. We run the following event study for days of
scheduled announcements, by regressing order flow on the surprise measure of interest rates. Our
event study results in Table 2.11 show that monetary announcements have no statistical effect on
order flow.25 The results are consistent with contemporaneous adjustment of the forward premium
as dealers offset changes to the interest rate differential.
2.7 Conclusion
In this paper we detail a new channel for price discovery in FX swap markets. We identify order
flow–the net of buyer and seller initiated transactions–as a fundamental signal used by dealers to
update the price of the FX swap. Our key finding is that order flow has significant price impact
in the post 2008 period, with no effects during the pre-2008 period. We explore two factors that
restrict arbitrage capital: the increased heterogeneity of dollar funding costs and periods where the
FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends, that account for the increase in price impact.
We first provide a model framework of the FX swap market. Agents supply dollars for CIP
arbitrage, and demand dollars to hedge currency risk of their balance sheets. Dealers are the
market-maker, and set a forward rate that equates customers net demand for dollars in the FX swap
market with the supply of dollars of agents with arbitrage capital. We derive a price-setting rule in
which dealers use order flow to update the forward rate of the swap.
We then test the framework empirically. Based on transaction level data for 1 week FX swaps in
the inter-dealer market, we document a significant price impact of order flow in the post crisis-period,
with a 1 standard deviation OF leading to a 4 basis point widening of CIP deviations. We estimate
up to three quarters of the observed price impact is explained by an increase in the heterogeneity
of dollar funding costs, and when the FX swap crosses quarter-end periods. Through the lens of
the model, these factors lead to a reduction in arbitrage capital, and require dealers to increase the
forward premium more aggressively to order flow and balance inventories.
Our second empirical contribution is to distinguish between public and private information in
the FX swap market. We find evidence of contemporaneous price-setting during quarter-ends and
monetary announcements. During quarter-ends, we document a high-frequency jump in the forward
premium that corresponds to the hour during which the FX swap contract crosses quarter-ends.
This suggests that dealers are pricing the effects of quarter-ends on arbitrage capital, consistent
25In line with this we find no effect of monetary announcements on the price impact of order flow, see table 2.12
in appendix 2.3.
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with public information. We also show gradual price adjustment through order flow in response













































Note: This figure plots the 1 Week CIP deviation measured in basis points, obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick
History. This provides a measure of CIP deviations based on a LIBOR benchmark rate. Negative deviations indicate
a dollar borrowing premium for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs. Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.











Note: FX swap is typically for maturities at less than 3m. At the spot leg, domestic currency and dollars are swapped
at the prevailing spot rate. At maturity, the principals are then re-exchanged at the forward rate.
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Figure 2.3











































































































Note: Daily count order flow for EUR/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD pairs using the TR D2000-2, for FX swap
maturities at 1 week. Order flow is given as the net of buyer initiated transactions, where buyer initiated transactions
are signed +1 and seller initiated transactions are signed −1. OF countt =
∑k=t
k=t0
1[Tk = B]− 1[Tk = S]Sample period
is 01/2005-09/2017.
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Figure 2.4































Note: The figure depicts the daily difference in percentage points between the highest and lowest submission among the
contributing banks in USD Libor with 3-month maturity. The data are obtained from Bloomberg and Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE). Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.
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Figure 2.5





























Note: The figure shows the daily average between the bid and the ask quotation based on hourly data from Thomson
Reuters tick history. The bid/ask spread is expressed in basis points. Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.
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Figure 2.6
































Note: The figure shows the daily standard deviation in swap points based on hourly data from Thomson Reuters tick
history. The standard deviation is expressed in basis points. Sample period is 01/2005-09/2017.
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Figure 2.7
















Note: This schematic illustrates the structure of the dealer-customer and inter-dealer market. Each customer has a
net demand for dollar funding in the FX swap market, which we denote xD$ . The excess demands for dollar funding
that cannot be met by the dealer’s supply of dollars, is in turn submitted to the inter-dealer market. Aggregating net
orders for swapping domestic currency into dollars gives rise to inter-dealer order flow OF which is observed as a
public signal by the inter-dealer market for setting the forward rate.
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Figure 2.8
Timing
Note: This schematic illustrates the timing of the model. The customer-dealer trading is done at the beginning of
each period. Following customer-dealer trading, there is an inter-dealer market which sets the forward rate following
the customer-dealer trading. Dealers use inter-dealer order flow at the end of the period OF0+ in order to set the
forward rate and CIP deviation ∆1 in period 1.
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Figure 2.9
Response of EUR/USD, JPY/USD and CHF/USD 1w CIP deviation to unit
shock in count order flow in pre 2008 (left) and post 2008 (right)













Pre 2008 CIP Response to 1 std OF Shock: EUR














Post 2008 CIP Response to 1 std OF Shock: EUR
















Pre 2008 CIP Response to 1 std OF Shock: CHF
















Post 2008 CIP Response to 1 std OF Shock: CHF
















Pre 2008 CIP Response to 1 std OF Shock: JPY

















Post 2008 CIP Response to 1 std OF Shock: JPY
Note: This figure plots the impulse response of the change in CIP deviations to a 1 standard deviation shock to order
flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps, based on a bivariate VAR following Hasbrouck (1991)
and Ranaldo and Somogyi (2019). Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping
euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades, and CIP deviation is
calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week forward rates. We condition our sample into two periods based on pre
2008 and a post 2008 period. The left panel shows response of EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD in the pre-2008
period, and the right panel shows the response in the post-2008 period. Total sample period is from 01/2005-09/2017.
Gray area denotes a standard error band equivalent for statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Figure 2.10
CIP and OF Response to 1 std change in Swap Line Allotments

















OF Response to 1 std Swap Allotment: EUR
















CIP Response to 1 std Swap Allotment: EUR














OF Response to 1 std Swap Allotment: CHF
















CIP Response to 1 std Swap Allotment: CHF

















OF Response to 1 std Swap Allotment: JPY
















CIP Response to 1 std Swap Allotment: JPY
Note: This figure plots the impulse response of the change in CIP deviations and order flow to a 1 standard deviation
shock in swap line allotments for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps, based on a multivariate VAR
following Hasbrouck (1991) and Ranaldo and Somogyi (2019). Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer
transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades,
and CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week forward rates. Swap line allotments measure
aggregate flows of dollar loans from the Federal Reserve to counterparty central banks. The left panel shows order flow
and the right panel shows the response of cip deviations of EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD respectively. Total
sample period is from 01/2007-12/2011. Gray area denotes a standard error band equivalent for statistical significance
at the 10% level.
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Figure 2.11
1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD CIP deviations during










































































































Note: This figure examines 1 week CIP deviations for the EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD pairs around the
quarter-end period in September of 2016, with contemporaneous adjustment of the forward premium as the FX swap
contract enters the quarter-end period. The CIP deviation is computed using 1 week forward, spot and domestic and
dollar LIBOR rates, using intra-day data from Thomson Reuters Tick History
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Figure 2.12
Response of the forward premium of EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD




























































































Note: This figure shows the response of 1 week forward premium in EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD around
scheduled monetary announcements of the ECB, SNB and BOJ respectively. Grey area denotes an intra-day window
around the scheduled monetary announcement. In each case, the scheduled announcement changed the central bank
policy rate and caused dealers to contemporaneously adjust the forward premium. The forward premium is computed




Summary Statistics 1 Week CIP Deviations.
Pre 2008 Post 2008
mean sd min max mean sd min max
EUR/USD -2.33 10.3 -120.0 5.1 -28.5 38.7 -621.9 73.1
CHF/USD -8.1 17.0 -213.3 10.3 -34.0 42.7 -500.6 54.9
JPY/USD -11.6 37.5 -347.2 33.7 -31.9 45.4 -705.8 52.7
Note: This table records summary statistics of CIP deviations in EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD for 1 Week
FX swaps. CIP deviations are expressed in basis points. Data on 1 Week Forward and Spot rates are taken from TR
Tick History. Interest rates are 1 Week Libor. The full sample period is from 01/2005-09/2019, and is divided into
pre and post 2008 periods.
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Table 2.2
Summary Statistics count Order Flow.
Pre 2008 Post 2008
mean sd min max mean sd min max
EUR/USD 0.00 3.91 -16 29 -.09 3.25 -24 18
CHF/USD 0.08 1.59 -8 8 0.11 1.01 -10 7
JPY/USD 0.06 1.63 -7 8 0.00 1.41 -9 8
Note: This table records summary statistics of order flow based on trades in 1 week FX swaps using inter-dealer trades
in Thomson Reuters D2000-2 Platform. Order flow is constructed as the net of buyer initiated transactions, where
a transaction is signed +1 if it is swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars at the spot leg of the FX swap
contract. The sample period is from 01/2005-09/2017.
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Table 2.3
Price impact of order flow before and after GFC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre 2008 Post 2008
∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy ∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy
OF -0.16 -0.42** -0.41 -0.01 -3.64*** -3.74*** -2.98*** -4.42***
(0.33) (0.18) (0.41) (0.96) (0.55) (0.89) (0.85) (1.05)
Constant -0.01 -0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.22 0.24 -0.13
(0.35) (0.24) (0.50) (0.93) (0.27) (0.45) (0.48) (0.47)
Observations 2,084 713 712 659 6,703 2,238 2,234 2,231
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.04 0.09
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes
in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions
of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week
FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates
with close at 5 pm London time. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month
maturities, the VIX index, and the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. The full sample from Jan 1, 2005 to Sep 1,
2017 is split into pre and post 2008. Data is daily. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent
level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.4
Price impact of order flow; funding constraints and quarter-ends
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Pre 2008 Post 2008
∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy ∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy
OF -0.46 -0.47** -0.50 -0.57 -1.04** -1.20** -2.02* 0.06
(0.31) (0.20) (0.45) (0.94) (0.48) (0.47) (1.03) (0.60)
OF × FundingHet 6.00 0.91 0.32 37.08 -4.14*** -4.84** -0.34 -6.36***
(6.46) (4.30) (2.30) (26.70) (1.18) (2.17) (1.57) (1.68)
Qend×OF 1.54 -0.13 0.29 3.16 -9.27*** -2.83 -9.09* -15.97***
(1.40) (0.57) (0.82) (3.88) (3.26) (2.95) (5.32) (6.06)
Constant 0.13 0.03 -0.04 0.48 0.39* 0.24 0.92** 0.19
(0.36) (0.25) (0.52) (0.96) (0.21) (0.28) (0.41) (0.37)
Observations 2,084 713 712 659 6,703 2,238 2,234 2,231
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.16
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes
in 1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions
of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week
FX swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates
with close at 5 pm London time. FundingHet is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the daily dispersion
in individual panel bank’s 3-month Libor quotes is among the 25 per cent largest values, and zero otherwise. Qend
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 1 week contract is settled prior to quarter-end and matures after
quarter-end. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX
index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Additionally, the following variables are included in the regression
specification but not shown in the Table; Qend and FundingHet. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2005 to
Sep 1, 2017. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.5
Price impact of order flow; direction of flow
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy ∆CIP panel ∆CIP panel
OF × 1[OF > 0] -0.12 -1.22* -0.28 0.97 -0.88 -1.42*
(0.67) (0.67) (0.35) (2.13) (0.60) (0.72)
OF × 1[OF < 0] 0.38 0.02 -0.25 1.26 0.01 -0.86
(0.47) (0.51) (0.95) (0.97) (0.47) (0.86)
OF × 1[OF > 0] × post2008 -4.39*** -5.07** -2.58* -6.04*
(1.23) (2.31) (1.38) (2.77)
OF × 1[OF < 0] × post2008 -3.30*** -1.32 -2.99** -5.32
(1.01) (1.03) (1.51) (2.58)
OF × 1[OF > 0] × FundingHet 11.25* -5.31**
(6.23) (2.20)
OF × 1[OF < 0] × FundingHet 5.89 -2.83*
(7.46) (1.65)
OF × 1[OF > 0] × Qend 3.43 -6.98*
(2.42) (4.24)
OF × 1[OF < 0] × Qend -0.96 -12.33*
(1.28) (7.48)
Constant 0.10 0.36 -0.02 -0.02 0.41 0.50
(0.51) (0.50) (0.52) (1.35) (0.52) (0.34)
Observations 8,787 2,951 2,946 2,890 2,084 6,703
R-squared 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.11
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post2008 No Yes
Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in
1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of
swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX
swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with
close at 5 pm London time. 1[OF > 0] takes the order flow value if the order flow is positive, zero otherwise. Positive
order flow implies a pressure to obtain USD spot and sell USD forward (i.e. borrow USD). 1[OF < 0] takes the order
flow value if the order flow is negative, zero otherwise. FundingHet is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when
the daily dispersion in individual panel bank’s 3-month Libor quotes is among the 25 per cent largest values, and zero
otherwise. Qend is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 1 week contract is settled prior to quarter-end and
matures after quarter-end. Post 2008 is a dummy that takes the value 1 after Jan 1 2008, and zero otherwise. The
Table only shows the relevant coefficients. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3
month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Additionally, the dummies for FundingHet,
Qend and Post2008 are included, but not shown. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2005 to Sep 1, 2017.
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.6
Bid/ask spreads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pre 2008 Post 2008
EUR CHF JPY EUR CHF JPY EUR CHF JPY
FundingHet 0.02 14.05*** 2.21** 10.95*** 5.07*** 13.39*** 17.40*** 10.13*** 18.67***
(0.19) (2.08) (1.09) (0.95) (0.89) (1.13) (1.59) (1.32) (1.95)
Qend 0.01 -0.41 0.27 3.64*** 3.59** 4.81** 2.69 0.61 3.25
(0.05) (0.53) (0.34) (1.33) (1.70) (1.91) (1.63) (1.48) (2.44)
post2015 -2.16*** 10.74*** 2.32***
(0.28) (1.40) (0.40)
post2015 × Qend 2.57 10.68** 5.36*
(2.36) (4.97) (2.98)
post2015 × FundingHet -13.53*** -17.89*** -13.50***
(1.63) (2.01) (2.01)
Constant 2.51*** 9.56*** 4.52*** 5.61*** 16.54*** 6.11*** 6.06*** 14.53*** 5.71***
(0.01) (0.15) (0.07) (0.18) (0.42) (0.19) (0.22) (0.39) (0.23)
Observations 756 745 691 2,434 2,437 2,438 2,434 2,437 2,438
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.13
Note: This table regresses bid/ask spreads for 1 week FX swap quotes based on high frequency data from Thomson
Reuters Tick History database on dummies for Funding Heterogeneity (FundingHet) and dates when the 1 week contract
crosses quarter-ends (Qends) for three currency pairs (EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD). Column (1) to (3)
depict the results from a sample that runs from January 1,2005 to December 31, 2007, while column (4) to (6) are based
on a sample period that runs from January 1, 2008 to September 1, 2017. In column (7) to (9) the interaction terms
between a dummy that takes the value 1 from January 1, 2005 and onwards (zero otherwise) and funding heterogeneity





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Pre 2008 Post 2008
EUR CHF JPY EUR CHF JPY EUR CHF JPY
FundingHet 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.07** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Qend 0.00 0.01 0.01* 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.02** 0.01 0.02**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
post2015 -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.01***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
post2015 × Qend 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.14***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
post2015 × FundingHet -0.04*** -0.07*** -0.02***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.05*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 756 745 691 2,434 2,437 2,396 2,434 2,437 2,396
R-squared 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.15
Note: This table regresses daily price volatility for 1 week FX swap quotes based on high frequency data from Thomson
Reuters Tick History database on dummies for Funding Heterogeneity (FundingHet) and dates when the 1 week contract
crosses quarter-ends (Qends) for three currency pairs (EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD). Column (1) to (3)
depict the results from a sample that runs from January 1,2005 to December 31, 2007, while column (4) to (6) are based
on a sample period that runs from January 1, 2008 to September 1, 2017. In column (7) to (9) the interaction terms
between a dummy that takes the value 1 from January 1, 2005 and onwards (zero otherwise) and funding heterogeneity
and quarter-ends are added. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10
percent level.
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Table 2.8
Effect on order flow; Swap Lines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OFpanel OFeur OFchf OFjpy
SwapLines -0.21** -0.28* -0.04 -0.50*
(0.11) (0.15) (0.19) (0.26)
Constant 0.03 -0.14* 0.18*** 0.07
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Observations 1,444 480 482 482
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table illustrates the impact of quarter-end on for 1 week order flow. Standardized order flow OF is
measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR
D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. SwapLine is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days when
there was initial take up in any of the swap lines between the Fed and foreign central banks, zero otherwise. Controls
include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade
weighted exchange rate. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Dec 31, 2009. *** denotes significance
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.9
Price adjustment quarter-end for EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD
EUR/USD CHF/USD JPY/USD
Hour 2005-2007 2008-2013 2013-2015 2015-2017 2005-2007 2008-2013 2013-2015 2015-2017 2005-2007 2008-2013 2013-2015 2015-2017
-5 0 -0.5 0 0.3 -0.1 2.1 -0.2 -1.8 -0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.3
-4 0.3 1 0 0.2 -0.2 1.8 -0.3 -0.1 0.2 1 -2.1 -0.3
-3 -0.1 -0.8 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -1 0.1 -3.3 -0.8 -0.9 -0.3 -0.5
-2 0.1 -0.2 2.1 1.7 0.2 -4.7 1.3 2.4 -0.8 2.2 -0.4 15.6
-1 0 0.9 0 9 1.3 2.7 -1.4 1.6 0.7 0.1 0.4 2.7
0 0.8 0.8 -1.6 22.7 0.2 2.3 -2.8 22.3 14.3 5.1 16.3 55.2
1 0.5 0 -0.4 6 -3.2 -3.2 2 16.2 -4.3 4.5 10.8 36
2 0.9 2.2 -0.3 0.8 0 1.1 -1.1 5.2 -1.2 4 -2.8 32.9
3 0.2 2.9 -0.2 0 -0.1 3.7 0.2 12.2 1.1 1.3 0.4 0
4 -0.1 0 -0.4 -0.7 0.4 -2 0.5 -2.2 -0.3 1 1.1 0.9
5 0.2 -0.4 0 0.1 -0.1 1.3 -0.7 -6.5 -0.2 0.2 0.7 10.3
Note: This table illustrates the hourly change in the FX swapped (synthetic) USD rate calculated from Libor from 5
hours before to 5 hours after the 1 week FX swap contract matures after quarter-end. 0 denotes the hour when the
contract first matures after quarter-end. The numbers are in basis points and represent the average of all quarter-ends
within the sample period.
Table 2.10
Effect on order flow; Quarter-end
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Pre 2008 Post 2008
OFpanel OFeur OFchf OFjpy OFpanel OFeur OFchf OFjpy OFpanel OFpanel
Qend 0.14 -0.03 0.61*** -0.17 0.13*** 0.15* 0.16** 0.08 0.22*** 0.14**
(0.10) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) (0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06)
post2013 0.03
(0.03)




post2015 × Qend -0.02
(0.09)
Constant 0.05** -0.04 0.11*** 0.07* 0.03** -0.04* 0.11*** 0.02 0.02 0.03**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 2,095 724 712 659 6,723 2,240 2,241 2,242 6,723 6,723
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table illustrates the impact of quarter-end on 1 week order flow. Standardized order flow OF is measuring
the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2
inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. Qend is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the 1 week contract
is settled prior to quarter-end and matures after quarter-end, zero otherwise. Post2013 and post2015 are dummy
variables that are 1 from Jan 2013 and Jan 2015, respectively, zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in USD
Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Data
is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Sep 1, 2017. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the
5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.11
Effect on order flow; Monetary Policy surprises
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OFpanel OFeur OFchf OFjpy
∆ois -1.86 -2.28 -1.18 13.86
(1.59) (3.84) (1.85) (10.07)
Constant -0.05 0.02 -0.03 -0.09
(0.05) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 363 136 87 122
R-squared 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.09
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post2008 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table illustrates the impact of monetary policy surpirses on 1 week order flow. Standardized order flow OF
is measuring the net buyer transactions of swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR
D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX swaps. ∆OIS is the 30 min change in the 1-month OIS rate (Overnight
Index Swaps - a proxy for the risk free rate) in the respective currency around the central bank policy announcement.
Monetary announcements in EUR, CHF, JPY and USD are considered. In the case of US announcements the sign
of the change in the OIS is switched so that a positive change in the OIS always proxy an increase in the interest
rate differential towards the US (i.e foreign currency rate minus the US rate). Controls include the changes in USD
Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate. Data
is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Sep 1, 2017. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the




Price impact of order flow; Monetary announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy ∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy
OF -0.34 -0.23 -0.41 0.03 -0.88 -1.26** -2.09* 0.57
(0.49) (0.39) (0.72) (1.53) (0.54) (0.52) (1.12) (0.74)
MP 2.20 6.19* -14.32 2.02 -1.08 1.71 -5.41 -0.74
(3.72) (3.52) (12.09) (7.07) (1.53) (1.43) (3.79) (2.39)
MP*OF -3.14 -0.59 -24.40* -3.54 -3.18 3.34 3.11* -7.45
(1.94) (2.12) (13.41) (3.46) (3.87) (2.55) (1.65) (5.79)
Constant 0.16 -0.20 0.16 0.48 0.44* 0.22 1.04** 0.25
(0.60) (0.40) (0.85) (1.68) (0.25) (0.34) (0.49) (0.45)
Observations 2,053 713 706 634 6,675 2,211 2,233 2,231
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.16
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Post2008 No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in
1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of
swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX
swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with
close at 5 pm London time. MP is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days when the central bank disseminates
its monetary policy decision, and zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week
and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate, FundingHet, OF*FundingHet, Qend,
Qend*OF. Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2008 to Sep 1, 2017. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent
level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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Table 2.13
Price impact of order flow; Swap lines
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆CIP panel ∆CIP eur ∆CIP chf ∆CIP jpy
OF -0.84 -3.06* -0.75 0.66
(0.68) (1.75) (0.62) (1.05)
SwapLine -0.42 0.06 -2.07 1.62
(2.99) (3.88) (5.26) (5.95)
OF*SwapLine 2.75 5.25 -3.12 4.86
(3.06) (6.81) (3.05) (4.47)
Constant -0.39 -0.34 -0.25 -0.92
(0.56) (1.22) (0.78) (0.94)
Observations 1,444 480 482 482
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.38
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: This table regresses order flow for 1 week EUR/USD, CHF/USD and JPY/USD FX swaps on daily changes in
1 week CIP deviations based on Libor rates. Standardized order flow OF is measuring the net buyer transactions of
swapping euros, swiss francs and yen into dollars, and is sourced from TR D2000-2 inter-dealer trades for 1 Week FX
swaps. The 1 Week CIP deviation is calculated using TR tick history quotes on 1 week spot and forward rates with
close at 5 pm London time. SwapLine is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 on days when there was initial take
up in any of the swap lines between the Fed and foreign central banks, zero otherwise. Controls include the changes in
USD Libor-OIS spreads for 1 week and 3 month maturities, the VIX index, the USD Trade weighted exchange rate.
Data is daily. The sample runs from Jan 1, 2007 to Dec 31, 2009. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, **
at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.
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3.1 Introduction
An important aspect of global financial intermediaries is that a significant part of their transactions
is financed by USD-denominated unsecured credit. The dollar liabilities of non-U.S. banking insti-
tutions have grown rapidly since the early 2000s, and are estimated currently at above $10 trillion
based on data from the Bank for International Settlements (Ivashina et al. (2015)). This is compa-
rable to the size of the combined balance sheet of all U.S. banks.1 A large part of this borrowing
activity is then transferred to loans to customers in local currency.
Sizable USD denominated liabilities can expose banks to an additional source of funding risk
to the extent that the cost of USD denominated short-term funding does not change one to one
with the change in domestically denominated short-term funding. Our point of departure is the
empirical observation that - post-crisis - there has been substantial variation in the cost advantage
of borrowing short-term USD relative to domestic short-term funding, also when accounting for FX
hedging cost ("USD cost advantage"). This form of covered interest parity deviation exposes banks
to a new source of variation in funding costs, and can potentially transmit to the domestic economy
via a bank lending channel.2 Although deviations from covered interest parity has gotten substantial
attention in the academic literature (Rime et al., 2019a; Du et al., 2019), the real implications is not
yet fully understood. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap.
Analyzing the impact of FX cost advantages is empirically challenging, because the debt structure
of banks is endogenous to the composition of their assets, to investors’ preferences, and to the cost of
financing. In this paper, we overcome these challenges by exploiting an arguably exogenous change
in the USD cost advantage for internationally active Norwegian banks, which took place during the
European sovereign debt crisis of 2011. At that time, U.S. money market funds expanded USD-
denominated credit to highly rated Norwegian banks (as well as to other highly rated banks from
neighboring Scandinavian countries, Australia, among others), while at the same decreasing supply
to Euro area banks (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). This resulted in funding becoming less expensive for
banks that had access to the USD-denominated debt market, versus the rest of the domestic banking
system.
We present two sets of results. First, internationally active banks responded to the USD cost
advantage by raising more USD funding. The increase in USD foreign funding were not offset by
similar decreases in other funding sources, leading to an overall expansion of bank balance sheets.
A sizable fraction of the funds raised in USD-denominated short-term funding markets were lent
domestically to Norwegian firms.3 As a result of the shock to the USD cost advantage, bank short-
term funding to total assets increased by approximately 3 percentage-points. Second, the expansion
in domestic credit translated into higher investment at the firm-level – especially in total fixed assets
1See Ivashina et al. (2015) for more details on the role of dollar-denominated financial intermediation.
2Strictly speaking, and in line with the terminology in Rime et al. (2019a), we are measuring the Law of One
Price as we are comparing borrowing costs across currencies
3Approximately half of the initial increase in foreign funding was lent to domestic firms. The bulk of the remaining
funds were deposits at foreign central banks.
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and PP&E (capital). In aggregate, the effects were large: according to our estimates, aggregate
capital grew by 2-2.9% more due to this shock, suggesting that covered interest parity deviations
have sizable economic implications.
In order to analyze the impact of USD cost advantages, we use data from four different sources.
First, we use data from Bloomberg to compute the USD cost advantages. Second, we use a su-
pervisory bank-level database to identify banks operating in short-term foreign funding markets,
in addition to obtaining data on several bank outcomes. Third, we use an annual administrative
loan-level database on all firm-bank connections to investigate the loan-level impact of USD cost
advantages. Fourth and finally, we complement our data with annual firm-level data to trace out
the impact of banks’ adjustment to the shock to the real economy.
Our main identification strategy exploits the fact that to take advantage of USD cost advantages,
banks either already had to have in place the necessary infrastructure to issue commercial paper,
or had to have a branch in the U.S. Both entails substantial fixed costs, and hence only a subset
of the banks ("internationally active banks") in our sample could effectively access lower funding
costs via CIP deviations.4 Motivated by this, we aim to identify the real implications of USD cost
advantages by comparing outcomes at the bank- and loan-level for internationally active banks with
other domestic banks. The assess the real implications, we compare outcomes for firms borrowing
from internationally active vs. domestic banks. In our main analysis, we restrict attention to the
period 2009 - 2012, and focus on the one-time increase in the USD cost advantage associated with
the Eurozone crisis. In the robustness, however, we show that our findings at the bank-level are not
confined to this particular episode but holds more generally.
We first explore the underlying mechanism of the failure of the CIP in the market for short-
term bonds issued by highly rated Scandinavian banks. CIP represents a key pillar in international
finance, and it postulates that the cost of borrowing in a foreign currency plus the cost of hedging
hedging FX risk should be equal to the cost of borrowing domestically. CIP is a no-arbitrage
condition, which requires a risk free two-way trade between the interest rate in the funding leg and
the unsecured funding rate with the same maturity as the FX-swap contract ((Rime et al., 2019a)).
Prior to the financial crisis, CIP was known to hold across a wide range of financial instruments.
This changed after the crisis. The breakdown of CIP has been dubbed as "one of the most significant
developments in global financial markets"(Du et al., 2019).5 We argue that an important potential
explanation for the deviation in CIP for highly Scandinavian banks was the shift in the supply of
funds from US money market funds.
Second, we compare the evolution of bank-level outcomes for banks that are active in short-
term USD funding markets ("internationally active banks") with other Norwegian banks. Our main
identifying assumption at the bank-level is that the difference in outcomes between the two groups
4Norwegian banks operating in FX short-term markets are typically larger banks.
5Several papers have investigated deviations of CIP. Different explanations include regulation (Du et al., 2019),
market segmentation (Rime et al., 2019a), arbitrage limits (Ivashina et al., 2015), changes in bank balance sheet
(Avdjiev et al., 2019), and swap market imperfections (Liao, 2020).
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of banks would have been the same in the absence of the funding shock. More specifically, we show
that during this episode, internationally active banks increased the growth in foreign borrowing,
leading to approximately a relative increase in the share of foreign funding to total assets of 3 %-
points. Contemporaneously, corporate lending relative to total assets increased by approximately 2
%-points.
We then trace out how the impact of the shock to bank financing translates at the loan amounts
and firm activity. We show that credit growth is approximately 6% higher on average for firms
borrowing from internationally active banks. We also show that the change in the interest rate
on loans to the same firm within the same year is roughly 146 bps lower when borrowing from
internationally active banks. Overall, our results suggest that the favorable foreign funding shock
to bank financing translated into an expansion of domestic credit.
Using firm-level data we trace out the impact of the expansion of credit on economic performance.
Importantly, the greater availability of funding on better terms from treated banks may have led
to less borrowing from other sources, thus weakening the real implications of the shocks. However,
we show that this type of substitution hardly took place. The increase in borrowing by firms is
comparable to the total growth in debt. This finding suggests that firms may have been financially
constrained during normal times. Rather surprisingly, we do not find that cheaper short-term funding
at banks was channeled to finance short-term firm assets, such as trade-credit. On the contrary,
firms that borrowed from treated banks increased their fixed tangible assets, and in particular capital
and fixed financial assets. But, we find no effect on intangible capital or on current assets. More
precisely, firms borrowing from internationally active banks had about 1.3% growth in fixed assets
compared to other firms, and 2.3% higher growth in sales. The increase in borrowing from banks is
driven by both an increase in short-term and long-term debt. As we discuss in the policy section,
such outcome increases the potential liquidation risks not only at the bank level (due to rollover risk
and fire sales), but also at the firm level, as failure to refinance can bring about high liquidation
costs for firm assets.
As a final step, we use our estimates to provide a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the importance
of the shock in the aggregate. Assuming there are no general equilibrium effects, and that the sales
and capital growth of firms borrowing from banks that are not internationally active constitutes
a reasonable counterfactual, we find that sales were 1.2-5% higher in 2011-2012 due to the foreign
funding shock. The corresponding effect on capital was 2-2.9%.
Throughout our analysis, we employ numerous robustness exercises to ensure the validity of our
empirical approach. At the bank-level, we employ a dynamic difference in differences to explicitly test
for parallel trends in outcomes for the two groups prior to and after the shock. At the loan-level, first
we follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) for the sample of firms borrowing from both an internationally
active and non-internationally active bank, and only look at within firm-year variation. For the full
sample of firms, we control for firm demand by employing a granular set of fixed effects. Second,
we focus on both quantities and prices, which allows us to plausibly argue that we isolate changes
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in credit due to supply factors rather than demand. Finally, at the firm-level we saturate our
specifications with industry-year fixed effect to control for confounding firm shocks.
Our paper has implications for the macroeconomy, bank regulation and monetary policy. Given
the close links between financial markets and real economic outcomes, deviations from CIP have real
economic implications beyond credit markets. As financial institutions finance themselves issuing
debt in numerous currencies, deviations from CIP between two currencies affect the funding mix
and the average cost of capital for internationally active banks. Changes in the extent to which CIP
holds then affect credit supply, which in turn affects the macroeconomy. Until now little has been
shown about the quantitative strength of this channel, about how it ultimately affects real economic
outcomes, and what policymakers should do about it.
The CIP shock is a short-term funding shock, and as such it is distinct from monetary policy
shocks that are typically persistent in time, often because they affect the entire yield curve. Our
focus is on a change in short-term funding costs that may rapidly reverse. This allows us to examine
how transitory liquidity shocks affect the supply of credit. In this respect, the short-term nature of
the shock sets us apart from the academic and policy discussion which focuses mainly on long-term
refinancing. Moreover, as the shock originated outside Scandinavia, it was arguably orthogonal to
Norwegian monetary policy. This gives us a unique opportunity to study fluctuations in the local
credit supply that are unrelated to domestic monetary policy.
Related literature This article adds to the literature on how financial frictions affect bank lending
behavior. A number of these papers study the impact of shocks during crises times, generally finding
adverse effects on lending that cannot be substituted by alternative sources. Cornett et al. (2011)
show that banks that relied more heavily on stable sources of financing, such as core deposit and
equity capital financing, continued to lend more relative to other banks. Iyer et al. (2014) study the
dry-up of interbank markets during the financial crisis, which hurt banks that were dependent on
such markets. Avdjiev et al. (2019) study the relationship between dollar strength, CIP deviations
and bank-level flows. We focus on loan- and firm-level flows, as well as firm level activity.
Closer to our work, Ivashina et al. (2015) and Brauning and Ivashina (2017) focus on the dollar’s
central role in international financial markets. During the same time period that we examine,
Ivashina et al. (2015) document how U.S. money market funds withdrew lending to Euro-area
banks, and thus generated a foreign funding disadvantage for those banks. Due to the perceived
deterioration in creditworthiness, the adverse shock for these banks lead to a spike in their dollar
funding costs. While we focus on the real effect of a global bank borrowing from the US, our
paper documents that the opposite side of this effect has been at work: perceived improvement in
creditworthiness for some banks led to the increase in lending for them during the same period.
Our work is also related to recent studies in banking that highlight the importance of international
transmission of policy shocks. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012)) use bank level data from the U.S.,
and show that the banks with international subsidiaries are less sensitive to U.S. monetary policy.
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Morais et al. (2019) use firm-bank level data and show that a softening of foreign monetary policy
increases the supply of credit by foreign banks in Mexico. Ongena et al. (2011) use micro-level data
and show that lower policy rates expand the supply of credit in the domestic currency, but not in
foreign currencies. We differ from these papers in that rather than looking at policy shocks, we focus
on a shock that is orthogonal to monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes fundamentals of parity de-
viations. Section 3 and 4 describe data and methodology. Section 5 and 6 present micro- and
macro-level results. Section 7 provides policy discussions, while section 8 concludes.
3.2 Deviatons from covered interest rate parity
Covered interest parity (CIP) is a central condition in finance, postulating that interest rates should
be equal across currencies after accounting for the price of hedging exchange rate risk through an
FX swap contract. For example, a bank with access to money markets around the globe can choose
to obtain funding across a range of currencies. Suppose a European bank that needs to obtain
EUR for a period of 3-months. It can for instance either obtain it in USD and enter an FX swap
contract to hedge the exchange rate risk, or resort to direct funding in EUR. Letting F denote the FX
(USD/EUR) forward price, S the FX spot price, if the unsecured funding cost in foreign currency
(USD) and id the funding cost in domestic currency (EUR), the CIP conditions states that
F
S
(1 + if )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Funding cost in foreign currency (USD), hedged for exchange rate risk
= (1 + id)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Funding cost in domestic currency (EUR)
(3.1)
If the CIP does not hold, global lenders will obtain funds in the cheapest currency and enter an
FX-swap contract to convert this funding to the currency of interest. Such lenders are then able to
raise funds in the chosen currency at a lower price than they would pay in their home currency, and
on better terms than their peers without access to foreign markets.
During the European Sovereign debt crisis, European banks were constrained in terms of U.S
short-term funding (Ivashina et al., 2015). The shock affected primarily purely continental European
banks. On the contrary, Norwegian and banks from other safe-haven countries experienced an
increased supply of USD funding by US money market funds. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1,
where we show the allocation of investments in commercial paper and certificates of deposits by U.S
money market funds over time.6 During the last months of 2011 the reduction of lending to Euro
area banks was severe, even though the total worldwide investments made by U.S. money market
funds did not change substantially.7
6U.S money market funds supply the majority of USD short-term funding to European banks.
7Figure 3.1 highlights how USD assets and liabilities of foreign banks have grown rapidly in the past two decades,
and are currently above $10 trillion, which puts them roughly on par with U.S. banks. See also Ivashina et al. (2015).
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–Insert Figure 3.1—
–Insert Figure 3.2 –
In Figure 3.2, we show the evolution of U.S money market funds’ funding of Norwegian vs.
continental European banks. The figure illustrates that, while there was a drop in funding to
continental European banks, there was a contemporaneous increase in funding to Norwegian banks.
Hence, in the midst of the crisis, high quality banks outside the Euro area obtained better access
to money market funding. Norwegian banks were among those institutions that benefited from the
reallocation of money market funds away from Euro-area banks.
The shift in the supply of funds gave internationally active Norwegian banks a substantial funding
cost advantage compared to Norwegian banks not funding themselves in short-term USD funding
markets. Norwegian banks with access to short-term funding in USD could obtain cheaper funding
by exchanging USD for domestic currency and simultaneously hedging the FX risk compared to
borrowing directly in NOK. Figure 3.3 illustrates this, by comparing the funding cost in NOK for
hedged-USD funding with the cost faced by banks borrowing directly in NOK. At the height of the
crisis, the funding cost advantage reached 150 bps. Such cost advantages were also present against
other currencies, notably CAD, JPY, CHF, AUD. Figure 3.7 in the Appendix shows the strong
relationship between favorable foreign funding for Canadian banks and borrowing: the outstanding
volume of U.S. CD funding and CIP deviations correlate strongly with a correlation coefficient of
0.57.
–Insert Figure 3.3–
Not all Norwegian banks could exploit this cost-advantage. The Norwegian banking system
comprises of a small number of high-rated globally oriented commercial banks with access to the
U.S. commercial paper market. The remaining banks are relatively small domestic savings banks
with no access to the U.S. money market. Access to U.S. money markets is effectively available
only for large banks for two main reasons: first, money market funds require that at least one of
the main rating agencies have a rating for the bank. Second, fixed costs make it worthwhile to
issue commercial paper only if the amount raised is large. Because of these reasons, most smaller
and medium sized Norwegian banks do not have access to short-term funding via the U.S. money
markets.
As a result of this structure, the funding cost advantage documented in Figure 3.3 affected
only the internationally active banks. A natural empirical strategy to isolate the effects of CIP
deviations is therefore to compare the internationally active banks with other, domestic Norwegian
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banks. During the fall of 2011, the Eurozone-crisis escalated rapidly. As shown in Figure 3.3, this
lead to a substantial decrease in the funding cost in foreign currency markets for Norwegian banks
compared to the domestic banks. By the summer of 2012, most of the cost advantage had receeded
to pre-2011 levels. In our main analysis, we therefore focus on how the increase the CIP funding
advantage during 2011 and 2012 affected bank behavior.8 We discuss our empirical strategy in more
in detail in Section 3.4.
3.3 Data
In this section, we discuss the data used in our analysis. We start by describing the data soures,
before discussing how we construct our final sample. Finally, we provide and discuss summary
statistics of our final sample.
3.3.1 Description of data sources
[Description of data on how we construc the CIP-deviations]
In order to investigate the impact of covered interest parity deviations on bank lending and real
economic outcome, we use data from three main sources: (1) a supervisory bank-level dataset, a
(2) firm-level dataset from a credit rating agency and (3) an administrative loan-level dataset. Our
bank data are obtained from several bank reports available at Norges Bank at a quarterly frequency.
We take asset side variables (total asset size, liquid asset ratio) and liability side variables (foreign
funding ratio) from the reports to construct our main set of bank-level outcomes variables, in addition
to assign banks into a group of treated banks (banks operating in short-term international funding
markets) and control banks (all other domestic banks). Our firm-level data consists of information on
the end-of-year financial statements for all Norwegian private and public limited liability companies
for the period 1997-2015. Norwegian companies are required to have an authorized auditor, and
must file their annual financial statements after each accounting year. The accounting database
includes the profit and loss account, the balance sheet, industry information and legal form. Finally,
our loan-level dataset is an administrative data obtained from the Norwegian tax authorities. For
tax reasons, all banks report all accounts on their books by the end of the year. A unit of observation
in this data is therefore a loan between a bank and a firm. It contains firm and bank identifiers, as
well as the outstanding loan balance and the interest paid over the calendar year.
3.3.2 Sample selection and data construction
We work with a subset of the combined three data sources. The subset is chosen based on two sets of
criteria. First, we restrict attention to borrowers with positive debt, assets, sales and capital. Second,
8Table 3.11 in Appendix 3.8 shows that our results holds more generally, however.
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in the firm-level regressions we exclude firms for which the dependent variable of the regression is
below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile in the unconditional distribution of that variable.
In the case where firms have multiple loans at a specific bank, we aggregate our loan-level data
to the relationship×year level.
Due to our focus on the Eurozone crisis, our final sample runs from 2009q1 to 2012q4.
3.3.3 Summary statistics
In this section, we show summary statistics at the bank- and firm-levels. We show separate summary
statistics for treated vs. control banks, and firms borrowing from at least one treated banks vs. other
firms.
–Insert Table 3.1–
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics at the bank-level, in addition to including the (aggregate)
CIP funding deviation. Starting with the latter, the average CIP funding deviation is 29 bps, when
we average commercial paper issuances at the quarterly level. That is, issuing funding abroad in
an average quarter is 29 bps cheaper than issuing funding the NOK (with a standard deviation of
21 bps). Approximately 19% of the total liabilities of internationally active banks are short-term
foreign funding, with a standard deviation of 10%. The table also compares treatment and control
banks across several key ratios. Treated banks have slightly higher equity ratios, more liquid assets
and are slightly larger compared to control banks.
Table 3.2 compares firm-level characteristics for firms that were served by at least one treated
bank (treated firms) with those that were served only by control banks. Treated firms have more
assets in place and pay higher wages. They have similar equity, R&D and short-term debt ratios.
–Insert Table 3.2–
3.4 Methodology
Our empirical approach consists of comparing bank-, loan- and firm-level outcomes based on whether
banks were active in the short-term foreign funding market within a difference-in-differences setting,
zooming in on the CIP shock of 2011 and 2012. We refer to the banks active in short-term foreign
funding markets as "treated banks" and other banks as "control banks". We treat 2011 and 2012
as the "Post" period and 2009 and 2010 as the pre-period.
In our empirical strategy, we rely on two identifying assumptions which are akin to the standard
parallel trends assumption in a difference-in-differences set-up. Specifically, Assumption 3.4 assumes
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parallel trends at the bank- and loan-level while Assumption 3.4 assumes parallel trends at the firm-
level.
The outcomes considered at the bank- and loan-level would have been similar for treated and
control banks in the absence of the CIP-shock.
We refer to firms borrowing from at least one treated bank in the year prior to the shock as a
"treated firms" and other firms as "control firms".
The outcomes considered at the firm-level would have been similar for treated and control firms
in the absence of the CIP-shock.
There are at least two main threats to these identifying assumptions. The first threat is that
outcomes are systematically different for treated and control banks at the bank- and loan-level, and
systematically different for treated and control firms at the firm-level. This can arise for instance
if treated banks over the time-period considered have different business models compared to our
control banks giving rise to differential corporate credit growth.
We address this threat to identification by adopting a dynamic difference-in-differences approach,
where we explicitly test for differences between treated and control units also prior to the shock. At
the bank-level, this is our baseline regression. At the loan- and firm-level, where our data has an
annual frequency, our baseline regression is a static difference-in-differences. We report the results
from dynamic difference-in-differences in the appendix.
Our second main threat to identification is that, even if treated and control banks and firms are
similar prior to the shock, they may be hit by different shocks during the treatment period. For
instance, this can be the case if treated banks are more exposed to Eurozone credit markets, or if
treated firms are more likely to be exporting firms, and thereby be more affected by the slowdown
in the Eurozone economy.
We adopt two strategies to rule out such confounding demand and supply shocks. First, at the
loan-level we adopt an approach a la Khwaja and Mian (2008), effectively only using variation within
firm-year. Second, at the firm-level we only use within-industry×year×size variation, which ensures
that we compare outcomes for relatively similar firms borrowing from different types of banks.
Conditional on these identifying assumptions being satisfied, our estimates map out the effect of
the CIP shock onto bank funding and lending decisions, the effect at the loan-level and ultimately
how the CIP shock translate into differential real economic outcomes.
In the rest of this section, we explicitly outline how we operationalize our identification strategy
at the different units of analysis.
Bank-level At the bank-level, we estimate equation (3.2)






γτ (Db × 1t=τ ) + εb,t (3.2)
where b refers to bank and t to time. The outcome variable ∆Yb,t denotes the change in either
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foreign currency denominated short-term funding or the change in log(corporate loans). The treat-
ment indicator Db is equal to 1 if a bank has positive short-term foreign funding in 2011q2. At the
bank-level, Db = 1 for approximately 12 % of banks.
Loan-level At the loan-level, we estimate






γτ (Db × 1t=τ ) + εb,f,t (3.3)
where f refers to firm. The main outcome variable is growth at the loan-level. We saturate
our specification with bank fixed effects. In addition, we include firm×year fixed effects captured
by αf,t for the subsample of loans at firms that borrow from multiple banks (Khwaja and Mian,
2008). This subsample constitutes roughly 10% of the sample of loans. At the loan-level, Db = 1
for approximately 74 % of our sample.
Firm-level At the firm-level, we estimate
∆Yf,t = αf + 1t=2011∪t=2012 + γ (1t=2011∪t=2012 ×Db) + Xf ,t + εf,t (3.4)
where ∆Yf,t is chosen from a broad set of firm balance sheet and income statement variables.
To control for confounding factors, we include firm-year controls Xf ,t. Specifically, we control for
year×industry×fixed effects.
3.5 Micro-level response
In this section, we go through the different levels of analysis at the micro-level. We start by investi-
gating the impact of the shock to growth in short-term foreign funding and overall corporate credit
for treated banks, and show that both variables increase at the time of the shock. We then move
to a loan-level analysis, and show that treated banks expand credit relative to control firms, after
controlling for firm × fixed effects. We then investigate how a range of firm outcomes are affected.
We show that treated firms increase dividend payouts and take on more debt. They also expand
production and investment into fixed assets. The investment into fixed assets is driven both by an
increase in financial fixed assets and an increase in capital investment.
3.5.1 Bank-level
– Insert Figure 3.4
In Figure 3.4 we show the evolution of the level of aggregate foreign funding for treatment and
control banks over time. The evolution is relatively flat for both groups of banks prior to 2011q3.
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In 2011q3 however, there is a substantial increase in the level of foreign funding for treatment bank
which persists throughout the remainder of the sample. The third quarter of 2011 correspond to the
beginning of the escalation of the Eurozone crisis, and also the point in time for when the USD cost
advantage started to become especially pronounced (Figure 3.3.) Overall, the timing is consistent
with the USD cost advantage leading to increased foreign borrowing by the affected banks.
To shed further light on this, we move on to estimate equation 3.2 using the share of foreign
funding to total assets as dependent variable. For each period, we estimate the difference in total
foreign funding to total assets for treated and control banks.9 The time-varying differences between
treated and control banks are shown in Figure 3.5.
–Insert Figure 3.5
Conditional on group fixed effects, the fraction of foreign funding to total assets evolves relatively
similar for treated and control banks for all periods considered, except the third and fourth quarter
of 2011 where there is a sizable and significant increase in foreign funding at the treated banks. The
difference is large. In 2011q3 and 2011q4, foreign funding relative to total assets is approximately
3 %-points higher for the treatment group. Once the shock reverts. This finding is consistent with
the USD cost advantage shock leading treated banks to increase their intake of short-term foreign
funding.
Next, we examine what happens to the corporate credit share at the bank-level. In Figure 3.6,
we show the time-varying differences in the share of corporate loans to total assets for treated and
control banks.
–Insert Figure 3.6
While the difference between the two groups are a bit noisier compared to the previous figure,
there are no significant differences in the corporate credit share between treated and control banks
prior to the shock. After the shock, there is an uptick in corporate credit for treated banks. For
2011q4, the difference in corporate credit relative to total assets between treated and control banks is
approximately 2 %-points. This is consistent with the relative increase in foreign funding documented
in Figure 3.5, which translated into higher credit supplied to corporations.10
A potential challenge to our bank-level analysis is that the difference in corporate credit growth
between treated and control banks may be driven by other factors, such as confounding demand
shocks. We therefore proceed to investigate whether the observed increase in corporate credit at
the bank-level is also present at the loan-level in a setting in which we can control for time-varying
factors affecting credit demand.
9Both treated and control banks are active in more long-term foreign funding markets through issuance of covered
bonds in especially Euro.
10In the Online Appendix, we show that the remainder of the foreign funding acquired in 2011q3 and 2011q4 is
deposited at foreign central banks.
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3.5.2 Loan-level
In this section, we explore whether the observed increase in corporate credit is present at the loan-
level. Using loan-level data allows us to further substantiate that we are identifying a credit supply
expansion by (1) investigating both quantity and price responses and (2) control for firm-specific
factors. Our baseline loan-level results are given in Table 3.3.
–Insert Table 3.3–
Starting with column (1), loan-level credit growth is approximately 3.2% higher on loans from
treated banks compared to control banks. The economic magnitude is relatively large. Specifically,
the unconditional mean credit growth is -6.8%. Put differently, the effect on loan-level credit growth
from borrowing from a treated bank is almost 50 % of the absolute value of average credit growth. In
columns (2) and (3), we restrict attention to the sample of firms borrowing from more than one bank,
and where at least one of those banks is treated. This represents approximately 10% of our sample.
In column (2), we run our baseline regression without firm× year fixed effects, whereas the results
from our referred specification with firm×year fixed effects is given in column (3). The results in
column (3) indicate that credit growth within a firm×is approximately 6% higher at treated banks.
Again, compared to a mean credit growth of -10.5%, these results suggest that there is a sizable
expansion in credit at the loan-level for loans from treated banks compared to control banks.
In Table 3.4 we repeat the estimation, using the change in interest paid relative to outstanding
debt as dependent variable. Consistent with a credit supply shocks, there is a significant decline in
loan-level interest rates once we control for firm-specific factors in Column (3).
–Insert Table 3.4–
From the previous tables, it remains unclear whether the expansion in credit is equally spread
across all firms in the economy. To examine the heterogeneity of the effects across firms, in Table 3.5
we repeat the loan-level estimation in Column (1) of Table 3.3 interacting the treatment × shock-
period variable with a broad range of firm-characteristics. Over a broad set firm characteristics, only
the export-dummy has a statistically significant impact on our estimate. The coefficient estimate
suggests that exporting firms have a significantly higher loan-level credit growth following the shock.
A potential explanation for this can be that they during the sovereign debt crisis had a more elastic
demand for bank debt and hence were more likely to utilize the increase in bank debt. Note that in
Tables 3.3 3.4 we do include firm× year factors, suggesting that within an exporting firm there is
an increase in credit and a decrease in price.
–Insert Table 3.5–
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3.5.3 Firm-level
Next, we examine the impact of the USD cost advantage shock at the firm-level. We start by looking
at a range of firm outcomes in Table 3.6.
–Insert Table 3.6–
In column (1), we consider the growth in bank debt as dependent variable. The column shows
that there is a statistically significant increase in bank debt at the firm level, even though it is
somewhat smaller as compared to that observed at the loan-level. Column (2) shows the results
from a regression using log(sales) as a dependent variable. There is a positive and statistically
significant effect on sales for treated firms. The magnitudes are large: the estimated impact is 2.7%,
compared to an unconditional mean of 3.6%. In column (3), we show that there is a positive and
statistical effect on the change in wages. In column (4), we show a statistically significant impact
on the growth in fixed assets. The effects are large, and roughly equal to the mean growth in fixed
assets. In column (5), we do not find a similar impact on current assets. Therefore, the expansion in
credit that comes from increased short-term funding at banks translates into long-term investment
at the firm-level.
–Insert Table 3.7–
In Table 3.7, we provide further evidence of how treated firms adjust their capital structure in
response to the shock. Importantly, we find that firms increase their leverage. While the expansion
in credit does not lead to more dividends (extensive margin) (column 1), firms increase dividend
payouts (intensive margin) (column 2). As there is no expansion in equity (column 3) - suggesting
that any increased profits is paid out rather than retained -, firms expand their overall debt (column
4). This suggests that the expansion of bank credit does not replace other forms of credit. Rather
it leads to an increase in debt. The increase in debt occurs via both an increase in short-term and
long-term debt, as highlighted in columns (5) and (6).
Explaining the effect on fixed assets
Next, we exploit the granularity of our firm-level data to examine the type of fixed assets that
firms invest in. In our database, fixed assets consist of three sub-components: fixed financial assets,
capital and intangible assets. The overall impact of the credit supply expansion on the real economy
is likely to depend substantially on whether firms allocate surplus funds to financial investments,
whether they invest in intangible assets, or whether the credit supply expansion leads to more capital
investment. In Table 3.8, we replicate our estimation, while focusing on the different components of
fixed assets.
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–Insert Table 3.8–
In Column (1), we reproduce Column (6) from Table 3.6. Columns (2) - (4) report the results
from using the different subcategories of fixed assets as outcome variables. In column (2), we show
that there is a positive and statistically significant impact on financial fixed assets. This comprises
intra-conglomerate holdings of other firms, as well as investments in publicly listed stocks and bonds.
In column (3), we show that there is also an increase in capital investment for treated firms. Treated
firms have approximately a 1.25% higher growth in capital as compared to control firms. This is
roughly equal to the absolute value of the unconditional mean of capital growth, suggesting that the
relative large increase in bank credit translates to a relatively large increase in capital.
Heterogeneous effects
Given that we observed a larger credit growth for exporting firms, a natural question is whether they
are crucial for driving the capital response documented in Table 3.6. In order to do so, we redo our
firm-level estimation including a wide range of firm-characteristics as interaction terms. We restrict
attention to focusing on the impact on capital. The results are reported in Table 3.9. Consistent
with our loan-level results, exporting firms have significantly higher capital growth.
3.6 Macro-level response
In the previous section, we documented that the increase in lending at the bank- and loan-level,
translated to higher growth in sales and capital at the firm-level. In this section, we provide back-
of-the-envelope calculations on how important these effects were for the aggregate growth in sales
and capital. In order to do so, we aggregate our estimates in Tale 3.6 using lagged sales or capital as
weights. Our analysis implicitly relies on two assumptions (see for instance Chodorow-Reich 2014):
there are no general equilibrium effects; and in the absence of the shock, sales/capital would have
had a growth rate equal to the average growth rate of control firms. The results of our aggregation
exercise are shown in Table 3.10
–Insert Table 3.10–
Both in 2011 and 2012, the growth in sales and capital is substantially higher as compared to our
aggregated series in the counterfactual case. Specifically, the sales growth is 5% higher in 2011 due
to the CIP shock and 1.2% higher in 2012. Capital is 1% higher in 2011 and 2.9% higher in 2012.
This suggests that the CIP shock not only translated into a relatively large increase in domestic
lending, but also into a substantial increase in both sales and capital at the aggregate level.
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3.7 Policy implications
The issue of refinancing risk has been a topic of core discussions in both academic and policy circles.
Short-term foreign funding represents high refinancing risk, especially due to the fact that generally,
and in our setting in particular, this consists of unsecured commercial paper and certificate of
deposits. Precisely due to its unsecured nature, this type of funding is likely to dry up in bad times,
as it happened in the Great Financial Crisis around the world, or in Euro area banks during the
European sovereign debt crisis. Norwegian policymakers, too, have expressed their concern regarding
the matter:
"This funding comprises short-term paper and deposits from money market funds and large com-
panies. Deposits can be withdrawn quickly and are not considered stable. Short-term money market
funding is considered unstable owing to short maturities."(Norges Bank Financial Stability Report,
2018).
As Diamond and He (2014) point out, such pro-cyclicality is further exacerbated due to a possible
debt overhang with short-term debt. The value of short-term debt is not very sensitive to new
investment. This may create little value transfer from investment to debtholders, and ameliorate
debt overhang (underinvestment as in Myers (1977)). Yet, due to this insensitivity in the long-run,
it becomes problematic in volatile periods and in bad times, as equity value becomes highly volatile:
highly volatile equity means more state-contingent scenarios of potential underinvestment, and debt-
overhang will increase. Therefore, policies of lengthening debt maturity in the times of crisis can
have positive effects on bank lending and real activity.
Despite the CIP shock being orthogonal to monetary policy, it has implications for monetary
authorities. Banks’ private incentives to borrow short-term may lead individual banks to overdo
so. This is because banks do not fully internalize potential fire-sales costs to which their maturity
transformation activities will lead (Stein, 2012). In a crisis, the only way for banks to honor their
short-term debt would be to sell their long-term assets at fire-sale prices. The potential for such fire
sales may give rise to a negative externality. Thus, unregulated banks may engage in excessive short-
term borrowing leaving the financial system overly vulnerable to costly crises. However, if banks’
short-term liabilities are subject to reserve requirements, the monetary policy can be used as a
mechanism: the central bank can inject or contract reserves into the system, effectively changing the
amount available for lending amount. Therefore, policymakers are better off expanding regulation
(e.g. reserve requirement, or haircut) on such short-term facilities. This is especially true when
there is no other direct impact on the schedule of foreign funding availability, such as pricing which
can be altered only for local borrowing. 11
11Kashyap and Stein (2000) describe monetary policy shocks in the U.S. prior to the financial crisis, as it worked
through funding availability. As they convincingly argue, credit supply may be affected by monetary policy through
changing central bank reserves available to the banking system. Under these circumstances, such monetary policy
would work only if the bank cannot substitute the drained reserved by other, non-reservable funding such as certificate
of deposits. The effect of reserves on funding availability in this system is over and above the effect of the changes
in reserves on interest rates (which used to be the case also in the previous U.S. monetary system). This monetary
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Thus, the short-term nature of the shock puts it apart from academic and policy discussions on
longer term refinancing. For instance, the 2011 European Central Bank’s (ECB) long-term refinanc-
ing operations (LTRO) allowed participating banks get unlimited funding of long-term (three-year)
maturity at similar conditions as in case of the short-term borrowing (the same interest rate, pool
of eligible securities and haircut policy). At the time of the ECB policy decision, Euro area banks
were relying on short-term debt and were largely exposed to rollover risk. The purpose of the LTRO
policy was, by ensuring stable funding for a horizon of three years, the substantially lengthened
maturity of bank liabilities and sizably reduced uncertainty about the refinancing conditions over a
longer period would support bank investment. While this may imply that short-term financing may
not have credit or, more importantly, real implications, we show the opposite.
3.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we take an empirical approach to investigate the impact of a shock to short-term
funding in a subset of Norwegian banks during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2011. During this
event, internationally active Norwegian banks could benefit from their access to USD-denominated
debt markets. Because of deviations in the covered interest parity, once translated into Norwegian
Krone USD-denominated debt allowed internationally active Norwegian banks to obtain favourable
funding terms as compared to other Norwegian banks that only had access to domestic funding.
The asymmetric nature of this shock gives us the opportunity to examine how a shock to short-
term funding, that is unrelated to domestic monetary policy, affects lending behaviour of banks with
different exposure to the shock. By making use of a supervisory bank-level dataset, in conjunction
with loan- and firm-level data, we can quantify the effects of the shock in the cross-section of firms
in the economy. The completeness of our data allows us to control for firm demand by employing a
granular set of fixed effects.
We find that firms that borrowed from internationally active banks benefited from an expansion
in credit, and this effect was stronger for firms with multiple banking relationships. The effect was
not limited to quantities but also extended to prices. Our results indicate that the favorable foreign
funding shock to bank financing translated into an expansion of domestic credit. We also show
that despite the short-term nature of the shock, firm borrowing was employed to support long-term
investment more than to prop up short-term assets. Finally, we find that the shock had a significant
aggregate impact on the Norwegian economy.
system used to be the case in the U.S. before, while nowadays the amount of central bank reserves available to the
banking system is decoupled from the monetary policy stance. Our shock originates abroad, and is not related to
monetary policy.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1
Investment by U.S. prime money market funds across regions
MMF lending to Euro went down, blue line
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Figure 3.2
Investment by U.S. prime money market funds in safe heavens , as compared to


















01jan2011 01jul2011 01jan2012 01jul2012 01jan2013
Euro area banks High quality banks outside Euro area
Notes: Safe havens defined as Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, while the main Euro
Area countries consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Spain
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Figure 3.3
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Notes: A negative value indicates cheaper USD hedged funding as compared to domestic borrowing in NOK.
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Figure 3.4
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Control Treatment
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of aggregate foreign funding for treatment and control banks. To facilitate
comparison, we have indexed each series where 2011q2 is set as base quarter.
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Figure 3.5




































Notes: This figure shows the estimated γτ from equation (3.2) using the foreign funding relative to total assets as
outcome variable. Dots indicate point estimates and vertical lines are the associated 95% confidence interval. All
coefficients are plotted relative to 2011q2.
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Figure 3.6



































Notes: This figure shows the estimated γτ from equation (3.2) using corporate loans to total assets as dependent
variable. Dots indicate point estimates and vertical lines are the associated 95% confidence interval. All coefficients
are plotted relative to 2011q2.
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Figure 3.7
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CIP deviation Outstanding volume CD (rhs)
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of CIP funding deviations between USD and CAD (blue line, left axis) and
the outstanding volume of USD funding (orange line, right axis) . Negative figures indicate cheaper USD hedged





Control Treatment Difference (Control - Treatment)
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev
CIP funding deviation -0.29 0.21
Short-term foreign fund ratio 0.19 0.10
Equity / Assets 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 -0.011∗∗∗
Deposits / Assets 0.62 0.13 0.62 0.22 0.005
Liquid assets / Assets 0.10 0.09 0.18 0.18 -0.08∗∗∗
Log(Assets) 10.99 1.28 11.77 1.81 -0.78∗∗
Observations 117 23
Notes: This table report summary statistics at the bank-level. All values based on end of 2010 balance-sheet statement. Summary
statistics are computed for banks active in international short-term funding market ("Treated", column (2)) and other banks ("Control",
column (1)). *** indicates p < 0.01 and ** indicates p < 0.05, where p is the p-value on a test of equality across groups.




Control Treatment Difference (Control - Treatment)
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev
log(Wages) 6.99 1.90 7.23 1.96 -0.23∗∗∗
log(Capital) 7.26 1.86 7.81 2.14 -0.55∗∗∗
log(Assets) 8.33 1.32 8.82 1.62 -0.48∗∗∗
Cash / Assets .13 .17 .12 .16 0.01∗∗∗
Equity / Assets .28 .20 .29 .29 -0.01∗∗∗
Short-term debt / Assets 0.32 0.26 0.31 0.25 0.01∗∗∗
R&D and patents / Assets 0.001 .02 .002 .03 -0.001∗∗∗
Exporter 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.17 -0.01∗∗∗
Observations 13’925 30’667
Notes: This table report summary statistics at the firm-level. All values based on end of 2010 income and balance-sheet statement.
Summary statistics are computed for firms borrowing from treated banks ("Treated", column (2)) and other firms ("Control", column
(1)). *** indicates p < 0.01, where p is the p-value on a test of equality across groups. Short-term is debt with maturity less than
12 months. Exporter is a dummy variable indicating whether the firm belongs to an exporting industry, defined as the 10 most





Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt
Db×Post 0.0321∗∗ 0.0402 0.0605∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0282) (0.0305)
N 162315 15745 15745
No. of clusters 111 110 110
Mean of dependent variable -0.0687 -0.105 -0.105
SD of dependent variable 0.627 0.716 0.716
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No
Firm-Year No No Yes
Sample All Multiple banks Multiple banks
R-squared 0.00356 0.0108 0.484
Notes: This table contains the results from estimating equation (3.4) using loan-level credit
growth as outcome variable. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations are
taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1 for 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise.
Column (1) considers the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) consider only firms borrowing from
at least one internationally active and one internationally non-active bank. Standard errors
two-way clustered at the bank-firm level.
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Table 3.4
Loan-level results, interest rates
(1) (2) (3)
∆Interest rate ∆Interest rate ∆Interest rate
Db×Post 0.00184 -0.00802 -0.0146∗∗
(0.00216) (0.00615) (0.00640)
N 143605 12383 12383
No. of clusters 111 110 110
Mean of dependent variable 0.000420 0.00134 0.00134
SD of dependent variable 0.157 0.176 0.176
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes No
Firm-Year No No Yes
Sample All Multiple banks Multiple banks
R-squared 0.0852 0.0790 0.502
Notes: This table contains the results from estimating equation (3.4) using imputed interest
rates as outcome variable. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations
are taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1 for 2011 and 2012, and zero
otherwise. Column (1) considers the full sample. Columns (2) and (3) consider only firms
borrowing from at least one internationally active and one internationally non-active bank.
Standard errors two-way clustered at the bank-firm level.
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Table 3.5
Loan-level results - heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt Growth in debt
Db×Post 0.0741∗∗ 0.0580 0.0671∗∗ 0.0470 0.0162 0.0783∗∗ 0.0529 0.0177
(0.0343) (0.0774) (0.0305) (0.0593) (0.0427) (0.0312) (0.0512) (0.0577)
Db×Post×Low TFP, 2010 0.00192
(0.0512)






Db×Post×Cash / Total assets, 2010 0.243
(0.154)
Db×Post×Net income / Total assets, 2010 -0.00513
(0.00842)
Db×Post×Equity / Total assets, 2010 0.0864
(0.157)
Db×Post×Short-term debt / Total assets, 2010 0.147
(0.147)
N 14726 14726 14726 14726 15745 14211 14722 14722
No. of clusters 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110
Mean of dependent variable -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 -0.102 -0.105 -0.103 -0.102 -0.102
SD of dependent variable 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.713 0.716 0.715 0.712 0.712
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table contains the result from estimating equation (3.4), using loan-level credit growth as outcome variable and where we add a triple interaction term based on firm-characteristics. Low TFP is defined as a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm had an estimated TFP below the industry median in 2010. TFP is estimated by regressing log value added on the wage bill, firm capital, as well as year, firm and industry fixed effects. *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations are taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1 for 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the bank-firm level.
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Table 3.6
Firm-level results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Growth in bank debt ∆Log(sales) ∆Log(wages) ∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Current assets)
Db×Post 0.0233∗∗ 0.0276∗∗∗ 0.0116∗ 0.0130∗∗ -0.00775
(0.0115) (0.00595) (0.00673) (0.00498) (0.00848)
N 126053 79119 76465 112427 115235
No. of clusters 109 108 108 108 108
Mean of dependent variable -0.0620 0.0359 0.0518 0.0118 0.0393
SD of dependent variable 0.578 0.365 0.342 0.345 0.583
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table contains the results from estimating equation (3.4) using different firm outcomes as dependent variable across columns. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations are taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1 for 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dividends>0 ∆Log(dividends) ∆Log(Equity) ∆Log(debt) ∆Log(short-term debt) ∆Log(long-term debt)
Db×Post -0.0000833 0.233∗∗ 0.00818 0.0207∗ 0.0113∗ 0.0121∗
(0.00347) (0.100) (0.00758) (0.0119) (0.00576) (0.00624)
N 151257 16698 116077 115973 104260 105337
No. of clusters 109 107 108 108 108 108
Mean of dependent variable 0.171 1.225 0.0859 -0.0674 0.0415 -0.0642
SD of dependent variable 0.377 2.379 0.429 0.676 0.412 0.432
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table contains the results from estimating equation (3.4) using different firm outcomes as dependent variable across columns. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
Mean and standard deviations are taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1 for 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the bank-firm level. Dependent variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Table 3.8
Firm-level results, decomposing the effect on fixed assets
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Financial asssets) ∆Log(Capital) ∆Log(Intangibles)
Db×Post 0.0130∗∗ 0.0326∗∗ 0.0116∗ 0.0147
(0.00498) (0.0147) (0.00595) (0.0203)
N 112427 52628 102341 33512
No. of clusters 108 108 108 108
Mean of dependent variable 0.0118 0.0338 -0.0163 0.0534
SD of dependent variable 0.345 0.617 0.370 0.685
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations are taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1
for 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise. Standard errors two-way clustered at the bank-firm level. Dependent variables are truncated at




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Fixed Assets) ∆Log(Fixed Assets)
Db×Post 0.0130∗∗ 0.0117∗ 0.00386 0.0203∗∗ 0.0337∗∗ 0.0114∗∗
(0.00498) (0.00665) (0.00989) (0.00855) (0.0142) (0.00516)
Db×Post×Large, 2010 0.00966
(0.00844)
Db×Post×Equity / Assets, 2010 0.0272
(0.0304)
Db×Post×Cash / Assets, 2010 -0.0353
(0.0402)




N 112427 111129 111127 112427 111129 111129
No. of clusters 108 108 108 108 108 108
Mean of dependent variable 0.0118 0.0119 0.0119 0.0118 0.0119 0.0119
SD of dependent variable 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.345
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations are taken over the full sample period (2009 - 2012). Post = 1 for 2011 and 2012, and zero otherwise. Standard errors two-way
clustered at the bank-firm level. Dependent variables are truncated at the 1st and 99th percentile.
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Table 3.10
Aggregate implications for growth in capital and sales
Sales Capital
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
2011 11.4% 6.4% 1.8% 0.8%
2012 2.7% 1.5% 4.2% 1.3%
Notes: This table contains counterfactual aggregate sales and credit
growth. Counterfactual growth measures are computed based on
the procedure in section 3.6.
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Table 3.11
Robustness - panel regression
(1) (2)
∆Log(foreign funding) ∆Log(corporate loans)
CIPt × Db,2011q2 0.298* 0.00209**
(0.153) (0.000960)
N 475 2719
Mean of dependent variable -0.014 -0.000149
SD of dependent variable 0.406 0.00573
Bank FE Yes Yes
Year FE No No
R-squared 0.0483 0.0382
Notes: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Mean and standard deviations are taken over the
full sample period (2010 - 2015). CIP is normalized, so that a positive value indicates more
favorable foreign funding conditions. Column (1) considers the change in the log of foreign
liabilities as dependent variable. Column (2) considers the change in the log of corporate
loans as dependent variables. Standard errors clustered at the bank-level.
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Chapter 4
Covered Interest Parity in long-dated
securities
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4.1 Introduction
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) has been known as one of the most reliable no-arbitrage conditions in
international finance. According to CIP it should not be possible to earn risk free profit by borrowing
in one currency and investing in another with the foreign exchange rate fully covered. Since the
global financial crisis (2008-2009), seemingly large deviations from CIP have puzzled academics,
policy makers and market participants alike. Despite several years of tranquil financial conditions,
recent work indicates persistent and sizeable arbitrage opportunities in some of the most liquid long-
dated fixed income and currency markets in the world (Du et al. (2019), Liao (2020), Sushko et al.
(2016), Avdjiev et al. (2019)).
The failure of CIP is commonly ascribed to the post-crisis tightening of banking regulations.12
According to this view, tighter balance sheet constraints make it more costly for banks to step in
as arbitrageurs. In turn, this may lead to unexploited arbitrage opportunities, less efficient markets
and a breakdown of CIP. If proven correct, stricter banking regulations have broad implications for
market efficiency and the relative pricing of fixed income securities across currencies.
This paper revisits the validity of CIP across a range of long-dated fixed income securities for
three major currency pairs; EUR, JPY and GBP, against USD.3 An important premise for CIP
arbitrage is that the profit is riskless and adjusted for trading costs. To this end, I look into various
trading strategies to ensure that the strategy is truly risk-free and that all costs are identified. I
examine Libor swaps (fixed-for-floating interest rate swaps), corporate bonds and government bonds
and refer to deviations between the synthetic and direct interest rate as the basis, i.e. the Libor basis,
the government bond basis and the corporate bond basis. My results suggest that CIP arbitrage is
difficult to reap and that common measures of CIP rely on trading strategies subject to rollover risk
and credit risk, or fail to fully account for the trading cost.
As a point of departure, Figure 4.1 depicts the 5-year EUR/USD basis for Libor swaps, high
quality corporate bonds and risk-free government bonds in two tranquil periods before and after the
global financial crisis. Prior to the crisis (2004-2006), the corporate bond basis and the Libor basis
were close to zero. In the same period, the government bond basis hovered between -30 and -40
basis points. Seen from the perspective of an U.S. investor, this means that U.S. Treasuries yield
less than investing in German government bonds after fully covering the exchange rate risk. After
the crisis (2015-2017), the Libor basis has moved into negative territory. In contrast, the corporate
bond basis is fairly close to zero in both periods.
Figure 4.1 raises several questions. Why has the Libor basis widened substantially after the
1See for instance Du et al. (2019), Liao (2020), Sushko et al. (2016), Avdjiev et al. (2019)
2The Basel III framework introduces new capital and liquidity standards. This includes higher capital requirements
for banks, a strengthening of banks liquidity coverage (Liquidity Coverage Ratio - LCR) and a more stable funding
structure (Net Stable Funding Ratio - NSFR). Moreover, some jurisdictions have introduced Leverage Ratios limiting
the amount of bank leverage independent of the risk profile of the asset side of the bank. These regulations have been
gradually implemented since the global financial crisis.
3Long-dated is defined in this paper as 1 year to maturity and beyond.
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financial crisis? The government bond basis traded well below zero already prior to the post-
crisis tightening of banking regulations - what prevented market participants from exploiting cross
currency deviations in presumably risk-free securities? Moreover, a wide range of bond market
participants are not subject to banking regulations. Why would a relatively unconstrained hedge
fund leave risk-free profit on the table if the deviations can easily be taken advantage of? These
questions call for further analysis of the impediments to cross currency arbitrage in long-dated
securities.
To answer these questions I first turn to the Libor basis - the difference between the direct and
the synthetic Libor swap rate.4 The Libor basis is a frequently applied measure of long-dated CIP
deviations and has traded at unprecedented levels ever since the global financial crisis.5 However, the
Libor basis is not suited to measure CIP deviations due to substantial roll-over risk and the failure
of the Libor swap rates to accurately reflect the costs of avoiding this roll-over risk - which I refer to
as the term funding liquidity premium. The Libor swap is a derivative reflecting the expected path
of the underlying short-term floating rate. Hence, to take advantage of the 5-year Libor basis, for
instance, the investor has to raise funding every quarter exactly at the 3-month Libor rate over the
next 5 years.6
Although the roll-over risk is always inherent in the Libor basis trade, it only shows up in the
Libor basis if the costs of avoiding roll-over risk differ across currencies. Indeed, the Libor basis is
basically a necessary compensation for such differences as the Libor swap rate in the two currencies
does not reflect the true cost for borrowing and lending at the respective tenor. My empirical results
suggest that cross-currency differences in the relative costs of locking in funding over longer periods
- the term funding liquidity premium - is an important driver of the Libor basis after the global
financial crisis. Divergence in the timing, scale and composition of central bank asset purchases
contribute to the differences in the term funding liquidity premium. Furthermore, trading the Libor
basis exposes the trader to credit risk in the investment leg. The considerations above substantiate
that the Libor basis is not an adequate measure of CIP deviations.
To avoid the roll-over risk in Libor swaps, one may turn to corporate bonds where the principal
is exchanged at the same tenor as the FX forward agreement. Hence, corporate bond rates should
embed the full term funding liquidity premium at the relevant tenor and the corporate bond basis
is expected to be significantly closer to zero than the Libor basis. To verify this, I construct the
deviations between the synthetic and direct corporate bond rate for similar bonds. I find that the
corporate bond basis is substantially closer to zero and less persistent than the corresponding devi-
ations based on Libor swap rates. Moreover, empirical tests indicate that the long run relationship
4The Libor swap rate is often referred to as Interest Rate Swaps (IRS). The Libor basis is equivalent to a Cross
Currency Basis Swaps (CCBS) which is quoted directly on data vendors like Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters.
5Several studies have shown the tight correspondence between the Libor basis and CCBS, see for instance Du
et al. (2019).
6The underlying short-term rate in Libor swaps are typically 3-month or 6-month Libor. In this paper I use
3-month Libor rates. In currencies where Libor is not quoted, an equivalent interbank benchmark rate acts as the
underlying floating rate. Although Libor is quoted in EUR, the market convention is Euribor.
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between corporate bond spreads and the Libor basis is in line with the CIP-condition. These results
are consistent with the hypothesis that corporate bond rates indeed account for differences in the
term funding liquidity premium across currencies.7
Corporate bonds are typically not risk-free. Hence, the corporate bond basis can be exploited
by bond issuers, but deviations do not represent round-trip arbitrage opportunities.8 To eliminate
the credit risk embedded in the corporate bond basis, a risk-free option is government bonds. Du
et al. (2019) suggest that deviations between the synthetic and direct risk-free bond rate - e.g. the
government bond basis - can be arbitraged by going short the "expensive" bond denominated in one
currency and investing in the "cheap" bond denominated in another currency with the exchange
rate risk fully covered (the short/long strategy).910 The authors argue that the persistent deviations
between the synthetic and direct risk-free bond rate - in their case bonds issued by the German gov-
ernment sponsored bank KfW - are due to stricter banking regulations introduced in the aftermath
of the financial crisis.
The short/long strategy incurs substantial shorting costs in the form of haircuts and lending
fees. My estimations of the shorting costs suggest that the post-crisis CIP deviations for government
bonds are generally below the costs of employing the short/long strategy. The main costs in the
short/long trade are haircuts and lending fees.11 To obtain the security to sell short, the arbitrageur
has to pledge collateral with the lender of the security. In the CIP trade, the value of the foreign
denominated bond (long position) is not sufficient when the security lender requires a haircut.
Typically, security lenders require a 5 per cent haircut when the collateral is denominated in foreign
currency due to the substantial currency risk such collateral pose to the securities lender, see for
instance Grohowski (2014), Duffie et al. (2002), Bassler and Oliver (2015) and Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2009). On the top of the cost of haircut the arbitrageur faces a lending fee of at least 15
basis points (Baklanova et al. (2016)).12
Moreover, as shown in figure 4.1, the government bond basis persistently traded below zero prior
to the introduction of new banking regulations. This simple observation, also carefully documented
in Du et al. (2018), substantiates that shorting costs is a more plausible explanation for the observed
deviations in risk-free bonds than stricter banking regulations. It also explains why market partic-
ipants not subject to banking regulations, like hedge funds, are not able to close the government
7These results are also consistent with the findings in Liao (2020). However, this paper conducts a more granular
comparison of corporate bond rates across currencies for instance by comparing bonds issued by financial corporations
domiciled in the same country.
8This is because, conditional on default, the payoff from the claim in the two currencies differs.
9Du et al. (2019) employ bonds issued by the government owned bank KfW. This means that they can compare
bonds issued by the same issuer across currencies. However, as long as the bonds are risk-free it does not matter if
the issuer is different. Hence, I examine the government bond basis as government bonds are traded in much deeper
markets (better market liquidity), with large outstanding volume and are easier to obtain in the securities lending
market - a precondition for the short/long strategy.
10Note that it is not possible to employ the short/long strategy to take advantage of the Libor basis as Libor swaps
are derivatives with no exchange of the principal.
11Note that haircut applies to all types of bonds, not only government bonds.
12Given that these 15 basis points are based on collateral denominated in the same currency as the borrowed
security it is likely a conservative estimate when the collateral is denominated in foreign currency.
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bond basis.
Despite not representing round-trip arbitrage, investors with a portfolio of US government bonds
can indeed enhance their return by selling U.S. government bonds and buying foreign government
bonds with the foreign exchange rate risk fully covered when the basis is negative. Textbook rep-
resentations of CIP suggest that with such return-enhancing opportunities available, investors will
push the government bond basis towards zero by reallocating their portfolios. However, such return-
enhancing opportunities were equally large prior to the introduction of new banking regulation.
Hence, a more plausible explanation is a USD specific premium: investors value USD liquidity
highly due to its status as the main settlement, funding and investment currency in the world. U.S.
government bonds can easily be turned into USD cash (via the repo market for instance), while the
costs of turning foreign denominated bonds into USD cash is much more difficult and costly - in
particular in distressed markets when the demand for USD is high. This argument is in line with
U.S. Treasuries being subject to a convenience yield. Note that the convenience yield hypothesis
cannot explain why market participants are not employing the short/long strategy, but serves as an
explanation for real money investors preference for U.S. Treasuries.
Finally, I test for round-trip arbitrage opportunities in international bond markets based on
actual unsecured funding costs for high quality financial corporations in the funding leg and the
risk-free government bond rate in the investment leg. This strategy captures the funding costs of
potential arbitrageurs of high credit quality.13 The trading strategy I propose assumes that one can
borrow unsecured in USD and invest in a risk-free asset in one of the foreign currencies (EUR, GBP
or JPY), or borrow unsecured in foreign currencies and invest in a risk-free asset in USD. I find no
evidence of persistent risk-free profit opportunities in major bond markets based on this measure.
Overall, my analysis lend little support to the hypothesis that stricter banking regulation has dis-
torted long-dated fixed income and currency markets. Although the cross currency basis is sizeable
for risk-free bonds, this was also the case prior to the post-crisis tightening in banking regulations.
Moreover, round-trip arbitrage in risk-free bonds is difficult to reap due to substantial costs asso-
ciated with shorting bonds or due to the direct funding costs that apply when financing the trade.
Real-money investors that can increase portfolio returns without adding credit risk by reallocating
out of US government bonds seem to prefer securities that can easily be turned into USD liquidity.
Holding liquid assets in USD is particularly valuable during a crisis and consequently act as an
insurance against market volatility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of related literature,
Section 3 defines relevant concepts, Section 4 examines the Libor basis, Section 5 takes a closer look
at the relation between the Libor basis and the corporate bond basis, while Section 6 discusses costs
and risks associated with taking advantage of cross currency deviations between risk-free government
bonds. In Section 7 I assess arbitrage opportunities in bonds after accounting for actual funding
13This strategy is in line with the one Rime et al. (2019b) examine for short-term maturities and can be interpreted
as a way to incorporate the practice of Funding Value Adjustment (FVA).
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costs. Section 8 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
This paper is closely related to a growing body of literature investigating deviations from Covered
Interest Parity in long-dated fixed income markets, in particular Du et al. (2019) and Liao (2020). Du
et al. (2019) suggest a short/long strategy to take advantage of deviations between the synthetic and
direct bond spreads in risk-free bonds. The authors show large and persistent deviations between
the direct and synthetic USD rate for bonds issued by the German government sponsored bank
KfW. They argue that these deviations represent potential arbitrage opportunities and ascribe its
existence to the introduction of new banking regulation. My results indicate that the long/short
strategy is more costly than assumed by Du et al. (2019) due to haircut in the securities lending
market. Liao (2020) looks at corporate bond spreads and establishes that the spreads are different
across currencies and co-move with the Libor basis. This is consistent with my findings for the
corporate bond basis. Liao (2020) links the differences in bond spreads across currencies and the
Libor basis to limits of arbitrage in the two market segments and highlights regulatory constraints
as a reason for the lack of arbitrage activity.
Sushko et al. (2016) investigate the Libor basis and relates the widening of the basis to hedging
demand caused by currency mismatch between assets and liabilities on banks’ balance sheets. The
authors argue that the persistent non-zero Libor basis is due to new regulatory costs for banks
limiting the arbitrage flows. Avdjiev et al. (2019) also look at the long-term Libor basis and relate
the widening to the USD exchange rate. They argue that the cross currency basis widens when the
USD strengthens.
Although my paper examines CIP-deviations at longer maturities, it is also closely related to a
large literature on the validity of CIP in money markets. The first wave of literature on short-term
CIP-deviations emerged shortly after the outburst of the global financial crisis, see e.g. Baba et al.
(2008), Baba and Packer (2009a), Baba and Packer (2009b), Coffey et al. (2009), Gârleanu and
Pedersen (2011), Goldberg et al. (2011), Griffoli and Ranaldo (2010) and McGuire and von Peter
(2012). Common for these studies is the focus on market frictions arising as a result of the financial
crisis.
As market conditions stabilized from 2014 another wave of interest in the CIP-condition and
the seemingly large violations of CIP emerged, i.e. Du et al. (2019), Rime et al. (2019b), Cenedese
et al. (2019), Iida et al. (2016), Wong et al. (2016) and Pinnington and Shamloo (2016). Du
et al. (2019) look at the deviations in repo rates arguing that regulatory constraints are the main
reason for these deviations. In contrast, Rime et al. (2019b) focus on differences in funding liquidity
and unconventional monetary policy. The authors show that a narrow group of global banks face
arbitrage opportunities, but that the scalability of this arbitrage is limited due to funding constraints.
Cenedese et al. (2019) argue that dealers with higher leverage ratio charge less attractive FX forward
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prices to their customers.
Finally, my paper is also related to research on the effect of central bank balance sheet policies
on bond prices and the funding liquidity premium. Specifically, it adds to an emerging literature
on the balance sheet composition of private banks caused by central bank operations. For instance,
Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) explain how an increase in the central bank balance sheet increases
private banks’ deposit ratio, while Haldane et al. (2016) and Butt et al. (2014) discuss the bank
credit channel of central bank balance sheet policies. Moreover, Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018)
find that corporate bonds eligible under the ECB’s corporate asset purchase program experienced
a significant yield reduction compared with those not eligible. In this paper I relate central bank
balance sheet policies to funding liquidity through higher demand for bonds and an improvement in
the deposit base for banks.
4.3 Covered Interest Parity
This section clarifies the main concepts in the paper - Covered Interest Parity, the cross currency
basis and the requirements for arbitrage.
Covered Interest Parity (CIP) Generally, CIP can be expressed by the following equation:14
(
1 + rm;$) =
Fm
S
(1 + rm;?) , (4.1)
that is, the direct interest rate (rm;$) equals the synthetic FX swap implied rate FmS (1 + rm;?), where
Fm is the forward exchange rate, m is the maturity and S is the spot exchange rate. The subscript
t for time is suppressed for simplicity.
Equation 4.1 holds if the forward and the spot rate (the hedging cost) is equal to the interest
rate differential. By applying log approximation equation 4.1 can be written as:
fm − s ≈ rm;$ − rm;? (4.2)
At a given tenor m, the FX hedging component, i.e. fm − s, is homogenously priced in the
interdealer market and can easily be obtained through data vendors like Bloomberg and Thomson
Reuters.15 In contrast, one can compute a plethora of interest rate differentials (rm;$ − rm;?) by
using the interest rates on various fixed income securities. Consequently, two important questions
arise. First, which interest rate differential corresponds to the hedging cost (interest rate differen-
tial) in the foreign exchange market? Second, which instruments can be used to construct proper
14Subscript t for time is dropped for simplicity.
15Interdealer transactions as quoted on Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters are typically subject to two-way variation
margins leading to low degree of price dispersion.
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arbitrage strategies? The answers to these questions are crucial when analyzing deviations from
CIP. Since a cross currency trade necessarily involves the exchange of currencies, the interest rate
differential priced in the FX swap market must correspond to an interest rate differential composed
by instruments where funding can be raised and money can be invested at the relevant tenor.
The cross currency basis In line with the recent literature on CIP, I refer to the deviation from
the general CIP-equation (equation 4.1) as the cross currency basis. Hence, the cross currency basis
(ρm) is defined as follows:
ρm =
(
1 + rm;$) −
Fm
S
(1 + rm;?) (4.3)
I examine three cross currency bases based on the following fixed income instruments; Libor
swaps (interest rate swaps), corporate bonds and government bonds. I refer to the three bases
as the Libor basis, the corporate bond basis and the government bond basis, respectively. It is
important to stress that each basis potentially can be traded with profit when it deviates from zero,
but this does not necessarily imply viable arbitrage opportunities.
Covered Interest Rate Arbitrage The requirements for an implementable round-trip arbitrage
trade imply that i) the trade is adequately adjusted for the transaction costs; (ii) the instruments
involved need to be tradeable; and (iii) the sequence of trades involved is free of risk for the arbi-
trageur.
Taking bid/ask spreads into account, and both from the perspective of U.S. and foreign borrow-




















where the superscripts a and b symbolize ask and bid rates, respectively, and ra > rb. Equation (4)
implies that the funding rate (ask) in USD has to be equal to or higher than the synthetic investment
rate (bid) measured in USD for the no-arbitrage condition to hold. Similarly, Equation (5) implies
that the funding rate (ask) in the foreign currency has to be equal to or higher than the synthetic
investment rate (bid) measured in foreign currency for the no-arbitrage condition to hold.16
As I will discuss later, the bid/ask spreads constitute a small part of the trading costs in the CIP
trade. The largest part is associated to the costs of obtaining the necessary funding at the relevant
maturity and potential short-selling costs. It is also important that the security in the investment
leg is risk-free.
16Note that the currency convention, i.e. if it is EUR/USD or USD/EUR, matters for the exact specification of
the equations. Equation (4) and (5) are based on USD as the base currency.
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4.4 The Libor basis
This section examines a frequently reported measure of long-dated CIP deviations - the Libor basis.17







(1 + cm;?) , (4.6)
where cm;$ is the USD Libor swap rate, cm;? is the foreign currency Libor swap rate, while Fm and
S are the forward exchange rate and the spot exchange rate, respectively. Subscript m refers to the
maturity. Figure 4.2 depicts the evolution in the 5-year Libor basis for EUR, GBP and JPY, against
USD. The Libor basis traded fairly close to zero across all three currency pairs prior to 2008. Since
the onset of the global financial crisis, the Libor basis has been volatile and persistently below zero
across the currency pairs.
At first glance it may seem like the post-crisis widening of the Libor basis convincingly represents
large and persistent deviations from CIP and consequently opportunities to reap arbitrage profit.
However, the properties of the underlying Libor swap rates in the Libor basis challenge this inter-
pretation. If the 5-year Libor basis is minus 35 basis points between EUR and USD, a number close
to the post-crisis average for the 5-year EUR/USD Libor basis, it means that the 5-year Libor swap
rate in USD is 35 basis point lower than the comparable alternative in EUR after the EUR/USD
exchange rate risk is fully covered. Theoretically, one would expect market participants to pay the
Libor swap rate in USD, receive the Libor swap rate in EUR and hedge the FX risk in order to take
advantage of the basis. The problem is that the Libor swap is not a security where cash can be
raised or placed at the 5-year tenor.
Given a negative Libor basis of 35 basis points, market participants that are able to borrow funds
exactly at 3-month Libor in USD and invest exactly at 3-month Libor in EUR on a rolling basis
over the next five years and simultaneously exchange currencies and hedge the foreign exchange rate
risk for 5 years will earn an annual profit of 35 basis points. However, a non-zero Libor basis should
not be interpreted as an arbitrage opportunity as taking advantage of the basis implies both rollover
risk in the funding leg and credit risk in the investment leg. Hence, there is no reason to expect the
Libor basis to be zero at all times. Even though a non-zero Libor basis does not indicate arbitrage,
the post-crisis evolution in the Libor basis has been unprecedented. The next subsection examines
potential drivers of the Libor basis.
The main reason for the inadequacy of the Libor basis as a measure of CIP-deviations stems
from the fact that the Libor swap rate is a derivative connected to a short-term interest rate and
not a cash instrument. In a Libor swap the counterparts exchange a fixed coupon rate for a variable
17The focus in this analysis is on maturities ranging from 2 to 10 years. The Libor basis is effectively quoted in
the market as the cross currency basis swaps. Several papers have shown the correspondence between the Libor basis
calculated as the Libor swap rate plus the FX implied interest rate differential and the cross currency basis swap, see
for example Du et al. (2019). In order to stick to a fixed terminology, I consistently refer to the "Libor basis".
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coupon rate equal to the 3-month Libor rate over the term of the swap.18 At initiation, the value of
the Libor swap is zero. The Libor swap rate is therefore the yield to maturity the market is willing
to pay in order to receive a path of unknown 3-month Libor interest rate payments throughout the
term of the Libor swap contract. To take advantage of a negative Libor basis the trader needs to
obtain funding in USD and invest the proceeds in EUR since the participants in the foreign exchange
market require that USD is exchanged and delivered against EUR. However, as the Libor basis is
based on Libor swaps - a derivative with no exchange of the principal - it is not straight forward to
borrow or invest at the interest rates used to compute the Libor basis.
To obtain the necessary funding to exploit a negative Libor basis, market participants have to
roll over 3-month Libor borrowing in USD throughout the term of the Libor swap (in this example
5-year). The Libor swap rate in USD can then be locked in by paying the fixed rate and receiving the
3-month U.S. Libor throughout the lifetime of the Libor swap contract. The interest rate payments
(equal to the 3-month U.S. Libor rate) on the funding will be canceled out by the incoming 3-month
U.S. Libor rate from the Libor swap and the trader is left paying the fixed Libor swap rate in USD.
On the investment side, the Libor basis assumes an unsecured investment in a representative Libor
panel bank in the investment currency, for instance EUR. The trader then rolls over the unsecured
deposit at 3-month EUR Libor (or an equivalent rate like Euribor), pays the 3-month EUR Libor
in the Libor swap and receives the Libor swap rate in EUR. The trader is then left with the EUR
Libor swap rate on its investment.
4.4.1 Determinants of the Libor basis
The rollover risk in the Libor swap serves as a natural starting point when searching for potential
drivers of the Libor basis. The Libor swap rate represents the expected average of 3-month Libor
over the term of the Libor swap, but not the actual term funding cost at longer tenors. This implies
that cross currency differences in the term funding liquidity premium not embedded in the Libor
swap rates may influence the Libor basis. To see this, imagine a trader who wants to take advantage
of the Libor basis. Since there is no exchange of the principal, only interest rate payments in a Libor
swap the trader of the Libor basis has to raise funding every third month while the cash proceeds
are exchanged and locked in another currency for a long period of time. Moreover, the trader place
the funds in the new currency at 3-month Libor. The trader has now basically traded one currency
for another at a long tenor, while paying and receiving the expected path of short term rates in the
respective currencies. If the compensation for locking in funds for a long term - the term funding
liquidity premium - in the currency the trader gave up is higher than in the currency she receive, a
similar compensation must be given in the FX forward market. Such compensation shows up as a
Libor basis.
18In some currencies the underlying interest rate in the swap is the 6-month rate. In main currencies swap rates
with both 3-month and 6-month rates as underlying are quoted. The Libor basis that corresponds to cross currency
swaps is based on 3-month Libor swap rates.
4.4. THE LIBOR BASIS 203
To test this hypothesis, I resort to the relative size of the central bank balance sheets as a proxy
for differences in the term funding liquidity across currencies. This implicitly assumes that central
bank balance sheet policies have an effect on the term funding liquidity premium.
To justify this assumption, I start with the stylized fact that the central bank has the power to
influence the short-term funding liquidity premium in its own currency due to its control over the
supply of the most liquid asset in the economy - central bank reserves. It is already well established
that standard central bank operations affect the funding liquidity premium at short horizons, see for
instance Hamilton (1997) and Carpenter and Demiralp (2008). Furthermore, in their seminal paper,
Kashyap and Stein (2000) establish that even relatively small asset purchases by the Federal Reserve
- conducted as part of the regular implementation of monetary policy prior to the financial crisis -
affect banks’ liability composition through relative changes in the deposit base. Such changes in the
liability composition consequently affects lending. One important lesson from Kashyap and Stein
(2000), further supported in Drechsler et al. (2017), is that deposits is a special source of funding
for banks which may not be easily replaced by market funding and that many types of deposits,
independent of the maturity, can be regarded as long-term funding for banks.
Large-scale asset purchases may have a similar effect on the long-term funding liquidity premium
as standard central bank operations have on the short-term funding liquidity premium. One potential
channel is through an increase in non-bank deposits. For instance, when the central bank purchases
assets held by the non-bank sector, the central bank prints money to finance its purchases and
thereby induces an increase in non-bank deposits at commercial banks. The new non-bank deposits
show up on the liability side on commercial banks’ balance sheets and are matched by highly liquid
central bank reserves on banks’ asset side. Additional deposits and a higher level of central bank
reserves improve banks’ funding and liquidity position19
Indeed, deposits relative to non-cash assets have increased significantly after the introduction of
large-scale asset purchases in the US, UK, Japan and the euro area.20 Normally, non-cash assets and
deposits grow at a fairly similar pace. However, in the aftermath of central bank asset purchases the
deposit growth has outpaced the non-cash asset growth.21 Higher growth in deposits than in non-
cash assets may lead to lower demand for long-term market funding (bond issuances) and improved
term funding liquidity for banks as banks’ less liquid assets can increasingly be financed by deposits.
Hence, large-scale asset purchases may reduce the term funding liquidity premium for banks in
the respective currency through the deposit channel. In turn, this affects the relative term funding
liquidity premium across currencies for all market participants and it becomes relatively cheaper
to obtain long-term funding in the respective currency. However, because the Libor swap rate
does not embed the term funding liquidity premium, the interest rate differential based on Libor
19There may also be other channels like the direct price impact of central bank purchases of corporate bonds, see
for instance Abidi and Miquel-Flores (2018).
20This can be seen in figure 4.B.2 in Appendix B.
21See Appendix B and Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) for a detailed discussion of how asset purchases may
affect the deposit base.
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swap rates does not change while the hedging cost adjusts to the fact that the relative price of the
currencies changes (because the notional in the two currencies changes hands when exchanging from
one currency to another). Consequently, the Libor basis widens.
The Libor basis may also be effected by discrepancies between the underlying Libor benchmark
rates across currencies. The Libor swap rate inherits the characteristics of the underlying 3-month
Libor benchmark rate. Differences across benchmark rates, e.g. the panel composition, transmit
to the Libor basis through the Libor swap rates in the two currencies. If the Libor swap rates are
not comparable due to differences in the underlying instrument, a compensation is needed. Such a
compensation shows up as a Libor basis.
Libor benchmark rates have been under scrutiny, evidently manipulated and subject to various
reforms over the past 10 years. Since Libor is based on quotes rather than actual transactions,
these rates are sensitive to the panel banks’ own assessment. The various reforms and the touch of
banks’ own judgement may cause differences in the benchmark rates across currencies. I proxy such
cross currency discrepancies by the spread between 3-month Libor rates and actual funding costs for
similar issuers in the commercial paper market. In cases where the spread between the benchmark
rate and actual funding costs for banks with a specific rating differs across currencies, this is a sign
that the benchmark rates contain different information, for instance in terms of methodology or
credit quality of the panel banks.22 I use these cross currency differences as a proxy for benchmark
rate discrepancies.23
Empirical strategy I examine the Libor basis and the potential determinants laid out above by
employing a panel regression on three currency pairs - EUR/USD, GBP/USD and JPY/USD.24 I
investigate the Libor basis for 2, 5 and 10 years maturity and my sample runs from 2010 to 2017
with weekly frequency due to data availability for the central bank balance sheets. The regression
is specified as follows:
∆LBmi,t = β0 + β1∆LB
m
i,t−1 + β2∆(Bali,t/Balfed,t) + β3∆CDSsprFRt
+ β4∆(LIBCPspri,t − LIBCPsprUS,t) + β5LBmi,t−1 + εi,t (4.7)
where ∆ is the first difference operator, LBmi,t is the Libor basis for currency i (against USD)
22Figure OA.1 in the online appendix illustrates the relevant 3-month Libor rates and the non-bank funding cost
measured by the 3-month commercial paper rate (CP rate) for high quality banks (A1/P1 short-term rating) differ
across currencies.
23Libor and other Ibor panel banks have generally A1/P1 rating. After the financial crisis, some panel banks have
been downgraded. However, the effect of lower rated banks in the Libor fixing should be minimal as the methodology
ensures that outliers are removed, e.g. the four lowest and highest contributions. See the online appendix for further
details about benchmark rates.
24Table OA.I in the online appendix shows the results from a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), an alternative
to the panel regression allowing currency specific coefficients. By employing a SUR model, potential correlation
between the residuals across currencies is taken into account.
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at time t with maturity m, Bali,t is the indexed balance sheet for currency i, Balfed,t is Federal
Reserve’s indexed balance sheet, CDSsprFRt is the difference between the 5-year French CDS price
denominated in USD and EUR added as a control variable in order to account for the impact of the
European sovereign debt crisis and the euro break-up risk.25 The Euro crisis increased the political
risk of holding euro assets in addition to a general surge in market uncertainty. The sovereign debt
crisis in the euro area can be characterized as a period with severe turmoil across financial markets
and large heterogeneity in banks’ funding costs depending on the country of incorporation and the
asset composition of the bank. Finally, LIBCPspri,t is the spread between 3-month Libor and
commercial paper rate in currency i and LIBCPsprUS,t is the corresponding spread in USD.
The model is specified on first differences, solely focussing on short-run effects, because of non-
stationarity of some variables on levels. Standard unit-root tests indicate that all variables are
stationary after differencing. Johansen cointegration tests show mixed results across currencies and
lack of cointegration between the main variables. The lagged dependent variable on first differences
is included to shed light on the persistence of the effects. A positive coefficient estimate on this
variable would suggest that the price adjustment in the previous period is not reversed.
Finally, the lagged dependent variable on levels act as an "error correction" term as the Libor
basis is potentially a stationary variable. Note that the focus on short-run effects means that the
change in the relative central bank balance sheet has to be interpreted as a flow rather than a stock
effect.
Regression results Table 4.1 depicts the results from the panel regression specified in equation
4.7 for three different maturities - 2, 5 and 10 years. The results indicate that the relative central
bank balance sheet affects the Libor basis. An increase in the non-US central bank balance sheet
relative to the Federal Reserves balance sheet (β2) is associated with a decline in the Libor basis,
consistent with asset purchases improving the funding liquidity and consequently affect the Libor
basis. Specifically, a one standard deviation change in the relative central bank balance sheet (β2)
is followed by a 0.15 basis point change in the 5-year Libor basis.
As expected, the results also suggest that a higher spread between the French CDS price denom-
inated in USD and Euro (β3) leads to a more negative Libor basis, i.e. an increase in the break-up
risk is associated with a higher cost of synthetic USD funding. Specifically, during the height of
the sovereign debt crisis in Europe USD investors worried about the health of some banks balance
sheets - especially those exposed to European sovereign debt - and many globally active banks were
forced to obtain USD through the FX swap market. This put a downward price pressure on the
Libor basis.
Finally, a higher Libor-CP spread in non-US currencies compared to the US Libor-CP spread
(β4) leads to a lower Libor basis. The relative Libor-CP spread between non-US currencies and
25I use French government CDS prices due to data quality. German CDS prices show the same pattern, but suffer
from more frequent data gaps.
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the US dollar measures the contemporaneous discrepancies in the benchmark rates relative to the
actual non-bank funding rate across currencies. These discrepancies are compensated by a widening
of the Libor basis. Interestingly, the regression coefficients across the term structure indicates a
declining importance of the benchmark rate discrepancies. A one basis point increase in the non-US
Libor-CP spread versus the US leads to a 0.12 basis point decline in the 2-year Libor basis. The
corresponding decline in the 10-year Libor basis has been 0.073 basis points. The striking pattern
observed in the benchmark rate coefficients is consistent with market participants interpreting a
share of the benchmark rate discrepancies as transitory (declining effect along the term structure).
For example, the strains in US money markets due to the European sovereign debt crisis may have
been considered to be transitory and benchmark rates in different currencies may react differently to
the underlying market stress. If this effect was perceived to be a short lived the coefficients should
indeed be smaller than one and declining along the term structure since the transmission from the
3-month Libor to the longer term Libor swap rates and further to the Libor basis depends on the
expected persistence of the discrepancies between the 3-month Libor rates.
4.5 The corporate bond basis
The discussion above suggests that the Libor basis is not an accurate measure of CIP deviations
because Libor swap rates do not adequately capture the full funding costs across currencies. To
avoid this problem I turn to the corporate bond basis by obtaining granular corporate bond data
from Barclays/Bloomberg running from 2010 to the end of 2017.26 This allows the calculation
of zero coupon corporate bond spreads based on country of incorporation, rating of the bond,
issuance currency and maturity.27 I compute the corporate bond basis (ρCorpm ) for issuers with







(1 + ym;?) , (4.8)
where ym;$ is the direct zero-coupon corporate bond rate denominated in USD, ym;? is the zero-
coupon corporate bond rate in foreign currency and FmS is the hedging cost. That is,
Fm
S (1 + ym;?)
is the synthetic zero-coupon corporate bond rate based on foreign currency at maturity m.28
As a starting point, it is useful to look at the relation between the corporate bond basis and the
26It is important to note that the corporate bond market is highly fragmented. In my analysis of the corporate
bond basis the Barclays/Bloomberg data are restricted to bonds with the minimum outstanding volume of around 200
million USD. After the financial crisis both market liquidity and funding liquidity have been gained importance and
the price differences between bonds with different outstanding volume but otherwise similar/equal may be substantial.
Moreover, among more standard features of the bond as rating and remaining maturity, I condition on the country
of incorporation of the bond issuer.
27More details regarding the data and the calculation of bond spreads can be found in Appendix A.
28Subscript t for time is dropped for simplicity. Mid prices from the foreign exchange market are applied to
simplify the illustration as deviations between the synthetic and direct corporate bond rate do not represent arbitrage
opportunities due to the credit risk in corporate bonds. Table OA.VI in the online appendix illustrates the bid/ask
spreads in the FX hedging market and shows these spreads would only account for a couple of basis points.
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Libor basis. Corporate bond rates are typically compared to the Libor swap rate (interest rate swap)
as a measure for the bond spread.29 In contrast to Libor swaps, corporate bonds are cash instruments
where the principal is exchanged over the full maturity of the bond. Corporate bond rates should
therefore embed the term funding liquidity premium. Hence, the corporate bond spread is expected
to be positive. However, there is nothing that prevents bond spreads for the similar corporations
to differ across currencies. For instance, in the presence of differences in the term funding liquidity
premium, the spread between the corporate bond rate and the Libor swap rate (the corporate bond
spread) should also differ across currencies. If the Libor basis exactly compensates for potential
differences in corporate bond spreads the corporate bond basis is zero.
To show the relationship between bond spreads and the Libor basis I decompose the zero coupon
corporate bond rate, y, into the zero coupon Libor swap rate, c, and the corporate bond spread, b:
ym = cm + bm, (4.9)
Hence, the bond spread, bm, is the difference between the corporate bond rate, ym, and the Libor
swap rate, cm, at maturity m. For a given issuer, differences in the term funding liquidity premium
show up in differences in corporate bond spreads across currencies. By combining equation 4.8 and
4.9, the corporate bond basis (in logs) can be expressed as a function of corporate bond spreads and
Libor swap rates:
ρCorpm ≈ cm;$ + bt;$ − (fm − s)− cm;? − bm;? (4.10)
A zero corporate bond basis implies that the difference between the corporate bond spreads equals
the Libor basis. Equation 4.10 illustrates that the corporate bond basis is basically the Libor basis
plus the cross currency bond spread differential. After isolating the bond spreads, the remaining
elements constitute the Libor basis (i.e. the log version of equation 4.6):
ρCorpm ≈ ρLibm + (bm;$ − bm;?) (4.11)
Figure 4.3 illustrates the empirical relationship between the bond spread differential, the Libor
basis and the corporate bond basis. As expected, and consistent with the term funding liquidity
premium hypothesis, corporate bond spreads differ substantially across currencies. The left hand
side of the panel, graph a and c, depicts the corporate bond spreads for high quality financial
corporations in EUR and USD, and JPY and USD, respectively. Moreover, the difference between
the bond spreads corresponds closely to the Libor basis as shown in graph b and d in figure 4.3.
This means that the corporate bond basis is relatively close to zero. The exception is during the
European sovereign debt crisis, a period characterized by high political risk and generally high degree
29Bond spreads are commonly referred to as credit spreads or z-spreads. However, since a main point in this
analysis is that bond spreads across currencies may vary due to differences in the term funding liquidity premium,
the terminology bond spreads is used in this paper.
208 CHAPTER 4. COVERED INTEREST PARITY IN LONG-DATED SECURITIES
of uncertainty in financial markets, highlighted by the grey shaded area in the graphs.
Overall, the data suggest that the discrepancies in the funding liquidity premium are embedded
in corporate bond prices. This observation supports the hypothesis that the Libor basis expresses
cross currency differences in the term funding liquidity premia that are not reflected in Libor swap
rates.30 The co-movement between the Libor basis and the corporate bond spread differential sheds
light on the development in bond markets. The differences in corporate bond spreads for similar
issuers mean that the funding liquidity premium in bonds varies across currencies as the credit risk
component should be fairly similar. The widening of the Libor swap basis is necessary to equalize
the synthetic and direct corporate funding costs.
A natural implication of the discussion above is that bond spreads should be similar across
currencies prior to the financial crisis as the Libor basis was close to zero in the pre-crisis period.
Figure 4.4 shows the senior bond spreads in EUR and USD for investment grade financial issuers
in two periods - 2004-2007 and 2015-2017 obtained from the Barclays/Bloomberg global financial
indices for EUR and USD. The average maturity of the bonds included varies slightly and the credit
quality of the included bonds can vary within the investment grade environment. Despite being
a crude measure, figure 4.4 confirms that bond spreads were very close prior to the crisis. The
right-hand panel depicts the difference between the bond spreads (EUR minus USD) in two periods,
the first from 2004 to 2007 and the second from 2015 to 2017. Between 2004 and 2007 the difference
in bond spreads never exceeded 10 basis points. In contrast, between 2015 and 2017 the difference
between the bond spreads in the two currencies increased substantially. This happened in tandem
with the widening of the Libor basis. It is worth noting that a zero Libor basis implies that the
bond spreads across currencies have to be equal for the corporate bond basis to hold, i.e. if the
Libor basis is interpreted as a measure of CIP it either implies that the central bank has no room to
affect bond spreads in its own currency or that the ability of one central bank to affect bond spreads
will be transmitted to all other currencies as well for CIP to hold in corporate bonds.
The corporate bond basis, however, does not reflect round-trip arbitrage opportunities. The
reason is that the investment currency is assumed invested in a risky corporate bond. Despite high
rating and relatively good credit quality, most corporations cannot be considered risk-free. However,
the corporate bond basis can be exploited by globally active issuers in their search for lowest possible
funding cost. This means that the corporate bond basis should be close to zero. I now examine
the empirical relationship between the Libor basis and the corporate bond spread differential before
turning to risk-free arbitrage strategies in section 4.6,
30I do not adjust for so-called quanto spreads connected to potential jump risk in the foreign exchange rate in the
case of default. The existence of quanto spreads implies a room for the corporate bond basis to deviate from zero
without violating CIP.
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4.5.1 Empirical analysis of the corporate bond basis
This subsection examines the empirical relationship between the 5-year Libor basis and the corre-
sponding corporate bond spread differential in EUR, JPY and GBP against USD.31 Essentially, I
look at how well corporate bond rates are aligned with CIP across currencies.32 As explained above,
the corporate bond basis is zero (no deviations from CIP) when the bond spread differential equals
the Libor basis.
The main empirical concern is that corporate bond spreads and the Libor basis are potentially
endogenously related as the FX swap price may influence the relative demand for bonds across
currencies for given bond prices and vice versa. Hence, I employ a vector error correction framework.
An advantage of this approach is that I can test for the long-run relationship between the two. The
estimates also give an indication whether it is bond prices or the hedging price (the FX swap price)
that adjust most towards the long run equilibrium.
I apply the following Vector Error Correction Model on daily data to shed light on the cointe-
grating relationship and the speed of adjustment from disequilibrium towards its equilibrium level:33
∆bsprt = β11∆bsprt−1 + β12∆bsprt−2 + β13∆LBt−1 + β14∆LBt−2+
λbspr(bsprt−1 − α1LBt−1) + vbsprt (4.12)
∆LBt = β21∆bsprt−1 + β22∆bsprt−2 + β23∆LBt−1 + β24∆LBt−2+
λLB(bsprt−1 − α1LBt−1) + vLBt (4.13)
where bsprt is the 5-year bond spread differential and LBt is the 5-year Libor basis for the
respective currency pair. The λbspr is the adjustment parameter for the bond spread differential
while λLB is the corresponding adjustment parameter for the Libor basis. After normalizing the
coefficient on bsprt to 1, the cointegrating relationship predicted by the CIP - in order to keep the
synthetic corporate bond rate equal to the direct rate - implies a cointegrating vector (1,-1). This
means that in the long-run bsprt = LBt. The error-correction term in each equation above is then
bsprt−1 = LBt−1, meaning that if bspr is above its long-run equilibrium or LB is below. Hence, I
expect λbspr < 0 and λLB > 0.
Table 4.2 reports the results from both an unrestricted model and a model specification where
the cointegrating vector is restricted to (1,-1). The unrestricted model indicates that for EUR/USD
and USD/JPY the cointegrating coefficient, α1, is very close to -1. The adjustment coefficients
31I also provide the results for the 2-year and 10-year tenor in the online appendix.
32Note that in this section I am not looking for CIP-arbitrage (due to the credit risk in corporate bonds), but
deviations from the general CIP equation.
33Table OA.II in the online appendix confirms a cointegrating relationship between the Libor basis and the bond
spread differential.
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for both currencies have the expected sign, have similar magnitude and are statistically significant
at conventional significance levels. The major part of the adjustment comes through the bond
spread differential (about 2.5 per cent). The adjustment coefficient on the basis swap is about 1
per cent per day. For the GBP/USD cross, α1 is only - 0.56. Moreover, for GBP the bond spread
differential seems to take all the burden of adjusting to long run equilibrium. When restricting the
long run relationship to bsprt−1 = LBt−1, the adjustment parameters are basically unchanged and
the Likelihood Ratio test for binding restrictions indicate that this restriction is not binding for any
of the currency pairs.
My results indicate that CIP for corporate bond prices issued by similar issuers cannot be
rejected in the long run despite the large and persistent non-zero Libor basis. This is due to the
joint movement in the bond spread differential and the cross currency Libor basis. Furthermore, the
analysis shows that the adjustment from disequilibrium is relatively slow and driven by both the
Libor basis and bond spreads. However, the largest part of the adjustment stems from the bond
spreads as these are more volatile than the Libor basis.
4.6 The government bond basis
In this section I investigate risk-free rates. To this end, I compute the government bond basis in
the same manner as the Libor and the corporate bond basis. Government bonds, at least for the
currencies in this analysis, are close to risk-free and frequently traded in liquid markets. Equation
4.14 shows the computation of the government bond basis where gm;? and gm;$ are the zero coupon







(1 + gm;?) , (4.14)
Figure 4.5 depicts the difference between the synthetic and the direct US dollar rate based on
2, 5 and 10-year zero coupon government bonds. Negative values indicate that the synthetic bond
spread is above the corresponding US Treasury rate, i.e. the USD return on foreign denominated
government bonds is higher than for US government bonds after the foreign exchange rate risk is
fully hedged.
The figure illustrates substantial deviations between the synthetic and the direct US treasury
rate across all currency pairs since 2000. The deviations over the past five years are not large in a
historical perspective. For instance the average 5-year JPY/USD government bond basis is minus
45 basis points in the period between 2000 and 2006, while the corresponding average is minus 50
basis points between 2014 and 2017 (a tranquil period in the aftermath of the financial crisis and
the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area). Indeed, there is no indication that the deviations can
be attributed to the banking regulations implemented after the global financial crisis. Although the
synthetic bond spread based on Japanese government bonds is currently above the corresponding
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US Treasury rate (leading to a negative government bond basis), the deviations were even larger in
the period between 2000-2003, a period where the USD/JPY Libor basis traded close to zero. The
government bond basis in the two remaining currencies have varied substantially, but have more or
less closed the gap towards the end of the sample.
The intention of figure 4.5 is to illustrate that the cross currency deviations in government bond
markets are not a post-crisis phenomenon pointing to impediments to arbitrage beyond the post-
crisis tightening of banking regulations. Hence, I turn to an examination of the potential costs of
trading the cross currency CIP deviations in bonds, particularly focussing on government bonds.
4.6.1 Trading the government bond basis - costs and risks
Du et al. (2019) propose a short/long strategy to take advantage of the risk-free bond basis, i.e. to
short-sell the security denominated in the currency with the highest relative price.34 The various
steps in the strategy are:
1. Borrow, say, a risk-free US security with m-year remaining maturity from a securities lender,
and short-sell this security at rate rm;$
2. With the proceeds of the sale of the security, buy euros spot to obtain 1/S euros, and simulta-
neously enter a forward contract Fm reversing the currency exchange at a predetermined price
in m years (effectively entering a FX swap contract),
3. Invest the euro funds at the currently available m-year risk-free euro rate rm;?.
4. Use the euro-denominated bond as collateral for the borrowed security denominated in USD.
Du et al. (2019) find substantial deviations between the synthetic and the direct interest rate
on bonds issued by KfW. KfW is a German government sponsored bank and can be considered to
be close to risk-free. Hence, the authors suggest persistent arbitrage opportunities in long-dated
bond and currency markets. Despite that the government bonds in my analysis are not issued by
the same issuer this should not matter as long as the government bonds are considered to be free
of risk.35 Indeed, government bonds are better suited for the short/long trade than for instance
KfW bonds as the market liquidity is better and government bonds are more likely to be available
by securities lenders. The short/long strategy involves substantial trading costs beyond the bid/ask
spreads. Although Du et al. (2019) consider the lending fee in the securities lending market, other
important short-selling costs apply. I discuss the costs of short-selling fixed income securities below.
34Short-selling means borrowing the security and subsequently sell the security to raise cash.
35 The main risk for the security lender is the fact that the collateral is denominated in another currency which
implies that the general interest rate level in the two currencies can develop differently and the exchange rate can
move substantially.
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Haircut and lending fees Security lenders typically require over-collateralization (haircut) as
risk mitigation mechanism in the case of the default of the security borrower. Haircut is necessary
even when the trade is subject to variation margin due to the price and exchange rate risk the security
lender is exposed to between the last margin call and the potential liquidation of the collateral.36 If
a default occurs, it may take some time to liquidate the security and the cross currency nature of
the collateral increases the risk of a loss due to changes in the price of the collateral relative to the
security on loan and exchange rate movements between the last margin payment and the liquidation
of the collateral.
Unfortunately, data on haircut are scarce. However, several pieces of information collectively
provide evidence on both the level and importance of haircut in the repo and securities lending
market. For instance, Baklanova et al. (2016), a pilot study conducted by the Office of Financial
Research and the New York Fed on the US securities lending market, present data on the last three
months of 2015. This study finds that the haircut level ranges from 2 to 5 per cent for government
bonds. The average lending fee for US government bonds varied between 15 and 20 basis points
during the last three months of 2015, see table 4.3. The data hide potential differences in the lending
fee and haircut between USD denominated collateral and foreign currency denominated collateral.
Most of the transactions in USD are collateralized by USD denominated collateral. The haircut on
foreign denominated collateral is therefore likely to be in the high end of the haircut range presented
in Baklanova et al. (2016) due to the exchange rate risk connected to foreign currency collateral.
The difference between domestic and foreign currency collateral is emphasized by the Investment
Company Institute (ICI). Grohowski (2014) states the following: "A U.S. regulated fund must receive
collateral equal to at least 100 percent of the value of the securities on loan. In practice, funds require
102 percent collateral for domestic securities and 105 percent for international securities. Because
loaned securities must be available for recall on short notice, the collateral that funds can accept from
borrowers must be highly liquid, such as cash, government securities, or bank letters of credit."37
U.S. regulated funds are not the only player in the U.S. securities lending market, but constitute
a large participant together with pension plans and insurance companies, see Adrian et al. (2013).
The practice of requiring a 5 per cent haircut on foreign denominated collateral in securities lending
transactions is also pointed out by Duffie et al. (2002) and Bassler and Oliver (2015).38
Furthermore, the New York Federal Reserve publishes haircut level data on repo transactions.
These data are based on repo only, not on securities lending transactions. However, securities lending
is a form of repo meaning that the numbers give an overall picture of the haircut levels. The median
level has over the past 6 years hovered between 2 and 5 per cent.39 Note that a borrower in the
tri-party market cannot freely choose the security to be delivered. An important presumption of the
36Variation margin is additional collateral posted in order to reflect price movements in the underlying security on
loan. The exchange rate risk applies only to transactions where the collateral is denominated in foreign currency.
37102 and 105 per cent collateral are for all practical purposes equivalent to 2 and 5 per cent haircut, respectively.
38See also Hu et al. (2019) for a detailed analysis of haircut levels in the U.S Tri-Party repo market.
39See figure OA.5 in the online appendix for a time series of the data from New York Federal Reserve.
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short/long trade is that a pre-specified security is delivered. In a special repo where the security
lender requires a specific security, both the interest rate (lending fee) and the haircut may be less
attractive from the perspective of the cross currency arbitrageur.
Finally, data from EUREX Clearing - a leading clearing house in Europe - suggest a haircut
level of at least 5 per cent on foreign denominated collateral. The numbers suggest the haircut rates
applied by EUREX clearing for a range of currencies against the USD. The cross currency haircut
rates vary between 4 and 8 per cent.40 Higher haircut levels for foreign currency denominated
collateral is also reflected in most central banks’ collateral frameworks, either by a higher haircut
(Central Bank of Norway and BoE) or larger mark-down on the valuation of the collateral (ECB).
Overall, the indicative evidence above points in the same direction: consistent with the extensive
literature on US repo markets haircut is an important part of the risk mitigation for the securities
lender and can be substantial for trades relying on cross currency collateral, see for instance Krish-
namurthy et al. (2014), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Copeland et al. (2014). Essentially, this implies
that the short/long strategy needs capital to be deployed in order to cover the haircut. Moreover,
the costs of haircut based on standard assumptions of the required return on equity are high. As an
example, given a 5 per cent haircut and 10 per cent required return on equity implies an additional
cost of the trade equal to 50 basis point. This is around twice the size of the average CIP deviations
for long-dated risk-free bonds reported in Du et al. (2019) after accounting for the lending fee, and
about four times as large as the reported arbitrage return when the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro
area is excluded from the sample.
Maturity According to the latest report by the International Securities Lending Association
(ISLA), 79 per cent of all government bonds on-loan have open term. This means that the lender
can call back the security on short notice. Although it is possible to borrow securities on longer
tenors, the large number of securities with open term implies that average lending fees based on
historical transactions are likely to be underestimated. The reason is that the lender has to pay (by
reducing the lending fee) for the option to call back the security on short notice. Alternatively, the
arbitrageur faces roll-over risk.
What are the total costs of haircut and lending fee compared to the size of the government basis?
The costs of haircut is difficult to estimate as it depends on the cost of capital for the individual
arbitrageur. However, by making some assumptions one can get a good sense of the magnitude
of the costs. The arbitrageur may finance the haircut either by debt or equity. Some participants
have limited access to bonds markets, like hedge funds, and may have to finance the haircut by
equity. Others may resort to the bond market. In figure 4.6 I have calculated the cost of haircut
financed at the unsecured borrowing rate for high quality financial corporations and added a lending
fee of 15 basis points. Moreover, the figure also shows the cost of equity financed haircut given 10
per cent required return on equity plus the lending fee. Finally, these numbers are compared to
40See table OA.V in the online appendix for an overview.
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the 5-year government bond basis for the three currency pairs in my analysis. One may think of
the two financing alternatives as a lower and a higher end estimate of the shorting costs. Figure
4.6 illustrates that the government basis across all currencies are generally below the higher end
estimate, and that the basis for GBP/USD and EUR/USD have been below the lower end estimate
after 2013. Hence, it seems difficult to reap any profits for most arbitrageurs based on the short/long
strategy when the costs of haircut and the lending fee are taken into account.
To sum up, the short/long trade exposes market participants to substantial non-regulatory costs
that prevent market participants to take advantage of the government bond basis. This point is
substantiated by the fact that the government bond basis is currently not particularly large compared
with the pre-crisis period.
4.6.2 Real money investors, portfolio allocation and arbitrage
Haircut and lending fees make it costly to trade the government bond basis without being in posses-
sion of an inventory of government securities. However, these costs are not occurring for real money
investors with portfolios consisting of USD securities or USD cash. A negative 5-year government
bond basis between USD and JPY, for instance, indicates that anyone with a 5-year US government
bond can increase their return by selling this bond, lend the USD in the FX swap market for 5 years
and invest the proceeds in a 5-year Japanese government bond.
Based on Figure 4.5 it is difficult to explain the unwillingness of US government bond and cash
holders in USD to reallocate into Japanese government bonds by stricter regulation or short-selling
costs. There must be other reasons for the preference for US government securities. Although any
attempts to explain the preference for U.S. securities necessarily are speculative, specific features
of key real money investors may be part of an explanation for the reluctance to fully profit from
the government bond basis. First, many real money investors with USD assets have USD liabilities
and/or liquidity requirements in USD. An example is a mutual fund facing redemptions in USD.
This fund may hold US government bonds exactly because of the ability to convert these into USD
cash at short notice. A synthetic USD position is not a liquid asset in USD. Second, some asset
managers, like money market funds, are prohibited from investing in foreign currency or do not
have the operational capacity to conduct FX swap transactions. Third, government institutions like
central banks and foreign governments may strategically prefer USD liquidity due to its status as the
main reserve and settlement currency in the world. Even many non-US banks prefer to keep much
of their liquid assets in USD. The financial crisis clearly illustrated how important USD liquidity
becomes in crisis times and USD liquidity act as an insurance against liquidity squeezes in USD.
Several explanations for the existence and persistence of the government bond basis beyond those
mentioned above may exist. Despite that the government bond basis easily can be taken advantage
by real money investors equipped with US government bonds or USD cash, investors seem to prefer
USD assets over synthetic USD assets. The access to USD liquidity US government bonds are
giving the investors together with the prominent role of USD in the global financial system may be
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an important factor for these preferences.
4.7 CIP arbitrage with marginal funding
In this section I investigate the returns from an alternative cross currency trading strategy. This
strategy implies rasing unsecured funding in one currency, investing in a risk-free asset in another
currency and simultaneously hedge the foreign exchange rate risk and can be interpreted as incor-
porating the cost of Funding Value Adjustment (FVA), see Andersen et al. (2019).41 To this end, I
exploit the bond prices for high-quality financial institutions to calculate the return from such a cross
currency arbitrage strategy. High-quality (AA) financial institutions have among the lowest funding
costs in the market and should therefore overestimate the return for most market participants.




















where gb$ is the US government bond rate, y
a
? is the foreign currency corporate bond rate, gb? is the
foreign currency government bond rate and ya$ is the US corporate bond rate. The superscripts a
and b symbolize ask and bid rates, respectively.
Figure 4.7 illustrates the arbitrage profit for Euro, GBP and JPY using USD as base currency.
The maturity is 5 year. I include both directions in the graph meaning that each line in the graph
may either represent borrowing in USD and investing in foreign currency or borrowing in foreign
currency and investing in USD. The funding costs are based on corporate bond prices for AA financial
institutions, while government bonds are used in the investment leg.42 The line closest to zero in
the graph is the return from borrowing in USD and investing in Japanese government bonds. This
line has briefly crossed zero, but the maximum profit is not more than 4 basis points. Basically,
this graph illustrates that bond and FX-swap prices have been consistent with the no-arbitrage CIP
condition for this maturity.
Table 4.4 depicts the arbitrage profit across three main maturities, 2, 5 and 10 years. As before,
senior corporate bond prices for bonds of high quality (AA) issued by financial institutions are
41FVA is basically an adjustment for the underlying funding cost. The FVA has become highly debated as banks
started to report large FVA connected to the derivative book. FVA is typically related to uncollateralized derivatives
with customers where the bank has hedged the risk in the interdealer market. If the customer is out-of-the money (and
the bank is out-of-the money on the hedge), the bank has to pay margins without receiving margin payments from
the customer. This has to be financed to a rate that is higher than what the bank receives on the margin account. In
the case of the arbitrage strategy in this paper, the analogy is simply that the true funding cost has to be accounted
for.
42Due to the use of zero coupon rates in the government bond market are based on mid-rates, the calculation does
not account for bid/ask spreads in government bonds. This means, however, that the arbitrage profit reported in
table 4.4 is biased upwards. The bid/ask spreads in government bonds are generally small.
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used as a proxy for unsecured funding costs. As can be gleaned from the table, the average and
median arbitrage profit is negative for all strategies independent of the funding currency. The most
interesting figures, however, are the maximum value and the number of days with positive arbitrage
profit. These figures reveal whether the mean/median hide periods of positive arbitrage profits. For
the 10-year maturity arbitrage profit is not possible to reap. For the 5-year maturity, borrowing in
USD and investing in JPY is the only trade that provides a small number of days in arbitrage (7 out
of 2007) with a limited maximum arbitrage of 4 basis points. Turning to the 2-year maturity, USD
borrowing invested in JPY shows a maximum of 22 basis points. The number of days in positive
arbitrage return territory is now 195, close to 10 per cent of the observations. However, the average
profit during days with arbitrage opportunities is only 5 basis points (not reported). For the rest of
currencies no arbitrage profit is available. The main picture is that arbitrage profit is very difficult
to reap across major bond markets.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the Covered Interest Parity condition for three long-dated fixed income
securities across different tenors and currencies. All these securities - Libor swaps, corporate bonds
and government bonds - are commonly used to test the validity of CIP.
I explain that the Libor basis, which is the difference between the synthetic and the direct Libor
swap rate at a predefined tenor, cannot be arbitraged due to the roll-over and credit risk such a
strategy embeds. My results indicate that the Libor basis can be explained by relative central bank
balance sheets and benchmark rate discrepancies. Central bank balance sheet policies affect the price
of locking in funding over longer periods - the term funding liquidity premium - in the respective
currency and consequently the costs of obtaining funding for market participants. When the term
funding liquidity premium varies across currencies, the Libor basis is basically an expression of this
difference.
Corporate bonds do not face the issues of roll-over risk that colludes the Libor basis. This means
that the corporate bond basis should be significantly closer to zero than the Libor basis after the
global financial crisis when the term funding liquidity premium has varied across currencies. Indeed,
I show that the corporate bond basis is smaller and much less persistent than the Libor basis in the
post-crisis period. However, investments in corporate bonds are risky. Hence, trading the corporate
bond basis is not riskless.
To avoid the default risk embedded in corporate bonds, I also examine cross currency deviations
in government bonds. Based on a sample dating back to 2000 I show that the government bond
basis is not particularly large compared to the pre-crisis period. I provide evidence suggesting that
the government bond basis may be non-zero due to substantial costs (haircuts and lending fees)
of taking advantage of this basis for round-trip arbitrageurs. Moreover, the observation that the
government bond basis deviated substantially from zero prior to the financial crisis speaks against
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the common view that tighter banking regulation is the main driver of the current deviations.
Finally, I calculate the return based on an alternative arbitrage strategy and find no evidence
of large and persistent arbitrage opportunities in bonds based on this measure. Overall, my results
suggest that Covered Interest Rate Parity holds equally well in bond markets now as prior to the
global financial crisis. Moreover, In contrast to the existing literature, I find little evidence of loss
of market efficiency in the aftermath of the introduction of new banking regulation.
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Note: The graph depicts a boxplot of the 5-year Libor basis, corporate bond basis and government bond basis for
EUR/USD in two tranquil periods prior to the financial crisis(Pre=2004-2006) and after the global financial crisis
(Post=2015-2017). The figure shows median (black horizontal line), average (dot), and ranges between the 25 per
cent and 75 per cent quantiles (box). The corporate bond basis is calculated based on zero coupon bonds of high
quality (AA) issued by financial institutions. The Government bond basis is calculated based on US and high quality
European government zero coupon bonds (AAA). The Libor basis is the deviations from CIP using on Libor interest
rate swaps. Negative values indicate that the US denominated security yields lower return (higher price) than the
European denominated security swapped into USD, i.e. after the exchange rate risk is fully covered.
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Figure 4.2





























Note: The graph shows the 5-year Libor basis for three currencies - EUR, JPY and GBP - against the USD. The
series are showing mid prices extracted from Bloomberg. A negative value means that the direct Libor swap rate in
USD is lower than the synthetic Libor swap rate based on foreign currency.
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Figure 4.3



































































(d) Corporate bond basis JPY/USD
Note: The left-hand graphs (a and c) show the corporate bond spread for a basket of corporate issuers with the same
rating and domiciled in the same country in EUR, JPY and USD. The right hand graphs (b and d) show i) the
corporate bond spread differential (EUR or JPY minus USD) based on the corporate bond spreads depicted in graph a
and c, ii) the Libor basis which is the difference between the synthetic and direct Libor swap rate, and iii) the corporate
bond basis for similar issuers which is the difference between synthetic and direct corporate bond rate. Negative values
of the basis mean that the direct corporate bond rate in USD is lower than the synthetic corporate bond rate implied
from foreign currency denominated bonds. The corporate bond basis is zero if the Libor basis and the bond spread
differential are equal. The shaded area illustrates the European sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 2012. Similar
graphs for GBP can be found in figure OA.2 in the online appendix.









































(b) Zooming in on differences in bond spreads
Note: The left-hand graph shows corporate bond spreads - the difference between the senior corporate bond rate and
the Libor swap rate - for investment grade financial issuers in EUR and USD. The bond rates are from Barclays
Bloomberg indices (LEEFYW for EUR and LUAFYW for USD). The right-hand graph zooms in on the difference
between the two bond spreads (EUR minus USD) in the period leading up to the financial crisis (2004-2006) and the
tranquil period after financial crisis (2015-2017), the grey shaded area. Negative values mean that EUR spreads are
lower than the corresponding spread in USD.
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Figure 4.5






















































(c) 10 year maturity
Note: The figure shows the difference between the direct and the synthetic US dollar government bond rates for 2,
5 and 10-year maturity, respectively. The synthetic yields are implied from EUR, GBP and JPY government bond
yields. Negative values of the basis mean that the direct government bond rate in USD is lower than the synthetic
government bond rate implied from foreign currency denominated bonds. For the euro area the government bond yields
are based on government issuers with AA and AAA rating. The government bond basis is calculated based on mid
prices. The government bonds are zero-coupon interest rates collected from either Bloomberg or central bank webpages.
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Figure 4.6
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Note: The figure shows the government basis for JPY/USD, EUR/USD and GBP/USD together with the total costs of
a 15 basis point lending fee (LF) and two different ways of financing a 5 per cent haircut: i) borrowed financing based
on unsecured borrowing costs in USD obtained from Bloomber/Barclays US aggregate index for financial corporations
(LF+borrowed hc), and ii) equity financed haircut based on 10 per cent required return on equity (LF+equity hc).
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Table 4.1
Determinants of the Libor basis
(1) (2) (3)
2-year 5-year 10-year
∆LBt−1(β1) 0.248*** 0.245*** 0.250***
(3.75) (4.36) (6.14)
∆RelCBbal(β2) -15.75** -14.23** -14.77***
(-2.47) (-2.17) (-2.61)
∆CDSsprFR(β3) -0.162*** -0.156*** -0.106***
(-4.49) (-4.43) (-3.99)
∆LIBCPdiff(β4) -0.124*** -0.095** -0.073***
(-2.87) (-2.57) (-2.81)
LBt−1(β5) -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.018***
(-2.59) (-3.14) (-3.73)
Constant -0.657*** -0.704*** -0.589***
(-3.04) (-3.60) (-3.96)
CurrencyFE Yes Yes Yes
Adj R2 0.149 0.134 0.113
Number of Observations 1119 1119 1119
Note: The table depicts the results from the panel regression specified in equation 4.7 for EUR/USD, GBP/USD
and USD/JPY. LB is the Libor Basis, RelCBbal is the ratio between the indexed foreign central bank balance sheet
and the indexed Federal Reserve balance sheet, CDSsprFR is the difference between the 5-year CDS price on France
denominated in EUR and USD and LIBCPdiff is the difference between 3-month Libor CP spread in foreign currency
and USD. The dependent variable is the Libor basis. Results are reported with White cross section standard errors.
*** denote a statistical significance level of 1 per cent, ** 5 per cent and * 10 per cent. The sample runs from 2010
to 2017.
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Table 4.2
Vector Error Correction Model
(a)Unrestricted
EUR/USD USD/JPY GBP/USD
bspr LB bspr LB bspr LB
Coint. Coeff 1 -0.95 1 -0.97 1 -0.56
∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB
Adj. coeff -0.029 0.011 -0.025 0.011 -0.016 -0.000
t-values (-2.92) (4.00) (-2.83) (3.02) (-4.59) (-0.38)
(b)Restricted: Coint. relation (1,-1)
EUR/USD USD/JPY GBP/USD
bspr LB bspr LB bspr LB
Coint. Coeff 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1
LR test (prob.) 0.39 0.41 0.72
∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB
Adj. coeff -0.028 0.011 -0.023 0.010 -0.015 -0.000
t-values (-2.91) (4.09) (-2.72) (3.01) (-4.60) (-0.24)
Note: The table shows the results from a Vector Error Correction Model with two lags, no trend and intercept in the
cointegrating relationship. The first model is an unrestricted model (a), while in (b) the cointegrating relationship is
restricted to (1,-1) The variables are 5-year bond spread differential (bspr) and 5-year Libor basis (LB). Bond spreads
and the Libor basis are measured in basis points. The sample runs from January 2010 to December 2017.
Table 4.3
Lending fee and haircut in the securities lending market
Oct 9, 2015 Nov 10, 2015 Dec 31, 2015
5th Mean 95th 5th Mean 95th 5th Mean 95th
a) Lending Fee (bps)
U.S. Treasury/Agencies 5 13 31 5 15 40 6 20 60
U.S. Corporate Bonds 8 27 38 8 28 25 8 27 25
b) Haircut (per cent)
U.S. Treasury/Agencies 0 2 5 0 2 5 0 2 5
U.S. Corporate Bonds 2 2 3 2 2 5 2 2 5
Note: The table shows lending fees and haircut levels based on a survey of securities lenders conducted by the Office
for Financial Research and New York Fed. The data are collected on three specific dates in the last quarter of 2015
and taken from Baklanova et al. (2016).
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Figure 4.7
















Note: The graph shows the deviations between the synthetic funding cost and the government bond rates for EUR,
GBP, USD and JPY. The maturity is 5-year. Positive numbers indicate arbitrage. Both directions are included, i.e.
from USD to foreign currency and from foreign currency to USD.
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Table 4.4
Arbitrage profit in bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
$–>EUR $–>JPY $–>GBP EUR–>$ JPY–>$ GBP–>$
10-year maturity
Mean (bps) -125 -77 -113 -131 -100 -169
Median (bps) -108 -60 -100 -1.18 -96 -170
Max (bps) -66 -25 -51 -46 -53 -71
Obs 1932 1918 1896 1687 2009 1314
Arb days 0 0 0 0 0 0
5-year maturity
Mean (bps) -92 -39 -94 -114 -103 -142
Median (bps) -81 -25 -84 -99 -97 -113
Max (bps) -48 4 -44 -46 -49 -52
Obs 2010 2007 2006 2012 2012 2011
Arb days 0 7 0 0 0 0
2-year maturity
Mean (bps) -58 -24 -80 -98 -62 -119
Median (bps) -52 -20 -71 -87 -59 -82
Max (bps) -21 22 -37 -41 -5 -17
Obs 2006 1997 1974 2012 2012 2012
Arb days 0 195 0 0 0 0
Note: The table illustrates the arbitrage profit for three maturities based on actual funding cost in the funding currency
and risk-free investment in government bond in investment currency. All figures are in basis points. USD–>EUR
means that the funding currency is USD and investment currency is euro while EUR–>USD illustrates the case where
euro is the funding currency and USD is the investment currency. Positive figures imply arbitrage opportunities.
Bid/ask spreads are taken into account. The sample runs from january 2010 to December 2017.
Appendix
4.A Data and calculations
Table 4.A.1
Summary statistics
A. Libor basis B. Rel. CB balance sheets C. Benchmark and CDS spreads
EUR GBP JPY EUR GBP JPY EUR GBP JPY CDS USD-FRA
Mean -29.95 -7.19 -63.45 0.81 1.13 1.29 15 5 20 23
Median -30.96 -8.21 -63.62 0.85 1.09 1.06 10 3 13 15
Maximum 0.10 6.63 -25.86 1.10 1.58 2.19 46 24 81 106
Minimum -65.40 -26.44 -101.63 0.54 0.66 0.85 1 -6 -18 3
Std. Dev. 12.90 6.21 16.66 0.16 0.22 0.42 11 6 20 21
Observations 413 413 413 413 413 413 377 377 377 391
Note: The maturity of the Libor basis is 5 years. The benchmark spread is the U.S. Libor minus the foreign currency
equivalent benchmark rate with the foreign currency denoted in the column heading. The last column depicts the 5-year
CDS spread between Germany and France. All numbers in basis points except the relative central bank balance sheets
(Rel. CB balance sheets) which are indexed at 1 in January 2010. The sample runs from 2010 to 2017. Weekly data
frequency.
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Data sources and bond spreads
1. Libor Basis/Cross Currency Basis Swap with 3m IBOR as underlying short rate: Quoted on
Bloomberg with tickers EUBSx, JYBSx, BPBSx, where x the number of years to maturity.
2. Commercial paper rates: Commercial paper rates from Tradeweb for A1/P1 rated finan-
cial institutions. Quoted on Thomson Reuters Eikon with tickers: YUSD3MCPF=TWEB,
YGBP3MCPF=TWEB, Y3JPYMCPF=TWEB and YEUR3MCPF=TWEB.
3. Interbank Offered Rates - IBOR: Quoted on Bloomberg with tickers EUR003M, BP0003,
JY0003 and US0003.
4. Iterest Rate Swaps: Interest rate swap rates with 3m IBOR as underlying short rate. Quoted
on Bloomberg with tickers JYSWx (for Japanese Yen 6m LIBOR is the underlying short rate),
EUSWxV3, USSWx, BPSWx, where x represents the number of years to maturity.
5. Government bond yields: Estimated (Nelson Siegel approach) zero coupon rates downloaded
from Bank of England webpage and European Central Bank webpage. For US and JPY
government bonds I use data sourced through Bloomberg with tickers GS x (generic strips)
and ticker GJGBx, respectively. x represents the number of years to maturity.
6. Bank balance sheet data: Available at the respective central bank webpages.
7. Central Bank balance sheet data: Available at Bloomberg with tickers EBBSSECM, B111B56A,
BJACTOTL and FARBAST.
8. Credit Default Prices prices for France: Quoted on Thomson Reuters Eikon with tickers
FR5USD and FR5EUR.
9. Corporate bond data: The computation of corporate bond spreads follows the following steps:
(a) Extract all individual bonds included in Barclays Global Aggregate Index (Bloomberg
ticker for information about the index: LEGATRUU) issued by an institution classified
as "banking" and issued by institutions domiciled in Germany, Netherlands, Australia,
Canada, UK, and Japan and where the issuances are denominated in USD, EUR, GBP
or JPY. Bonds included in the Global Aggregate index have an amount outstanding of
at least 300mn USD or EUR, 200mn GBP, 35bn JPY.
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(b) Select Senior unsecured issues (bullet bonds) with rating AA or A1.
(c) Calculate the zero coupon spread over the respective currency interest rate swap curve.
I follow the calculation of bond spreads in Du et al. (2019) closely. The bond pays a
coupon (coup), q times a year. The investor receives the principal at t+ n. Each coupon
and principal payment are discounted with the term structure of the zero coupon Libor
swap rates (interest rate swap rates), cj,LibSwapt,t+n . The bond spread is defined as b
j
t,t+n,
i.e. the spread over the Libor swap rate necessary to achieve the observed price P jt,t+n in
















(d) The average bond spread is calculated for each rating category, maturity bucket (1.5-2.5
years to maturity equals maturity bucket 2 year etc.), country of incorporation of the
issuer and currency.
(e) The bond spread differentials are calculated for the same rating category, maturity bucket
and country of incorporation separately. For instance, the n-year bond spread differential
between Japanese issuers in JPY and USD with rating A1 is:
BondSprdDiff = bJPY,A1t,t+n − b
USD,A1
t,t+n (4.18)
Quisque ullamcorper placerat ipsum. Cras nibh. Morbi vel justo vitae lacus tincidunt ultrices.
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. In hac habitasse platea dictumst. Integer
tempus convallis augue. Etiam facilisis. Nunc elementum fermentum wisi. Aenean placerat. Ut
imperdiet, enim sed gravida sollicitudin, felis odio placerat quam, ac pulvinar elit purus eget enim.
Nunc vitae tortor. Proin tempus nibh sit amet nisl. Vivamus quis tortor vitae risus porta vehicula.
4.B The relation between funding liquidity and central bank bal-
ance sheet policies
The central bank has the power to inject the most liquid asset in the monetary system - central
bank reserves. Asset purchases, which effectively inject central bank reserves, may affect the funding
liquidity through different channels. One of these is the bank balance sheet channel. This channel
is a direct product of the central bank purchasing securities held by the non-bank sector.43
Figure 4.B.1 provides a stylized illustration of how this channel works. For simplicity the central
bank has a clean balance sheet before embarking on asset purchases. For simplicity, the aggregate
43See also Christensen and Krogstrup (2016) for an explanation of this mechanism.
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private bank balance sheet consists of bank loans and deposits. The non-bank sector holds non-bank
assets and commercial bank deposits financed by bank debt and non-bank debt. As the central bank
absorbs assets held by non-banks (1), it requires commercial banks to credit the non-bank client’s
deposit account as settlement for the assets the central bank has purchased (2). On the other side,
the commercial bank simultaneously requires central bank reserves in return from the central bank.
This leads to an increase in banks’ deposits at the central bank (3). In figure 4.B.1, the central
bank buys securities worth 100 from non-banks. For the non-bank sector, the transaction with the
central bank is no more than an asset swap - securities in return for bank deposits. In contrast, the
aggregate bank balance sheet increases by 100 - new deposit on the liability side and highly liquid
central bank reserves on the asset side and the balance sheet size remain unaffected. The central
bank has increased its balance sheet size by 100. The increase in banks’ central bank reserves leads
to an increase in liquid assets for banks, while the increase in non-bank deposit liabilities increase
banks’ deposit-to-illiquid asset ratio.
The illustration is highly simplified, but serve as an example of how central bank asset purchases
may affect commercial banks balance sheets on the margin. The impact on banks’ funding position
depends on which type of deposits the banks receive, how large share of the new liabilities that ends
up as deposits, what kind of alternative liabilities banks may receive and the maturity structure of
these liabilities. However, on the margin at which the new liabilities created by the central bank
will put downward pressure on the yields banks are willing to attract funding and increases the
availability of term funding. This may be especially pronounced in situations with sluggish domestic
growth in banks’ illiquid assets.
In short, if the additional deposits - or liabilities - are characterized as long term-funding (i.e retail
deposits are regarded as long-term funding (Drechsler et al. (2017))) central bank asset purchases
contribute both to a more liquid banking system and additional long-term funding for banks. When
the central bank creates new long-term bank liabilities through asset purchases over and above the
ex-ante demand by the banking sector for such liabilities, funding liquidity improves and the yield on
long-term bank liabilities falls. Basically, this particular channel implies that banks can access long-
term funding at favourable terms either by replacing bond issuances with deposits and/or attracting
market based funding (by issuing bonds) at relatively low spreads. The increase in central bank
induced liabilities is disconnected from the standard bank-driven increase in liabilities facilitated
by non-cash asset growth. The new liabilities are instead matched by highly liquid central bank
reserves. As shown in Figure 4.B.2, data indicate that this channel has indeed been at play.
The deposit-to-asset ratio may, however, increase independently of asset purchases. A change
in the composition of liabilities can be driven by several factors. Negative interest rates may for
instance induce a shift from market-based money market investments to deposits as it is difficult
for banks to charge negative interest rates on household deposits. However, figure 4.B.2 depicts
a remarkable correlation between the introduction of asset purchases and relative deposit growth,
potentially reinforced by the introduction of negative interest rates.
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Figure 4.B.1







Note: Panel a) depicts a stylized illustration of the aggregate players’ balance sheets before the central bank has
initiated asset purchases. In panel b) the central bank is buying securities from the non-bank sector worth 100 (1).
Simultaneously, the non-bank sector gets bank deposits on its asset side (2) and commercial banks get deposits at the
central bank (3). Both the central bank and commercial banks have increased their balance sheet, while the non-bank
sector’s balance sheet is unchanged.
The central bank may also purchase securities held by commercial banks. In such case, asset
purchases can affect banks’ asset composition and can potentially explain the correspondence be-
tween central bank asset purchases the relative increase in deposits. Although banks’ total assets
will not change, the share of cash relative to non-cash assets will increase. Figure 4.B.2 depicts assets
excluding cash holdings. However, this can not explain the increase in deposits. When the central
bank purchases assets held by banks, non-cash assets fall, but deposit liabilities are not affected.
There are also other ways asset purchases may affect funding liquidity. For instance the port-
folio rebalancing channel may improve funding liquidity. The argument is that when the central
bank buys a certain asset the seller seeks for alternative investments in other asset classes. This
may be reinforced by extraordinary low yield on long-dated securities that often is the case when
unconventional monetary policy is implemented.
Quisque ullamcorper placerat ipsum. Cras nibh. Morbi vel justo vitae lacus tincidunt ultrices.
Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. In hac habitasse platea dictumst. Integer
tempus convallis augue. Etiam facilisis. Nunc elementum fermentum wisi. Aenean placerat. Ut
imperdiet, enim sed gravida sollicitudin, felis odio placerat quam, ac pulvinar elit purus eget enim.
Nunc vitae tortor. Proin tempus nibh sit amet nisl. Vivamus quis tortor vitae risus porta vehicula.
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Figure 4.B.2
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Note: The graph shows private banks’ assets excluding cash in the central bank, deposits excluding deposits from
Monetary Financial Institutions (interbank deposits) and the size of the central bank balance sheet in EUR, GBP,
JPY and USD. All series are indexed to 1 at the beginning of 2010. The central bank balance sheet in EUR represents
only the asset purchases due to the fact that the ECB has conducted a large range of open market operations. These
operations have affected the size of the balance sheet, but are not relevant for the deposit channel. For the remaining
currencies I use aggregate data on the central banks balance sheets. The vertical lines indicate the dates when the
respective central banks embarked on large-scale asset programs.
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4.C Benchmark rate discrepancies
Unsecured term interbank reference rates all have one common problem: They are meant to represent
rates on transactions that are virtually non-existent. Available data and surveys show that unsecured
interbank lending is heavily concentrated in the shortest maturities, like overnight. Very little
unsecured interbank lending goes on in maturities of 3 and 6-months.44 This was the case even
before the financial crisis, and the trend has been reinforced since then. This means that the banks
submitting ibor-rate must rely on rates from other markets with similar characteristics, on their
subjective judgement or a combination of the two. The current effort in many countries to produce
nearly risk-free alternative reference rates must be seen in this context.
Since 1998, Libor has been defined by the panel banks’ daily answer to the following question:
"At what rate could you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting interbank
offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?" This question is posed in a way that defines
Libor as an interbank offered rate. However, recognizing the fact that interbank term transactions
are rare, the administrator of Libor, ICE Benchmark Administration Limited (IBA), has laid out
a roadmap for the transition of Libor to a new "waterfall methodology". This methodology entails
a new output statement for Libor: "A wholesale funding rate anchored in LIBOR panel bank"
unsecured transactions to the greatest extent possible, with a waterfall to enable a rate to be
published in all market circumstances".
The term "waterfall" refers to the ordering of inputs for the submissions into three levels. To
the extent available, panel banks should base their submissions on Level 1 input, which are "eligible
wholesale, unsecured funding transactions". If no such eligible transactions were made, submis-
sions should be transaction-derived (Level 2). That means utilizing time-weighted historical eligible
transactions adjusted for market movements, and linear interpolation. If neither Level 1 nor Level
2 inputs are available, panel banks should base their submissions on expert judgement (Level 3).
One important feature of the new methodology is that the eligible transactions are no longer
limited to interbank loans. The eligible transactions are rates paid by banks on unsecured term
deposits, as well as fixed rates paid on primary issuances of commercial paper (CP) and certificates
of deposits (CD). The major part of CP and CD funding comes from investors outside the banking
system, like money market funds and non-financial corporations. Rates paid by banks on CP/CD
funding are not interbank rates and cannot necessarily be seen as offered rates like in the current
definition of Libor. Hence, the âIBOâ part of the abbreviation Libor will no longer apply. In general,
funding rates from counterparties outside the banking system are likely to be somewhat lower than
rates on interbank loans. The reason is that money market funds and corporations that supply
funding to banks via CP/CD are not subject to the same regulatory requirements as a bank lending
to another bank. Thus, all else equal, the price of funding from outside the banking system will be
somewhat cheaper than interbank funding.
44See for instance Euro Money Market Survey (2015) by the European Central Bank.
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IBA expects the transition to the new waterfall methodology to be completed by no later than
the first quarter of 2019. However, USD Libor already looks very similar to the rates paid for CP-
funding by highly rated banks, as shown in figure OA.1. The waterfall methodology also means that
even Libor, despite the same definition across currencies, can differ due differences in money market
activity and judgment across currencies.
Euribor was created in 1999 with the introduction of the euro. Currently 20 banks provide their
daily submissions to EURIBOR according to the following definition: Euribor is defined as the rate
at which euro interbank term deposits are offered by one prime bank to another prime bank within
the EMU zone, and is calculated at 11:00 am (CET) at spot value (T+2).
Euribor is thus defined as an interbank rate. In contrast to US Libor it is not only an interbank
rate in name, but also quoted as one. Chart 4 below shows the same as Chart 3, only for the euro
area: The difference between 3-month Euribor and the rate on 3-month commercial paper in euros
issued by highly rated European banks. As discussed above, differences in regulatory costs should
imply that interbank rates are somewhat higher than comparable rates on banks’ borrowing from
non-banks. As can be seen from chart 4, this is the case for Euribor. The difference is not constant
over time. Variation may be due to many factors, like shifts in the demand-supply balance in the CP
market that are not transmitted one-for-one to Euribor. On average since 2011, the spread between
3-month Euribor and the corresponding CP rate has been 12 basis points. A simple back-of-the-
envelope calculation substantiates such a spread. An interbank loan is subject to a 20 per cent risk
weight in Basel III. Assuming 10 per cent capital requirement and 10 per cent required return on
equity, the required spread on top of the borrowing cost is 20 basis points (0.2*0.1*0.1)
Since unsecured term lending transactions between banks are rare, the panel banks’ Euribor
submissions must to a large extent be based on expert judgement. Panel banks’ submissions reflect
what they believe the rates on eligible interbank lending transactions would have been, if they had
taken place. This judgement is likely to be informed by rates on traded products in other markets
like CP, CD and OIS, adjusted appropriately to reflect interbank term offered rates.
Acknowledging the decline in interbank activity, the administrator of Euribor, the European
Money Market Institute (EMMI), has launched a program of Euribor reform. An important part
of this has been to move from a quote-based methodology to a transaction-based methodology for
Euribor (the latter sometimes referred to as Euribor+). To assess whether a seamless transition
from a quote-based to a transaction-based methodology would be feasible, the EMMI ran a so-called
pre-live verification program from September 2016 to February 2017. During this period, the EMMI
calculated a transaction-based rate based on collected data. In order for a seamless transition to be
feasible, the level and volatility of the transaction-based rate would have to be similar to the level
and volatility of Euribor. In May 2017, the EMMI presented the outcome of the pre-live testing.
It concluded that the level and volatility of the transaction-based rate differed too much from the
quote-based Euribor to allow a seamless transition. This conclusion is mirrored by the different
behavior of the 3-month Euribor and corresponding rate on banks’ borrowing via commercial paper
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in figure OA.1.
As a way forward, EMMI now plans to introduce a hybrid methodology for Euribor. EMMI
recognizes that the level of liquidity in the unsecured money market is currently not consistently
sufficient to base the Euribor calculation solely on transactions. In a consultation paper published
in March 2018, EMMI asked market participants for feedback on the proposed hybrid methodology.
In short, the suggested hybrid methodology has many similarities to the waterfall structure for
Libor described above. It is suggested to follow a hierarchical approach, where inputs to Euribor
submissions are divided into three levels, ranging from real-time eligible transactions to panel banks’
judgement. Eligible transactions include unsecured, fixed rate, cash deposits from banks and a range
of non-bank financial institutions, as well as funds obtained from all counterparties via commercial
paper and certificates of deposits.
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4.D Additional tables and graphs
This section provides supplementary results complementing the evidence in the main text. Table
OA.I shows an alternative regression specification to the panel specification in table 4.1 applying
a Seemingly Unrelated Regression framework, table OA.II illustrates the cointegrating relationship
between the Libor basis and the bond spread differential, while table OA.III and table OA.IV provide
the results from a Vector Error Correction Model for maturity 2 and 10 years. Table OA.V and
table OA.VI illustrate the haircut levels applied by EUREX Clearing and the bid/ask spreads in the
forward exchange rate market, respectively. Furthermore, figure OA.1 shows the respective IBOR
rates and the A1-P2 CP rates across currencies. Figure OA.2 depicts the 5-year bond spreads and
relation to the Libor basis for GBP/USD while figure OA.3 and figure OA.4 show the bond spreads
and Libor basis for 2 and 10 year maturities, respectively. Finally, figure OA.5 shows the repo
haircut levels source from New York Federal Reserve.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Coint.rel. P-value Coint.rel. P-value Coint.rel. P-value
Trace None 0.00 None 0.00 None 0.00
At most 1 0.85 At most 1 0.77 At most 1 0.10
Max E.V None 0.00 None 0.00 None 0.00
At most 1 0.85 At most 1 0.77 At most 1 0.10
Note: Cointegration test for the 5-year Libor basis and the 5-year bond spread differential for high quality issuers. I
include two lags based on Schwarz Information Criterion.
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Table OA.III
Vector Error Correction Model - 2 year maturity
EUR/USD USD/JPY GBP/USD
(a)Unrestricted
bspr LB bspr LB bspr LB
Coint. Coeff 1 -0.76 1 -0.97 1 -0.53
∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB
Adj. coeff ((λbspr),(λLB)) -0.05 0.005 -0.004 0.005 -0.025 -0.00027
t-values (-3.57) (1.84) (-0.99) (2.52) (-3.15) (-0.13)
(b)Restricted: Coint. relation (1,-1)
bspr LB bspr LB bspr LB
Coint. Coeff 1 -1 1 -1 1 -1
LR test (prob.) 0.009 0.82 0.22
∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB
Adj. coeff ((λbspr),(λLB)) -0.03 0.002 -0.004 0.005 -0.02 0.0002
t-values (-2.87) (1.28) (-0.95) (2.52) (-2.90) (0.11)
Note: The table shows the results from a Vector Correction Model with two lags, no trend and intercept in the
cointegrating relationship. The variables are the 2-year corporate bond spread differential (bspr) in EUR, JPY and
GBP, against USD and the 2-year Libor basis (LB). The first model is an unrestricted model (a), while in (b) the
cointegrating relationship is restricted to (1,-1). Bond spreads and the Libor basis are measured in basis points. The
sample runs from January 2010 to December 2017.
4.D. ADDITIONAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 241
Table OA.IV
Vector Error Correction Model - 10 year maturity
EUR/USD USD/JPY GBP/USD
(a)Unrestricted
bspr LB bspr LB bspr LB
Coint. Coeff 1 -1.59 1 -1.27 NA NA
∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB
Adj. coeff ((λbspr),(λLB)) -0.012 0.002 -0.004 0.0014 NA NA
t-values (-3.00) (2.9) (-1.70) (2.21) (NA) (NA)
(b)Restricted: Coint. relation (1,-1)
bspr LB bspr LB bspr LB
Coint. Coeff 1 -1 1 -1 NA1 NA
LR test (prob.) 0.056 0.30 NA
∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB ∆bspr ∆LB
Adj. coeff ((λbspr),(λLB)) -0.010 0.0013 -0.004 0.0010 NA NA
t-values (-2.91) (2.37) (-1.83) (1.86) (NA) (NA)
Note: The table shows the results from a Vector Correction Model with two lags, no trend and intercept in the
cointegrating relationship. The variables are the 10-year corporate bond spread differential (bspr) in EUR, JPY and
GBP, against USD and the 10-year Libor basis (LB). The first model is an unrestricted model (a), while in (b) the
cointegrating relationship is restricted to (1,-1). Bond spreads and the Libor basis are measured in basis points. The
sample runs from January 2010 to December 2017. The estimates for GBP/USD is not available due missing data.
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Table OA.V
EUREX Clearing cross currency haircut levels
Base currency Cross currency Cross currency haircut
USD AUD 8.40 %
USD CAD 5.00 %
USD CHF 6.30 %
USD EUR 4.30 %
USD GBP 5.60 %
USD JPY 4.20 %
USD NZD 7.40 %
Note: The table shows the haircut applied by Eurex clearing - a large European clearinghouse - in the case of cross
currency collateral. The numbers are updated by Eurex regularly. The numbers indicate a haircut level between 4 and
9 per cent depending on the currency pair. This indicates the additional risk connected to cross currency collateral.
Source: EUREX Clearing.
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Table OA.VI
Bid/ask spreads in the foreign exchange hedging market
GBP/USD EUR/USD JPY/USD
2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year 2-year 5-year 10-year
Mean 3.83 3.19 2.91 3.75 2.88 3.03 4.28 4.19 3.76
Median 4.00 3.00 2.90 4.00 3.00 3.82 4.00 4.00 3.00
Max. 12.00 8.10 10.90 6.20 6.00 6.45 10.00 8.25 10.00
Obs. 2062 2062 2061 2062 2062 2061 2062 2062 2061
Note: The table shows the bid/ask spreads from 2010-2017 in the foreign exchange hedging market across different
currency pairs and maturities. The data is extracted from cross currency basis swaps quoted on Bloomberg. All
numbers are in basis points.
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Figure OA.1
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Note: The panels show 3-month A-1/P-1 commercial paper rates and the 3-month Libor rates in GBP, JPY and USD.
In EUR I use Euribor as this is the most commonly used benchmark rate and the underlying benchmark rate in euro
area Libor swaps. The Commercial Paper rates are quoted rates from Tradeweb and sourced through Thomson Reuters
Eikon. The Libor and Euribor rates are downloaded from Bloomberg.
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Figure OA.2



































(b) Corporate bond basis GBP/USD
Note: The left-hand graph shows the corporate bond spread for a basket of corporate issuers with the same rating and
domiciled in the same country in GBP and USD. The right hand graph shows i) the corporate bond spread differential
(GBP minus USD) based on the corporate bond spreads depicted in graph a, ii) the Libor basis which is the difference
between the synthetic and direct Libor swap rate, and iii) the corporate bond basis for similar issuers which is the
difference between synthetic and direct corporate bond rate. Negative values of the basis mean that the direct corporate
bond rate in USD is lower than the synthetic corporate bond rate implied from foreign currency denominated bonds.
The corporate bond basis is zero if the Libor basis and the bond spread differential are equal. The shaded area illustrates
the European sovereign debt crisis from 2010 to 2012.
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Figure OA.3
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Note: The graph shows the 2-year Libor basis and the corresponding corporate bond spread differential for high quality
(AA) bonds denominated in EUR, JPY and GBP versus USD. The Corporate bond basis is zero if the Libor basis and
the bond spread differential are equal.
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Figure OA.4































Note: The graph shows the 10-year Libor basis and the corresponding corporate bond spread differential for high quality
(AA) bonds denominated in EUR, JPY and GBP versus USD. The Corporate bond basis is zero if the Libor basis and
the bond spread differential are equal.
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Figure OA.5


















Note: The figure depicts the evolution of the median, the 90th percentile and the 10th percentile of haircut levels for
international securities in the U.S. tri-party repo market and Fixed Income Clearing Corporation (FICC).
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5.1 Introduction
The London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) is arguably the financial world’s most important num-
ber; it is a proxy for banks’ marginal funding costs and serves as benchmark rate in trillions of loans,
floating-rate debt, and financial contracts. The Libor manipulation scandal and a shrinking inter-
bank debt market caused a push toward alternative benchmark rates, culminating in the “Libor
funeral” – a speech by Bailey (2017) announcing that the publication of Libor cannot be guaran-
teed beyond 2021. The Libor funeral caused a transition toward transaction-based overnight rates,
which will serve as alternative benchmark rates. In theory, overnight rates are virtually risk-free and
simply reflect the current level of policy rates. In practice however, the alternative benchmark rates
are prone to upward or downward spikes (depending on the region) at regulatory reporting dates,
can differ substantially from other overnight rates in the same region, and occasionally exhibit large
volatility.1
Why are some benchmark rates prone to upward spikes while others are prone to downward
spikes? What drives movements in the alternative benchmark rates? What are the implications
of the high volatility for term rates? To address these questions, we first describe the alternative
benchmarks and the institutional setting. Afterwards, we derive and test three hypotheses about
the alternative benchmark rates. Finally, we examine the consequences of the funeral for term rates
and discuss its broader implications.
Focusing on the alternative benchmark rates in the U.S., the U.K. and the Eurozone (henceforth,
Europe), we start by illustrating the difference between the alternative benchmark rates and or, in
Europe, its European counterpart Euribor. Panel (a) of Figure 5.1 shows whisker plots of the
spread between alternative benchmark rate and overnight in the three regions, illustrating large
cross-country differences. While the spreads are stable around zero in the U.K., they are on average
−8.5 basis points in Europe with occasional downward spikes and fluctuate between −15 and 15
basis points in the U.S. In interpreting these spreads, it is important to note that all rates are
overnight lending rates for low-risk borrowers and should therefore be close to the “risk-free” rate.
More importantly, given that the alternative rates are intended to replace Libor as benchmark rate,
spread changes of a few basis points can translate to valuation changes of millions of dollars, making
a deeper understanding of the drivers behind these alternative benchmarks crucial.
To develop this understanding, we first note that all three alternative benchmark rates are
transaction-based and that the transactions underlying these rates can either be collateralized or
uncollateralized. Moreover, the underlying transactions can comprise up to three different types –
non-bank to bank lending (T1 ), bank to bank lending (T2 ), and bank to non-bank lending (T3 ).
In the U.S., the alternative benchmark rate is Sofr (the Secured Overnight Financing Rate), which
comprises collateralized transactions of all three types (using U.S. Treasuries as collateral). In the
U.K. and Europe, the alternative benchmarks are Sonia (the Sterling Overnight Index Average) and
1The most dramatic example of such volatility was the “repo squeeze” in mid-September 2019, when the alternative
benchmark rate for the U.S. unexpectedly spiked more than 150 basis points.
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Estr (the Euro Short Term Rate), respectively. Both rates are uncollateralized and only comprise
transactions where banks borrow from either non-banks or other banks, that is, transaction of type
T1 and T2.
As a next step, we link the behavior of the alternative benchmarks to financial regulation and
monetary policy, deriving three testable hypotheses. First, whether a rate is prone to upward or
downward spikes depends on the types of transactions underlying the rate, the lenders’ financial
constraints, and the availability of alternative cash placements. If banks have ample amounts of
reserves, tighter regulatory constraints lower their demand for borrowing money and therefore lower
interest rates. This is the case in the U.K. and Europe, where banks have large amounts of reserves
and the alternative benchmarks only comprise bank borrowing transactions. By contrast, rates
increase with tighter regulatory constraints if banks are in need for cash and reluctant to lend
money. This is the case in the U.S., where reserves are concentrated within few large banks and
the alternative benchmark also reflects bank to non-bank transactions. Second, an increase in
government debt increases the alternative benchmarks. This increase is due to a “crowding out”
effect, where investors prefer Treasury debt instead of lending money to banks. In addition, the
impact of more government debt is amplified for Sofr because an increase in government debt
leads to more demand for collateralized borrowing, which directly affects collateralized rates. Third,
if banks do not have ample reserves, a drop in central bank reserves increases banks’ demand for
borrowing and therefore increase interest rates.
To test our first hypothesis, we use regression analysis to examine spikes in the alternative
benchmarks at regulatory reporting dates. On average, Sofr is 20.25 basis points higher at quarter-
ends compared to other dates. By contrast, both Sonia and Estr are significantly lower at quarter-
ends compared to other dates. However, in comparison to Sofr, the magnitude of these spikes –
on average −2.12 basis points for Sonia and −0.51 basis points for Estr – is several orders of
magnitude smaller.
Turning to our second and third hypothesis, we examine the link between daily or weekly changes
in the alternative benchmarks and the quantities of government debt and bank reserves. In addition,
we investigate how changes in transaction volumes affect the alternative benchmarks. For the U.S.,
we find a strong positive link between the amount of Treasuries outstanding and Sofr. In addition,
more Sofr transactions increase the rate and a higher amount of bank reserves tends to coincide with
drops in Sofr (although the relationship is insignificant in this test). In the U.K., a higher amount
of gilts outstanding significantly increases Sonia and more excess reserves in Europe correspond to
a (borderline insignificant) drop in Estr. In both the U.K. and Europe, more transactions increase
the alternative benchmarks. Contrasting the results for the U.K. and Europe with the U.S. shows
that Sofr is more affected by these micro structure effects; especially fluctuations in the quantity
of government debt have a stronger impact on Sofr compared to Sonia and Estr.
Motivated by these findings and by our hypotheses, we examine changes in Sofr more closely.
We construct a proxy of the fraction of non-bank to bank lending in Sofr and find that this proxy
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together with the amount of government debt outstanding explains 13% of the daily variation in
Sofr on non-reporting dates. In addition, the impact of changes in reserves on Sofr strengthens
between mid-2018 and late 2019, when reserves in the U.S. became less abundant and more primary
dealer repos increase Sofr.
To provide a closer link between the reporting date spikes in Sofr, or, more broadly, U.S. repo
rates, and regulatory constraints we perform two simple difference-in-difference analyses. First,
investigating the 2010 – 2019 period, we show that quarter-end spikes in U.S. repo rates appeared
only after January 2013, the date at which financial institutions started reporting their leverage
ratios (LRs) to regulators. Second, we examine the difference between banks’ repo borrowing on
quarter-ends and their quarterly average repo borrowing. We split the sample between U.S. banks,
who report quarterly averages of their leverage ratios and hence have no incentive to reduce their
positions at quarter-ends, and foreign banking offices (FBOs), who report quarter-end snapshots of
their leverage ratios. We find that FBOs significantly decrease their repo borrowing at quarter-ends
after 2013 compared to U.S. banks.
Turning to the implications of the funeral for term rates, Panel (b) of Figure 5.1 shows the spreads
between 3-month averages of the alternative reference rates computed “in arrears” (averaging over
the following 90 business days) and 3-month Libor rates. The figure shows that term rates based
on the alternative benchmarks are substantially lower than term Libor rates and we show that a
large part of this difference is due to the term and credit premiums embedded in .
We next examine how the funeral affected the open interest in Euro-dollar futures (contracts
referencing ). While the open interest for GBP contracts decreased, neither USD nor Euribor
futures were affected. These steady volume in Euro-dollar futures suggest a slow transition away
from and pose practical challenges because futures expiring after December 2021 will potentially
lack an underlying reference rate.
Finally, we construct Sofr term rates based on futures contracts and highlight two properties
of term Sofr. First, Sofr decreased during the March 2020 market turmoil when Libor rates are
soaring. This observation resonates with Schrimpf and Sushko (2019), who survey the alternative
benchmarks and emphasize that, during crisis periods, Sofr can be substantially below financial
intermediaries’ marginal funding costs. Second, the 1-month term rates based on Sofr futures also
exhibit predictable upward spikes on regulatory reporting dates with term rates being on average
0.77 basis points higher in the last month of a quarter.
Our findings shed more light on the drivers of overnight rates and contribute to a large literature
examining the working of the Fed funds market (Furfine, 1999, Ashcraft and Duffie, 2007, Afonso
and Lagos, 2015), the different segments of the U.S. repo market (Bartolini et al., 2010, Gorton
and Metrick, 2012, Krishnamurthy et al., 2014, Copeland et al., 2014, Munyan (2017) among many
others), European money markets (Mancini et al., 2015, Nyborg, 2019), money markets in the U.K.
(Bicu et al., 2017) and the impact of post-crisis regulation on these markets (Banegas and Tase,
2017, Duffie, 2017b, Munyan, 2017, Ranaldo et al., 2020 among others). Specifically, we show that
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the composition of the marginal lenders, the Treasury debt outstanding, and the amount of excess
reserves are key drivers in the alternative benchmark rates and most pronounced for the U.S.
5.2 Background and Hypothesis Development
To understand the main drivers of the alternative benchmark rates and why they are prone to either
upward or downward spikes, we give an overview of their main features and provide a detailed back-
ground on the different types of transactions that can be part of these alternative rates. Afterwards,
we discuss the impact of regulatory constraints on the different transactions and derive three testable
hypotheses about the behavior of the alternative benchmarks.
5.2.1 The Alternative Reference Rates
The alternative benchmark rates in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe are all transaction-based
overnight rates. In the U.S., the underlying transactions are collateralized (with U.S. Treasuries)
while they are uncollateralized in the U.K. and Europe. Moreover, the underlying transactions
can be grouped into three different types – non-bank to bank lending (T1 ), bank to bank lending
(T2 ), and bank to non-bank lending (T3 ) – which we illustrate in Figure 5.2. In transactions of
type T1, the non-bank lenders are typically cash-rich companies or money market mutual funds
(MMFs), who place part of their cash holdings in overnight transactions with banks. Banks use
these overnight loans to fund their own positions or act as intermediaries, channeling the funds
either to other banks (transactions of type T2 ) or to non-bank cash takers like hedge funds and
investment managers (transactions of type T3 ).
In contrast to the alternative benchmarks, Libor is an interbank rate that should reflect the
interbank rate at which one prime bank could borrow money from another prime bank. Traditionally,
this rate is based on “expert judgments” by each panel bank, but the manipulation scandal led to a
reform (see Wheatley, 2012), pushing panel banks to replace these “expert judgments” with market-
based rates (such as commercial paper rates), where possible. As a result, the Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE) took over the publication of in 2014 and announced the transition toward the
reformed methodology in April 2018 (see ICE, 2018). Hence, rates can be thought of as hypothetical
interbank transactions of type T2 and, more recently, as non-bank to bank transactions of type T1
because non-banks are the main commercial paper investors. Similarly, Euribor was largely based
on “expert judgements” and recently reformed by the European Money Market Institute (EMMI) to
reflect actual transactions where possible. In contrast to , there is no overnight Euribor rate and
we therefore compare ESTR to Eonia (the European Overnight Index Average), which, according
to the EMMI, can be considered as the 1 day Euribor rate.4
4Eonia is based on interbank transactions executed by a similar panel of banks as Euribor. The key difference
between Eonia and overnight in the U.S. and the U.K. is that Eonia is fully transaction-based.
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To examine fluctuations in the different rates that are not simply driven by changes in policy
targets, we focus on the spreads between overnight rates and key policy rates that reflect the level
of the target interest rate in each respective area. For the U.S., we use the “Interest On Excess
Reserves” (IOER) that banks receive for placing their excess reserves with the Federal Reserve Bank
(Fed). As key policy rate for the U.K., we use the “bank rate”, which is the rate at which banks’
central bank reserves are remunerated at the Bank of England (BoE). For Europe, we use the
“deposit rate” that banks receive for placing their central bank reserves with the European central
bank (ECB). Because all three policy rates are constant unless central banks change their policy
targets, the resulting spreads reflect any rate moves that are unrelated to policy rate changes. The
blue lines in Figure 5.3 show the alternative benchmarks relative to the policy rates and the black
lines show overnight rates for the U.S. and the U.K. or Eonia rates for Europe, all relative to
respective policy rates. As we can see from the figure, the alternative benchmarks exhibit large
volatility at quarter-end dates (as illustrated by the gray vertical lines) and the U.K. overnight rate
shows a visible decline in mid-2018, which, as we explain in more detail below, can be attributed to
the reform.
The Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR)
Sofr is the proposed U.S. Libor replacement, suggested by the alternative reference rates committee
(ARRC). It is based on collateralized overnight transactions (repos) with U.S. Treasuries as collateral
and comprises three types of transactions. First, broad repos (similar to T1 ), also called tri-party
repos (because they are cleared through a third party which is either Bank of New York or JP
Morgan), in which the typical lenders are MMFs and other non-banks. Second, inter-dealer repos
(similar to T2 ), which are called General Collateral Financing (GCF) repos. Third, bilateral repo
transactions, which are typically between dealers and non-banks (similar to T3 ). Figure 5.4 shows
that bilateral and tri-party repos (type T3 and T1 ) dominate Sofr while GCF repo comprise a
small share of the volume.
To understand the potential impact of the different types of transactions on Sofr, we first note
that interest rates in the bilateral segment can be driven by the lender’s demand for borrowing a
specific security instead of borrower’s demand for cash (see, for example, Duffie, 1996). However,
the calculation methodology in Sofr accounts for this by removing the bottom 25th percentile of
the rate distribution within this segment. In addition, transactions of types T2 and T3 in Sofr
are largely driven by demand for cash because central bank reserves in the U.S. are concentrated
within the largest banks and small banks or non-banks are unable to borrow directly in transactions
of type T1. Moreover, a key difference between the U.S. and other jurisdictions is that the Fed’s
reverse repo facility (introduced in September 2014) allows MMFs and other investors to engage in
overnight repo transactions with the Fed at a pre-specified rate. This reverse repo facility effectively
puts a lower bound on repo rates because lenders with access to the facility have no incentive to
lend at a rate below the Fed’s reverse repo rate.
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As illustrated in Panel A of Figure 5.3, Sofr is significantly more volatile than the overnight
rate and exhibits large upward spikes that frequently occur at quarter-end dates. Note that the
y-axis in Panel A is truncated at 100 basis points, which Sofr exceeded in September 2019. By
comparison, the overnight rate is stable with no visible upward or downward spikes.
The Sterling Overnight Index Average (SONIA)
Sonia captures overnight funding costs in sterling and is a wholesale funding rate which comprises
both non-bank to bank and bank to bank lending (transactions of type T1 and T2 ). Sonia already
serves as benchmark rate in overnight index swaps (OIS) and was reformed in April 2018, including
an even broader set of wholesale transactions (more transactions of type T1 ) and adjusting the
averaging methodology.6 This reformed Sonia rate is the proposed Libor replacement in the U.K.
Panel B of Figure 5.3 compares Sonia and the U.K. rate. The blue line in Figure 5.3 shows
the reformed Sonia rate, which the BoE calculates from 2016 on. As we can see from the graph,
Sonia tends to spike downward on reporting dates and these spikes have somewhat diminished since
mid-2018. By contrast, the overnight rate does not exhibit any regular upward or downward spikes.
However, the implementation of the new waterfall methodology in 2018 lead to a drop in overnight
from approximately −3 basis points in Q2 2018 to −7 basis points in Q4 2018. When comparing
Sonia to the rates in the U.S., it is important to note the different scaling of the y-axis in Panel
B, which ranges from −10 basis points to 5 basis points, suggesting that Sonia is significantly less
volatile than Sofr.
The Euro Short-Term Rate (ESTR)
Estr is an uncollateralized overnight rate that comprises non-bank to bank and bank to bank
lending (transactions of type T1 and T2 ) and the proposed replacement for the Euro area. This
rate is officially published from October 2019 on and a pre-Estr version is available from 2016 on.
Instead of , the benchmark rate for the Euro-area is Euribor (the European interbank offered
rate) and because overnight Euribor does not exist, we compare Estr to Eonia (the European
Overnight Index Average), which is an average of overnight interbank transactions (of type T2 ),
executed by 28 panel banks. According to the benchmark provider, Eonia can be considered as
the 1 day Euribor rate and also serves as the current benchmark in euro-denominated overnight
index swaps. While the transactions underlying Estr are reported by a similar panel of banks as
in Eonia, the Estr transaction volume is on average ten times larger than the Eonia volume,
suggesting that the majority of Estr transactions are of type T1.
6As explained by the BoE, “the coverage of Sonia [is] being broadened to include overnight unsecured transactions
negotiated bilaterally as well as those arranged via brokers [. . . ]” (see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/
boe/files/markets/benchmarks/sonia-as-the-risk-free-reference-rate-and-approaches-to-adoption.pdf?
la=en&hash=35A8953638C9101CAB7204688918D501DA04D7C0)
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Panel C of Figure 5.3 compares Estr and to Eonia. As we can see from the figure, Estr is
significantly lower than Eonia and exhibits small downward spikes at quarter-ends and irregular
upward spikes. The large difference between Eonia and Estr can be explained by the fact that a
large part of the lending in Estr comes from non-banks (transaction type T1 ) which do not have
access to the ECB deposit facility and therefore accept rates below the deposit rate.7
5.2.2 The Impact of Regulatory Constraints
We distinguish two types of regulatory constraints that affect the interest rates in the three transac-
tions shown in Figure 5.2.8 First, risk-weighted capital requirements (based on Value-at-Risk type
constraints), which lower banks’ incentives to lend money uncollateralized because uncollateralized





where Total Exposure comprises on-balance-sheet assets, securities-financing transactions (SFTs)
such as repos and security lending, and off-balance sheet items (e.g. derivatives). Because the
computation of Total Exposure does not take netting into account, borrowing money increases
the Total Exposure, irrespective of whether the borrowed money is invested in safe or risky
assets. Hence, the LR lowers banks’ incentives to borrow money and gives banks an incentive to
reduce their repo intermediation (i.e. borrowing from one party to lending to another; see Duffie,
2017b).
The LR was introduced after the financial crisis, banks started reporting their LRs to regulators
in January 2013, and public disclosure of the LR was introduced in January 2015. The way Total
Exposure is reported varies across countries. In the U.S., banks report quarterly averages based
on daily data for on-balance-sheet items, but quarterly averages based on month-end snapshots
for SFTs and off-balance-sheet items. In the U.K., banks reported Total Exposure based on
quarterly averages of month-end snapshots until December 2017 and now report quarterly averages
based on daily observations.9 Banks in Europe report their LR using quarter-end snapshots. The
use of month-end or quarter-end snapshots for LR reporting implies tighter regulatory constraints
at month-ends or quarter-ends and allows us to test the impact of regulatory constraints on the
alternative benchmarks.
We now discuss the impact of regulatory constraints on borrowing and lending in transactions
7The ECB explains on its website that Estr reflects banks borrowing from other banks as well as
other counterparties, such as money market funds, insurance companies and other financial corporations
(see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/financial_markets_and_interest_rates/euro_short-term_rate/html/
eurostr_qa.en.html). Hence, most transactions in Estr can be thought of as T1.
8We simplify our examination of the regulatory background by not discussing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
because this regulation mainly affects term rates with longer maturities.
9The concern that month-end snapshots could lead to window-dressing lead the BoE to change the reporting
requirement (see Jones (2016)).
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T1 -T3. First, lending from non-banks to banks (T1 ) increases banks’ liabilities, independent of
whether the transaction is uncollateralized or collateralized. Hence, all else equal, a more binding
leverage ratio makes banks reluctant to borrow and lowers the interest rate banks are willing to pay
non-banks.
Second, in interbank transactions (T2 ), tighter regulatory constraints can lower both the bor-
rowers’ supply and the lenders’ demand for cash. Because uncollateralized transactions increase the
lenders’ risk-weighted assets, tighter constraints reduce the supply in T2 transactions. Moreover,
because the borrower in T2 is another bank and all borrowing affects the LR, tighter regulatory
constraints can lower demand in T2 transactions. However, this is only the case if liquidity in
the interbank market is abundant and banks have little incentive to borrow cash. If liquidity is
unevenly distributed – e.g. because some banks do not have access to non-bank funding – tighter
regulatory constraints leave the borrowing demand in T2 transactions largely unaffected. In this
situation, banks in need of liquidity push collateralized interbank rates up because tighter regulatory
constraints give lenders less incentives to perform repo intermediation. This effect is particularly
strong if the interest rates on lending from non-banks to banks (T1 ) are floored by central bank
facilities that open up for non-banks to place money directly in the central bank.
Finally, for lending from banks to non-banks (T3 ), the borrowers’ demand for cash is unaf-
fected by regulatory constraints while the lenders’ supply of cash decreases. For uncollateralized
transactions, supply decreases because uncollateralized lending increases banks’ risk-weighted as-
sets. Collateralized transactions are impacted indirectly because a tighter LR constraint lowers
banks’ incentives for repo intermediation. Hence, tighter regulatory constraints tend to increase
rates in transactions of type T3.
5.2.3 The Impact of Government Debt and Excess Reserves
We next discuss the impact of government debt and excess reserves on overnight rates. Figure 5.2
suggests that Treasuries offer an alternative way of placing cash for non-bank lenders. Because
government debt issued by developed countries is arguably the safest and most liquid investment,
lenders tend to prefer investing in Treasuries and a higher Treasury supply lowers the lending sup-
ply.11 Hence, more Treasury supply has a “crowding out” effect that increases interest rates in
transactions of type T1. In addition, more Treasury supply directly impacts collateralized rates
because levered Treasury investors need to finance a larger quantity of positions. This increased
financing need increases the demand for repo borrowing and collateralized rates in T1–T3.
Another asset on banks’ balance sheets illustrated in Figure 5.2 are central bank reserves. If a
bank has more central bank reserves, it has more cash available for investments and a lower demand
for borrowing. Hence, more central bank reserves lower banks’ demand for borrowing, which can
11This argument rests on the Treasury department placing the proceeds on its account in the central bank, thereby
temporarily reducing the money supply. After the financial crisis, it is common practice for Treasury departments in
the U.S., the U.K, and several European countries to place their proceeds in the central bank.
258 CHAPTER 5. LIFE AFTER LIBOR12
lower interest rates in transactions of type T1. However, if reserves are ample, a small change in
reserves is less likely affect banks’ demand for cash (see Afonso et al., 2020). While the amount of
central bank reserves increased sharply after the financial crisis, it is worth noting that reserves in
the U.S. are concentrated within few large banks (see Cœuré). This reserve concentration leads to
more demand for cash by banks and hence, tighter regulatory constraints increase interbank rates
in the U.S.
5.2.4 Testable Hypotheses
Panel A of Table 5.5 summarizes the background behind the three alternative benchmarks. While
the marginal lenders in Sofr can be banks or non-banks, most lending in Sonia and Estr is done
by non-banks. In addition, Sofr is different from the other two rates because non-bank lenders in
Sofr can alternatively place their money at the Fed’s reverse repo facility (which serves as a floor for
the rates), because Sofr also includes transactions of type T3, and because Sofr is collateralized.
By contrast non-banks in the U.K. and Europe do not have access to a deposit facility, both Sonia
and Estr are uncollateralized and only include transactions of type T1 and T2.
To derive our hypotheses, we build on theories of segmented markets in which an unconstrained
non-bank interacts with a constrained bank intermediary (see, for example, He and Krishnamurthy,
2012 or Gârleanu and Pedersen, 2011). In these theories, a more binding capital constraint reduces
the bank’s ability to borrow money from the non-bank. Hence, in equilibrium, non-bank to bank
lending rates decrease to induce the non-bank to lend less. At the same time, a more binding capital
constraint lowers the bank’s ability to lend money to other banks, thereby increasing interbank
rates. In the appendix, we illustrate this mechanism in a simple model where the bank faces a LR
constraint.
Applying this logic to our context, recall that non-bank lenders in the U.S. have access to the
Fed’s reverse repo facility while non-bank lenders in the U.K. and Europe cannot place cash with
their central banks. Hence, tighter regulatory constraints lower the rates in transactions of type T1
for Sonia and Estr but not for Sofr. In addition, small banks and non-banks in the U.S are usually
unable to borrow directly from MMFs but rely on repo intermediation from large banks. Moreover,
according to CGFS (2017), European banks are an important counterparty in U.S. repo markets,
suggesting that their regulatory quarter-end constraints impact U.S. repo rates. Taken together, for
Sofr, tighter regulatory constraints increase the rates in transactions of type T2 or T3, and we
hypothesize that tighter regulatory constraints lead to large increases in Sofr. For Sonia and Estr,
the rates in transactions of type T2 likely increase with tighter regulatory constraints, but because
transactions of type T1 make up the majority of the volumes, we expect that tighter regulatory
constraints decrease Sonia and Estr.
Tighter regulatory constraints correspond to large increases in Sofr and moderate decreases in
Sonia and Estr.
Next, because Sofr is a collateralized rate, increases in Treasury supply increase the demand for
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repo financing and therefore have a direct impact, increasing the repo rate. In addition, as discussed
in Section 5.3.2, an increase in the supply of safe assets increases rates in T1 transactions because
non-bank lenders can invest more in Treasuries. Hence, we hypothesize that an increase in Treasury
debt outstanding increases interest rates for all alternative benchmarks but has a stronger effect on
the collateralized rate Sofr.
An increase in Treasury debt outstanding increases all three alternative benchmark rates and
has the largest impact on Sofr.
Finally, building on our discussion in Section 5.3.2, we argue that more central bank reserves
lower banks’ demand for overnight borrowing, which lowers interest rates. However, the impact
of changing reserves diminishes when banks have ample reserves and their demand for liquidity is
saturated.
If banks are not saturated with central bank reserves, a decrease in the amount of central bank
reserves increases the alternative benchmark rates.
Panel B of Table 5.5 summarizes our three hypotheses and shows how tighter regulatory con-
straints, more Treasury debt outstanding, and more central bank reserves affect Sofr, Sonia, and
Estr.
5.3 Drivers of the Alternative Benchmark Rates
In this section, we examine how regulatory reporting dates, government debt, and excess reserves
affect the alternative benchmark rates. We test our three hypotheses for the alternative benchmarks
in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe and conduct additional tests for the alternative benchmark in the
U.S., where we expect the largest effects.
5.3.1 Reporting Date Spikes
We test Hypothesis 5.2.4 by comparing the average of the alternative benchmarks to their value
at quarter-ends, year-ends, and month-ends, using regression analysis. We focus on three dummy
variables, QEnd, YEnd, and MEnd \ QEnd, which are equal to one if the observation is from the
last trading day of the quarter, the last trading day of the year, or the last trading day of the
month but not quarter-end, respectively. As in Figure 5.3 before, we use the full period for which
the alternative benchmarks are available and focus on their spread over the key policy rate, which
captures rate moves unrelated to changes in key policy rates.
Panel (1) of Table 5.2 shows that Sofr is on average 20.25 basis points higher at quarter
ends and 10.06 basis points higher at month-ends, compared to its time series average. Panel (2)
repeats the analysis with year-quarter fixed effects. Adding year-quarter fixed effects reduces the
potential impact of a time trend and ensures that QEnd reflects the difference between the quarterly
average and the quarter-end value of Sofr. As we can see from Panel (2), adding year-quarter
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fixed effects leaves the coefficients virtually unchanged. Focusing next on reformed Sonia, Panel
(3) of Table 5.2 shows significant average downward spikes of −2.12 basis points at quarter-end
dates and less-significant average downward spikes of −0.38 basis points at other month-end dates.
Panel (4) confirms the robustness of this finding to controlling for year-quarter fixed effects. Turning
to Estr, Panel (5) shows small downward spikes of −0.51 basis points at quarter-ends, which are
more pronounced at year-ends, and Panel (6) confirms that these spikes are robust to controlling for
year-quarter fixed effects. In contrast to Sofr and Sonia, Estr does not exhibit any significant
month-end spikes.
Taken together, Table 5.2 documents a qualitative difference between Sofr (which is prone to
upward spikes) and Sonia or Estr (which are prone to downward spikes), as well as a quantitative
difference – spikes in Sofr are several orders of magnitude larger than the spikes in Sonia or
Estr. In line with Hypothesis 5.2.4, the large upward spikes in Sofr reflect borrowers’ cash
demand in transactions T2 and T3, as well as the floor introduced by the reverse repo facility for T1
transactions. By contrast, the downward spikes in Sonia and Estr reflect the absence of a floor for
transactions of type T1 and the fact that these rates mainly comprise transactions of type T1. In
addition, the significant month-end spikes in Sofr and Sonia are in line with regulatory reporting
based on month-end snapshots in the U.S. and the U.K. while the absence of month-end spikes in
Estr reflects the quarter-end reporting in Europe.
5.3.2 The Impact of Government Debt and Excess Reserves
We next examine the main drivers of the alternative benchmarks aside from regulatory reporting
dates. To that end, we remove all month-end observations from the data and examine daily or weekly
changes in the alternative benchmarks relative to the key policy rates in the respective area.13
We construct two variables that are available on a daily basis – the amount of government debt
outstanding and the transaction volume underlying the alternative benchmarks. First, to obtain the
quantity of government debt outstanding, we collect auction data for U.S. Treasuries, U.K. gilts, and
German Treasuries. We then use the issuance volumes, auction dates, and maturity dates to con-
struct daily volumes of U.S. and U.K government debt outstanding and to approximate the volume
of safe assets in the Euro-area. Second, because a more detailed breakdown into transaction types
is only available for Sofr, we simply use the total transaction volumes underlying the alternative
benchmark rates in this section and conduct additional tests for Sofr later. In interpreting the role
of transaction volumes, it is important to note that Sonia and Estr volumes are largely transac-
tions of type T1, while changes in bilateral repo volumes are the main driver of daily fluctuations
in Sofr volumes. Hence, higher Sonia or Estr volumes reflect banks’ demand for funds from
non-banks, which increases the rate. Similarly, a higher Sofr volume reflects stronger demand for
13Because the goal of these tests is to examine the link between Sofr and other variables under “normal” market
conditions, we also remove the week from September 16 – September 20, 2019, when Sofr spiked up to 5.23% to
avoid our results being driven by large outliers in the data.
5.3. DRIVERS OF THE ALTERNATIVE BENCHMARK RATES 261
funds from non-banks in the bilateral repo, also increasing the rate.
In addition, we use a weekly measure of bank reserves in the U.S., the U.K. and Europe and also
reexamine the impact of government debt and transaction sizes on a weekly frequency.
Confirming Hypothesis 5.2.4, Panel (1) of Table 5.3 shows that an increase in Treasury debt
outstanding corresponds to large, statistically significant increases in Sofr. This impact remains
statistically significant in Panel (2), where we examine weekly changes instead of daily changes
and control for changes in reserves. In addition, more underlying transactions increase Sofr and,
together with changes in government debt outstanding, the two variables explain 12% of the daily
variation in Sofr. Focusing next on the U.K., Panel (3) of Table 5.3 shows that an increase in
gilts outstanding increases reformed Sonia while daily changes in transaction volumes have an
insignificant impact. For weekly instead of daily changes, Panel (4) shows that gilts outstanding
become insignificant while increases in transaction volumes correspond to significant increases in
reformed Sonia (although only at a 10% significance level). Examining Estr, Panels (5) and (6)
show an insignificant impact of changes in the amount of German Treasuries outstanding, while
fluctuations in transaction volumes have a positive and significant impact in both specifications.
Taken together, Table 5.3 confirms Hypothesis 5.2.4, which suggests that the impact of government
debt is strongest for the U.S. because Sofr is collateralized with Treasury debt and therefore changes
in the volume of debt outstanding have a direct impact on Sofr.
Turning to Hypothesis 5.2.4, we find that both Sofr and Sonia are largely unaffected by changes
in reserves while we find a borderline insignificant impact for Estr.15 The insignificant impact of
reserves on the alternative benchmarks can reflect the fact that banks had ample reserves for most
of the sample; only U.S. banks struggled with less ample reserves from mid-2018 and we re-examine
the impact of reserves for this period in the following section.
5.3.3 Additional Evidence from the U.S.
Because the results so far suggest that Sofr is most affected by the market idiosyncracies described in
Section 5.2, we next utilize the more granular U.S. data to conduct additional tests of our hypotheses
for Sofr.
First, instead of using daily changes in total Sofr volumes, we construct the share of tri-party
repos underlying Sofr. An increase in this share corresponds to more transactions of type T1
in Sofr, which lowers the rate because rates in which non-banks act as lenders are usually lower
than rates in which banks act as marginal lenders. In line with this assertion, Panel (1) shows a
strong negative link between Sofr and the tri-party share in Sofr while the impact of changes in
Treasury debt outstanding remains virtually unchanged. While the link between tri-party share and
Sofr is arguably mechanical (tri-party repo rates are typically below GCF and bilateral rates), it
highlights that movements in Sofr can be due to compositional changes in the repo market that are
15Despite being borderline insignificant for Estr, controlling for changes in reserves increases the daily R2 of 6%
to a weekly R2 of 22%, suggesting that fluctuations in reserves help explaining fluctuations in Estr.
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unrelated to banks’ funding costs – for example, unusually low bilateral transaction volumes (e.g.
because hedge funds scale down their leverage) combined with unchanged tri-party volumes lower
Sofr without having an obvious impact on banks’ funding costs.
Next, we focus on weekly changes and add the total amount of bank reserves as explanatory
variable. In addition, we obtain data on overnight Treasury repos and reverse repos by primary
dealers. Primary dealers are net repo borrowers since 2013, which allows us to use log-changes for
our analysis. We expect that more primary dealer net repo borrowing increase Sofr because it
reflects an elevated demand for repo funding from the financial sector. In line with these arguments,
Panel (2) of Table 5.4 shows that all explanatory variables have the expected signs – a higher amount
of reserves lowers Sofr while more primary dealer net repos increase Sofr.
We next test if the link between Sofr and reserves is stronger when the aggregate level of
reserves is relatively low. To that end, we interact changes in reserves with a dummy variable that
equals one from mid-2018 on (when reserves reached a low level) and zero otherwise. Panel (3) of
Table 5.4 shows that the impact of reserves is over 10 times stronger and statistically significant
(t = −2.64) when interacted with the mid-2018 dummy variable.
Finally, we address a potential shortcoming of our analysis. Due to central bank purchases,
the amount of Treasury debt can differ from the publicly-available debt level. In particular, an
increase in reserves can decrease the amount of publicly-available debt and therefore affect Sofr
through a change in the supply of safe assets. To address this concern, we construct a measure of
publicly-available Treasury debt outstanding by subtracting Fed Treasury holdings from the amount
of Treasuries outstanding. Panel (4) of Table 5.4 shows that using this modified version of debt
outstanding leaves our results virtually unchanged. In addition, we replace the amount of reserves
with the amount of non-Treasury securities held by the Fed. This measure can capture changes in
reserves that leave the publicly-available Treasury debt unaffected and Panel (5) shows that it has
a qualitatively similar impact on Sofr as reserves.
The Impact of Financial Regulation
We next test if the introduction of the Lr in January 2013 (more precisely, the reporting of the Lr
to regulators from 2013 on) impacted rates. Because Sofr is only backward calculated until August
2014 and because the tri-party repo rate is only available from September 2012 on, we focus our
analysis of the pre-2013 period on the GCF repo rate. We contrast the month-end and quarter-end
spikes in the 2010–2013 period with the 2013–2019 period and find massive average quarter-end
spikes of 18.55 basis points in the post-2013 period, which did not exist before. This behavior is
opposite to the pre-crisis results reported in Bartolini et al. (2010), who find significant downward
spikes in the GCF repo rate at quarter-ends. Panel (2) of Table 5.5 shows the results for the tri-party
repo rate in the 2013 – 2019 period; the rate exhibits a less significant volatility at quarter-ends
than the GCF rate. As explained in Section 5.2, any potential downward spikes in tri-party repo
rates are limited by the Fed reverse repo program, while quarter-end spikes in other repo market
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segments could spill over to the tri-party market.
Panels (3) and (4) illustrate the mechanisms in the repo market from a different angle, using
the difference between quarter-end and quarterly average repo holdings for individual banks as
independent variable. We regress this measure on a dummy variable (FBO) that equals one if the
bank is a foreign banking office and zero otherwise, and a post-2013 dummy variable, interacted with
FBO. The idea behind this test is that, in contrast to U.S. banks, who report quarterly averages,
foreign bank offices report quarter-end snapshots of their leverage ratio to regulators. With the
beginning of leverage ratio reporting to regulators in 2013, we therefore expect an impact on foreign
banking offices that is not present for U.S. banks.
Panels (3) and (4) show the regression results for repo borrowing and repo lending, respectively.
Panel (3) shows that, in the post-2013 period, foreign banking offices reduce their quarter-end bor-
rowing significantly compared to U.S. banks, suggesting that foreign bank offices engage in window
dressing to increase their Leverage ratio over reporting dates. Panel (4) shows a qualitatively sim-
ilar, but weaker, pattern for repo lending. The weaker result is in line with repo lending being, in
principle, balance sheet neutral and only affecting constraints due to repo intermediation.
5.4 Implications for Term Rates
In this section, we first examine how term rates based on the alternative benchmarks deviate from
term rates. We then study the transition of derivatives markets toward the alternative benchmarks
and conclude with an overview of the implications for discount rates.
5.4.1 Comparison to Term LIBOR
An important difference between term (tenors with more than one day to maturity) and term
rates based on the alternative benchmarks is that contains a term premium. This term premium
comprises a liquidity premium to compensate lenders for committing funds over longer time periods
and a credit premium accounting for the risk that the borrower defaults during the term of the loan
(see Filipović and Trolle, 2013 for a decomposition of the term premium in ).17 By contrast, term
rates based on the alternative benchmarks will be averages of overnight rates and therefore lacking
a term premium.
To illustrate the different ways of averaging the alternative benchmarks, assume that we want to
compute a 3-month term rate. The simplest approach is to compute the average of the overnight rate
over the past 90 days. This approach is also called averaging “in advance” because the resulting term
rate is available in advance of a payment.18 Averaging in advance has the shortcoming that it results
17In theory, even overnight rates can contain a credit premium, but for borrowers with high credit quality, the
default risk decreases with shorter times to maturity. Hence, the credit premium is negligible for overnight rates.
18One example of such term rates are the Sofr term rates published by the New York Fed (https://apps.
newyorkfed.org/markets/autorates/sofr-avg-ind)
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in a backward-looking rate that, unlike , does not reflect market expectations about interest rates in
the following 3 months. An alternative approach partly addressing this shortcoming is averaging “in
arrears” – in our example that means computing the 3-month term rate as average overnight rate
over the following 90 days. Despite the drawback that these in arrears averages are not available in
real time and reflect realized instead of expected rates, regulators explicitly advocate the use of this
approach (see, for example, ARRC (2019); “A users guide to Sofr”). A third approach is extracting
forward-looking averages from derivatives, which would incorporate future rate expectations and be
available in advance. However, the drawback of this approach is that derivatives prices are not as
robust as transaction-based overnight rates. In theory, dealer banks could collude to manipulate the
derivatives prices which would undermine the fact that the underlying overnight rate fulfills all the
requirements to a robust benchmark rate.
In addition to choosing between in advance and in arrears averaging, we also need to distin-
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The resulting proxy for the term premium has three components – in addition to the liquidity
premium and credit premium discussed above, it also contains an “expectations error” because the
in arrears average of overnight reflects the realized level of interest rates while 3-month reflects the
market expectation for rates over the next three months (this error is not present when using OIS
contracts instead).
Figure 5.5 shows the results of this decomposition. As we can see from the figure, the term
premium occasionally exceeds −50 basis points in the U.S., reaches almost −40 basis points in the
U.K.,and is between 0 and −5 basis points in Europe. In addition, Figure 5.5 shows that the U.S.
benchmark spread exhibits large variation between −20 and 15 basis points, with a noticeable spike
in mid-2019 while the benchmark spread in the U.K. is relatively stable with the only noticeable
change in 2018, when the reform lead to a decrease in rates. In Europe, the term spread is virtually
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constant at 8.5 basis points and significantly larger than the term premium.19
5.4.2 The Impact on Derivatives Markets
We next examine how the Libor funeral affects the open interest of Euro-dollar futures for contracts
referencing either USD , GBP , or Euribor. Euro-dollar futures are exchange-traded derivatives
that pay the 3-month or Euribor rate at expiry (which is the third Wednesday of a quarter). The
price of each futures contract reflects the expected 3-month (or Euribor) rate at a future valuation
date and contracts with valuation dates up to 60 months in the future are liquidly traded in all three
currencies.
Focusing on the open interest of Euro-dollar futures allows us to test if market participants
reduced their exposure in contracts with valuation dates after December 2021 once Bailey (2017)
announced the funeral on July 27, 2017. Table 5.6 shows the results of regressing the log-open
interest in contracts with valuation dates between 27 and 60 months on the interaction between
a dummy variable that equals one after the funeral announcement (1t>Funderal) and a dummy
variable that equals one if the valuation date of the underlying contract is after December 2021
(1T>Discontinued). We remove contracts with less than 27 months to maturity to keep the focus on
contracts that reference after December 2021 at least once during our January 2015 – December 2019
period. To control for potential differences in open interest for contracts with different maturities,
we add time-to-maturity (TTM) fixed effects. In addition, each specification includes year fixed
effects, 1t>Funderal, and 1T>Discontinued as controls.
If market participants reduced their exposure after the funeral announcement, we would expect
a negative coefficient on the interaction term. However, as we can see from Panel (1) of Table
5.6, the funeral had no significant effect on USD futures contracts that reference after December
2021. By contrast, Panel (2) suggests that the open interest in GBP contracts with valuation dates
after December 2021 dropped after the funeral while Panel (3) suggests the opposite is true for
Euribor futures, where the open interest increased. The increase for Euribor futures reflects the
different approach of European regulators, who decided to reform Euribor instead of discontinuing
it after 2021 (see EMMI, 2018). Moreover, the significant decrease for GBP contracts is in line with
Sonia derivatives already being liquidly traded and therefore allowing investors to transition away
from . By contrast, activity in Sofr-linked derivatives is picking up slowly, which can explain the
insignificant drop in USD futures. Confirming the different developments in derivatives markets,
ISDA (2020) estimates that 31.8% of the risk in OTC interest rate derivatives for GBP are already
linked to Sonia while only 3.8% of USD derivatives are linked to Sofr.
19 The missing term premium in the alternative benchmarks makes it difficult to compare term rates based on
averaging the alternative benchmarks with other proxies for the risk-free rate. For instance, Van Binsbergen et al.
(2019) derive an option-implied risk-free rate and we compare this option-implied rate to Treasury yields and average
Sofr rates in Figure 5.D.1 in the online appendix, showing that the average Sofr rate is significantly lower.
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5.4.3 Implications for Discount Rates
To discount future cash-flows and value derivatives, it is common to use a rate that is close to risk-
free. Since the financial crisis, market participants such a clearinghouses and derivatives traders rely
on overnight index swap (OIS) rates as discount rates (see, for example, Hull and White, 2013). The
funeral will impact this practice by changing these discount rates from the current OIS benchmarks
to OIS referencing the alternative benchmarks. For the U.K., which uses a reformed version of
its OIS benchmark as replacement, this switch is already implemented. In Europe, the old OIS
benchmark is Eonia and the transition comprises two steps; from Eonia to Estr plus 8.5 basis
points and from Estr plus 8.5 basis points to Estr flat. We discuss the practical implications of this
8.5 basis point switch in Section 5.4.4 and focus this section on implications for U.S. benchmarks.
SOFR-OIS Spreads
In this subsection, we use futures contracts to construct a 3-month Sofr-OIS spread which we
compare to the 3-month Libor-OIS spread. To construct this spread, we rely on Fed funds futures
and Sofr futures. Fed funds futures are widely-used hedging instruments that mature at the end
of each calendar month and reference the arithmetic average of the effective Fed funds rate (Effr)
during that month. Sofr futures were introduced in May 2018, reference Sofr instead of the Effr,
and, apart from that, have exactly the same contract details as Fed funds futures.21 We use the
implied futures rates in these contracts to construct discount and forward-discount factors that allow
us to compute discount factors from the current date to the end of month t+2 and the end of month
t + 3. We then use these discount factors to extract corresponding term rates and obtain 3-month
Sofr and Effr by interpolating between the rates for month t+ 2 and t+ 3.
Panel (a) of Figure 5.6 compares the resulting 3-month Sofr-OIS spread to the observed 3-month
Libor-OIS spread. As we can see from the Figure, the repo squeeze on September 16, 2019 lead to
an increase in the Sofr-OIS spread which only normalized after the quarter-end date on September
30, while having virtually no effect on the Libor-OIS spreads. By contrast, in March 2020, when
the Corona virus started hitting the U.S. economy – the third red line in Figure 5.6 highlights the
date when the Fed cut interest rates by 50 basis points – we see a sharp increase in Libor-OIS
spreads while Sofr-Effr spreads show a moderate initial increase. During March 2020, we then
observe a further increase in Libor-OIS spreads while Sofr-Effr spreads reverse into negative.
These increases in combined with decreases in Sofr resonate with Schrimpf and Sushko (2019), who
argue that the difference between and collateralized rates becomes most apparent in crisis times.
To better understand the term rate during this turbulent period, Panel (b) shows the spread
between overnight Sofr and Effr. As we can see from the figure, the overnight Sofr-Effr spread
spiked above 150 basis points at the September repo squeeze followed by an increase to around 50
21In addition to this type of Sofr futures, there is a second type which closely resembles Euro-Dollar futures,
referencing the three-month average Sofr and maturing at the same dates as Euro-dollar futures. We provide
additional detail on this type of futures in Appendix 5.A.
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basis points at quarter-end in late September. In early March 2020, the volatility of the Sofr-
Effr spread starts increasing with the onset of the crisis. On March 12 (fourth red line), the Fed’s
term repo program schedule was announced and on March 17 the Fed announced the overnight
repo program (announcing 500 billion of overnight repo lending every day), which stabilized repo
markets and lead to a drop of the Sofr-Ffr spread into negative territory. Taken together, Figure
5.6 highlights a fundamental difference between Libor rates and Sofr – during a crisis period, repo
rates do not increase as significantly as uncollateralized bank lending.
Spikes in SOFR Term Rates
We next use Sofr futures to examine spikes in Sofr term rates. We first focus on Sofr-Effr
futures spreads and contracts with maturities between 2 months and 6 months, removing the 1-
month contract (because we are interested in expectations about future term rates) and dropping
less liquid contracts with more than 6 months to maturity. We then examine if the futures-implied
Sofr-Effr spread is higher for contracts that expire in the last month of the quarter or the last
month of the year. Panel (1) of Table 5.7 shows that this is indeed the case; the average Sofr-Effr
futures spread is positive at 3.44 basis points and 0.79 basis points higher in the last month of the
quarter and more than 2 basis points (0.79+1.39) higher in the last month the calendar year. Panel
(6) shows that this results remains virtually unchanged after adding year-quarter and maturity-type
fixed effects.
Because the Effr can be prone to downward spikes at regulatory reporting dates (see our
discussion in Internet Appendix 5.B), part of the quarter-end and year-end spikes in Panels (1) and
(2) could be a result of expected downward spikes in the Effr instead of expected upward spikes in
Sofr. We therefore use an alternative approach to examine expected quarter-end spikes in Sofr.
Similar to Fleckenstein and Longstaff (2019), who examine year-end effects in Euro-dollar futures,
we construct an interpolated Sofr futures rate for month t by linearly interpolating between Sofr
futures rate in month t − 1 and in month t + 1 and then examine the spread of the Sofr-implied
futures rates for month t and the interpolated rate. As we can see from Panels (3) and (4) in Table
5.7, this approach leads to qualitatively similar but less significant results. Given that downward
spikes in the Effr are much smaller than the upward spikes in Sofr and diminish after Q2 2018
(our futures sample starts in May 2018), we argue that the Sofr-Effr spreads in Panels (1) and
(2) more closely reflect the expected quarter-end behavior of Sofr than the simple spline estimates
in Panels (3) and (4).
5.4.4 Practical Issues Going Forward
We now discuss six practical issues stemming from the funeral.
First, even though market participants know the overnight rates set to replace , the construction
of corresponding term rates can vary across market segments. For example, USD interest rate swaps
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and floating rate notes (FRNs) reference Sofr compounded averages in arrears, syndicated loans
reference Sofr simple averages in arrears, and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) reference Sofr
compounded in advance. Moreover, the ARRC recommends in arrears averaging for business loans
(see ARRC, 2020a) while this approach is not possible for mortgages where regulation requires
that consumers know their interest rate 45 days in advance. Complicating the transition further,
compounded Estr is problematic for Germany and Italy, where compounded interest is illegal in
consumer loans (see Smith, 2019). The difference between in arrears and in advance compounding
can be substantial when key policy rates change unexpectedly while the difference between simple
averaging and compounding is negligible, especially when interest rates are low (see ARRC, 2020b).
Second, the fact that term rates based on alternative benchmarks are detached from banks’
marginal funding costs (especially for the U.S., where term spreads are high), poses a problem for
bank loans – was originally introduced as benchmark in syndicated loans, allowing banks to charge a
spread relative to their own funding costs (see, Vaughan and Finch, 2017). Replacing the floating rate
in a loan with an overnight rate exposes banks to fluctuations in term premiums and be especially
problematic for products like credit lines, where the probability of customers drawing on such lines
increases during market turmoil. These issues contributed to a slow growth in Sofr-denominated
debt, mainly issued by U.S. agencies so far (see Smith, 2020a) and opposed by smaller banks (see
Banker, 2020) and received heightened attention during the market turmoil in March 2020 when
spreads soared. To resolve these issues, the U.S. established a credit sensitivity group (CSG) and a
likely fix is constructing a measure of bank credit risk that can be added to Sofr (see Berndt et al.,
2020 for one proposal and a discussion of this approach).
Third, changing the reference rate in the vast quantity of derivatives referencing and maturing
after 2021 is a challenge. One possible solution is to determine the compensation for switching the
underlying derivatives benchmark from to alternative benchmarks in an auction, thereby retiring
large parts of derivatives before December 2021 (see Duffie, 2018b or Zhu, 2019 for a discussion
of different mechanisms). The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), suggests
amending the derivatives contracts with a fallback protocol: Should be discontinued the benchmark
rate will be replaced with the alternative benchmark, compounded in arrears, plus a fallback spread.
The fallback spread is the five-year historical median spread between and the compounded alternative
benchmark (see ISDA, 2019). As discussed in Section 5.4.2, dervatives trading transitions slowly to
referencing the alternative benchmarks and to increase trading volumes in derivatives referencing
the alternative benchmarks, the U.S. Treasury is considering to issue FRNs linked to Sofr (see
Zhu, 2020 for a comment on this idea). In addition, clearing houses change the discount rates
for derivatives pricing and collateral valuation from OIS discounting (with the Effr or Eonia as
benchmark in the U.S. and Europe, respectively) to using discount rates based on the alternative
benchmarks.
Fourth, this discounting switch poses a challenge for derivatives markets in the U.S. and Europe.
In Europe, the Eonia reform first replaces Eonia with Estr plus 8.5 basis points, reflecting the
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almost constant spread between Eonia and Estr. In a second step, Estr plus 8.5 basis points
is replaced by Estr flat. This 8.5 basis point switch in discount rates changes the valuation of
interest rate swaps and other derivatives. While regulators can impose a compensation scheme
for cleared derivatives, the compensation scheme is voluntary for uncleared derivatives. This is
especially problematic for levered swap positions such as options to engage in swaps (commonly
known as swaptions), where changes in discount rates can lead to windfall profits or losses (see
Becker, 2020). In addition to these potential windfall profits, the situation in the U.S. is challenging
because Sofr-Effr spreads are more volatile.
Fifth, while the construction of Libor is similar across countries, the construction of the new
benchmark rates differs across countries and the rates exhibit quantitatively different patterns.
Hence, in addition to the basis risk between Libor and the new benchmark rates, the Libor
funeral also introduces additional basis risk across countries. This basis risk can be amplified by
different conventions for obtaining term rates in different regions (see Smith, 2020b).
Finally, the funeral poses difficulties for the risk management of U.K. insurance companies. On
the one hand, the financial conduct authority (FCA) urges insurances to transition away from (see
the FCA “Dear CEO Letter”) while insurance regulation under Solvency II explicitly uses discount
rates linked to swap rates. Hence, U.K. insurers using Sonia derivatives instead of Libor derivatives
can face regulatory capital charges for transitioning to the alternative benchmarks.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
We examine the alternative benchmark rates in the U.S., the U.K, and Europe, provide a detailed
overview of the micro-structure behind these rates, and highlight their three main drivers. First,
tighter regulatory constraints increase Sofr but decrease Sonia and Estr. Second, besides the
predictable reporting date spikes, a higher volume of government debt outstanding corresponds to
a significant increase in Sofr and less-significant increases in Sonia and Estr. Finally, when
reserves are at a low level, an increase in the amount of reserves lowers the alternative benchmarks.
Our analysis provides a better understanding of the alternative benchmark rates which is important
given that these rates are intended to replace Libor in trillions of loans, floating rate debt, and
financial contracts. In addition, we show that term rates based on the alternative benchmark rates
can be affected by regulatory reporting spikes but are more stable than Libor rates, lacking a term
premium.
While the transition away from Libor to alternative benchmark rates will enhance the trans-
parency and robustness of benchmark rates, our paper highlights three potential issues for the “life
after Libor”. First, the type of transactions underlying the alternative benchmarks affect the inter-
est rates and introduce volatility unrelated to banks’ marginal funding costs. More broadly, while
the inclusion of non-bank to bank transactions in the alternative benchmarks ensures that transac-
tion volumes are robust, borrowing from non-banks might not be readily available for some banks,
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putting a wedge between the rates and banks’ marginal funding costs. Second, we show that the
supply of government debt affects the alternative rates. For collateralized rates, the impact of gov-
ernment debt supply is even more pronounced because the rates are also affected by the availability
of government debt collateral. Finally, term rates based on the alternative benchmarks lack a term




Spread between the alternative benchmark rates and LIBOR
(a) Overnight spreads (b) Term spreads using 3m average
Notes: This figure shows medians (black bars), ranges between the 25% and 75% quantile (thick grey
line), and ranges between the 1% and 99% quantiles (thin grey line) for the spread between the alternative
benchmark rate in the U.S., the U.K., and Europe relative to Libor (for the U.S. and the U.K.) or Euribor
(for Europe). Panel (a) shows the spread between the alternative benchmark rates and the overnight Libor
rate (for the U.S. and the U.K.) or the spread relative to Eonia (the overnight Euribor rate for Europe).
Panel (b) shows the spread between 3-month forward-looking averages of the alternative benchmark rates,
computed in arrears, and 3-month Libor (for the U.S. and the U.K.) or Euribor (for Europe). The sample
periods starts in August 2014 for the U.S., February 2016 for the U.K., and December 2016 for Europe and
include data until December 2019.
5.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 271
Figure 5.2
The different transaction types in the alternative benchmarks
Notes: This figure gives a stylized overview of the different types of transactions that can be part of the
alternative benchmarks, abstracting from whether the underlying transaction is collateralized or uncollater-
alized. The figure shows lending from right to left, starting with a non-bank cash provider who lends to a
bank (T1 ) that acts as intermediary and, in turn, lends to a cash taker. The cash taker can either be another
bank (T2 ) or a non-bank (T3 ). The grey area highlights the interbank transactions.
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Figure 5.3
Alternative benchmarks and overnight Libor in different regions



















































Notes: This figure compares the level of the alternative benchmark rates (blue lines) in the U.S., the U.K.,
and Europe to the overnight Libor rates (for the U.S. and the U.K.) or Eonia (the overnight Euribor rate
for Europe). To remove the effect of changes in policy target rates, each line represents the spread between
an overnight rate and a proxy of the policy target rate in the respective region. These policy targets are the
interest on excess reserves (IOER) for the U.S., the “bank rate” at which banks can deposit money with the
Bank of England for the U.K., and the rate that banks receive for placing their reserves with the European
central bank for Europe. The grey vertical lines indicate quarter-ends.
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Figure 5.4
Underlying repo volumes in SOFR


















Notes: This figure shows the volumes of the different types of repo transactions underlying Sofr. The three
different types are (from top to bottom): Billateral repo volumes, GCF repo volumes, and Triparty repo
volumes. The grey vertical lines indicate quarter-ends.
Figure 5.5
Spread between 3-month average of alternative benchmarks and Libor


















































Notes: This figure decomposes the spread between 3-month averages of the alternative benchmarks, computed
in arrears, and 3-month Libor into a term spread component and benchmark spread component. The light-
shaded areas show the component of the spread due to term premium. This component is estimated as
the spread between the 3-month average of overnight (or Eonia; both computed in arrears) and 3-month
term . The dark-shaded areas show the component of the spread due to differences in overnight rates.
This component is computed as the 3-month average of the spread between the alternative benchmarks and
overnight . On days where the spread between overnight rates is positive, the term premium is the sum of the
light-shaded and dark-shaded areas in the graph. On days where the term premium component is positive,
the term premium is the sum of the light-shaded and dark-shaded areas in the graph.
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Figure 5.6
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(b) Overnight spread
Notes: Panel (a) shows the spread between the 3-month Sofr rate and 3-month Fed funds rate, extracted
from Sofr and Fed funds futures as well as the spread between 3-month Libor and the 3-month OIS rate
based Fed funds. Panel (b) shows the spread between overnight Sofr and the Fed funds rate. We focus
on the September 2019 – March 2020 period and the red lines highlight the repo squeeze on September 16,
2019, the quarter-end date September 30, 2019, the rate cut by 50bp on March 4, 2020, the introduction of
the Fed term repo program on March 12, 2020, and the announcement of the Fed overnight repo program on
March 19, 2020.
Table 5.1
Properties of the alternative benchmark rates
Panel A: Background Panel B: Impact on rates
Transactions Alternatives for Regulatory More More
Name included non-bank lenders Collateralized constraints Treasuries reserves
Sofr T1, T2, T3 Fed’s RRP 51 ↑ ↑ ↘
Sonia T1, T2 55 55 ↘ ↗ ↘
Estr T1, T2 55 55 ↘ ↗ ↘
Notes: Panel A gives an overview of the background behind the alternative benchmark rates in the U.S.
(Sofr), the U.K. (Sonia), and Europe (Estr). Panel B summarizes how regulatory constraints, a larger
quantity of Treasury debt, and more central bank reserves affect the different rates.
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Table 5.2
Reporting-date spikes in the alternative benchmark rates
Sofr Sonia Estr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept −2.39∗∗∗ −4.89∗∗∗ −4.81∗∗∗
(−7.87) (−242.31) (−158.90)
QEnd 20.25∗∗∗ 20.00∗∗∗ −2.12∗∗∗ −2.04∗∗∗ −0.51∗∗∗ −0.57∗∗∗
(4.73) (5.39) (−2.68) (−3.29) (−2.83) (−3.45)
YEnd −2.20 −1.27 0.61 0.33 −1.57∗∗∗ −1.48∗∗∗
(−0.22) (−0.14) (0.48) (0.31) (−3.97) (−3.97)
MEnd \ QEnd 10.06∗∗∗ 10.10∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗ −0.39∗∗∗ −0.16 −0.16
(9.25) (10.19) (−2.35) (−5.07) (−1.26) (−1.52)
FEs – YQ – YQ – YQ
Adj. R2 0.07 0.29 0.11 0.75 0.02 0.13
Num. obs. 1,337 1,337 987 987 695 695
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the alternative benchmark rates on three dummy variables
capturing regulatory reporting dates. QEnd equals one on the last trading day of a quarter and zero otherwise,
YEnd equals one on the last trading day of a year and zero otherwise, and MEnd \ QEnd equals one on the
last trading day of a month which is not quarter-end and zero otherwise. Panels (2), (4), and (6) include
year-quarter fixed effects. The independent variables are Sofr (Panels (1) and (2)), Sonia (Panels (3) and
(4)), and Estr (Panels (5) and (6)). To remove fluctuations in these rates due to changes in policy rates, we
use the spread of these rates over the policy targets in the three regions. The sample periods start in August
2014 for Sofr, February 2016 for Sonia, and December 2016 for Estr, including data until December 2019.
The numbers in parantheses are Newey-West t-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%,
and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.3
Drivers of the alternative benchmark rates in the U.K. and Europe
Sofr Sonia Estr
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept −0.00∗∗∗ −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00
(−2.91) (−1.50) (0.11) (0.41) (−0.19) (0.33)
∆ log(Debt) 9.73∗∗∗ 4.00∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.01 −0.21 0.07
(8.80) (3.03) (2.01) (0.37) (−1.09) (1.14)
∆ log(Transact. V olume) 0.09∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(2.46) (2.68) (1.22) (1.85) (4.10) (3.92)
∆ log(Reserves) −0.14 0.01 −0.03
(−1.15) (0.74) (−1.47)
Adj. R2 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.22
Num. obs. 1,186 241 850 179 597 124
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing changes in the alternative benchmark rates on the indicated
variables. Panels (1), (3) and (5) examine daily changes. Panels (2), (4) and (6) examine weekly changes
(sampled on Wednesdays). For the U.S., the U.K., and Europe, ∆ log(Debt) are changes in the total amount
of U.S. Treasuries, Gilts, or German Treasuries outstanding, respectively. ∆ log(Transact. V olume) are
changes in the total trading volume underlying the alternative benchmark rates, and ∆ log(Reserves) are
changes in the total amount of bank reserves in the respective area. The independent variables are Sofr
(Panels (1) and (2)), Sonia (Panels (3) and (4)), and Estr (Panels (5) and (6)). To remove fluctuations in
these rates due to changes in policy rates, we use the spread of these rates over the policy targets in the three
regions. The last, second-last, and first trading day of each month as well as five days after September 15 are
removed from the sample to avoid large outliers and reporting-date spikes driving the results. The sample
periods start in August 2014 for Sofr, February 2016 for Sonia, and December 2016 for Estr, including
data until December 2019. The numbers in parantheses are heteroskedaticity-robust t-statistics. ***, **, and
* indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.4
What makes SOFR tick?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Intercept −0.00∗∗∗ −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01∗
(−3.03) (−1.31) (−1.34) (−1.51) (−1.93)







−0.07∗∗∗ −0.08 −0.09 −0.08 −0.11
(−2.80) (−1.08) (−1.30) (−1.05) (−1.52)
∆ log(PD NetRepo) 0.21∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(3.51) (3.48) (3.33) (3.22)
∆ log(Reserves) −0.26∗ −0.08 −0.24∗
(−1.90) (−0.56) (−1.80)
∆ log(Reserves)× 1≥Jul 2018 −0.94∗∗∗
(−2.64)
∆ log(Debt \ FED) 3.39∗∗∗ 3.79∗∗∗
(2.94) (3.51)
∆ log(Other Hold) −1.53∗
(−1.79)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.09
Num. obs. 1,135 235 235 235 235
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing changes in Sofr on the indicated variables. To avoid
capturing fluctuations in Sofr due to changes in the policy target rate, we analyze the spread between
Sofr and the upper bound of the of the Federal Fund’s target rate. ∆ log(Debt) are changes in the total
amount of Treasuries outstanding, ∆ log(TPV/SORFV ) are changes in the fraction of triparty repo in Sofr,
∆ log(PD NetRepo) are changes in the net amount of overnight repos of primary dealers, ∆ log(Reserves) are
changes in the total amount of bank reserves in the U.S., 1≥Jul 2018 is a dummy variable that equals from July
2018 on and zero otherwise, ∆ log(Debt \ FED) are changes in the amount of Treasuries outstanding minus
FED Treasury holdings, and ∆ log(Other Hold) are changes in the amount of non-Treasury securities on the
FED balance sheet. Panel (1)examines daily changes, Panels (2)–(5) examine weekly changes (sampled on
Wednesdays). The last, second-last and first trading day of each month as well as five days after September 15
are removed from the sample to avoid reporting-date spikes or the large September 15, 2019 spike driving the
results. The sample period is August 2014 to December 2019. The numbers in parantheses are Newey-West
t-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.5







MEnd \ QEnd 3.92∗∗∗
(4.29)
QEnd × 1{≥2013} 18.55∗∗∗ 9.15∗∗∗
(3.90) (3.54)
YEnd × 1{≥2013} 29.27 0.29
(0.85) (0.04)
MEnd \ QEnd × 1{≥2013} 1.98 4.50∗∗∗
(1.41) (3.68)
Adj. R2 0.33 0.27









FBO ×1t≥2013 −0.97∗∗ −0.83
(−2.08) (−1.58)
Adj. R2 0.00 0.00
Num. obs. 21,979 21,887
Notes: Panels (1) and (2) show the results of regressing the spread between GCF or triparty repo rates and
the IOER rate on three dummy variables: QEnd, which equals one on the last trading day of a quarter and
zero otherwise, YEnd, which equals one on the last trading day of a year and zero otherwise, and MEnd
\ QEnd, which equals one on the last trading day of a month that is not quarter-end, and zero otherwise.
1≥2013 is a dummy variable that equals one if the observation is after January 2013 and zero otherwise. Both
specifications include year-quarter fixed effects. The sample period is January 2010 to December 2019. Panel
(3) and (4) show the results of regressing the difference between banks repo holdings (borrowing and lending)
on quarter end and the quarterly average during the quarter on 1≥2013 and FBO, which equals one if the
bank is a foreign banking office operating in the U.S. and zero if it is a U.S. bank. The sample period is
first quarter 2000 to fourth quarter 2018. The data is obtained from regulatory filings to Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council’s (FFIEC). The numbers in parantheses are Newey-West t-statistics. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.6
The impact of the Libor funeral of futures volumes
USD GBP Euribor
1{t>Funeral} × 1{T>Discontinue} −0.03 −0.60∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(−0.46) (−2.20) (4.69)
1{t>Funeral} −0.02 0.06 −0.06
(−0.36) (0.38) (−0.63)
1{T>Discontinue} −0.02 1.80∗∗∗ −0.04
(−0.28) (8.84) (−0.50)
TTM FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.93 0.87 0.95
Num. obs. 14,592 14,545 14,568
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the logarithm of the open interest in futures contracts with
maturities between 27 and 60 months on three dummy variables. 1t≥Jul/2017 is a dummy variable that equals
one after the funeral announcement in July 2017 and zero otherwise. 1T>Dec2021 is a dummy variable that
equals one if the contract expires after December 2021 and zero if it expires earlier. Panels (1) and (2) show
the results for USD futures. Panels (3) and (4) show the results for GBP futures. Panels (5) and (6) show
the results for Euribor futures. All panels include time-to-maturity (TTM) type fixed effects and year fixed
effects. The numbers in parantheses are Newey-West t-statistics, clustered at the date and type level. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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Table 5.7
Reporting-date spikes in Sofr futures
SOFR-FFF SOFR-Spline
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 3.44∗∗∗ −0.27∗∗∗
(188.00) (−2.66)
QEnd 0.79∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗ 0.45
(3.42) (4.90) (2.25) (1.56)
YEnd 1.39∗∗∗ 1.16∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗
(2.97) (2.69) (2.06) (3.53)
FEs – YQ & Type – YQ & Type
Adj. R2 0.07 0.63 0.01 0.03
Num. obs. 2,060 2,060 2,060 2,060
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the spread between monthly Sofr futures and either Fed
Funds Futures (Panels (1) and (2)) or the interpolated Sofr futures rate for contracts maturing in month
T −1 and T + 1 (Panels (3) and (4)) for 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 months to maturity on two dummy variables: QEnd
equals one if the contracts expire in the last calendar month of a given quarter and zero otherwise, and YEnd
equals one if the contracts expire in the last calendar month of a given year and zero otherwise. The sample
comprises daily observations for the May 4, 2018 (the date when Sofr futures trading started) to December
2019 period. The numbers in parantheses are Newey-West t-statistics, clustered by time-to-maturity type.
***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Appendix
5.A Additional Details on SOFR
This section contains additional details and descriptive statistics for Sofr. Figure 5.A.1 illustrates
the impact of including different market segments into the computation of Sofr. The blue line
shows the spread between Sofr and the Broad General Collateral Rate (Bgcr), which removes
bilateral repo transactions from Sofr. As we can see from the Figure, the Sofr-Bgcr is virtually
always positive and spikes upward at quarter-ends. Moreover, the black line in Figure 5.A.1 shows
the spread between Bgcr and the Tri-Party General Collateral Rate (Tgcr), which removes GCF
transactions from the Bgcr. As we can see from the figure, removing GCF transactions has a small
effect on the rate, which is in line with the small share of GCF transactions in the overall Sofr
volume.
Figure 5.A.1
Different repo rates in SOFR

















Notes: This figure provides additional background for Sofr, illustrating the spread between Sofr and Bgcr
(removing billateral transactions) and the spread between Bgcr and Tgcr, removing GCF transactions. The
grey vertical lines indicate quarter-ends.
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5.A.1 The Term Structure of SOFR-LIBOR Spreads
We now use Euro-dollar futures and the second type of Sofr futures (the 3-month Sofr futures)
to examine the term structure of the Sofr-Libor spreads. The 3-month Sofr contracts have the
same contract specifications as Euro-dollar futures – they have the same expiry dates, settlement
dates, and collateral requirements – but reference the arithmetic 3-month average of the Sofr rate
instead of 3-month Libor. We use these futures contracts to construct forward-looking spreads,
where we match Sofr futures that pay the average Sofr rate over the following three months with
Euro-Dollar futures. In addition, we compute backward-looking spreads by using Sofr futures that
pay the average Sofr rate over the past three months instead.
Panel (a) of Figure 5.A.2 compares the two spreads for futures contracts with 12 months to
maturity. The blue line shows the Sofr-Libor spread using forward-looking Sofr futures, while
the black-dashed line uses backward-looking Sofr futures. The spread for forward-looking contracts
fluctuates between −35 and −15 basis points while the spread for backward-looking contracts is
more volatile and fluctuates between −50 and 10 basis points. Panel (b) illustrates the median term
structure of Sofr-Libor spreads for the May 2018 – December 2019 period. The blue line and black
line in Panel (b) illustrate the term structure for forward-looking and backward-looking spreads,
respectively. As we can see from the figure, both term structures are downward-sloping, suggesting
that investors expect Sofr-Libor spreads to be more negative in the long run. Comparing the
two term structures, Panel (b) shows that the median forward-looking spread is below the median
backward-looking spread for maturities up to 30 months. For the longer end of the term structure,
the median spreads are almost identical.
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Figure 5.A.2



































SOFR (backward) − Libor
(b) Term-structure
Notes: This figure illustrates Sofr-Libor spreads extract from 3-month Sofr and Euro-dollar futures
contracts. Panel (a) shows the Sofr-Libor spread for futures contracts that mature in 12-months. Panel
(b) shows the median Sofr-Libor spread for different maturities, ranging from 3 months to 60 months.
The blue line is the Sofr-Libor spread, where forward-looking averages are used and the black line is the
Sofr-Libor spread, where backward-looking averges are used. The dashed vertical lines in Panel (a) are
IMM dates. The sample period is May 2018 to December 2019.
5.B An Illustrative Model
We now illustrate the impact of tighter financial constraints and fluctuations in available government
debt on different overnight rates through a simple model. Two types of agents, A and B, can invest
in a risky asset in perfectly elastic supply with final payoff D ∼ N (1 + µ, σ2) and price normalized
to one. In addition, the agents lend money to each other or invest in government debt with limited
fixed supply S. Both government debt and lending between A and B earn the same return r, which
we determine below. Moreover, agent B can lend money to another agent (e.g. other bank or hedge
fund, which we do not model explicitly) at a rate ρ that we also determine below. Both agents have





g(µ− r − γgσ
2
2
) + ḡ(ρ− r)
]
,
where ḡ is the amount of money that B lends out.
Agent A can be thought of as a cash-rich investor, such as a MMF, that does not face regulatory
constraints. This agent can only lend to agent B (ā = 0), invests in the risky and risk-free asset,
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and lends its remaining wealth to other agents (or invests in the risk-free asset) at the broad lending
rate r. Agent B is a bank that faces regulatory constraints and can borrow money from A at the
rate r. B’s regulatory constraint limits its risky investments and capacity to lend out money, the




where WB can be interpreted as the banks’ capital, b + b̄ as the total exposure and x as a fixed
number between 3% and 6%. We restrict the model parameters such that we end up in the realistic
case where A and B take long positions in the risky asset and assume that there is a fixed demand c̄
for cash by another agent (which could be another bank or a non-bank). The following proposition
illustrates how r and ρ are affected by tighter regulatory constraints.





(a) If B ≥ 12 , the bank is unconstrained and r = ρ = µ−
γσ2
2 (Ω− S − b̄)
(b) If B < 12 , the bank is constrained and
r = µ− γσ2[(1− B)(Ω− S)− Bb̄]
ρ = µ− γσ2[B(Ω− S) + (1 + B)b̄]
We relegate the proof of Proposition 5.B to the internet appendix and focus on the economic
intuition behind the proposition instead. The variable B can be interpreted as tightness of the
bank’s constraint, i.e. a lower B implies that the bank is more constrained. Focusing on part (b),
the proposition shows that tighter constraints, reflected by a lower B, decreases r but increases
ρ. Hence, the proposition illustrates how a binding LR constraint affects interest rates differently,
depending on whether the marginal lender is an unconstrained non-bank or a constrained bank.




1. Alternative benchmark rates: We obtain backward-calculated (for the April 2014 – May 2018)
and actual (from May 2018 on) Sofr rates from the New York Fed website. Data for the
Sonia and reformed Sonia rate come from the BoE. Estr and pre-Estr rates are obtained
from the ECB website.
2. Libor and Euribor rates: We obtain 3-month term and overnightfor USD and GBP , as well as
3-month Euribor and Eonia (as a measure of overnight Euribor) rates from the Bloomberg
system.
3. Key policy rates: For the U.S., we use the IOER rate, for the U.K., we use the “bank rate”,
and for Europe, we use the bank deposit rates. All three rates are obtained from Bloomberg.
4. Government debt outstanding: We use auction data from TreasuryDirect.com, the U.K. debt
management office, and the German finance ministry to construct the daily volume of U.S.,
U.K., and German Treasury debt outstanding, respectively.
5. Transaction volumes: We obtain Sofr volumes, split into tri-party, GCF, and bilateral trans-
actions from the New York Fed website. Sonia volumes come from the BoE. Estr volumes
are obtained from the ECB website.
6. Reserves: For the U.S., we use the total balances with Federal reserve banks; For the U.K.,
we use excess reserves at BoE deposit accounts; For Europe, we use excess reserves defined
as deposits at the deposit account net recourse to the marginal lending facility. All three
quantities are obtained from the Bloomberg system
7. Primary dealer net repo: To construct primary dealers’ net repo positions, we obtain the
volume of overnight repo and reverse repo positions against Treasury collateral from the New
York Fed website.
8. Fed security holdings: We obtain the total assets on Fed’s balance sheet and the quantity of
Treasury securities held by the Fed from FRED.
9. Additional U.S. rates: Additional GCF repo data come from the DTCC website and tri-party
repo data from BNY Mellon. The Effr is obtained from FRED.
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10. Euro-dollar futures: Euro-dollar futures are futures contracts that allow investors to take
positions on the 3-month Libor rate at a future point in time. Prices and open interest for
Euro-dollar futures are obtained from the Bloomberg system.
11. Fed funds futures: Fed funds futures are futures contracts that allow investors to take positions
on the average Effr in a given month. Prices and open interest for Fed funds futures are
obtained from the Bloomberg system.
12. SOFR futures: Sofr futures rates for 1-month futures (which resemble Fed funds futures) and
3-month futures (which resemble Euro-dollar futures) prices and open interest are obtained
from the Bloomberg system.
5.B Additional Details on the EFFR
The Effr is the benchmark rate in more than $20 trillion overnight index swaps (Ois) and one
aim of U.S. monetary policy is to keep the Effr within a target corridor. Figure 5.B.1 compares
the Effr to Sofr. As we can see from the figure, the Effr is relatively stable and tends to spike
downward on quarter-ends and month-ends (although these downward spikes have diminished in
early 2018).
Figure 5.B.1
Comparison of SOFR and EFFR















Notes: This figure compares the level of Sofr (blue line) the Effr. To remove the effect of changes in policy
target rates, each line represents the spread between the respective rate and IOER. The grey vertical lines
indicate quarter-ends.
The main lenders in the Fed Funds market are Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs), which
face less stringent regulatory requirements compared to banks and can be thought of as non-bank
lenders in our framework (transaction type T1). Figure 5.B.2 illustrates the volumes in the Fed funds
market over time and confirms that GSEs became the predominant lender after the financial crisis.
Note that, prior to the financial crisis, the Fed Funds market was an important venue for banks
to trade excess reserves. However, the increasing amount of excess reserves in the banking sector
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(which was a consequence of unconventional monetary policy) prompted the Fed to start paying
interest on excess reserves (IOER) in December 2008, thereby lowering banks’ incentives to lend
their excess reserves to other banks. Figure 5.B.2 shows that the major borrowers in the Fed Funds
market are foreign banking offices (FBOs), which unlike domestic banks, do not pay a balance-sheet
fee to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and are responsible for 45% of the borrowing.
Figure 5.B.2
Fed Funds volumes by counterparty



































Notes: This figure shows quarterly fed funds volumes, split by counterparty. The dashed vertical lines corre-
spond to the quarters when IOER was introduced (Q4 2008), the FDIC reform (Q2 2011), the introduction
of the RRP facility (Q3 2013), the public disclosure of the leverage ratio (Q1 2015), and the implementation
of the MMF reform (Q4 2016). The source of these data are the financial accounts of the U.S. Chartered
bank borrowing and lending in the fed funds market became only available in January 2012 and we use the
amount of interbank lending by chartered depository instituions as a proxy before that date. To keep the
exposition clear, we drop credit unions, which only have fed funds different from zero in four quarters.
5.C The Impact of Regulation
We now compare the impact of the introduction of leverage ratio reporting on different collateralized
and uncollateralized overnight rates in the U.S., the U.K. and Europe. As for the U.S. before, we
regress the spread between overnight rate and policy target rate on QEnd, YEnd, and MEnd \
QEnd, testing if the dummy variable became more significant after January 2013. Because Sofr,
the reformed Sonia rate, and Estr are not available before 2013, we use the GCF repo rate,
Sonia, Eonia as well as the Effr and overnight repo rates backed with U.K. gilts or German
Treasuries as collateral. Focusing first on the U.S., Panels (1) and (2) of Table 5.C.1 show that
month-end downward spikes in the Effr and quarter-end upward spikes in GCF repo rates started
appearing after 2013. Given that GCF repo can be viewed as interbank transactions while the Effr
corresponds more to transactions of type T1, this finding supports Hypothesis 1.
Turning to the U.K., Panels (3) and (4) show that quarter-end and month-end spikes became
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more pronounced post-2013 and that the spikes ar more pronounced for repo rates compared to the
uncollateralized Sonia rate. Focusing next on the Euro area, Panels (5) and (6) show that Eonia
exhibits significant upward spikes at quarter-ends but not at month-ends. By contrast, the repo
rate based on German collateral shows significant downward spikes at quarter-ends in the post-2013
period, which were upward spikes in the 2010 – 2013 period. In line with the Lr being reported
based on quarter-end snapshots in Europe, month-end spikes are insignificant for both Eonia and
repo. However, the large quarter-end spikes in Eonia did not become more significant after 2013.
This is most likely due to the impact of the European debt crisis on unsecured overnight rates in
Europe, which increased volatility in the rate.
Table 5.C.1
Changing reporting-date spikes in different overnight rates
Effr GCF Sonia Repo UK Eonia Repo DE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
QEnd −4.79∗∗∗ 0.94 3.42 −0.41 23.59∗∗∗ 10.75∗∗∗
(−5.66) (0.39) (1.32) (−0.32) (3.14) (3.05)
YEnd 1.26 −4.43 −5.89∗ −10.15 −24.62∗∗ −29.31∗∗∗
(0.66) (−1.12) (−1.80) (−1.52) (−2.24) (−3.92)
MEnd \ QEnd 0.36 3.93∗∗∗ 0.38 −1.59∗∗∗ 3.41 1.00
(1.37) (4.29) (1.64) (−2.80) (1.07) (0.44)
QEnd × 1{≥2013} 0.39 18.61∗∗∗ −6.79∗∗ −10.55∗∗∗ −15.66∗ −23.85∗∗∗
(0.30) (3.91) (−2.54) (−4.18) (−1.95) (−3.17)
YEnd × 1{≥2013} −3.52 29.23 3.27 −28.19∗ 25.94∗∗ −68.04
(−1.23) (0.85) (0.87) (−1.65) (2.14) (−1.33)
MEnd \ QEnd × 1{≥2013} −3.54∗∗∗ 2.03 −1.19∗∗∗ −5.47∗∗∗ 0.46 1.50
(−4.60) (1.44) (−4.54) (−4.67) (0.14) (0.63)
Adj. R2 0.70 0.33 0.91 0.62 0.68 0.71
Num. obs. 2,543 2,475 2,518 2,518 2,555 2,555
Notes: This table shows the results of regressing the spread between the indicated overnight rate and key
policy rate for the respective area on several dummy variables. QEnd and YEnd are dummy variables that
equal one on the last trading day of a quarter or year and zero otherwise. MEnd \ QEnd is a dummy variable
that equals one on the last day of a month if that day is not the last day of a quarter, and zero otherwise.
1≥2013 is a dummy variable that equals one if the obseration is after January 2013 and zero otherwise. All
specifications include year-quarter fixed effects. The sample period is is January 2010 to December 2019.
The numbers in parantheses are Newey-West t-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%,
and 10% level respectively.
5.D Additional Descriptive Statistics
This section contains three additional descriptive statistics. Figure 5.D.1 compares the 6-month
Sofr average, computed in arrears, to the option-implied risk-free rate estimated by Van Binsbergen
et al. (2019).
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Figure 5.D.2 shows the average open interest in Euro-dollar futures, averaged from one expiry
date to the next, split into three maturity buckets: greater than 2 year, but less than 3 years; greater
than 3 years but less than 4 years; and greater than 4 years. Figure 5.D.3 compares monthly gross
notional of interest rate derivatives reported to DTCC split into contracts referencing and contracts
referencing Sofr.
Figure 5.D.1
Comparison between term SOFR and other risk-free rate proxies


































Notes: This figure compares 6-month term Sofr (computed in arrears) to 6-monht constant maturity Trea-
sury yields and the option-implied risk-free rate estimated in Van Binsbergen et. al (2019), as well as an
estimate of the option-implied rate using end-of-day option prices.
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Figure 5.D.2




























































GBP LIBOR Futures Volumes































Notes: This figure shows quarterly average open interest in euro-dollar futures, sampled between IMM dates,
The Euro-dollar futures reference either USD , GBP , or Euribor. Volumes are split into three different
maturity buckets: Maturity between 2 and 3 years (2y, 3y], maturity between 3 and 4 years (3y, 4y], and
maturity greater than 4 years.
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Figure 5.D.3
Interest rate swap volumes
Notes: This figure shows monthly gross trading volumes of interest rate swaps with Libor as underlying (blue
line) and Sofr as underlying (black line). The transactions are obtained from the DTCC trade repository.
5.E Proof of Proposition 1
To prove Proposition 1, we proceed in three steps. First, we determine the agents’ optimal in-
vestments as functions of the rates r and ρ. Second, we use these optimal investments to derive
expressions for r and ρ, conditional on agent B either being constrained or unconstrained. Finally,
we determine the region in which agent B is constrained.
First, we start by determining A’s optimal investment in the risky asset, which is the solution





assuming a sufficiently large WA. The remaining amount WA − a needs to be invested in risk-free
assets. Subtracting the amount of outstanding Treasuries § gives the total amount that A is lending
to B:
WA − a− §. (5.4)
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) + b̄(ρ− r)
]
s.t. b+ b̄ ≤ 1
x
WB,
where we assume that both b and b̄ are positive (i.e. long positions in the risky asset and lending
money to other banks). B’s Lagrangian is given as:
L(b, b̄, λ) = b
(




+ b̄(ρ− r)− λ(xb+ xb̄−WB)
and taking the first-order condition (FOC) gives:
∂L
∂b






:ρ− r − λ = 0⇔ λ = ρ− r
If B is unconstrained, we have λ = 0 and hence ρ = r and b = a. If B is constrained, plugging λ in











Second, to determine r, we assume market clearing in the non-bank to bank lending market,
which implies:
(WB − b− b̄) + (WA − a− S) != 0. (5.5)












A − §) +WB − b̄)
]
− ρ, if B is constrained.
(5.6)
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Because we already know that B being uncostrained implies that ρ = r, we focus on the case where
B is constrained and solving Equation (5.7) for ρ leads to:







Plugging ρ into the constrained case in Equation (5.6) gives:










, if B is constrained. (5.9)
Third, B is unconstrained if µ−r
γσ2
+ b̄ < 1xW




WA +WB − §+ b̄
< 1/2.
Replacing −c̄ with b̄ and rewriting the expressions in terms of B completes the proof. 
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Does Publication of Interest Rate Paths
Provide Guidance?∗
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6.1 Introduction
The practice of publicly communicating future policy intentions, forward guidance, is by now
widespread among central banks. Communication strategies take different forms, from loosely in-
dicating future policy options through speeches, to the more explicit form of describing the central
bank’s planned conditional course of action through published interest rate projections (IRPs). The
latter form has now been pursued by New Zealand, Norway and Sweden for more than a decade.
As a conceptual simplification, we find it useful to distinguish between two main motives for this
development.1 First, by announcing a plan for future policy rates the central bank might directly
affect long-term interest rates. Communication can then be justified as a means to control more
than just short-term rates, a rationale that is particularly relevant close to the zero-lower bound.
Second, statements about future plans, coupled with explanations of the considerations behind them,
may serve to improve market participants’ understanding of the central bank’s systematic reaction
pattern. Here communication is motivated as a means to sharpen the effectiveness of monetary
policy’s systematic component by improving market participants’ ability to map current information
into likely monetary policy consequences. The following statement by Ben Bernanke, then Chairman
of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, is illustrative of this second motivation: “I
believed then, as I do today, that transparency enhances public understanding [. . . ] and ultimately
makes policy more effective by tightening the linkage between monetary policy, financial conditions,
and the real economy” (Bernanke, 2013).
The trend toward more explicit policy communication by central banks has been followed by
careful empirical studies to analyze its consequences. This literature has largely been oriented
toward the first of the two motives above, and has documented that central bank communication
actually does affect market rates. However, little is known about the extent to which communication
serves its second rationale; to improve markets’ understanding of the central bank’s reaction pattern.
In this paper, we are more oriented toward this second motivation, as we explore how the practice
of publishing interest rate projections (IRPs) has influenced market participants’ ability to forecast
interest rates.
Our empirical strategy is to study market interest rate reactions in tight windows around mon-
etary policy announcements and other macroeconomic releases in Norway and Sweden. These two
countries are particularly well suited for our purposes since they introduced IRPs within otherwise
stable monetary policy regimes of inflation targeting. Moreover, with a difference-in-differences ap-
proach, we contrast market reactions in Norway and Sweden, which began to publish IRPs in 2005
and 2007 respectively, to market reactions in New Zealand and Canada which both have targeted
inflation over our sample period, but have not introduced IRPs in this time frame.2
1In practice these two motives are closely connected and likely to be simultaneously at play, but for the purpose of
disseminating and evaluating the rationale behind policy communication, we believe the distinction is useful. Blinder
et al. (2008) articulate a similar distinction, separating between “creating news” and “reducing noise”.
2New Zealand has published IRPs throughout our sample period, Canada has yet not introduced IRPs. Note that
we cannot focus on New Zealand alone, because we lack high-frequency data before it introduced IRPs in 1997, and
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Our starting point is to back out market expectations of future 3-month interest rates from
forward rate agreements (FRAs). We next compute the markets’ forecast errors (MFEs) at four
different horizons up to one year ahead, by comparing these expectations to the actual realizations
of each respective 3-month interest rate. Following earlier literature, we study if markets reacted to
announcements of monetary policy and various macroeconomic releases, but we also move one step
further and ask if the reactions were in the right direction: did the announcements serve to improve
market participants’ ability to forecast future monetary policy?
To fix ideas, we anticipate our analysis and display in Figure 6.1 how MFEs have responded to
a variety of announcements. The graphs show two-year rolling regressions estimates, together with
two standard deviation error bands, of the impact of macroeconomic releases and monetary policy
announcements, on MFE-changes occurring within 30-minute windows around each announcement.4
Overall, monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic releases tend to reduce MFEs and
hence move market interest rate expectations toward ex-post realizations. The vertical lines in Figure
6.1 mark the introduction of IRPs. Our question is if communication of future policy intentions
through IRPs stimulated this tendency toward MFE reductions.
[Insert Figure 6.1 about here]
Figure 6.1 suggests that there might have been improved market reactions in Sweden, but not in
Norway. Further analysis provides two perspectives on this difference. First, for other releases than
the monetary policy decision, such as the monthly updates on consumer price inflation, there is no
sign in either country that the presence of IRPs improved market reactions. The improvements in
Sweden are present only for responses to monetary policy announcements.
Second, whenever monetary policy announcements have reduced MFEs in either Norway or
Sweden, this has occurred via market reactions to implemented policy actions, not via reactions to
communication of future policy intentions. We reach this conclusion after using the approach of
Gürkaynak et al. (2005) to distinguish market reactions to implemented policy from communication
of future policy intentions. This method, by now the workhorse for empirical work on forward
guidance, decomposes market reactions to monetary policy announcements into a target and a path
factor. The former captures movements in the current short-term interest rate level, while the latter
captures longer-term interest rate movements that are orthogonal to the short-term rate. Hence, the
target factor can be interpreted as the market response to monetary policy actions, while the path
factor can be interpreted as responses to communication of future intentions that cannot be inferred
from implemented policy. In the Norwegian and Swedish data, one observes substantial reactions
through both the path and target factor when monetary policy decisions are announced.
because its policy regime changed after IRPs were introduced.
4The estimates are obtained by pooling all releases as in Swanson and Williams (2014), and each estimate is
centered on the respective release, using data one year back and one year forward. Further details are provided in the
appendix’ section 6.B.
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Strikingly though, the path-reactions do not generally serve to reduce forecast errors, neither
before nor after IRPs were introduced in either country. Hence, communication of future policy
intentions that cannot be inferred from current actions alone, have not served to reduce forecast
errors. The practice of publishing IRPs has not changed this pattern.
The common finding across time and our two countries, is that when monetary policy announce-
ments have reduced MFEs, this has occurred via the target factor only. In Norway this occurred
already before interest rate projections were utilized, and the strength with which target reactions
reduced forecast errors did not change after interest rate projections were introduced. In Sweden,
in contrast, this effect is only present after the Riksbank began to publish interest rate projections,
not before. It thus seems that it is the two central banks’ actions that has mattered for markets’
forecast errors. Regarding why the target factor began to reduce forecast errors in Sweden after
they introduced IRPs, we can only speculate. A plausible explanation might be that in Sweden, the
introduction of IRPs in 2007 improved the central bank’s explanations of its current policy actions.
In Norway, the current actions gave reduced forecast errors already before IRPs came into use, which
might be why the introduction of IRPs in 2005 did not improve markets’ understanding of policy
actions any further. Arguably, explanation of current actions does not require the publication of
future policy intentions.
Our use of high-frequency interest rate futures data to capture market expectations about mon-
etary policy dates back to Guthrie and Wright (2000) and Kuttner (2001). Gürkaynak et al. (2005)
followed in their footsteps when decomposing market reactions into target and path factors. They
found that both actions and statements influence asset prices, and particularly that statements have
greater influence on long-term Treasury yields. Campbell et al. (2012) have later utilized this same
decomposition, finding similar effects of FOMC statements right up until and well into the financial
crisis, concluding that statements can influence market rates even when one is close to or at the
zero-lower-bound. They also argue that these reactions are driven by perceptions that the central
bank has superior knowledge about the underlying state of the economy, rather than that statements
commit policymakers to a future course of action.
In a related paper, Brubakk et al. (2017) have recently approached the Norwegian and Swedish
data in similar spirit, asking if the path factor shifts when the two countries’ central banks announce
new interest rate projections. Brand et al. (2010) and Leombroni et al. (2017) distinguish commu-
nication from actions more directly, by separating market reactions to ECBs publication of current
policy decisions from market reactions to ECBs press conference 45 minutes later. All these studies
find considerable reactions to communication.5
While our paper shares the above literature’s focus on high-frequent market reactions, our anal-
ysis differs by asking if policy communication guides markets to improved interpretation of available
information, rather than just asking if communication shifts market rates.
5A full survey of the literature on how central bank communication affects interest rates is beyond the scope of
this paper. For an early summary of studies in the field, tending to find that communication affects interest rates, see
Blinder et al. (2008).
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Our focus on market participants’ ability to predict future policy rates is shared by Kool and
Thornton (2015). They use survey forecasts and evaluate if these forecast were improved after
forward guidance was introduced, finding moderately improved forecastability over short horizons
in Norway and Sweden. We use high-frequency traded FRAs, rather than infrequent survey data, to
measure market expectations. Not only do the FRAs reliably capture market expectations because
they are actually traded upon, but their high frequency allows us to credibly estimate how market
expectations react to released information. Beechey and Österholm (2014) also use expectations
inferred from market data. They evaluate the forecasting properties of central bank IRPs and market
participants’ forecasts at the same time, and find that they share similar properties of biasedness,
(in-)efficiency and low forecast precision.
The theoretical literature on forward guidance provides ample motivation for our study. Wood-
ford (2001) discusses general advantages of having the central bank communicate its policy intentions,
arguing that transparency is key to policy effectiveness. Rudebusch and Williams (2008) argue,
within a New Keynesian model with incomplete information, that a central bank that publishes
interest rate projections can improve welfare by informing market participants about the central
bank’s reaction function. The reason is that IRPs guide private agents to better map observed
macroeconomic events into future interest rate consequences. On the other hand, Morris and Shin
(2002) formalize the concern that central bank communication might prevent private agents from
utilizing other sources of information, which brings even the theoretical benefits of IRP publication
into question.7
Overall, our results indicate that the practice of publishing interest rate projections has not
improved markets’ understanding of what new macroeconomic information implies for future interest
rates. However, our findings do not support the Morris and Shin hypothesis either, as market
forecasts have continued to be improved by macroeconomic releases to approximately the same
extent after IRPs became available, as before. Hence, we do not contend that the publication of
interest rate projections has distorted markets. Rather, our evidence more neutrally establishes that
so far, the observed communication of future policy intentions through IRPs has not guided markets
to better anticipate how interest rates will be set in the future.
In what follows, Section 6.2 describes our data and the institutional settings behind them. In
Section 6.3 we study market reactions to monetary policy announcements, while in Section 6.4 we
consider macroeconomic releases. Section 6.5 concludes.
7Svensson (2006) show that this result is overturned if the central bank has somewhat precise information.
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6.2 Interest Rates and Monetary Policy in Norway, Sweden, New
Zealand, and Canada
We will study the role of central bank forecasts in Norway and Sweden, using New Zealand and
Canada as controls in an extension. These countries are all (relatively) small open economies,
which have been under an inflation targeting monetary policy regime over our entire sample period,
spanning January 2000 throughout March 2019.
6.2.1 Institutional Setting
Norges Bank began to publish its own forecast for the key policy rate (the sight deposit rate) on
November 2, 2005, while Sveriges Riksbank followed by publishing its own IRP for their key policy
rate (the repo rate) on February 15, 2007. Forecast horizons have varied somewhat, typically between
12 and 15 quarters for Norges Bank and up to three years for the Riksbank.
In both Norway and Sweden, the policy rate forecasts are conditional on macroeconomic pro-
jections based on economic models together with judgment by the Monetary Policy Committee,
and published in Monetary Policy Reports following an interest rate decision. The forecasts are for
quarterly averages of the key policy rate. Over our sample period, both countries have primarily em-
phasized inflation and output gaps as their main target variables, but they increasingly emphasized
financial stability toward the end of our sample.
A key difference between the two institutions is that the Riksbank has accompanied every policy
rate announcement with an updated IRP, while Norges Bank publish their IRP somewhat less
frequently. Currently, the Riksbank decides on its policy rate six times a year, but this frequency
has varied up to eight per year in our sample period. Until 2013, Norges Bank published interest
rate projections three times per year, usually in March, June and October. Since 2013 Norges Bank
has published its IRP four times a year, while it makes 6 interest rate decisions per year. Over
our sample period, the frequency of Norges Bank’s interest rate decisions has varied from six to ten
per year. Both the Riksbank and Norges Bank publish confidence bands together with their point
forecasts.8
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) began publishing its own IRPs in 1997. The forecast
horizon is 8 quarters, and the interest rate being forecast is the quarterly average of the 90-day
Bank Bill rate. RBNZ’s procedure for publishing is very similar to that in Norway and Sweden, see
Mirkov and Natvik (2016) or Drew and Karagedikli (2008) for further details. The Bank of Canada
has not pursued a policy of publishing IRPs in our sample period, but did for a period in 2009-2010
utilize other explicit means of forward guidance, see Charbonneau and Rennison (2015).
8For further details on monetary policy and interest rate projections in Norway and Sweden, see Holmsen et al.
(2008) and Riksbank (2017) respectively.
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6.2.2 Data
We use high-frequency data on forward rate agreements (FRAs) for Norway, Sweden, and New
Zealand, provided by the Thomson Reuters Tick History database, as our measure for market
expectations. Our sample period is 01.01.2000 to 03.31.2019. The FRA contracts are comparable
to the US Libor future contracts traded on CME. For Canada we use such interest rate futures. For
all countries the horizons are fixed at the International Money Market (IMM) dates.9
Let imarkett,h denote the FRA-rate for the future 3-month interbank interest rate at IMM-horizon
h, determined in the market at time t. We want to measure the forecast error for the ex-post
realization of the 3-month rate at the same date as the horizon h, and denote this rate iτ(h), where
τ(h) denotes the IMM-date for horizon h. We let mfeht denote the market forecast error implied by
a forward rate at time t for horizon h. Hence, MFEs are defined as follows:
mfeht = iτ(h) − imarkett,h . (6.1)
We will consider the first four IMM-dates as forecast horizons h, each approximately one quarter
ahead following time t.
The interest rate imarkett,h is directly quoted by market participants at high frequency. We will
utilize the change in mfeht within narrow windows around announced interest rate decisions or
released updates on key macroeconomic variables. For this purpose, we collect the exact timing of
both macro releases and monetary policy announcements in Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and
Canada. The window we will use is from immediately before the new information is available to
market participants, to 30 minutes after.
The benefit of a rather narrow window, is that confounding factors that affect interest rates
are less problematic. The narrower the window, the more likely we are to isolate the effect of each
specific information event. On the other hand, if markets need time to react, a wider window may
be necessary to capture their response. Figure 6.2 presents market reactions at different intervals
after monetary policy announcements. We see that most of the reaction typically occurs in the first
15 minutes, but between 15 and 30 minutes after announcements there will often still be marked
movements. There is a clear tendency for the forward rates to settle down thereafter, as we see the
response from 30 to 45 minutes after announcements are negligible.11
[Insert Figure 6.2 about here]
We consider releases of the following macroeconomic variables: The consumer price index (monthly),
industrial production (monthly), the trade balance (monthly), gross domestic product (quarterly),
9IMM dates are the quarterly dates which most futures contracts and option contracts use as their scheduled
maturity date or termination date. The IMM dates are the third Wednesday in March, June, September and December.
11For brevity, Figure 6.2 displays only movements in the FRA maturing four IMM dates ahead. The patterns for
shorter horizons are similar. Results available upon request.
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PMI headline (purchasing managers sentiment index, monthly), retail sales (monthly), the unem-
ployment rate (monthly), the economic tendency indicator (Sweden only, monthly), oil investments
(Norway only, quarterly), a credit aggregate (Norway only, monthly).
The IRPs in Norway and Sweden provide the central banks’ forecasts of future (short-term)
policy rates. In contrast, FRAs capture the markets’ forecasts of future (short-term) market rates
plus an additional term premium. The realized market rates can in turn be considered as the sum
of the policy rate plus a short-term premium. This raises two notable issues with our empirical
approach.
First, our object of interest, mfeht , regards market rates only: We will compare FRAs to realized
market rates. Strictly speaking, this means that we are estimating how new information affects
markets’ ability to forecast future market rates, not future policy rates alone. These responses will
reflect the markets’ ability to forecast policy rates under the additional assumption that our observed
short-window changes in FRAs reflect changes in expectations about policy rates, not changes in
expected short-term premia.
Second, the fact that FRAs might reflect term premia in addition to expected future market
rates means that it is simplistic to consider the level of mfeht as a forecast error only. This is why
our interest lies in high-frequent MFE changes rather than levels. We will study MFE changes in
30-minute windows around releases of monetary policy decisions and other macroeconomic news,
and then interpret these responses as movements in forecast errors under the assumption that FRA
premia are constant in these specific windows. This assumption is typically imposed in the empirical
literature on monetary policy communication, see for instance Gürkaynak (2005) and Brand et al.
(2010).
While it is common practice in the literature to assume that premia are constant around an-
nouncements and macroeconomic releases, we acknowledge that it is impossible to validate this as-
sumption with certainty. Generally speaking, variation in term premia within the narrow windows
we study would work against detecting statistical evidence that markets’ forecast errors respond. We
therefore anticipate our results and note that MFEs generally do fall in our announcement windows.
Hence, it seems unlikely that the FRA-variation our empirical strategy utilizes is driven by premia
alone. Moreover, we will find a different impact of IRP introduction on MFE responses in Norway
than in Sweden. If these differences are driven by premia alone, then term premia variability must
be correlated with the introduction of IRPs in one country, but not in the other. This also seems
unlikely. We therefore believe the assumption of constant premia is innocuous. Moreover, in the
conclusion we return to how one of our results may be re-interpreted if both premia and expectations
are responding.
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6.3 How Do Monetary Policy Announcements Affect Market Fore-
cast Errors?
The extent to which a monetary policy announcement guides markets about the future evolution
of short-term interest rates will be reflected in how mfeht responds. Note that it is the absolute
value of forecast errors that matters here: we need not distinguish between an initially negative
forecast error that moves up or an initially positive forecast error that moves down,- in both cases
the forecast moves closer to the ex-post realization. Hence, we will study movements in market
forecast errors from right before an announcement to 30 minutes after, defined as ∆|mfeht | =
|mfeht |+30min − |mfeht |÷Ann.
First, we assess if the response of ∆|mfeht | to monetary policy announcements changed after
Norges Bank and the Riksbank began to publish IRPs. Second, we ask if the underlying drivers
behind the patterns observed are market responses to current monetary policy actions or market
responses to communicated monetary policy intentions that cannot be inferred from policy actions.
6.3.1 MFE Responses and interest rate projections
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 plot the change in market forecast errors, ∆|mfeht |, around monetary policy
announcements in Norway and Sweden. Each figure contains one plot per horizon h. Red circles
refer to announcements which were accompanied by the central bank’s IRP, blue circles refer to
announcements that were unaccompanied by an IRP. The high number of positive values reveals
that a monetary policy announcement does not necessarily contribute to a reduced forecast error.
Naive eyeballing of the movements in forecast errors leaves the impression of no particular pattern
other than a mean response close to zero.
[Insert Figures 6.3 and 6.4 about here]
The blue solid lines in each figure display the average MFE response to announcements that are
unaccompanied by IRPs. In Norway this line lies below zero, implying that interest rate announce-
ments without IRPs on average have guided markets toward the realized future interest rate level.
The red line shows the mean MFE responses to announcements accompanied by IRPs. We see that
for Norway the red and blue lines lie close to each other, indicating that the publication of IRPs
have not added information above the ordinary interest rate announcements. In Sweden, shown in
Figure 6.4, on the other hand, the red line lies below the blue line at all horizons. This indicates that
monetary policy announcements have been more informative after the Riksbank began to publish
its own interest rate projection.
An alternative view of the data is offered by Figure 6.5, which shows kernel estimates of the
∆|mfeht |-distributions around monetary policy announcements. As one would expect, all the distri-
butions are centered close to zero. The Norwegian distributions are highly similar before and after
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the central bank begun to publish its own interest rate projections. In contrast, in the Swedish
distributions we clearly see that after the Riksbank introduced IRPs, mass moved leftwards, toward
MFE-reductions, for three out of four horizons.
[Insert Figure 6.5 about here]
To scrutinize the significance of the differences in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, we run simple regressions
comparing ∆|mfeht | before and after IRPs were introduced. We study each horizon in Norway and
Sweden separately, starting from the specification
∆|mfeht | = ψ + βIt + εt, (6.2)
where It = 0 before IRPs were being published, and It = 1 thereafter. The estimate of ψ will capture
the average MFE-response in the years before IRPs were used, while β captures how the average
MFE-response has changed thereafter. If the presence of IRPs has provided substantial guidance, β
should be negative.
For Norway, we extend this specification to distinguish between policy announcements that were
accompanied by a forecast (Dt = 1) and meetings that were unaccompanied by a forecast (Dt = 0)
in the period after IRPs were introduced:
∆|mfeht | = ψ + β1ItDt + β2It (1−Dt) + εt. (6.3)
For both countries, we also isolate the international financial crises to ensure that results are not
driven by anomalies in these particular periods. We provide two alternatives, one for the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 and 2009, and another which also includes the Euro-crisis (the
dummy runs from 2008 to 2012). In addition, for Sweden we isolate the period 2010-2014 where the
Riksbank is claimed to have been “leaning against the wind” by taking house prices into account,
without precisely communicating it (Svensson (2015)).13 For Norway, where we keep the dummy
Dt, this implies estimating:
∆|mfeht | = ψ + βnc1 Inct Dt + βnc2 Inct (1−Dt) + βc1IctDt + βc2Ict (1−Dt) + εt, (6.4)
where Ict = 1 in crisis periods (2008-2009 or 2008-2012), while Inct = 1 in non-crisis periods after IRPs
were introduced. For Sweden, Dt = 0 always since almost all meetings have been accompanied by a
projection ever since IRPs were first introduced. In addition, for Sweden we have one specification
where Ict = 1 for the leaning period 2010-2014 and Inct = 1 for the other periods after IRPs were
introduced.
13In this specification we do not add any of the crisis dummies. We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting
that we isolate this specific period.
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Results are provided in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 for Norway and Sweden, respectively. For each horizon,
the first column refers to the specification in equation (6.2). For Norway, the second column refers
to the specification in (6.3). The final two columns refer to specification (6.4) isolating the two
alternative definitions of the financial crisis period, 2008-2009 and 2008-2012 respectively.
[Insert Tables 6.1 and 6.2 about here]
The regressions confirm the visual impression from Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Before Norges Bank
introduced its projections in 2005, the market forecast errors were on average reduced by monetary
policy announcements. The second row shows that the incremental response of ∆|mfeht | after Norges
Bank introduced IRPs in 2005, β from equation (6.2), is positive at all horizons, and statistically
insignificant. This holds both for meetings that were accompanied and for meetings that were
unaccompanied by an interest rate projection, and is approximately unchanged when we control for
crisis periods.
In Sweden, the results go in the opposite direction. MFE-responses were insignificant before the
Riksbank introduced its IRPs, and then significantly negative thereafter. When we look at the crisis
dummies, it seems that most of the improvements in MFE responses occurred in the crisis periods.
However, the sub-period that most clearly stands out is the leaning-against-the-wind period from
2010-2014. In these years the MFE responses are back to their pre-IRP levels. This is consistent
with the view that the Riksbank pursued an ill-communicated policy of responding to house prices
in this specific period. It seems that the improvements in MFE responses that occurred in Sweden,
materialized in the years when the Riksbank was not alleged to pursue an opaquely formulated
policy.
The results above indicate that in Sweden, the introduction of IRPs served to guide markets’ to
interpret policy announcements better, whereas in Norway it did not. However, this interpretation
is questionable as the periods before and after IRPs might differ along other important dimensions
than the introduction of projections alone. For this reason, we consider a difference-in-differences
approach where we compare Norway and Sweden to New Zealand and Canada. In New Zealand,
IRPs have been published throughout our sample period. In Canada, the practice of regularly
publishing IRPs has not been introduced. Hence, by differencing out the coinciding movements in
market forecast errors in New Zealand and Canada, we factor out those sources of time variation
that are common across our two countries of interest (Norway and Sweden) and our two control
countries (New Zealand and Canada), and unrelated to the introduction of IRPs. Figure 6.A.2 in
the appendix shows that the policy interest rates in Norway and Sweden co-move with the policy
rates in New Zealand and Canada, supporting the relevance of this exercise.
Because central banks do not hold interest rate meetings on the same days, we need to time-
aggregate our data in order to have observations from both countries at the same frequency. Unfor-
tunately for our purposes, there are quarters where some of the central banks in question do not hold
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policy meetings. We therefore aggregate to the yearly frequency.15 The aggregated MFE change
then is the sum of all MFE changes, as defined earlier over 30-minute windows around monetary






where Ji,T is the number of monetary policy announcements in country i in year T .
We estimate the following specification for Norway and Sweden separately, comparing them to
New Zealand and Canada in separate regressions:
∆|MFEhi,T | = ψ + γ1Ii + γ2IT + βIiIT + εt. (6.5)
where Ii = 0 if i is the comparison country (New Zealand or Canada), Ii = 1 if i is Norway or
Sweden, and IT = 1 after Norges Bank or Riksbank began to publish IRPs. Hence, in the regression
comparing Norway to New Zealand, ψ + γ1 captures the average change in forecast errors around
policy announcements in the period before Norges Bank began publishing IRPs, while γ2 captures
any source of change in forecast error responsiveness that coincided with Norway’s introduction of
IRPs and was common across New Zealand and Norway. Our main parameter of interest is β, as it
captures the change in responsiveness that occurred after IRPs were introduced and that was not
shared with New Zealand.
Table 6.3 presents the results for each country differenced against New Zealand and Canada in
separate regressions. Because we now have aggregated the data to a yearly frequency, there are fewer
observations (number of years multiplied by two, the number of countries being compared) and lower
t-values. Still, we see that the previously emphasized results regarding IRPs remain qualitatively
unchanged. The estimates of β are close to zero and insignificant in Norway, while they are negative
and significant at the shorter horizons in Sweden. Hence, our previously found effects of publishing
IRPs were not driven by omitted time-varying factors that Norway or Sweden shared with New
Zealand or Canada.
[Insert Table 6.3 about here]
Finally, one might be concerned that spreads in the object being forecast in an FRA, i.e. premia
in the interbank offered rates, have risen and become more volatile in the period after Norway
and Sweden introduced IRPs, in particular after the widespread turbulence from Fall 2007. This
pattern is documented across a variety of economies, see for instance Taylor and Williams (2009).
The concern would be that interbank rates have become less predictable because their premia have
become less predictable, and that this might weaken the negative response of MFEs to monetary
15In the appendix, we extend this analysis to a quarterly aggregation. As those results show, the quarterly
aggregated data yields similar results as the yearly aggregation.
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policy announcements in the later part of our sample. At this point, note first that the increase
in premia is a wide international phenomenon, and therefore should have been picked up by our
differencing against New Zealand and Canada above. In addition, when we look directly at estimated
interbank rate premia after 2007, we find that to the extent they are correlated with our observed
MFE changes, this comovement is negative. That is, if we let premt denote the actual interbank
premium at time t, the correlation between ∆|mfeht | and ∆|premt+h − premt| is negative at all
horizons h.16 Hence, to the extent that premia affect our results, the effect is to strengthen the
negative response of MFEs to monetary policy announcements after IRPs were introduced.
6.3.2 Target vs. Path Responses
Publication of IRPs is primarily considered a tool to communicate future policy intentions. However,
our analysis above does not distinguish how markets react to communication of intentions from how
markets react to monetary policy actions (the actual decision on the current short-term policy rate).
To distinguish actions from intentions, we rely on the method proposed by Gürkaynak et al.
(2005). They use principal component analysis to decompose market interest rate reactions up to 4
quarters ahead into a “current federal funds rate target” factor and a “future path of policy” factor.
These factors summarize uncorrelated sources of variation in the surprise movements in market
rates. The former captures implemented policy actions, whereas the latter captures surprise changes
in future short term rates. As the two are orthogonal by construction, the path factor represents
reactions to communication about future policy that cannot be inferred from implemented decisions.
Section 6.C in the appendix explains this method in more detail. Notably, the two factors together
explain 98 percent of the total variation in interest rate reactions in Norway, and 96 percent in
Sweden. Moreover, as documented in Appendix C, the path factor explains a substantial and
increasing share of the interest rate reactions as the horizon increases. At the two-, three- and four-
quarter horizons in Norway, the R-squared of the path factor is 0.36, 0.54 and 0.62, respectively.
The corresponding numbers in Sweden are 0.34, 0.47, and 0.64.
Note that for the shortest horizon in this decomposition, we use the one-month-ahead interest rate
implied by foreign exchange forward contracts.18 Occasionally, the one-month rate matures after the
next monetary policy meeting, and hence the change in this rate might in principle be contaminated
by changes in expectations about future interest rate decisions. However, this occurred for only 9
out of 121 policy meetings in Sweden, and 11 out of 152 meetings in Norway. For 17 of these 20
16The correlations in Norway are -0.07, -0.02, -0.04, and -0.22, at the three, six, nine and twelve month horizons,
respectively. In Sweden, these correlations are -0.53, -0.24, -0.30, and -0.35. The premia we use in these exercises are
the spread between the interbank rates and the Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS). For Norway we use the Norges Bank
estimated OIS due to the lack of a market based alternative, see Lund et al. (2016).
18This rate is the interest rate differential between USD and NOK in the FX swap market. In both Norway and
Sweden, the FX swap market is one of the most liquid segments of the fixed-income market. We convert the difference
between the FX forward rate and the spot rate to basis points. Then we use the high-frequency change in the 1-month
interest rate differential around the monetary policy announcement as a measure of the market’s immediate response
to new information.
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episodes the overlap was less than three days. It therefore constitutes a negligible problem for our
purposes. Note that we choose the one-month rate rather than a shorter one because the one-month
rate is less likely to be influenced by other factors than the information from the central bank within
the window, especially banks’ short term liquidity management.19
Figure 6.6 displays the target and path factors computed in 30-minute windows around policy
announcements in Norway and Sweden. As before, red circles refer to policy announcements accom-
panied by an interest rate projection. We see that while both factors typically deviate from zero
after policy announcements, the market reactions captured by the target factor are often negligible.
This reflects that in several of the announcements, the policy action was to keep the short-term rate
unchanged and in accordance with market expectations. Similar to what Gürkaynak et al. (2005)
found for the US, Figure 6.6 also shows that the path factor tends to deviate substantially from zero
around policy announcements in both Sweden and Norway.
[Insert Figure 6.6 about here]
To disentangle how the two types of market reactions contribute to forecast errors, we estimate
the following specification for each horizon and country separately:
∆|mfeht | = ψ + γ1Ztart + γ2Z
path




t + εt, (6.6)
where Ztart and Z
path
t are the absolute values of the 30-minute target and path factors displayed in
Figure 6.6. Table 6.4 provides the results from this regression.
[Insert Table 6.4 about here]
Focusing first on the estimated γ1 and γ2 in rows two and three of Table 6.4, we see that for
Norway it was the target factor response that contributed to reduce forecast errors before IRPs were
introduced. This holds at all horizons. For Sweden, our previously presented evidence showed that
forecast errors were not systematically reduced by monetary policy announcements in the period
before IRPs were introduced. Table 6.4 shows that this pattern applies in both the target and path
dimensions, although the latter seem to have reduced forecast errors somewhat at longer horizons.
The bottom two rows of Table 6.4 provide estimates of how the target and path contributions
to ∆|mfeht | changed after IRPs were introduced (α1 and α2). In Norway, none of these estimates
are significant, again suggesting that the introduction of IRPs did not improve market participants’
forecasts of monetary policy. In Sweden, our estimates imply that the improvement of MFE-reactions
19Ideally, we would use standard proxies for short-term expectations like one-week Overnight Indexed Swap (OIS)
rates, but these do not exist over our full sample period. However, in Sweden there are OIS rates available from 2007.
This market is illiquid, but should still proxy for the expected policy rate over the next week. For the period where
OIS rates have existed in Sweden (after 2007), one-week OIS rates and the one-month rate we utilize in our main
analysis have a correlation of 0.7. In contrast, the correlation between one-week OIS rates and the short-term rate
that is available over our full sample, one-week foreign exchange contracts, is only 0.5.
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after IRPs were introduced predominantly came from the target factor, not from the path factor.
The estimates of α1 are negative at all horizons, though insignificantly so at the longest horizon.
The estimates of α2 indicate a slight negative contribution only at the shortest horizon, and at this
horizon the estimate is not statistically significant.20
Together with the MFE movements revealed previously, Table 6.4 leaves us with a notable
pattern. Publication of IRPs is generally considered as a means to more effectively communicate
future policy intentions. The path factor by construction captures exactly this dimension of how
markets interpret policy announcements. Yet, the introductions of IRPs have not increased the
extent to which path factor reactions reduce forecast errors. Even in Sweden, where we have seen
that MFEs began to fall upon policy announcements after IRPs were introduced, it is primarily the
policy action, as captured by the target factor, that has guided markets on future monetary policy.
One might well question why the target factor reduces MFEs, and why this has only happened
in Sweden. Here we can only speculate. One interpretation is that central banks may help market
participants to better understand the rationale behind current policy actions. Thereby, markets
might better infer what these actions imply for future policy. Moreover, it is plausible that there
are diminishing returns here: If market participants initially struggle to interpret what current
actions imply for future policy, better explanations by the central bank may have a sizeable effect.
If market participants initially have a fairly clear understanding of what current actions imply for
future policy decisions, there is less scope for improvement.22 We find this interpretation plausible,
since the improved reactions through the target factor occurred only in Sweden, where the target
factor initially was not contributing to reduced forecast errors, whereas in Norway the target factor
contributed to reduced forecast errors before IRPs were utilized and this did not improve further
after IRPs were introduced.
6.4 Movements in Market Forecast Errors around Macroeconomic
Data Releases
If IRPs serve to illuminate how the central bank systematically responds to changes in the economic
environment, its “reaction function”, then their presence should improve how market forecasts react
to new macroeconomic information in general. We therefore extend our analysis to explore how
MFEs have responded to the macroeconomic releases described in Section 6.2.2.
As an illustration, Figure 6.7 plots MFE-movements in 30-minute windows around the consumer
price index (CPI) and industrial production releases. We see that market reactions are moderate
for most of the releases, but there are several episodes of substantial responses. In Table 6.5 we
20None of these results change when we isolate the crisis period from 2007 to 2009. Details available upon request.
22At the extreme, the returns to communication must have decreasing returns: if markets already understand policy
actions perfectly, then any increased effort to communicate will necessarily have zero effect on markets’ mapping from
actions to future policy.
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examine a set of the arguably most important macro releases systematically. The first row in Table
6.5 shows that on average the MFE-movements have been negative, as one would expect. However,
these average responses are small, reflecting the many releases with little new information in Figure
6.7.
[Insert Figure 6.7 about here]
For each country, the second and third lines of Table 6.5 show estimates from the specification
in equation (6.2), where the units of observation are the MFE-changes around macro releases. The
estimate of ψ reflects the average response of MFEs before IRPs were introduced, while β captures
the change after IRPs were introduced. The β-estimates are small, non-negative, and insignificantly
different from zero. There is nothing that indicates improved MFE-responses in the post-IRP period.
[Insert Table 6.5 about here]
Next, we zoom in on the monthly releases of the consumer price index (CPI), as this arguably will
be the most important release for interest rates under inflation targeting. The results are displayed
in Table 6.6. These give the same overall pattern as we saw in Table 6.5. In short, it does not seem
that IRPs have guided markets to better interpret what macroeconomic news implies for future
monetary policy.23
[Insert Table 6.6 about here]
6.5 Conclusion
To a considerable extent, the ultimate benefits from explicit monetary policy communication depend
on how strongly it guides markets to better interpret what available information implies for future
interest rate setting. We provide novel evidence on this exact issue. Consistent with the rich existing
evidence from a variety of countries and periods, we do find that interest rates in forward contracts
respond a great deal to central bank communication. However, the introduction of central bank
interest rate projections (IRPs) has done little to improve these responses in the sense of bringing
them closer to realized interest rates. Overall, central bank communication about future policy
through IRPs has played only a limited role in guiding markets, at most.
We base our conclusion on two main findings. First, upon monetary policy announcements,
the path factor of market reactions, which is to be interpreted as markets’ response to central
bank communication about the future, does not systematically move market forecasts closer to
realized outcomes when central bank projections are present. It does seem that market reactions
23Isolating the crisis periods of 2007-2009 or 2008-2012 does not change these results in any substantial manner.
In an earlier version of this paper we used data on market expectations to scale each release by the extent to which
it surprised market participants. The results were essentially the same as in Table 6.5 here as well. Details available
on request
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to announced policy decisions were generally improved in Sweden after the Riksbank introduced its
own IRPs, but these improvements arose only for the target factor, which captures the monetary
policy action rather than communication of future policy intentions. In both countries, the path
factor reactions are sizeable, but unlike target reactions they do not systematically bring market
expectations closer to ex-post realizations.
Second, upon macroeconomic releases, there is no sign that the presence of IRPs makes market
rates respond more in the direction of ex-post realized interest rates. Hence, it does not seem
that IRPs have guided markets toward a better understanding of what macroeconomic information
implies for future monetary policy.
As discussed toward the end of Section 6.2.2, by interpreting our results in terms of market
forecast errors, we are implicitly assuming that premia in FRAs are constant within the 30-minute
windows we consider. While this assumption is widely imposed in the literature on central bank
communication, it is worthwhile to reflect upon how our results might be reinterpreted if the as-
sumption is violated. It could be that our observed movements in target factors reflect changes in
market forecasts, whereas the path factor movements primarily reflect responses of forward premia
to monetary policy announcements. This would explain the apparent paradox that after monetary
policy announcements, path factor responses typically are large, but fail to reduce forecast errors
systematically. Importantly though, even under this alternative interpretation of our results, the
main insight from our analysis withstands: It does not seem that the practice of publishing interest
rate projections has guided markets to better understand how the central banks will set interest
rates in the future.
The practice of having central banks publish their own interest rate projections may be advocated
on various grounds, and improving markets’ understanding of future interest rates and central banks’
reaction pattern are only two of them. Hence, we do not claim that publishing IRPs is without merit.
However, we do believe our findings contrast with part of the motivation for publishing IRPs, as
expressed by both policymakers and the academic literature. Moreover, our results motivate caution
in interpreting the widespread evidence that markets respond to central bank communication. That
pattern does not necessarily imply that the practice of publishing IRPs provides guidance on future
policy.




Time varying response of Market Forecast Errors (MFEs) to macro releases






























































(d) Sweden: Horizon 4
Notes: Daily centered two-year rolling-window estimates of how market forecast errors (MFEs) respond to
released macroeconomic data and monetary policy announcements, pooled. MFEs computed as the gap
between ex post realized interest rates and corresponding 1- and 4-quarter forward rate agreements (FRAs)
traded previously. Changes in MFEs are computed as the difference between MFEs immediately before a
release and 30 minutes after. Negative numbers indicate reduced forecast errors. Estimation based on the
method proposed by Swanson and Williams (2014). The bands cover two standard errors around each point
estimate. Sample: January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.2





































Notes: Movements of 1-year forward rate agreements (FRAs) after monetary policy announcements in Norway
and Sweden. The responses are computed from immediately before to 15 minutes after, from 15 to 30 minutes
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Notes: Change in Market Forecast Eerrors (MFEs) from immediately before to 30 minutes after monetary
policy announcements. Blue dots refer to policy meetings where no interest rate projection (IRP) was
published together with the current interest rate decision, and the blue line is the average MFE change
across these meetings. Red dots refer to meetings where an interest rate projection was published together
with the current interest rate decision, and the red line is the average MFE change across these meetings.
Sample: January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.4
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Notes: Change in Market Forecast Eerrors (MFEs) from immediately before to 30 minutes after monetary
policy announcements. Blue dots refer to policy meetings where no interest rate projection (IRP) was
published together with the current interest rate decision, and the blue line is the average MFE change
across these meetings. Red dots refer to meetings where an interest rate projection was published together
with the current interest rate decision, and the red line is the average MFE change across these meetings.
Sample: January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.5



























































Notes: Estimated kernels for the distributions of change in Market Forecast Errors (MFEs) from immediately
before to 30 minutes after monetary policy announcements. The kernel distribution indicated by the blue line
is for changes in MFEs when there is not interest rate projection (IRP), while red line are for distributions
with IRP. Sample: January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.5
(Continued) Distribution of Market Forecast Errors (MFE) movements around

























































Notes: Estimated kernels for the distributions of change in Market Forecast Errors (MFEs) from immediately
before to 30 minutes after monetary policy announcements. The kernel distribution indicated by the blue line
is for changes in MFEs when there is not interest rate projection (IRP), while red line are for distributions
with IRP. Sample: January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.6































Notes: Movements in the path and target factors of forward rate agreements (FRAs) from immediately before
to 30 minutes after monetary policy announcements. Sample: January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.7








































































Notes: Change in Market Forecast Errors (MFEs) from immediately before to 30 minutes after the monthly
release of the consumer price index (CPI) and industrial production (IP) in Norway and Sweden. Sample:
January 2000 - March 2019.
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Figure 6.7



































































Notes: Change in Market Forecast Errors (MFEs) from immediately before to 30 minutes after the monthly release
of the consumer price index (CPI) and industrial production (IP) in Norway and Sweden. Sample: January 2000 -
March 2019.
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Table 6.1
Market forecast error responses to monetary policy announcements. Norway
A: Horizon 1 B: Horizon 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Before IRP (ψ) -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036 -0.036
(-2.66) (-2.65) (-2.63) (-2.63) (-2.35) (-2.34) (-2.32) (-2.32)
Change after IRP (β) 0.022 0.022
(1.59) (1.29)
Change after IRP, 0.026 0.020
with IRP (β1) (1.38) (0.94)
Change after IRP, 0.018 0.024
no IRP (β2) (1.41) (1.48)
Change after IRP, 0.017 0.023 0.024 0.024
with IRP, no crisis (βnc1 ) (1.10) (1.40) (1.23) (1.12)
Change after IRP, 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.029
no IRP, no crisis (βnc2 ) (1.74) (1.91) (1.59) (1.70)
Change after IRP, 0.075 0.032 -0.006 0.012
with IRP, crisis (βc1) (0.97) (0.80) (-0.09) (0.34)
Change after IRP, 0.002 0.010 0.017 0.019
no IRP, crisis (βc2) (0.11) (0.63) (0.76) (1.07)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
Observations 151 151 151 151 150 150 150 150
Average FE 0.168 0.339
Notes: Regression results based on equations (2) to (4), with coefficient in question in parenthesis on each
row. ‘Before IRP’ means the period before interest rate projections were introduced. ‘Change after IRP’
is the change in coefficient estimate after interest rate projections were introduced. In column marked (2)
the post-IRP period is divided into monetary policy announcements that were accompanied by an IRP or
not. The two columns marked (3) and (4) separates crisis from non-crisis periods, using two alternative crisis
definitions. In column (3), a crisis dummy equals 1 only in the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009, while
column (4) extends the crisis dummy to the European sovereign debt crisis as well (2008-2012). Horizon 1 to
4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead
horizons respectively. Average FE means the average forecast error over the sample period, January 2000-
March 2019. t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West corrected standard errors).
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Table 6.1
(Continued) Market forecast error responses to monetary policy
announcements. Norway
C: Horizon 3 D: Horizon 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Before IRP (ψ) -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.030 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027
(-1.93) (-1.93) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.80) (-1.79) (-1.78) (-1.78)
Change after IRP (β) 0.024 0.019
(1.36) (1.13)
Change after IRP, 0.018 0.015
with IRP (β1) (0.83) (0.71)
Change after IRP, 0.029 0.023
no IRP (β2) (1.72) (1.39)
Change after IRP, 0.027 0.027 0.023 0.022
with IRP, no crisis (βnc1 ) (1.25) (1.21) (1.14) (1.03)
Change after IRP, 0.024 0.024 0.020 0.019
no IRP, no crisis (βnc2 ) (1.42) (1.36) (1.18) (1.14)
Change after IRP, -0.027 0.002 -0.031 0.002
with IRP, crisis (βc1) (-0.45) (0.05) (-0.63) (0.06)
Change after IRP, 0.047 0.035 0.036 0.027
no IRP, crisis (βc2) (1.90) (1.84) (1.40) (1.42)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Observations 147 147 147 147 145 145 145 145
Average FE 0.548 0.710
Notes: Regression results based on equations (2) to (4), with coefficient in question in parenthesis on each
row. ‘Before IRP’ means the period before interest rate projections were introduced. ‘Change after IRP’
is the change in coefficient estimate after interest rate projections were introduced. In column marked (2)
the post-IRP period is divided into monetary policy announcements that were accompanied by an IRP or
not. The two columns marked (3) and (4) separates crisis from non-crisis periods, using two alternative crisis
definitions. In column (3), a crisis dummy equals 1 only in the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009, while
column (4) extends the crisis dummy to the European sovereign debt crisis as well (2008-2012). Horizon 1 to
4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead
horizons respectively. Average FE means the average forecast error over the sample period, January 2000-
March 2019. t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West corrected standard errors).
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Table 6.2
Market forecast error responses to monetary policy announcements. Sweden
A: Horizon 1 B: Horizon 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Before IRP (ψ) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
(-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.70) (-0.70) (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
Change after IRP (β) -0.030 -0.022
(-2.76) (-2.15)
Change after IRP, -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.015
no crisis (βnc) (-1.13) (-1.28) (-1.13) (-1.78)
Change after IRP, -0.129 -0.058 -0.080 -0.031
crisis (βc) (-3.36) (-2.75) (-2.16) (-1.62)
Change after IRP, -0.041 -0.03
no leaning (βnl) (-2.65) (-2.18)
Change after IRP, -0.012 -0.008
leaning (βl) (-1.34) (-0.80)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.31 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.03
Observations 121 121 121 121 119 119 119 119
Average FE 0.218 0.277
Notes: Regression results based on equations (2) and (4), with coefficient in question in parenthesis on each
row (the Dt-dummy in eq. (4) not relevant for Sweden). ‘Before IRP’ means the period before interest
rate projections were introduced. ‘Change after IRP’ is the change in coefficient estimate after interest rate
projections were introduced. The two columns marked (2) and (3) separates crisis from non-crisis periods,
using two alternative crisis definitions. In column (2), a crisis dummy equals 1 only in the global financial
crisis from 2008 to 2009, while in column (3) the crisis dummy extends into the European sovereign debt crisis
as well (2008-2012). Horizon 1 to 4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month,
6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead horizons respectively. Average FE means the average forecast error




(Continued) Market forecast error responses to monetary policy
announcements. Sweden
C: Horizon 3 D: Horizon 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Before IRP (ψ) -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(-1.07) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-1.06) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.47) (-0.47)
Change after IRP (β) -0.015 -0.001
(-1.52) (-0.06)
Change after IRP, -0.006 -0.011 -0.003 -0.010
no crisis (βnc) (-0.73) (-1.22) (-0.32) (-0.87)
Change after IRP, -0.056 -0.021 0.010 0.011
crisis (βc) (-1.57) (-1.16) (0.28) (0.58)
Change after IRP, -0.021 0.002
no leaning (βnl) (-1.49) (0.16)
Change after IRP, -0.007 -0.005
leaning (βl) (-0.67) (-0.39)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02
Observations 118 118 118 118 116 116 116 116
Average FE 0.596 0.938
Notes: Regression results based on equations (2) and (4), with coefficient in question in parenthesis on each
row (the Dt-dummy in eq. (4) not relevant for Sweden). ‘Before IRP’ means the period before interest
rate projections were introduced. ‘Change after IRP’ is the change in coefficient estimate after interest rate
projections were introduced. The two columns marked (2) and (3) separates crisis from non-crisis periods,
using two alternative crisis definitions. In column (2), a crisis dummy equals 1 only in the global financial
crisis from 2008 to 2009, while in column (3) the crisis dummy extends into the European sovereign debt crisis
as well (2008-2012). Horizon 1 to 4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month,
6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead horizons respectively. Average FE means the average forecast error
over the sample period, January 2000 - March2018. t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West corrected standard
errors).
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Table 6.3
Difference in differences - Norway and Sweden
Horizon: Horizon:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
I: RBNZ
Ia: Norges Bank vs RBNZ Ib: Riksbank vs RBNZ
Constant (ψ) -0.047 -0.016 0.005 0.013 -0.042 -0.020 -0.005 0.002
(-2.97) (-0.77) (0.52) (0.90) (-2.89) (-1.06) (-0.36) (0.09)
Country (γ1) 0.016 -0.020 -0.037 -0.042 0.038 0.023 0.000 -0.005
(1.25) (-1.21) (-2.06) (-1.61) (2.43) (1.14) (-0.04) (-0.25)
IRP-period (γ2) 0.036 0.017 0.000 0.003 0.031 0.024 0.015 0.022
(1.62) (0.68) (-0.01) (0.15) (1.39) (1.04) (0.76) (1.05)
IRP-period×country -0.015 0.005 0.027 0.020 -0.056 -0.044 -0.031 -0.024
(β) (-0.93) (0.26) (1.13) (0.68) (-1.97) (-1.66) (-1.38) (-0.98)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.04
Observations (years×2) 40 38 38 38 39 37 37 37
II: Bank of Canada
IIa: Norges Bank vs BoC IIb: Riksbank vs BoC
Constant (ψ) -0.032 -0.031 -0.004 -0.014 -0.032 -0.030 -0.005 -0.009
(-2.52) (-1.96) (-0.59) (-1.56) (-3.09) (-2.21) (-0.93) (-0.96)
Country (γ1) 0.000 -0.005 -0.028 -0.015 0.028 0.032 0.000 0.006
(0.03) (-0.21) (-1.68) (-0.72) (2.51) (2.42) (-0.04) (0.51)
IRP-period (γ2) 0.016 0.024 -0.004 0.011 0.018 0.024 -0.002 0.003
(1.17) (1.43) (-0.50) (0.93) (1.57) (1.61) (-0.32) (0.29)
IRP-period×country 0.005 -0.002 0.031 0.012 -0.043 -0.043 -0.013 -0.006
(β) (0.28) (-0.06) (1.67) (0.57) (-2.56) (-2.50) (-1.15) (-0.42)
Adjusted R2 0.03 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.02 -0.09
Observations (years×2) 39 37 37 37 38 36 36 36
Notes: Regression results from the difference in difference specification in equation (5), comparing Norway
and Sweden to New Zealand and Canada. Coefficient-symbol in parenthesis on each row. IRP is short for
interest rate projection. Market forecast errors (MFE) are aggregated to a yearly sum for each country. In
panel Ia, the yearly sum of changes in forecast errors around monetary policy announcements in Norway are
compared to those in New Zealand before and after Norges Bank introduced IRPs. Panel Ib reports results
from the same exercise, but now for Sweden and New Zealand. In panels IIa and b, the control country is
Canada instead of New Zealand. The difference-in-difference coefficient of interest is ‘IRP-period×country’.
Horizon 1 to 4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and
1-year ahead horizons respectively. Sample period: January 2000 - March 2019. t-values in parenthesis
(Newey-West corrected standard errors).
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Table 6.4
Path vs. target factor
Horizon:
1 2 3 4
A: Norway
Constant (ψ) 0.010 0.024 0.023 0.014
(0.93) (1.53) (1.14) (0.55)
Target Factor (γ1) -0.030 -0.067 -0.057 -0.043
(-1.59) (-4.01) (-3.59) (-2.73)
Path Factor (γ2) -0.021 -0.013 -0.014 -0.011
(-1.58) (-0.53) (-0.43) (-0.26)
Change after IRP (β) -0.018 -0.019 -0.008 -0.004
(-1.09) (-1.05) (-0.35) (-0.14)
Target×IRP (α1) 0.018 0.046 0.046 0.023
(0.58) (1.59) (1.74) (1.04)
Path×IRP (α2) 0.030 0.002 -0.009 0.000
(1.20) (0.06) (-0.22) (0.01)
Adjusted R2 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.09
Observations 151 150 147 145
B: Sweden
Constant (ψ) 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.012
(0.96) (1.39) (0.11) (1.28)
Target Factor (γ1) -0.024 0.009 0.002 0.006
(-1.41) (0.53) (0.11) (0.28)
Path Factor (γ2) 0.005 -0.014 -0.014 -0.036
(0.43) (-1.63) (-1.61) (-1.39)
Change after IRP (β) 0.018 0.014 0.015 -0.018
(2.07) (1.33) (1.26) (-1.05)
Target×IRP (α1) -0.046 -0.052 -0.039 -0.029
(-1.84) (-2.27) (-1.95) (-1.09)
Path×IRP (α2) -0.014 0.005 0.001 0.060
(-0.98) (0.21) (0.05) (1.75)
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.29 0.23 0.07
Observations 121 119 118 116
Notes: Regression results based on equation (6), where change in forecast error is regressed on the absolute
value of target and path factors. Our computation of target and path factors is outlined in Appendix C and
follows the procedure of Gürkaynak et al. (2005). ‘IRP’ is short for interest rate projection. Horizon 1 to 4
represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead
horizons respectively. Sample period: 01.01.2000-03.31.2019. t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West corrected
standard errors).
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Table 6.5
Change in market forecast errors around macro releases
Horizon:
1 2 3 4
A: Norway
Average -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(-1.49) (-2.48) (-0.46) (-1.04)
Before IRP (ψ) -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003
(-1.39) (-1.58) (-0.37) (-1.45)
Change after IRP (β) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.003
(1.01) (0.89) (0.28) (1.35)
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1255 1255 1227 1227 1267 1267 1188 1188
B: Sweden
Average -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(-1.76) (-0.02) (-1.78) (-2.97)
Before IRP (ψ) -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(-0.88) (-0.19) (-2.42) (-2.73)
Change after IRP (β) 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.32) (0.21) (1.75) (1.35)
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Observations 1008 1008 987 987 1015 1015 959 959
Notes: The change in market forecast errors around releases of macro economic data in Norway and Sweden,
at 4 different horizons. Coefficients from the specification in equation (7) in parenthesis on each row. The
releases are: domestic consumer price index (CPI), domestic industrial production, trade balance, purchasing
managers sentiment index (PMI), unemployment rate, gross domestic product (GDP), retail sales, economic
tendency indicator (Sweden only), oil investments (Norway only), aggregate credit (K2, Norway only). ‘IRP’
is short for interest rate projection. Horizon 1 to 4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately
3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead horizons respectively. Sample period: 01.01.2000-03.31.2019.
t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West corrected standard errors).
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Table 6.6
Change in market forecast errors around CPI releases
Horizon:
1 2 3 4
A: Norway
Before IRP (ψ) -0.008 -0.012 -0.007 -0.010
(-1.68) (-2.15) (-0.92) (-1.47)
Change after IRP (β) 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.013
(1.30) (1.80) (0.96) (1.64)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Observations 231 228 225 222
B: Sweden
Before IRP (ψ) -0.006 -0.001 -0.005 -0.004
(-1.31) (-0.41) (-1.33) (-0.86)
Change after IRP (β) 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.000
(0.99) (0.43) (1.07) (0.07)
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
Observations 206 203 200 197
Notes: The change in market forecast errors around releases of the consumer price index in Norway and
Sweden, at 4 different horizons. Coefficients from specification in equation (7) in parenthesis on each row ‘IRP’
is short for interest rate projection. Horizon 1 to 4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately
3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-year ahead horizons respectively. Sample period: 01.01.2000-03.31.2019.
t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West corrected standard errors).
330CHAPTER 6. DOES PUBLICATION OF INTEREST RATE PATHS PROVIDE GUIDANCE?34
Appendix
6.A Additional Figures and Tables
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Figure 6.A.1































































(d) Sweden: Horizon 3
Notes: Daily centered two-year rolling-window estimates of how market forecast errors (MFEs) respond to
released macroeconomic data and monetary policy announcements, pooled. MFEs computed as the gap
between ex post realized interest rates and corresponding 2- and 3-quarter forward interest rate agreements
traded previously. Changes in MFEs are computed as the difference between MFEs immediately before a
release and 30 minutes after. Negative numbers indicate reduced forecast errors. Estimation based on the
method proposed by Swanson and Williams (2014). The bands cover two standard errors around each point
estimate.
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Figure 6.A.2


























Notes: Figure compares the Swedish and Norwegian key policy rates to those of New Zealand (panel a) and
Canada (panel b). All rates indexed to 100 in January 2003 in panel a, and to 100 in January 2006 in panel
b.
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Figure 6.A.3




























Notes: The individual contributions of the two orthogonal factors “target” and “path” in explaining the re-
sponses of the 1-month rate, the second, third and fourth IMM FRA (respectively horizon 1 to 4) in 30-minute
windows around monetary policy announcements. Each factor’s individual contribution is measured by the
R-squared from standard univariate OLS regressions with the respective interest-rate change as dependent
variable and the respective factor as explanatory variable.
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Table 6.A.1
Difference in differences - Norway and Sweden (Quarterly data)
Horizon: Horizon:
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
I: RBNZ
Ia: Norges Bank vs RBNZ Ib: Riksbank vs RBNZ
Constant (ψ) -0.055 -0.022 0.003 0.021 -0.047 -0.024 -0.008 0.002
(-4.04) (-1.28) (0.24) (1.40) (-4.08) (-1.76) (-0.68) (0.11)
Country (γ1) 0.021 -0.019 -0.039 -0.054 0.045 0.028 0.006 -0.001
(1.34) (-0.81) (-1.50) (-2.03) (3.82) (1.93) (0.52) (-0.04)
IRP-period (γ2) 0.043 0.022 0.003 -0.008 0.036 0.029 0.019 0.021
(2.18) (1.13) (0.16) (-0.42) (1.84) (1.62) (1.10) (1.06)
IRP-period×country -0.022 0.004 0.026 0.034 -0.065 -0.048 -0.040 -0.025
(β) (-1.14) (0.14) (0.89) (1.12) (-3.05) (-2.33) (-1.81) (-1.09)
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00
Obs. (quarters×2) 151 149 147 145 147 145 143 141
II: Bank of Canada
IIa: Norges Bank vs BoC IIb: Riksbank vs BoC
Constant (ψ) -0.028 -0.028 -0.005 -0.013 -0.029 -0.024 -0.004 -0.005
(-2.62) (-1.86) (-0.39) (-1.00) (-3.15) (-1.87) (-0.39) (-0.49)
Country (γ1) -0.005 -0.013 -0.031 -0.020 0.027 0.028 0.002 0.006
(-0.40) (-0.49) (-1.49) (-1.00) (2.50) (2.08) (0.24) (0.54)
IRP-period (γ2) 0.012 0.021 -0.002 0.009 0.014 0.018 -0.003 -0.001
(1.05) (1.36) (-0.14) (0.62) (1.41) (1.31) (-0.25) (-0.11)
IRP-period×country 0.008 0.004 0.031 0.017 -0.043 -0.038 -0.018 -0.003
(β) (0.52) (0.16) (1.38) (0.78) (-2.95) (-2.06) (-1.13) (-0.19)
Adjusted R2 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.02
Obs. (quarters×2) 148 146 144 142 144 142 140 138
Notes: Regression results from the difference in difference specification in equation (5), comparing Norway
and Sweden to New Zealand and Canada. Coefficient-symbol in parenthesis on each row. IRP is short for
interest rate projection. Market forecast errors (MFE) are aggregated to a yearly sum for each country. In
panel Ia, the yearly sum of changes in forecast errors around monetary policy announcements in Norway are
compared to those in New Zealand before and after Norges Bank introduced IRPs. Panel Ib reports results
from the same exercise, but now for Sweden and New Zealand. In panels IIa and b, the control country is
Canada instead of New Zealand. The difference-in-difference coefficient of interest is ‘IRP-period×country’.
Horizon 1 to 4 represent the next four IMM-maturity dates, approximately 3-month, 6-month, 9-month and 1-
year ahead horizons respectively. Sample period: 01.01.2000-03.31.2019. t-values in parenthesis (Newey-West
corrected standard errors).
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6.B Rolling Window Regressions
We here summarize how we estimate the rolling-window regressions in Figure 6.1 and 6.A.1. Our
approach to pooling different releases follows Swanson and Williams (2014), who study interest rate
reactions to macroeconomic news.
For each horizon h, we first estimate the non-linear least specification
∆|mfeht | = δTβIt + εt, (6.B.1)
where It is a vector of dummies that each equals 1 whenever one specific macro release or a monetary
policy announcement takes place. Next, β is a vector of coefficients on these dummies. In contrast,
δT consists of a year-specific scalars that may take on different values in each calendar year T .
Hence, the β-vector scales how much each release typically affects market forecast errors, across all
years in our sample. The coefficient δT captures how the influence of all releases combined varies
over time.
Next, to move from calendar years to windows centered around each release, we estimate rolling
regressions of
∆|mfeht | = δτ Ît + εt, (6.B.2)
where Ît = β̂It uses the estimated value of β̂ from (6.B.1). Our rolling estimation of (6.B.2) uses
two years of data centered at each day of release, τ . Hence, the resultant estimates of δτ reflect
how a “generic release” affects MFEs at time τ . To account for two-stage sampling uncertainty, the
standard errors estimated in (6.B.2) are scaled up by a factor based on the standard errors estimated
in (6.B.1) and interpolation between them.
6.C Target vs. Path Decomposition
We here summarize how we decompose market reactions into a target and a path factor, the method
of Gürkaynak et al. (2005).
The starting point is the equation:
X = FΛ + η (6.C.1)
where X is a matrix in which each row corresponds to a monetary policy announcements at specific
point in time, and each column contains the 30-minute change of a specific asset price around each
announcement. The prices we consider are the FRAs described in section 6.2.2. Importantly though,
to obtain a shorter-horizon interest rate than the 3-month FRA, we use the one-month interest rate
implied by foreign exchange forward contracts. F is a matrix of unobserved factors, Λ is a matrix
of factor loadings and η is white noise.
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The key finding of the now vast empirical literature following Gürkaynak et al. (2005), is that
two factors (two appropriately composed columns of F ) suffice to explain the data in X. The
same has been found to apply to Norway, see for instance Brubakk et al. (2017). In total, the two
first factors together explain 98 and 96 percent of our data’s interest rate reactions in Norway and
Sweden, respectively. Denote these two factors F1 and F2. To obtain a structural interpretation of
them, they are rotated to yield two new orthogonal factors Z1 and Z2 which explain the data in
X to exactly the same extent as F1 and F2 did, but with the additional restriction that Z2 has no
effect on one-month fx-forward implied interest rates (our measure of the instant effect of monetary
policy action not connected to signals about future policy). The rotation is simply Z = FU , where
F = [F1, F2], Z = [Z1, Z2], and U is a 2×2 matrix constructed such that Z2 on average is associated
with no change in the closest FRA. Hence, Z1 is associated with variation in the current policy
target rate, whereas Z2 captures any other information than the current policy rate that affects the
expected path of the monetary policy rate over the next year. The names follow: “target” and “path”
factors.
Figure 6.A.3 shows how much each the target and path factor contribute to explaining interest




t + εt, (6.C.2)
where ∆iht is the response of the h-horizon interest rate to a monetary policy announcement at time
t and Zjt is factor j at time t, where j is either target or path. Recall that because the two factors
are orthogonal by construction, the sum of R-squared from regressing interest rates on each factor
separately equals the total R-squared from regressing interest rates on both factors at once. As we
see from Figure 6.A.3, the target factor explains more at the lower horizons, while the path factor
explains more at the longer horizons. At the shortest horizon, the target factor explains everything
by construction.
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